#highcourtdelhi Archives - Page 8 of 9

4 Jul

Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court.

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Title: The StatesMan Limited vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.

Decision: 04.07.23

+ REVIEW PET. 516/2019 and CM APPL. 53531/2019, CM APPL. 12275/2022 in W.P.(C) 9497/2015

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Introduction

The Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court dated 18.11.19 on the grounds that it does not address the issue of jurisdiction of the Authority under the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, (“the Working Journalists Act”) to pass the order dated 21 July 2015 forming subject matter of challenge in WP (C) 9497/2015.

Facts of the case

The application made under Section 17(1) of the Working Journalists Act by a few members of the Statesman Mazdoor Union is resolved by the order dated July 21, 2015. The stated applicants requested payment of arrears in accordance with the Majithia Wage Board’s recommendations. The petitioner-Statesman disputed their obligation to pay the applicants in accordance with the Wage Board’s recommendations on the grounds that they had incurred significant cash losses three years prior to the implementation of those recommendations, exempting them from the requirement to pay arrears. The Court has carefully considered the applicants’ case and rejected the petitioner’s argument that it was not the petitioner’s responsibility to pay the applicants as recommended by the wage board.

The petitioner conceded to the Authority’s authority and objected to its need to compensate the applicants-workers on a merits-based basis. After losing before the Authority, the petitioner used the current writ petition to appeal to this Court.

Analysis and Decision of the court

The Delhi High Court held that Even in the current writ suit, there is not even the slightest hint of a challenge to the Authority’s authority to hear the workmen’s claims and issue the ruling of July 21, 2015. Instead, extensive and numerous submissions have been made in an effort to prove that the petitioner was, in fact, experiencing significant losses three years prior to the Wage Board’s recommendations and was not, therefore, required to pay the applicants-workmen in accordance with those recommendations. The petitioner submitted a response to the writ petition after the respondents submitted a counter affidavit. There isn’t even a claim that the Authority lacked the authority to decide the applications of the journalists in the response. Instead, the response outlines how the petitioner believes the Authority should have resolved the aforementioned arguments.

The order dated July 21, 2015 lists the errors under the heading “Grounds for Setting Aside Impugned Order” in paragraph 11 of that document. In the aforementioned paragraph, the petitioner first explains why, in its opinion, it had actually experienced losses for three years; second, it explains why the petitioner’s net current assets could not be taken into account when determining whether the losses suffered by the petitioner were heavy; and third, it makes reference to Supreme Court decisions that, in the petitioner’s opinion, established the guidelines for identifying “heavy losses.”

Therefore, the written submissions do not only fail to raise any objections to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction. decision on the petitions submitted by the applicant-journalists, but they also go so far as to assert that the Authority should have handled the cases differently than how it did. Therefore, there is a favourable claim regarding the Authority’s ability and authority to rule on the journalists’ application.

The petitioner also had approached the hon’ble SC with an SLP (C) 36133/2015 The Supreme Court did not interfere with the direction, of the learned Division Bench, to decide the writ petition expeditiously, and merely modified the order of pre-deposit by reducing it to ₹ 30 lakhs. This indicates that the argument of want of jurisdiction of the Authority to adjudicate on the claims of the respondent-workmen was not canvassed either before the Division Bench or even before the Supreme Court.

Even after reserving the judgement in 2018, the petitioner failed to file any written submission when given opportunity for the same. As a result, there was no challenge made to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction to decide on the claims of the respondent-workmen in the writ petition’s only written submission.

Thus, neither the writ petition nor the response nor the written representations submitted by the petitioner contested the Authority’s competence or authority to decide on the claims of the respondent-journalists. In contrast, the petitioner made specific allegations in the written submissions it submitted to this court about how it believed the Authority should have handled the situation, even going so far as to request a remand to make sure the Authority handled the situation again properly. These allegations cannot be reconciled with the claim that the Authority lacked the authority to determine the respondents’ petitions; in fact, they are diametrically opposed to one another. It was in these circumstances that, in the judgment under review, this Court did not return any findings regarding the competence of the Authority to pass the order dated 21 July 2015.

In light of the above, this Court conducted a merits review of the case and determined that the defence of three years of continuous loss as a justification for not adhering to the Majithia Wage Board’s Award was inadmissible.

Ultimately, the Delhi High Court dismissed the petition and miscellaneous applications were disposed of accordingly.

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Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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4 Jul

Delhi High Court Dismissed the petition seeking to quash government order giving the categories of Priority within the reservations provided in the Army quota of 5% for admission to various Colleges.

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Title: Viney Chaudhary vs UOI & Secretary of Higher Education

Reserved: 25.05.23

Pronounced: 03.07.23

W.P.(C) 3285/2023 & CM APPL. 12796/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

Introduction

Delhi High Court Dismissed the petition seeking to quash government order giving the categories of Priority within the reservations provided in the Army quota of 5% for admission to various Colleges, and directs the government to treat Priority No. VIII above the Priority No. VI or in alternative to consider both the Priority Nos. VI and VIII at the same podium for the admissions in the forthcoming Academic Year 2023-24.

Facts of the Case

The petitioner’s wife is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Indian Army and is stationed in New Delhi at the moment. The petitioner’s son, Master Divyansh Chaudhary, a Class XII student at Delhi Public School in R.K. Puram, is interested in pursuing a Bachelor of Technology (hereinafter referred to as “B.Tech” Course), for which the Joint Entrance Examination (Main) (JEE) serves as the qualifying examination. The said examination was scheduled to be held from April 6 to April 12, 2023.

The respondent No. 1 created nine categories with corresponding Priorities in its Order dated May 21, 2018, and eligible candidates under each category would be entitled to admission based on their respective Priority regardless of their ranks or mark totals.

The son of the petitioner discovered that the majority of reservation benefits are only being taken away by Priority-VI, leaving no seat available for the remaining Priorities, especially Priority-VIII, in order to obtain admission to various professional courses, after reviewing the cutoff charts of various engineering colleges run by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “GNCTD”).

Thus, the petitioner has contested the Letter/Order of May 21, 2018, claiming that the distinction between Priority VI and Priority VIII violates his fundamental legal rights and deprives him of his right to equality.

Analysis and Decision of the court

In the present petition the petitioner has challenged only the list of priorities for reservation issued by the government and defence ministry for the wards of defence personnel to various medical/professional/non-professional courses. It is important to note that the petitioner has not contested the 5% reservation given to dependents of members of the armed forces, but rather feels wronged by the revised list of priorities placement of dependents of serving personnel in Priority VIII while those of ex-servicemen in Priority VI. The petitioner claims that there is no discernible distinction to put the children of serving soldiers in a group lower.

The court also highlighted that Priority VIII and Priority VI should be combined since the division of the priority between military members and ex-servicemen’s wards is not based on any discernible differences.

In the case of Union of India v. M. Selvakumar (2017) 3 SCC 504, the Apex Court ruled that horizontal reservations in the context of governmental policy are outside the purview of the courts and that they are not the appropriate forum to consider whether a given public policy is sensible and acceptable or whether a better one can be developed. However, the Courts are not prohibited from intervening in those situations when a policy choice might be criticised on the grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or unfairness. The Supreme Court shared a similar opinion in its rulings in the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mala Banerjee (2015) 7 SCC 698 and Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. vs. Delhi Administration (2001) 3 SCC 635.

The advantage of reservations for wards of ex-servicemen had not, in this instance, been denied to the children of current soldiers. The Government of India’s Ministry of Defence has made a policy directive defining how children of Army officers may use their reservations in certain categories. The classification of the wards in Priority VI and Priority VIII does not involve any arbitrary decision-making, irrational behaviour, or intentional wrongdoing.

The case of The Chief Secretary vs. D. Kuralarasan MANU/TN/6162/2021, in which the children of serving personnel were totally omitted from the admissions advertisement, illustrates instances in which a policy choice may be interfered with by the court. The Court intervened to request that they be included to the Priority list for admission to the professional course after it was noted that the exclusion of the wards of the serving personnel without any basis or justification was inappropriate in that situation.

The petitioner questions why the wards of serving personnel should be placed in the last but one category, Priority VIII, while the wards of ex-servicemen receive priority VI, when wards and wives of ex-servicemen as well as serving personnel who are receiving Gallantry Awards, can be placed together in one category, be it Priority V or Priority VII.

The respondent No. 1 in the counter affidavit has explained that although the Government of India had initially decided to grant the benefit to the wives and wards of former service members or recipients of the Gallantry Award, it was ultimately discovered that some positions remained unfilled even after the benefit had been granted to the wards of all the categories. The inclusion of the category of wards of serving people as Priority VIII is solely intended to guarantee that the advantage of reservation is completely utilised, exhausted, and not left unutilized.

The Government Order F.No.6(1)/2017/D (Res.II) dated 21.05.2018 mostly governs how the reserve quota is utilised horizontally. The aforementioned policy hasn’t been accused of being arbitrary or malicious. We don’t see any reason to challenge the Government Order from May 21, 2018, or to rearrange the Priority categories as specified therein.

Thus, the High court dismissed the petition along with pending applications.

Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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3 Jul

Delhi High court granted bail to an accused under the offence of Kidnapping, as per their authority under section 439 of CrPC.

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Title: Shah Alam vs State Govt. of NCT Delhi

Reserved: 01.06.2023

Pronounced: 07.06.2023

BAIL APPLN. 1033/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

Introduction

Delhi High court granted bail to an applicant under section 439 of CrPC seeking regular bail in FIR No.394/2020 under Sections 364A/365/342/323/506/102B/34 IPC.

Facts of the case

The mother of the victim on 03.09.2020 made a complaint to the police at 10:02 p.m. that the victim, her daughter, aged about 24 years went to HDFC Bank, Sector-02, Noida, U.P at about 01:30 p.m. with her ATM, passbook and cheque book and she has not returned home and despite searching for her, the victim could not be found. She suspected that some unknown person has kidnapped her daughter by luring her. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR was registered under Section 365 IPC.

The father of the victim also produced few video recordings as well as Whatsapp messages regarding the demand for ransom. On the basis of the statement of the father, Sections 364A/506/342/323/120B/34 IPC were also added in the case.

Search was made for the victim with the help of location and CDR of victim’s mobile number and the victim was recovered on 04.09.2020 from the custody of accused persons namely, Simpal Srivastav and her boyfriend Shah Alam (petitioner herein) from Village Chhalera, Sector-44, Noida (U.P). The said accused persons were arrested on 04.09.2020.

During investigation statement under Section 164 CrPC of the victim was recorded wherein she alleged that she was kidnapped by both the accused persons for ransom and she was also beaten by them. Her mobile phone was also taken by the accused person from which the calls were made and Whatsapp messages were sent demanding ransom. She was also threatened by the accused person and was wrongly confined.

Analysis of the court and decision

The Delhi High Court held that it is Suffice it to state that only the Magistrate’s powers, while handling petitions for the grant of bail, are governed by the punishment specified for the offence for which the bail is requested. An offence under section 364A IPC is punished with death or life in prison. Generally speaking, the Magistrate lacks the authority to issue bail unless the case is covered by the provisos attached to section 437 of the Code if the punishment specified is the life sentence or death penalty and the offence is only triable by the Court of Session (Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)) There are no such restrictions limiting the High Court’s or the Court of Session’s authority while using the Section 439 CrPC’s authority.

It could also be appropriate to cite the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s ruling in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, which outlined the specific conditions under which a person facing trial’s freedom could be restricted as –

“The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In India, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the propose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”

Thus, without getting into the specifics of the case at this time, the court believes that, in light of the explanation above, the petitioner has established a case for the granting of bail. As a result, the petition is granted, and upon presenting a personal bond in the amount of Rs. 20,000/- and one surety bond in the same amount, the petitioner is permitted to bail, subject to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, CMM, or Duty Magistrate.

Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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3 Jul

Delhi High court passed an order directing the Petitioner/tenants to pay use and occupation charges.

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Title: MURARI CHAUHAN & ANR vs KAILASH NARAIN MALHOTRA

Decided on: 21.06.2023

+ RC.REV. 174/2019 & CM APPL. 13057/2019 and CM APPL. 40082/2019

CORAM: HON’BLE MS JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU

Introduction

The Delhi High court passed an order on an application seeking directions to pay use and occupation charges by the petitioner/tenants from the date of the eviction order dated 20.09.2018 till the revision petition is finally decided by this court.

Facts of the case

Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent/landlord submits that the Petitioner/tenant is in occupation of the demised premises for many years and the execution of the Eviction Order was stayed by this Court on 19.03.2019.

The present Application was filed on 03.08.2019 and the Notice in the Application was issued on 13.03.2020. On 13.03.2020, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/tenant had sought time to file a Reply to the present Application. The Reply has not been filed despite the last opportunity granted by this Court on 25.01.2023. On 01.05.2023, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/tenant, sought more time to file a Reply to the present Application.

Respondent/landlord has opposed the grant of any further time to file the Reply, as no Reply has been filed for almost 4 years. He further submits that the Petitioner/tenant has obtained Interim Orders from this Court and thereafter no use and occupation charges are being paid by the Petitioner/tenant.

In these circumstances, the Orders in this Application were reserved, and the Parties were given leave to file their respective written submissions.

Analysis and Decision of the court

The Delhi High Court held that the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Martin and Harris Private Limited and Another v. Rajendra Mehta and others confirmed Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. in the event that after the eviction is accepted, the tenant is obliged to pay the usage fees and usage fee of the respective sites based on the market rate until the application is finally removed. However, it has been found that the tendency to pay benefit or compensation depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including the location of the property, whether it is in a village, town or city, and its character, whether commercial or residential and the circumstances of each case are governed by the usual rate of rent. It is noted that in relation to rentals at:

(i) It is a newly constructed building and therefore not applicable;

(ii) It is 2600 sq. ft. property with a rent of Rs. 72,000/- so at that price the occupancy charges for this space can be around Rs. 27.70 per square meter foot;

(iii) Located far from the destroyed sites in a more expensive location.

The applicant/tenant has not registered leases. In the circumstances of the case, the order of the rental agreement no. (ii), above, viz. property measuring 258 square meters @ Rs.72,000/- seems most suitable for comparison considering that the destroyed premises is a shop on the ground floor.

In addition, since the location of the demolished premises is in a prime commercial area and the fact that the applicant/tenant uses the demolished premises for commercial purposes as much as he is engaged in the sale of shoes for daily use must also be borne. in mind However, since the demolished space is located in an old and dilapidated building, the price has been reduced. Therefore, without prejudice to the rights and claims of the parties, the applicant/tenant shall pay the occupancy and accommodation fees to the defendant/landlord and all payments shall be made to the bank account of the defendant/landlord.

Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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2 Jul

The Delhi High Court set aside the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal and granted compensation to the appellants.

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Title: Sita Devi & Ors. vs UOI

Decided: 22.03.2023

Pronounced: 02.06.2023

FAO 46/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

Introduction

The Delhi High court set aside the order of Railway claims tribunal and remanded back to the Tribunal for awarding the amount of compensation in terms of the Act and for which purpose the matter shall be listed at the first instance before the Tribunal on 10.07.2023. it is to be decided and compensation is to be paid within two weeks thereafter.

Facts of the case

It was Vinod Kumar i.e., deceased undertook a train journey on 12.06.2017 from Shahdara to Faridabad by a local train and when the train reached at KM 1514/13-11 JNC Yard between Faridabad and Tughlaqabad Station, the deceased fell down from the train on account of sudden jerk and push of the passengers and died at the spot. The journey ticket along with other articles of the deceased including his bag were also lost.

A perusal of the record would show that the first information on the incident was received in the form of memo of Station Master of Faridabad Railway Station at about 9:00 am on 12.06.2017. It mentions about the dead body lying at KM 1514/13-11.

Based on the reports and testimony submitted, On 10.02.2021, the principal bench of Railway Claims Tribunal passed an order dismissing the claims of the appellants.

Court Analysis and Decision

The delhi high court was expedient to refer to the judgement of Supreme court at Union of India v. Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572 para 29, Where it was held that, “mere presence of dead body on the railway tracks will not be conclusive to hold that injured or deceased was a bona fide passenger for which claim for compensation could be maintained. However, mere absence of ticket with such injured or deceased will not negative the claim that he was a bona fide passenger Initial burden will FAO 46/2022 Page 3 of 4 be on the claimant which can be discharged by filing an affidavit of the relevant facts and burden will then shift on the Railways and the issue can be decided on the facts shown or the attending circumstances. This will have to be dealt with from case to case on the basis of facts found. The legal position in this regard will stand explained accordingly.”

The court decided to avoid the DRM report for taking into consideration as it is being filed after 14 months of the incident especially in the view of final report submitted by the SHO, court referred to the judgement of its coordinate bench in Bhola v. Union of India 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13486. Accordingly, the deceased is held to be a bona fide passenger and the incident to be an ‘untoward incident’ under Section 123(c) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act 1987. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal for awarding the amount of compensation in terms of the Act and for which purpose the matter shall be listed at the first instance before the Tribunal on 10.07.2023. Let the compensation amount be paid to the appellants/claimants within two weeks thereafter.

Written by – Shreyanshu Gupta

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