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The Supreme Showdown: Unravelling the Sevika Saga and Nepotism Clauses.

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Date: January 08, 2024.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Quorum: Hon’ble J. B.R. Gavai, J. Sandeep Mehta.

 

Background of the Case

The case revolves around the appointment of Anganwadi workers (Sevikas) in the state of Bihar. In October 2012, the District Programme Officer in Katihar published a notice for the selection of Anganwadi workers. Both Anjum Ara (the appellant) and the respondent applied for the position. Anjum Ara scored 80.60 marks, while The respondent scored 48.60 marks. Consequently, Anjum Ara was appointed as an Anganwadi Sevika on July 2, 2013.

Aggrieved by Anjum Ara’s appointment, the respondent filed a representation before the District Programme Officer, seeking cancellation of Anjum Ara’s appointment order and a direction for her own appointment. The District Programme Officer rejected her representation on November 13, 2014. The respondent then appealed to the Appellate Authority (the Court of Joint Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Purnea), which allowed her appeal on July 30, 2015, setting aside Anjum Ara’s appointment order.

 

Legal Issues

Whether Clause 4.9 of the Anganwadi Sevika Guidelines, 2011, which imposed restrictions on the appointment of persons whose family members were employed with the State Government or its organizations, is valid and constitutional under Articles 14 (right to equality) and 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) of the Constitution of India?

Legal Provisions

The case dealt with the interpretation of Clause 4.9 of the 2011 Guidelines and its compliance with Articles 14 (right to equality) and 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) of the Constitution of India.

Contentions of the Petitioner

Anjum Ara contended that Clause 4.9 of the 2011 Guidelines, which formed the basis for her disqualification, had been found to be in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in another case (CWJC No. 13210 of 2014). However, the learned Division Bench of the High Court ignored this fact while dismissing her appeal.

Contentions of the Respondents

The State of Bihar and The respondent asserted that Clause 4.9 of the 2011 Guidelines was a valid restriction to prevent nepotism in public employment. They argued that the High Court’s decision striking down the clause in a separate case was not binding on Anjum Ara since she did not challenge it herself. The respondents emphasized the selection process was a matter of administrative discretion where courts should not interfere unless there is a constitutional violation. They contended that setting aside Anjum Ara’s appointment in favour of the lower scoring The respondent was justified based on principles of merit and fair selection.

Judgment and Analysis

The Supreme Court allowed Anjum Ara’s appeal and set aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Court found that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had erred in dismissing Anjum Ara’s writ petition and appeal.

The Court observed that Clause 4.9 of the 2011 Guidelines had been struck down by the High Court in CWJC No. 13210 of 2014 as violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Once the clause was declared invalid, it ceased to exist. Therefore, it was not necessary for Anjum Ara to challenge the validity of the clause separately, as it had already been held invalid by the same High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the reasoning adopted by the learned Division Bench was unsustainable in law. When a provision has been declared unconstitutional and invalid by a court, it cannot be applied to deny someone’s rights, even if the person did not challenge the provision individually.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed Anjum Ara’s appeal, quashed the judgments of the High Court, and directed her reinstatement forthwith. Although she would not be entitled to wages for the period she was out of employment, she would be granted continuity in service for all other purposes.

This judgment reinforces the principle that once a provision or law has been declared unconstitutional by a court, it ceases to have any legal effect, and no person can be denied their rights based on such an invalid provision. The judgment upholds the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Constitution and ensures that individuals are not deprived of their rightful employment opportunities based on arbitrary and unconstitutional criteria.

Judgement reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

 

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The Supreme Court grants appeals and clarifies the distinction between “legislation by reference” and “legislation by incorporation.”

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CASE TITLE – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India Versus Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors.

CASE NUMBER – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3851 OF 2023/ 2024 INSC 319

DATED ON – 19.04.2024

QUORUM – Justice B.R. Gavai.

FACTS OF THE CASE

M/s. SBM Paper Mills Private Limited (Corporate Debtor) filed a petition on 4th September 2017 under Section 10 of the Code for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of itself vide. The National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (NCLT) vide order dated 17th October 2017, admitted the Petition and directed the moratorium to commence as prescribed under Section 14 of the Code and directed certain statutory steps to be taken as a consequence thereof. Vide the said order, the NCLT also appointed Mr. Amit Poddar as the Interim Resolution Professional (“RP”) to carry out the functions as prescribed under the provisions of the Code. In the meanwhile, Mr. Satyanarayan Malu, i.e., the Respondent/Ex-Director of the Corporate Debtor filed an application being M.A. No. 1396/2018 before the NCLT under Section 12A of the Code for the withdrawal of the aforesaid petition under Section 10 in light of a One Time Settlement (“OTS”) entered into with the sole Financial Creditor, i.e., Allahabad Bank. On the other hand, the RP had also filed an application being M.A. No. 827/2018 for the approval of the Resolution Plan. The NCLT vide order dated 20th December 2018 allowed the M.A. No. 1396/2018 filed by the Respondent while 3 observing the consent for withdrawal of the petition by the sole Financial Creditor vide letter dated 27th November 2018. However, on account of non-compliance of the terms of the OTS by the Respondents, the NCLT issued a Show-Cause Notice against them vide order dated 11th March 2019. The NCLT further found it to be a fit case to propose the prosecution of the Respondents vide order dated 20th August 2019 while hearing an application filed by the sole Financial Creditor being M.A. 494 and 495 of 2019 thereby seeking prosecution of the Respondent. Thereafter, on 22nd September 2020, the Appellant-Board filed a Complaint against the Respondents before the Sessions Judge in Special Case No. 853/2020 under the aforementioned provisions and for offences punishable under Section 73(a) and 235A of the Code for the non-compliance of the terms of the OTS and for not having filed the M.A. 1396/2018 under Section 12A of the Code through the RP. The Sessions Judge vide Order dated 17th March 2021 directed issuance of process against the Respondents and further directed them to be summoned on the next date of hearing. Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondents filed a Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2021 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, praying for the quashing and setting aside of the order dated 17th March 2021 passed by the Sessions Judge for the want of jurisdiction. The High Court vide impugned judgement and order dated 14th February 2022 allowed the Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2021 filed by the Respondents.

This appeal challenges the judgement and order dated 14th February 2022, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.2592 of 2021, thereby allowing the petition filed by Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu and Ramesh Satyanarayan Malu, the Ex-Directors of M/s. 1 SBM Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Respondents’) challenging the order dated 17th March 2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 58th Court in Special Case No.853 of 2020.

 

ISSUES

Whether the the present case is a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not a case of ‘legislation by reference’?

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 435(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays out the qualification requirement for appointment as a judge in a Special Court. 

 

CONTENTION OF APPELLANTS

The Learned Counsel submitted that only the offences committed under the Companies 5 Act can be tried by Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge. He submitted that the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge that the offences other than the Companies Act cannot be tried by the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge is totally in ignorance of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code. Learned ASG submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 236 of the Code provides that the offences under the Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013. He stated that the legislative intent is clear. There is no general reference to the provisions of the Companies Act. He contended that what has been done by sub section (1) of Section 236 of the Code is that the offences punishable under the Code are required to be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013. 6. Learned ASG therefore submitted that, if the reference made to the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 is held to be legislation by incorporation, then the subsequent amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 would not be applicable to the Code. He submitted that since the Code has come into effect on 28th May, 2016, the provisions of Section 435, as it existed in Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013 then, would only be applicable. He submitted that, if a statute is a complete Code in itself, then normally a reference to the provisions of the prior statute referred to in a subsequent statute would only have a restrictive operation. In such a case, it would be a ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not a ‘legislation by reference’. He therefore submits that the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that in view of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017, the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge will not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in question is totally erroneous. Learned ASG submits that, in any event, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the complaint. It was submitted that, in the event the learned Single Judge found that the Special Court consisting of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction and it is the Special Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class which has jurisdiction, then it should have returned the complaint for presentation of the same before the competent court having jurisdiction.

 

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS

The Learned Advocate on Record appearing for the Respondents raises a preliminary objection. He submitted that the point with regard to ‘legislation by incorporation’ was not argued before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and therefore the said contention cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court. He submitted that the judgment of this Court in the case of Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as, in the said case what was incorporated in the subsequent statute was a definition of ‘motor vehicles’ as found in the earlier statute i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is therefore submitted that, the definition cannot be in a state of flux subject to the mercy of amendments to the Central Act. He submitted that in the said case, this Court was considering a provision which provided a substantive right to file an appeal. As such, a reference to Section 100 of the CPC was held amounting to be an ‘incorporation’ as the substantive right of appeal could not be left at the mercy of subsequent amendments to the CPC. Learned counsel stated that in the present case, a general reference is made to Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act. It was therefore contended that, since a general reference is made, the present case would not be a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ but would be a case of ‘legislation by reference’. Learned counsel submits that in any case, the Respondents Nos.1 and 2 have a good case on merits. He argued that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has not considered the merits of the matter and in the event this Court holds that the learned Single Judge was not justified in quashing the proceedings, the matter be remitted to the learned Single Judge of the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits.

 

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the present case is a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ and not a case of ‘legislation by reference’. In other words, the provision of Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 with regard to Special Court would become a part of Section 236(1) of the Code as on the date of its enactment. If that be so, any amendment to Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013, after the date on which the Code came into effect would not have any effect on the provisions of Section 236(1) of the Code. The Special Court at that point of time only consists of a person who was qualified to be a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge.  It was further stated that the Code has also suffered two subsequent amendments i.e. the 2015 Amendment and the 2018 Amendment. If the legislative intent was to give effect to the subsequent amendments in the Companies Act to Section 236(1) of the Code, nothing prevented the legislature from amending Section 236(1) of the Code. The legislature having not done that, 54 the provision with regard to the reference in Section 236(1) of the Code pertaining to Special Court as mentioned in Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 stood frozen as on the date of enactment of the Code. As such, they stated that the learned Judge of the High Court had erred in holding that in view of the subsequent amendment, the offences under the Code shall be tried only by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further stated that the reasoning of the learned single judge of the High Court that in view of the 2018 Amendment only the offences under the Companies Act would be tried by a Special Court of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge and all other offences including under the Code shall be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class is untenable. For a moment, even if it was held that the reference in Section 236(1) of the Code is a ‘legislation by reference’ and not ‘legislation by incorporation’, still the offences punishable under the Code having imprisonment of two years or more will have to be tried by a Special Court presided by a 55 Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge. Whereas the offences having punishment of less than two years will have to be tried by a Special Court presided by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. The Supreme Court further stated that in any case, the learned single Judge of the High Court had grossly erred in quashing the complaint only on the ground that it was filed before a Special Court presided by a Sessions Judges. At the most, the learned single judge of the High Court could have directed the complaint to be withdrawn and presented before the appropriate court having jurisdiction.

The Learned Advocate-on-record for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, had submitted that in the event this Court holds that the Special Courts presided by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge will have jurisdiction to try the complaint under the Code, the Supreme Court stated that they should remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the matter afresh on merits. It was stated that the respondents have a good case on merits and there has been no adjudication on merits of the matter. In the result, the court allowed the appeal.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Supreme Court Verdict: Importance of Following Proper Statutory Procedure

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Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. State of Gujarat.

Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 1547 of 2024.

Date: April 08, 2024.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Quorum: Hon’ble J. Pankaj Mithal, J. Bela M. Trivedi.

 

Facts of the Case:

The appellant, claiming to be the owner of the vehicle Eicher 10.80 (Blue) bearing registration number GJ 05-BT-0899, filed a Special Criminal Application before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, seeking the release of the said vehicle. The vehicle was seized as “Muddamal Article” in connection with an FIR registered against the appellant’s son, Lakhabhai Khengarbhai, and others at the Pardi Police Station, District Valsad, for offenses under the Gujarat Prohibition Act and the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

According to the police, they intercepted the vehicle based on a secret information while on patrol duty. It was alleged that the driver of the vehicle was carrying 1240.200 litres of English Liquor worth Rs. 7 lakhs without any valid permit or pass. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s application, leading to the filing of the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

 

Legal Issues

  1. Whether the appellant should have approached the concerned criminal court under Section 451 of the CrPC instead of invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution for seeking the release of the seized vehicle?
  2. Whether the interpretation and scope of Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, particularly the embargo against the release of a conveyance used for carrying liquor exceeding the prescribed quantity until the final judgment of the court was accurate?

Legal Provisions

  1. Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): This section deals with the order to be passed by the Criminal Court for the custody and disposal of property produced before the court pending an inquiry or trial.
  2. Section 98 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949: This section pertains to the articles liable to confiscation whenever an offense punishable under the Act has been committed. Subsection (2) deals with the confiscation of receptacles, packages, coverings, animals, carts, vessels, or other conveyances used in carrying such articles.
  3. Section 132 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949: This section lays down the procedure to be followed after the seizure of articles by the Prohibition Officer or the Police Officer.

Sure, here’s an expanded version with more details on the contentions of the petitioner (appellant) and respondent (State of Gujarat):

Contentions of the Petitioner (Appellant):

The appellant invoked the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, filing a Special Criminal Application seeking the release of the seized vehicle. He argued that the High Court had the power to grant such relief under its writ jurisdiction. He challenged the legality and propriety of the seizure of the vehicle by the police. He contended that the seizure was arbitrary and without following due process of law. The appellant claimed to be the rightful owner of the seized vehicle and asserted his legal right to possess and use the vehicle for lawful purposes.

The primary relief sought by the appellant was the release of the seized vehicle, either unconditionally or subject to appropriate conditions or furnishing bonds/sureties as deemed fit by the High Court.

Contentions of the Respondent (State of Gujarat):

The respondent heavily relied on Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, which prohibits the release of a vehicle used for carrying liquor exceeding the prescribed quantity until the final judgment of the court. In the present case, the seized quantity of 1240 litres exceeded the prescribed limit of 20 litres. The respondent opposed the release of the seized vehicle, arguing that it would be in contravention of Section 98(2) of the Act, which mandates that such vehicles cannot be released on bond or surety until the final judgment.

The respondent justified the seizure of the vehicle by the police, contending that it was carried out based on credible information and in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Prohibition Act and other applicable laws. He argued that the seized vehicle should remain in the custody of the appropriate authorities until the final disposal of the case, as per the legal provisions governing such situations.

The respondent challenged the appellant’s invocation of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, contending that there were specific statutory remedies available under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and the Gujarat Prohibition Act, which should have been exhausted first.

Analysis of the Judgement:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s order. They observed that the appellant should have approached the concerned criminal court under Section 451 of the CrPC for seeking the custody of the seized vehicle instead of invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act is not happily worded, and there is a lack of co-relation between the first and second parts of the sub-section. Applying the doctrine of harmonious construction, the Court harmonized the provisions with other relevant provisions of the Act and the CrPC.

The Court distinguished between the powers of “seizure” and “confiscation.” Seizure is a preliminary step leading to confiscation, and the power to seize is exercised by statutory authorities like the police or prohibition officers, while the power of confiscation is typically exercised by the jurisdictional courts. The Court clarified that Section 98 deals with the confiscation of articles, while Section 132 deals with the procedure to be followed after the seizure of articles by the Prohibition Officer or Police Officer. It observed that there was no factual material on record to suggest whether the seized vehicle was produced before the concerned court to invoke Section 451 of the CrPC or forwarded by the police officer to the concerned Magistrate as per Section 132(a) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act.

The Court rightly emphasized the importance of following the proper statutory procedure laid down in Section 451 of the CrPC for seeking the custody of seized property from the concerned criminal court. Invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution was deemed inappropriate in this case, as there was a specific statutory provision available. The Court’s analysis of Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act and its harmonious interpretation with other provisions is commendable. The Court acknowledged the lack of clarity in the wording of Section 98(2) and applied the doctrine of harmonious construction to resolve any ambiguity or inconsistency. The Court also relied on the precedent set in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, wherein it was held that it is incumbent upon the magistrate to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of seized vehicles during the pendency of the trial, as keeping them at police stations for an extended period serves no purpose.

 

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. State of Gujarat provides valuable guidance on the proper procedure to be followed for seeking the custody of seized property in cases involving offenses under the Gujarat Prohibition Act. The Court clarified the interplay between the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, emphasizing the importance of following the statutory procedure laid down in Section 451 of the CrPC. While the Court dismissed the present appeal due to the appellant’s failure to approach the concerned criminal court, it left the door open for the appellant to approach the appropriate court where the seized vehicle is sought to be produced during the inquiry or trial.

Judgement reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

Click here to read the Judgement.

PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.

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Brake on Abuse: Supreme Court Halts Misuse of Criminal Law.

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Naresh Kumar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Appeal No.         of 2024

                 (Arising out SLP (CRL.) No. 1570 of 2021).

Date: March 12, 2024.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Quorum: Hon’ble J. Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. Prasanna B. Varale.

 

Facts of the Case

The appellants, Naresh Kumar (Assistant Manager-Marketing) and the Managing Director of a bicycle manufacturing company, challenged the Karnataka High Court’s order dismissing their petition to quash an FIR filed against them by Respondent. The respondent, a contractor, was given a contract by the appellants’ company to assemble, transport, and deliver bicycles at a rate of Rs. 122 per bicycle. After assembling 83,267 bicycles and raising invoices amounting to Rs. 1,01,58,574, Respondent No. 2 was paid only Rs. 35,37,390 by the appellants, leading to a dispute over the outstanding amount.

Consequently, an FIR No. 113/2017 was filed against the appellants under Sections 406 (criminal breach of trust), 420 (cheating), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at P.S. Doddaballapura, Bengaluru Rural District. Subsequently, a chargesheet dated 30.05.2019 was filed in the court, making both the appellants accused in the case.

However, later a compromise deed was executed on 27.12.2017, wherein the appellants agreed to pay an additional Rs. 26 lakhs as a full and final settlement to Respondent. This additional amount of Rs. 25,75,442 (after deducting TDS) was duly paid to Respondent through a NEFT bank transaction on 29.12.2017, taking the total amount paid by the appellants to Rs. 62 lakhs against the claimed amount of Rs. 1,01,58,574. The appellants claimed that this settlement was reached to bring a quietus to the dispute and to avoid further litigation.

Legal Issues:

  1. Whether the dispute between the parties was of a civil nature or had criminal elements?
  2. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)?

Legal Provisions:

  1. Indian Penal Code, 1860:
  • Section 406 – Criminal breach of trust.
  • Section 420 – Cheating.
  • Section 506 – Criminal intimidation.
  1. Section 482 of the CrPC grants inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.

Contentions of petitioners:

The petitioners put forth several arguments to contend that the High Court erred in dismissing their petition to quash the FIR. Firstly, they argued that the central dispute between the parties was primarily civil in nature, centring around the number of bicycles assembled by Respondent and the consequent amount payable by the appellants’ company. They asserted that this did not constitute a criminal offense.

Secondly, the petitioners highlighted the fact that a compromise deed was executed, wherein they agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs. 26 lakhs as a full and final settlement. They contended even after paying an additional amount pursuant to a settlement, it cannot be construed that the parties had the intent to cheat. the act of payment was not admission to a fraudulent intent, but the act intended to settle the matter. The settlements are often reached to bring a quietus to disputes and avoid protracted litigation, even in cases where the parties may not agree on the precise quantum of claims. The petitioners argued that Respondent had accepted the additional amount paid under the compromise deed without any protest or allegation of coercion at that time. This negated the respondent’s subsequent claim that he was coerced into entering the settlement.

The petitioners asserted that the High Court failed to appreciate the civil nature of the dispute and should have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, which amounted to an abuse of the process of the court.

Contentions of Respondents:

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, alleged that the appellants had harboured a dishonest intention to cheat him from the very beginning. This was evident from the fact that the appellants paid an additional amount that was significantly higher than what they initially claimed was due, based on their assessment of the number of bicycles assembled. The respondent further alleged that he was coerced into entering the settlement agreement, and therefore, the compromise deed should not be treated as a voluntary and binding settlement. He argued that the prosecution of the appellants was necessary under criminal law to hold them accountable for their alleged misdeeds.

Analysis of Judgement:

The Supreme Court carefully evaluated the arguments put forth by both parties and sided with the petitioners. The Court agreed that the dispute was of a civil nature, relating to the number of bicycles assembled and the consequent amount payable. It held that merely paying an additional amount pursuant to a settlement cannot be presumed as an act of cheating, as settlements are often made to bring a quietus to disputes and avoid litigation.

Significantly, the Court observed that respondent had accepted the additional amount paid under the compromise deed, casting doubt on his subsequent allegation of coercion. The Court relied on several precedents, including Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., and Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., to reinforce the principle that where a dispute is civil in nature, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash criminal proceedings and prevent an abuse of the process of the court.

The Court also drew a clear distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offense of cheating, emphasizing that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offense of cheating unless it is shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgement reaffirms the principle that criminal proceedings should not be initiated in disputes that are civil in nature unless there is unambiguous evidence of fraudulent or dishonest intention from the outset. The Court rightly exercised its inherent powers to quash the criminal proceedings, which were an abuse of the process of the court and prevented the misuse of criminal law in a contractual dispute.

Judgement reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

Click here to read the Judgement.

PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.

 

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The Thodu Tangle: The Karnataka High Court Validates Villagers’ Concerns on Bridge Construction.

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Samad A.A. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.

Writ Appeal No.: 636 OF 2024

Court: High Court of Karnataka.

Coram: Hon’ble J. B.M. Shyam Prasad, J. T.G. Shivashankare Gowda.

The High Court of Karnataka delivered a judgment on May 2, 2024, on a writ appeal filed against an interim order dated 18.03. 2024. The interim order directed the Deputy Commissioner of Madikeri to remove a concrete road constructed on a thodu within four weeks.

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants are the residents of Mugatageri village in Kodagu District. A concrete road has been put up on the thodu (a small stream or water channel) in their locality, which might have resulted in the stagnation of water. The initial petition was filed by Sri K.K. Deepak against various state officials and local authorities responsible for the construction and maintenance of the road. After this, there were directions to remove the concrete road, but actions were yet to be taken due to the election.

 

LEGAL ISSUES

  1. Whether the appellant’s rights would be affected by the implementation of the interim order directing the removal of the concrete land?
  2. Whether the appellants should have been impleaded as parties in the writ petition before passing the interim order?

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Section 4  of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, under which the appeal was filed.
  • Rule 27 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, states that a certiorari writ petition must include certified or authenticated copies of the order to be quashed and, if applicable, copies of orders from all involved authorities.
  • Additionally, the case involves principles under environmental protection laws concerning water bodies.

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANTS

The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the implementation of the interim order directing the removal of the concrete road would affect their rights as they were not made parties to the original writ petition. Thus, their rights and interests were only considered after passing the interim order. The petitioners argued that the construction of concrete roads over thodu may have led to significant water stagnation, affecting the local land properties. They also contended that despite the direction of the Tahsildar, the Panchayat Development Officer, to remove the concrete road, no action was taken.

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

The learned Additional Government Advocate, representing the respondents, submitted that the interim order could not be implemented due to the elections during the time of order. However, he did not oppose the appellant’s contention that they should have been included and heard before passing the interim order to address their concerns appropriately.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court recognized the environmental issues resulting from the construction of the road over the thodu. It observed that the grievances of the appellants regarding the interim order and their concerns were valid as they were not given an opportunity to present their case in the original writ proceedings. The Court acknowledged the delay due to elections and deemed it necessary to provide the appellants an opportunity to file the applications.

CONCLUSION

The case above is an example of the importance given to the principles of natural justice by the courts. The courts allowed the appellants to be heard before the implementation of an order that might affect their rights. This case highlights the necessity of ensuring that all parties are heard in judicial proceedings. It also underscores the importance of maintaining natural environments and addressing the impact of infrastructure projects on the environment.

Judgement reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

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