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Supreme Court Mandates Hybrid Hearings for State Information Commissions: A Step Towards Digital Access to Justice.

Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.: Writ Petition No. 360 of 2021.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Date: October 09, 2023.

Quorum: Hon’ble CJI.  D. Y. Chandrachud, J.  J.B. Pardiwala, J.  Manoj Mishra.

Facts of the Case:

In 2021, Kishan Chand Jain filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking directions for better functioning of State Information Commissions (SICs) under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005. The petitioner argued that most SICs are located in state capitals and conduct only physical hearings, imposing prohibitive costs on applicants from remote areas.

Legal Issues:

  1. Whether SICs should provide virtual hearing options alongside physical hearings?
  2. Whether SICs should implement online filing systems for RTI appeals and complaints?
  3. Whether the current functioning of SICs aligns with the objectives of the RTI Act?

Legal Provisions:

Right to Information Act, 2005.

Section 15: Constitution of State Information Commissions.

Section 18: Powers and functions of Information Commissions.

Section 19: Appeal procedure.

Section 26: Development of programs by appropriate Government.

Arguments of the Petitioner

The learned counsel for petitioners aregued that virtual hearings would provide cost-effective access to information for applicants. Most SICs lack online filing facilities for RTI appeals and complaints, unlike the Central Information Commission (CIC). SICs should adopt user-friendly digital portals to enhance their effectiveness.

Arguments of the Respondents

The leraned counsel for respondents aregued that the responses varied among different state SICs. Some states (e.g., Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Haryana) had already adopted hybrid modes of hearing. Others (e.g., Sikkim, Goa) had not implemented virtual hearings. Some states (e.g., Uttar Pradesh) were not opposed to virtual hearings but had not yet implemented them.

Judgment and analysis

The Supreme Court issued the certain directives. All SICs must provide hybrid modes of hearing for complaints and appeals by December 31, 2023. SICs must implement e-filing systems for complaints and appeals by December 31, 2023. Central and State Ministries must compile email addresses of Public Information Officers within one month. The Department of Personnel and Training must convene a meeting of all Central and State Information Commissioners within one month to establish implementation modalities. State Governments must provide necessary funds for setting up virtual hearing infrastructure.

The judgment recognizes the right to information as a constitutional right, intertwined with Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21. It emphasizes that access to Information Commissions is crucial for securing this right. The Court’s decision aligns with the broader push for digital access to justice, acknowledging that technology can democratize legal processes and expand access beyond physical limitations.

The directive for hybrid hearings and e-filing systems is a significant step towards making the RTI process more accessible and efficient. It addresses the geographical and financial barriers that often hinder citizens from remote areas from fully utilizing the RTI Act. However, the effectiveness of this judgment will depend on its implementation. Factors such as digital literacy, internet connectivity in remote areas, and the adaptability of SICs to new technologies will play crucial roles in realizing the intended benefits.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India marks a progressive step towards digitizing and democratizing access to information. By mandating hybrid hearings and e-filing systems, the Court has attempted to bridge the gap between citizens and Information Commissions. This decision has the potential to significantly enhance the efficacy of the RTI Act, provided it is implemented effectively and uniformly across all states. As we move forward, it will be crucial to monitor the implementation of these directives and their impact on citizens’ ability to exercise their right to information.

Reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

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“Delhi High Court Decision on Maternity Benefits Entitlement: Advocates engaged Professionally are not Employees & are Not Entitled to Maternity Benefits”

Case title: Delhi State Legal Services Authority v. Annwesha Deb

Case no.: LPA 701/2023

Dated on: 23rd April 2024

Quorum: Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Saurabh Banerjee

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case, Annwesha Deb was appointed as a Legal Services Advocate (LSA) at the Juvenile Justice Board-I, Sewa Kutir, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi, with a daily pay of ₹1750, starting from May 09, 2016. During her tenure, she became pregnant and applied for maternity leave, seeking a duration of seven months. She submitted her application for maternity leave on October 06, 2017, and also formally notified the Member Secretary of the Authority about her claim for maternity benefits. Additionally, she sent an email to the Authority on October 21, 2017, regarding the same matter.

However, on October 31, 2017, the Authority responded to Annwesha Deb’s request for maternity benefits via email, rejecting her claim. The rejection was based on the assertion that there was no provision for granting maternity benefits to LSAs.

Feeling aggrieved by this decision, Annwesha Deb pursued legal action and approached the Learned Single Judge through a writ petition (W.P(C) 11016/2017) in the case titled Annwesha Deb v. Delhi State Legal Services Authority.

Decision of the Single Judge:

  1. The Single Judge framed the issue of whether Annwesha Deb, working on a contractual basis, could be extended maternity benefits like permanent/regular employees.
  2. The Single Judge examined relevant provisions of the Act and cited Supreme Court and High Court judgments to support his decision.
  3. The Single Judge held that Annwesha Deb’s case fell within the definition of “Wages” under the Act and that maternity benefits should be extended to all employees, irrespective of the nature of their employment.
  4. He directed DSLSA to release all medical, monetary, and other benefits accrued to Annwesha Deb due to her pregnancy within three months from the date of the order.

This appeal has been preferred by the DSLSA against the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The respondent/ petitioner is only an empanelled Advocate and is not its employee who is covered under the Act of 1961. The Advocates empanelled with them are paid honorarium as per the Fee Schedule of the DSLSA for which they are required to submit a report by the end of each month on the duties they have performed. Such reports are supported by attendance certificates based on which the payment is made depending upon the number of hours put in by the Advocates.

The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the Regulations of the National Legal Services Authority as well as the DSLSA Rules, regulate the empanelment of the Advocates with the Authority. The empanelled Advocates are not employees of the DSLSA, neither contractual nor even ad-hoc. The empanelled Advocates only render their services, as and when called upon or required by the appellant for which they are paid the honorarium.

The relationship between the Authority and the empanelled lawyers is of a client-lawyer (relationship) and as such, the Authority is not bound to provide benefits to the lawyers engaged by them in a professional capacity, which the regular employees may be entitled to. Hence, there is no entitlement that arises in favour of the respondent under Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961.

The respondent was only tasked to provide legal services to the children who are produced before the Juvenile Justice Boards for which she was paid honorarium for the number of days on which she discharged her duties with the Authority. It was also submitted that the empanelment is merely a process by which Advocates are selected to provide legal aid on behalf of DSLSA to the needy children but they do not become obligated to receive benefits which the regular employees are entitled to in law.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

As per Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, she has the right to maternity benefits and while denying such benefits, the Authority has violated her legal rights. It was also contended that the Section 3(o) of the said Act includes women employed for wages in any establishment and as per Section 3(n), wages include all remuneration paid to a woman in terms of contract of employment etc.

She had worked till the 7th month of her pregnancy as a LSA and it was upon Doctor’s advice for bed rest on finding of her deteriorating health, she had to stop working till the time of her delivery and hence, she is entitled to the time she took off for her delivery and post-delivery child care.

Despite contractually employed in the Juvenile Justice Board with the Authority for a tenure of 3 years, she was not paid maternity benefits, whereas the permanent employees of the Authority are being provided the same. It is in violation of Articles 14, 15(3), 16, 19(1) (g) and 42 of the Constitution of India.

The maternity benefits granted to women are substantial for their personal health as well as for the wellbeing of her children and denial of the same would amount to economic and social injustice. The decision of the Authority denying the maternity benefits is arbitrary, as there is no valid or material reason given by the Authority.

She relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224, to contend that a woman cannot be compelled to undertake hard labour at the time of advanced stage of her pregnancy and that she would be entitled to maternity leave for certain period prior to and after her delivery. It was also submitted that there is no provision in the Act of 1961 which suggest that women employees working on contractual/casual basis are not entitled to the maternity benefits during the course of their contract/tenure.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961: Legislation granting maternity benefits to eligible employees.
  2. Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Recognizes the right to bear a child as a fundamental right.
  3. Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Outlines criteria for eligibility for legal services, including entitlement for those filing or defending a case under specified conditions.
  4. Section 13 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Deals with entitlement to legal services if a prima facie case exists.
  5. Section 29 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Empowers the Central Authority to make regulations.
  6. National Legal Services Authority (free and competent legal services) Regulations, 2010: Regulations framed under Section 29 of the Act, providing free legal aid to eligible individuals.
  7. Section 2(e) of the Regulations of 2010: Defines “Legal Services Institutions” to include various legal bodies.
  8. Section 2(1)(eb) of the Regulations of 2010: Defines “Panel Lawyer” as a legal practitioner empanelled under regulation 8.
  9. Regulation 8 of the Regulations of 2010: Deals with the empanelment process for legal practitioners.
  10. Bar Council of India Rules: Likely referred to regarding legal professional conduct, though not explicitly stated.

ISSUE

Whether the claim of maternity benefits under the Act of 1961, being a statutory right, is available to the respondent, which has been granted in her favor by the learned Single Judge?

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Delhi High Court, after hearing arguments from both parties and reviewing the case records, affirmed that the right to bear a child is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, the court deliberated on whether the respondent, who had been granted maternity benefits by the learned Single Judge, was entitled to such benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961.

The court analyzed provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act of 1987, regulations made under it, the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961, and the Bar Council of India Rules. It noted that the Legal Services Authorities Act aimed to provide free legal services to disadvantaged sections of society and organize Lok Adalats for justice on equal opportunity grounds.

Section 12 of the Act outlined criteria for legal services eligibility, including entitlement for those filing or defending a case falling under specified conditions. Section 13 elaborated on the entitlement to legal services if a prima facie case existed. Section 29 empowered the Central Authority to make regulations, leading to the publication of the National Legal Services Authority (free and competent legal services) Regulations of 2010, which provided free legal aid to eligible individuals.

The court also considered the definitions of “Legal Services Institutions” and “Panel Lawyer” under the Regulations of 2010, emphasizing the process of empanelment for legal practitioners.

The court disagreed with the interpretation by the learned Single Judge regarding the application of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 to the respondent. It stated that extending maternity benefits to professionals engaged by entities like the appellant would set a problematic precedent. The court clarified the distinction between advocates engaged professionally and employees appointed according to recruitment rules.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment. It dismissed related applications as they had become redundant in light of its findings. No costs were awarded.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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