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Andhra Pradesh High Court Reviews Cooperative Bank’s Decision to Raise Retirement Age from 58 to 60 Years: Clarifies Financial Implications

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Andhra Pradesh High Court Reviews Cooperative Bank’s Decision to Raise Retirement Age from 58 to 60 Years: Clarifies Financial Implications  

Case Name: Sri Puvvada Venkata Mohana Murali Krishna Murthy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 

Case No.: Writ Petition No.4861 of 2018 

Dated: May 22, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Justice Raghunandana Rao 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The facts of the present case centre The petitioners were all workers at the Prakasam District Cooperative Central Bank Limited. By the year 2017, they had reached superannuation age and retired at the age of 58. The petitioners’ argument is that they should have retired when they became sixty years old.  

The petitioners argued that the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) (Amendment) Act, 2014, or simply “Act No. 4 of 2014,” was passed by the state legislature in order to bolster this claim. It replaced Section 3(1) with the following sub-section. It would be appropriate to include the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984’s definition of “government employee” below. 

 The Andhra Pradesh government released G.O.Ms.No.147, which contained instructions for putting Act No. 4 of 2014 into effect. It reiterated that the Act’s provisions only applied to the categories listed in it. It was subsequently issued, outlining the plan to delay applying the increased age of superannuation to employees of Public Sector Undertakings and Institutions listed in the IX and X Schedules of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, until the issue of the partition of the institutions’ assets and liabilities between the states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana was resolved and the distribution of the employees between the two states for those public sector undertakings and institutions was finalised.  

 ISSUES: 

  • whether the petitioners, who are employees of a Cooperative Bank (a corporate body), can claim that they have been discriminated against in comparison to Government employees or employees working for entities listed under Schedule IX and X of the Reorganisation Act. 

 LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) (Amendment) Act, 2014. The last day of the month in which a government employee turns sixty years old is when they are all required to retire from service. 

 CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS: 

The learned counsel for the appellants fiercely and strongly argued that the petitioners in this writ suit contest the Bank’s decision to not raise the superannuation age retroactively from 58 to 60 with effect from June 2, 2014, as was done in the case of institutions covered by Schedules IX and X of the Reorganisation Act by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 138. It is claimed that the Bank’s decision to reject such a retroactive benefit was discriminatory, unlawful, arbitrary, and unfair. 

 In addition, it was argued that the Bank was unfairly distinguishing between individuals who retired after June 2, 2014, and those who continued to work as of June 30, 2017, and that raising the superannuation age just in June 2017 was an illogical move.  

Learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that since the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (also known as the “APCS Act”) made no mention of the age of superannuation and only mentioned it in Rule 28(6) of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Rules, 1964 (also known as the “APCS Rules”), the Act No. 4 of 2014’s policy had to be adhered to.  

It was also argued that the Government should have made the choice to raise the retirement age rather than the Bank’s Board of Management, as Section 115(D) of the APCS Act did not grant them that authority.  

 CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

The arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the appellants were sharply and passionately rejected by the learned counsel according to Mr. C. Sumon, the learned counsel representing the respondents, the respondents’ position was that the petitioners were not government employees as defined by subsection (2) of Section 1 of the Act, and as such, they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act.  

It was argued that employees of public enterprises and autonomous organisations were not covered by the aforementioned Act. According to the statement, the petitioners were workers in cooperative credit societies, which operated independently. The Bank had consciously decided to raise its employees’ retirement age from 58 to 60 years old as of June after carefully examining the issue of employee benefits enhancement. 

The argument went on to say that fixing the age of superannuation was a policy decision and that raising it with effect from June 2017 was not perverse. Since it was a policy decision, this Court could normally only interfere with it in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction if it was deemed to be arbitrarily or unreasonable.  

 COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court observed that the litigation history covered in the preceding paragraphs demonstrates that the lawsuit was started at the request of workers who had worked for the institutions included in the Reorganisation Act’s IX and X Schedule for 58 years, or acquired the age of superannuation.  

The court further noted that the interim orders imposed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court had retrospective effect and went into effect on June 2, 2014. In addition, the aforementioned provided that employees of the businesses included in Schedules IX and X of the Reorganisation Act would not be eligible for superannuation only on the basis of reaching the age of 58.  

The court held that since the petitioners in this case did not meet the requirements of Act No. 23 of 1984’s definition of “Government employees,” they cannot be considered government employees in any sense. If that’s the case, then corporate employees’ inability to expect the same treatment as state government employees as a matter of right is no longer res integra.  

The government’s decision regarding those entities mentioned in Schedules IX and X will not bind the district cooperative central banks, which are cooperative credit societies. These institutions are required to make their own decisions based on a variety of factors, including their financial capacity, in order to decide whether or not to extend the age of superannuation and, if so, from what date. We believe that the DCCB’s decision is a decision of a policy character. 

Finally, the court laid down that the decision to raise the retirement age from a prospective date, i.e., June 2017, was made after weighing the advantages of increasing retirement age from 58 to 60 years old as well as the financial implications of salary and other benefits that the Bank would have to pay as a result of the increase. It cannot be argued that the Bank’s decision was so irrational, perverse, or unreasonable as to be unsupportable. As a result, the court denied the current writ petitions, as we see no value in them.  

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora. 

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Electricity Act | SEZ Developer Not Ipso Facto A ‘Deemed Distribution Licensee’, Must Apply for Recognition and Be Scrutinized: Supreme Court

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Electricity Act | SEZ Developer Not Ipso Facto A ‘Deemed Distribution Licensee’, Must Apply for Recognition and Be Scrutinized: Supreme Court

Case title: SUNDEW PROPERTIES LIMITED VS TELANGANA STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION & ANR.

Case no.:  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8978/2019

Dated on: 17TH May 2024

Quorum:  Hon’ble Mr. Justice DIPANKAR DATTA And Hon’ble Mr. Justice SANJIV KHANNA.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This is a statutory appeal before us under section 125 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003. It registers a challenge to the judgment and order dated 27th September, 2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity dismissing an appeal carried under section 111 of the Electricity Act by the appellant from the judgment and order dated 15th February, 2016 passed by the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order of the TSERC was upheld. The appellant was notified by the Ministry of Commerce & Industry (Department of Commerce), Government of India4 as a ‘Developer’, in terms of sections 3 and 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, to establish a sector-specific Special Economic Zone unit for Information Technology/Information Technology Enabled Services sector in Madhapur, Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad, in the former State of Andhra Pradesh. MoCI, vide a Notification bearing No.SO 528(E) dated 3rd March, 2010 introduced a proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act. The proviso accords upon the developer of a SEZ, the status of a deemed distribution licensee under the provisions of the Electricity Act. Pursuant to the 2010 Notification, the appellant filed an application before the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission seeking identification as a deemed distribution licensee, in terms of the proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act read with regulation 13 and Schedule-2 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution License) Regulations, 2013 and section 49 of the SEZ Act. Upon the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 coming into force, the application was transferred to the TSERC. By its aforesaid judgment and order dated 15th February, 2016, the TSERC identified and accorded the status of a deemed licensee to the appellant. However, this grant of status was made conditional upon the appellant satisfying the requirements stipulated in rule 3 of the Distribution of Electricity License (Additional Requirements of Capital Adequacy, Creditworthiness and Code of Conduct) Rules, 2005, compliance whereof was mandatory per regulation 12 [which stipulates that an applicant for grant of distribution license shall, in addition to regulations 4 to 11, comply with the 2005 Rules] read with regulation 49 of the 2013 Regulations [which stipulates that all the general conditions applicable to a distribution licensee are also equally applicable to a deemed licensee]. The appellant was, therefore, directed to infuse an additional capital of Rs. 26.90 crore as equity share capital, contributed by its promoters, into its power distribution business via account payee cheques by 31st March, 2016.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Singh, Counsel for the appellant submitted that the TSERC and the APTEL erred in failing to recognize that under section 14(b) of the Electricity Act, a developer of an SEZ is ipso facto and unconditionally deemed to be a distribution licensee, thus eliminating the need for a separate licence application. Recognition of the status of a deemed distribution licensee is a ministerial act, effected automatically upon fulfilment of conditions laid down in the SEZ Act, independent of rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules read with regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations. Under the 2013 Regulations, there are two types of licensees: first, those who apply for a distribution license under regulations 2(d) and 12, and secondly, those already deemed licensees, seeking recognition of their status as such, under regulations 2(h) and 13. The appellant belongs to the latter category. Regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations applies to general applicants seeking a distribution license, mandating compliance with both the 2005 Rules and the procedures prescribed in regulations 4 to 11. It cannot apply to a deemed licensee under regulation 13. The TSERC’s finding, as approved by the APTEL, that the 2005 Rules are in-built into the 2013 Regulations and therefore have to be satisfied by the appellant because of implied application of regulation 12 to deemed licensees, is contrary to the provisions of the Electricity Act and the very scheme of the 2013 Regulations. APTEL erred by agreeing with the TSERC’s reasoning that the requirement to infuse Rs. 26.90 crore in equity was imposed on the appellant under section 16 of the Electricity Act, despite recognizing the appellant as a deemed distribution licensee. Resting on the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel urged this Court to allow the appeal and set-aside the orders of the TSERC and the APTEL to the extent requiring the appellant to comply with the conditions stipulated in rule 3 of the 2005 Rules and infuse additional capital to gain the status of a deemed licensee.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Vaidyanathan, counsel for the respondent submitted that no doubt, the appellant, a SEZ developer, may be granted the status of a deemed licensee; however, the 2005 Rules and the 2013 Regulations will be applicable to the appellant. The appellant cannot be deemed to be a distribution licensee on its own without making an application under regulation. There is a necessity to harmoniously interpret the SEZ Act and the Electricity Act to uphold the provisions of both enactments. The appellant cannot argue that the 2005 Rules and the 2013 Regulations do not apply to it, being a SEZ developer. No doubt, the appellant, a SEZ developer, may be granted the status of a deemed licensee; however, the 2005 Rules and the 2013 Regulations will be applicable to the appellant as per the law laid down by this Court in Sesa Sterlite Limited. v. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission and others. The appellant cannot be deemed to be a distribution licensee on its own without making an application under regulation 13. There is a necessity to harmoniously interpret the SEZ Act and the Electricity Act to uphold the provisions of both enactments. The appellant cannot argue that the 2005 Rules and the 2013 Regulations do not apply to it, being a SEZ developer. TSERC is empowered to impose general and specific conditions at its discretion. The purpose of requiring the appellant to infuse an additional capital under the 2005 Rules was to assess the credit-worthiness of the appellant as it had accumulated losses at the end of the financial year 2013-2014 and more than 50% of its net-worth has been wiped-out, a fact which is reflected from the Statutory Auditor’s report. No case for interference having been set up by the appellant, learned counsel for respondents prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

ISSUES

  1. Whether the designation of an entity as a SEZ developer by the MoCI ipso facto qualifies the entity to be a deemed distribution licensee, obviating the need for an application under section 14 of the Electricity Act?

  1. Whether regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations, and by implication rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules, are applicable to a SEZ developer recognised as a deemed distribution licensee under the proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act read with regulation 13 of the 2013 Regulations?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Indian Electricity Act, 2003

Section 14(b): Pertains to the grant of distribution licenses and includes a proviso for Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developers to be deemed distribution licensees.

Section 16: Allows the Regulatory Commission to impose conditions on the grant of licenses.

Section 49: Deals with the supply of electricity by the distribution licensee to a consumer.

  1. Special Economic Zones Act, 2005

Sections 3 and 4: Define the establishment of SEZs and the roles of developers.

  1. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013

Regulation 2(d): Defines an “applicant” for a distribution license.

Regulation 2(h): Defines a “deemed licensee.”

Regulation 12: Stipulates that an applicant for a distribution license must comply with the 2005 Rules and regulations 4 to 11.

Regulation 13: Pertains to deemed licensees seeking recognition of their status.

Regulation 49: States that general conditions applicable to a distribution licensee are also applicable to a deemed licensee.

  1. Distribution of Electricity Licence (Additional Requirements of Capital Adequacy, Creditworthiness and Code of Conduct) Rules, 2005

Rule 3: Specifies the additional requirements of capital adequacy and creditworthiness for applicants seeking a distribution license.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

In view of the existing facts, we are inclined to the view that the very purpose of the deeming fiction in the proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act is to confer upon an entity like the appellant a status which is otherwise available in accordance with the Electricity Act. In other words, as an effect of the 2010 Notification inserting the proviso to section 14(b), the appellant is entitled to the privilege of being acknowledged as a (deemed) distribution licensee under the Electricity Act for supply of power within its SEZ area. Once the appellant is a (deemed) distribution licensee, certain benefits and/or privileges do ensure in its favour.  This Court interpreted the expression ‘open access’ and the rationale behind CSS and additional surcharge to observe that the former was payable by a distribution licensee and the latter was to meet the fixed cost of the distribution licensee of the area. The provision of open access, it is observed, balances the right of the consumers to purchase from a source of their choice. The rationale and the ratio of the decision, therefore, is that a deemed distribution licensee is treated at par and not different from a distribution licensee. Accordingly, if CSS is payable by a distribution licensee, the deemed distribution licensee is equally liable to pay the same. The status of a SEZ developer as a deemed licensee emanates from the 2010 Notification, which introduced the proviso to section 14(b), conferring deemed licensee status to SEZ developers. Reading anything beyond this would defeat the very purpose of the proviso and the concept of the deemed licence. The sixth proviso does not pertain to deemed licensees and, therefore, the 2005 Rules are not applicable to the appellant. Reading down and reading up are two principles often discussed in legal contexts, particularly in the realm of statutory interpretation. Reading down, which has been firmly ingrained in our jurisprudence, refers to the practice of interpreting a statute narrowly, limiting its scope or application to specific situations or individuals. This approach is commonly employed when the language of a statute is ambiguous or when there is a need to avoid potential conflicts with other laws or constitutional provisions. Reading up is a concept that is invoked with great caution within our legal framework because it can lead to judicial activism or judicial overreach, where courts expand the reach of laws beyond what the legislature intended. In the present case, the TSERC, in paragraph 19, asserted that regulation 12 applies implicitly to a deemed licensee as well. We do not agree with this reasoning, mainly for two reasons. First, the primary legislation, the Electricity Act, through the proviso inserted in section 14(b), confers deemed licensee status upon SEZ developers without imposing any specific conditions. Secondly, the 2013 Regulations make a clear distinction between an applicant seeking a license [as defined under regulation 2(d)] and a deemed distribution licensee seeking recognition as such [as defined under regulation 2(h)].

The 2013 Regulations clearly delineate distinct categories of licensees. Regulation 12 pertains solely to regular distribution licensees as defined under regulation 2(h), not to deemed licensees. ‘Reading up’ regulation 12 so as to expand its ambit to include within it deemed licensees, especially when the Electricity Act does not stipulate any such inclusion, runs counter to the subsequently inserted proviso to clause (b) of section 14 of the Electricity Act—an exercise which is impermissible and which we cannot approve. Therefore, the recognition of the status of a deemed distribution licensee cannot hinge on compliance with rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules read with regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations. set aside to this extent. The order of the TSERC, which grants the status of a deemed licensee to the appellant, however, subject to the condition that its promoters infuse additional capital is accordingly modified to the extent of excluding such condition. The appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

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Judgement Reviewed by – HARIRAGHAVA JP

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Criminal petition filed for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in Andhra Pradesh High Court.

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Bheemireddy Uma Maheswari vs The State Of A.P

BENCH – HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, CHIEF JUSTICE

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 6897 of 2015

DATE OF JUDGEMENT – 12 MAY 2023

This criminal petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kotturu, Srikakulam District.

 FACTS

The 2nd respondent – defacto complainant (Lakshamna Panigrahi) filed a private complaint on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kotturu, Srikakulam District, alleging that the petitioner/accused and her husband approached him and one Bhaskara Rao Patro, expressing willingness to sell their house situated in Srikakulam, upon which the defacto complainant and Bhaskara Rao Patro agreed to purchase the same. It was alleged that the accused and her husband suppressed the real facts with regard to the title of the property and entered into an agreement of sale with them for a sale consideration of Rs.15,30,000/-, out of whichan amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid as advance. It was further alleged that in the sale agreement neither the measurements of the property nor the names of the boundary holders were mentioned and even the link document was also not provided, that the accused purchased the said house from her vendor under an unregistered document, that the title of the vendor of the accused itself was highly doubtful and the accused intentionally and wilfully suppressed all those details, with a view to cheat the defacto complainant and Bhaskara Rao Patro. It was further alleged that in the above circumstances, the defacto complainant and Bhaskara Rao Patro issued notice to the accused asking her to cancel the agreement of sale and refund the advance sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- with costs and interest, but the accused did not do the needful. Upon forwarding of the said complaint to the concerned police for investigation, the police registered a case, conducted investigation, and filed charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 420 I.P.C.

It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the transaction between the parties is in relation to sale of an immovable property pursuant to the alleged agreement of sale entered into between them and the same being purely civil transaction, the defacto complainant has to pursue civil remedies in that regard and no offence of cheating was made out, even if the entire allegations are taken to be true on their face value. Learned counsel, therefore, prays for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner.

The learned Public Prosecutor would oppose the prayer made, stating that whether the accused has committed the alleged offence or not has to be decided by the trial Court after completion of trial and on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties.

JUDGEMENT

In this case, this criminal petition was allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner herein in on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kotturu, Srikakulam District was hereby quashed.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY HARSHIT JAIN

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Petitioner challenging the order of detention of her husband and prays to set him at liberty in Andhra Pradesh High court.

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Veeranki Lakshmi vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh

BENCH – THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S. SOMAYAJULU AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. SRINIVAS

WRIT PETITION No. 5334 of 2023

DATE OF JUDGEMENT – 12 MAY 2023

INTRODUCTION

In this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the order of detention of her husband by name Veeranki Rambabu, S/o Pedalaxmayya, aged 38 years dated 19.12.2022 passed by the 2nd respondent- The Collector and District Magistrate, West Godavari District, which was confirmed by the 1st Respondent (THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH) and prays to direct the respondent authorities to set the detenue at liberty forthwith.

The 2nd respondent (District Collector), West Godavari District, while categorizing the detenue as a “Bootlegger” within the definition of Section 3(2) r/w.3(1) of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 passed the impugned order of detention. The same was confirmed by the 1st Respondent (State).

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of detention was passed basing on vague, irrelevant, and non-existing grounds, that the offences alleged against the detenue is under Section 7(A) and 7(B) r/w.8(B) and 8(E) of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 and they can be dealt under general laws. It is also stated that out of five crimes, the detenue was already granted bail in four crimes and in one crime he was issued Section 41(a) Cr.P.C. notice. The detention authority erred in passing the impugned order without considering the bail orders.

JUDGEMENT

In this case the court held that the order impugned was made without proper application of mind and there is a serious procedural violation. The detenue will not fall under the category of Section 3(2) r/w.3(1) of the Act and this Court could not find that the order of detention has any material to either substantiate or justify the said allegation that the detenue is a ‘Bootlegger’ whose activities would be actually prejudicial to public order.

In this case court allowed this Writ Petition, setting aside the order of detention passed by the 2nd respondent. The detenue namely Veeranki Rambabu, S/o.Pedalaxmayya, aged 38 years, was  directed to be released forthwith by the respondents if the detenue is not required in any other cases.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY HARSHIT JAIN

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Andhra Pradesh High court disposed a PIL by directing the respondents to undertake the identification of unauthorized encroachments over subject land and take steps for removal of such.

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

LINGIREDDY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE vs The State of Andhra Pradesh

BENCH – HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, CHIEF JUSTICE & HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA

WRIT PETITION (PIL) No. 67 OF 2023

DATE OF JUDGEMENT – 11 MAY 2023

INTRODUCTION –

This case is about the writ petition direct the respondents concerned to undertake and complete the exercise of identification of unauthorized occupations/constructions/encroachments over the subject land and taking steps for removal of such encroachments/unauthorized constructions by following the relevant rules and the principles of natural justice.

The relevant provision followed in this case are as follows –

 The Constitution of India 1949

Article 226 Power of High Courts to issue certain writs –

Any High Court may issue directions, orders, or writs, including those in the nature of writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari, or any of them, to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, regardless of what Article 32 says. These writs may be used to enforce any of the rights granted by Part III and for other purposes.

 ARTICLE 14 RIGHT TO EQUALITY

All people residing on Indian territory have a right to equality before the law and equal protection under the law, according to Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. According to this clause, no one shall be denied equality before the law or national legal protection. This implies that everyone has a right to equal treatment under the law regardless of caste, religion, gender, race, or place of birth. Article 14 forbids discrimination and encourages justice and impartiality in the administration of the law.

Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty

The fundamental rights to life and individual freedom are guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It declares that no one may be robbed of their life or personal liberty until doing so in accordance with the legal process. The protection provided by this article prevents the state or any other authority from arbitrarily denying people their right to live in dignity and freedom. The judiciary has construed it to cover a wide range of rights, such as the right to privacy, the right to a healthy environment, the right to life, and the right to livelihood.

FACTS

This writ petition in the nature of public interest litigation has been preferred seeking to issue a Writ (Writ of Mandamus), declaring the inaction of the Respondents particularly the 2nd respondent(The District Collector) in not taking any action on complaint of the petitioner’s Society by way of Spandana request as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently, direct the Respondents particularly the 2nd respondent to remove the illegally and unauthorized compound wall or any other structures allotted to the burial ground in lands of situated at Peddaorampadu revenue village, Lingareddypalli village Obulavaripalli Mandal YSR Kadapa District (now in Annamayya District) and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice.

No steps were taken by the Government and its authorities in protecting the government lands. As the public authorities are failing in their duties in protecting the government lands, which are meant for the common use of general public, despite bringing to their notice, public spirited persons are approaching this Court to intervene and direct the public authorities to protect the government lands from encroachments.

JUDGEMENT

In view of the allegation that illegal and unauthorized constructions are made in burial ground situated in the land in at Peddaorampadu revenue village, Lingareddypalli village, Obulavaripalli Mandal, YSR Kadapa District (now in Annamayya District), this hon’ble court direct the respondents concerned to undertake and complete the exercise of identification of unauthorized occupations/constructions/encroachments over the subject land, within a period of two months from today, and thereafter, take steps for removal of such encroachments/unauthorized constructions by following the relevant rules and the principles of natural justice, i.e., issuing notice and providing opportunity of hearing to the unauthorized occupants/ encroachers, within a further period of four months. So, this hon’ble court has disposed of this Writ Petition (PIL).

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY HARSHIT JAIN

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