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The power of the trial courts to disallow to cross examine a defendant is subject to certain exception and is not absolute. This was adjudicated by the High Court of Karnataka in the case TK Ramakrishnappa v K Gopalagowda [W.P No 27796 of 2019] by Hon’ble Justice Krishna S.Dixit.

This judgement was made in response to a writ petition made to quash an order which disallowed the first defendant of the case from being cross-examined. The reasoning provided by the lower court for this was “The defendants in the affidavit annexed to the application contended that even though they are supporting the case of plaintiff but disputing the measurement. It is so, why they have not cross examined PW.1 in this regard is not stated. It shows that they filed this application only to drag the proceedings. In the same the plaintiff was not cross examined. If the contention raised is really true, definitely they would cross examine the concerned person on this point. Instead of the same, now they wants to cross examine the other person. This shows that they have not approached this court with clean hands. If the plaint averment not disclosed the proper measurement as alleged by the defendant, then they have to cross examine PW1. Hence the defendant has not made an y reasonable grounds or sufficient cause to allow the application”

The high court heavily criticized the reasoning given by the lower court in order to refuse permission for cross-examination. For this it relied upon multiple scholarly legal texts that deal with the law of evidence. One such source was the works of Mr. Rupert Cross, an Oxford Professor of Law and author of treatise of “EVIDENCE”. Relevant portion from this book highlighted by the judge were “All witnesses are liable to be cross- examined with very few exceptions. A witness otherwise is probably liable to be cross-examined, not merely by the opponent of the party calling him, but also by all other parties.”

The court then went on to list the situations where the witness may not be cross-examined. The most notable instances are (1) A witness summoned to produce merely to produce a document (2) a witness sworn by mistake (3) one whose examination has been stopped by the judge before any material question has been put which not liable to cross examination. (4) a witness giving replies to answer to question by the court only be cross-examined with leave(5) A witness who has given no evidence in chief, may not be cross-examined as to credit (6) Under s.138 of the Indian Evidence Act, cross examination follows chief-examination.

It further stated that the right to cross examination is not an objective thing and “it can vary depending upon the pleadings”. However, this should not be conditioned to the state of the parties and the court rightly observed that this aspect was not taken into consideration by the lower court thereby making it liable to be faltered.

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A court can post a matter for arguments in a case of defamation if the defendant repeatedly fails to produce evidence in the court when given the opportunity to lead the evidence. This was decided by the High Court of Karnataka in H.D Devegowda v. Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Ltd. [W.P No. 725 of 2021] by a single bench consisting of Hon’ble Justice Krishna S. Dixit.

The facts of the case are that the respondent had filed a defamation suit and had produced oral and documentary evidences successfully. However, the petitioner being the sole defendant in the original suit did not avail the opportunity given to lead the evidence. The judge of the civil court posted matters for arguments thereby closing the window to allow further evidences. This petition has been filed under Section 226 and Section 227 of the Constitution to set aside the order and permit to adduce the evidence of the petitioner.

This court elaborated on five grounds to explain why it was unfit to interfere in the order made. Firstly, it stated that the original suit of defamation was filed in the year 2012 for damages worth Rupees Ten Crore. The issues were framed and evidence was procured from the plaintiff years ago. But the petitioner and his counsel remained absent as a result of which the case was posted for arguments.

Secondly, after the suit reached the argument stage, no plausible reason was given by the petitioner for not producing evidence within the stipulated time. Thirdly, the judge of the civil court has rightly pointed out that such leniency only proves that the intention of the petitioner was to drag the suit and delay the verdict of the court. This is reflected by the language used in the order sheet and the writ court cannot dispute with the learned judges of the courts below.

Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the court said that a suit of defamation must be tried as soon as possible because here the stakes are high. This is due to the fact that the reputation of a person is most sacrosanct and right to reputation is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It further stated “Any claim for redressal for the hurt of reputation merits speedier consideration and ideally speaking, before the public memory fades; in defamation suits, awards of damages in terms of money hardly constitutes a full recompense for the injury suffered; delayed justice makes it still worse; this is an added reason for the speedy trial of such suits; they cannot be allowed to be dragged on indefinitely. This makes the order unfit for challenge”.

Fifthly, the court referred to judgement made by Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd & Anr [(2003) 3 SCC 524 ] where it was held that as long as the lower court functions in accordance with rules  and reasons of justice, the Writ court cannot conduct a deeper examination of the merits of the case.

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The petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of nomination paper by returning officer to contest village panchayat elections, would not be maintainable. This decision was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Karmaveer Tulshiram Autade and others vs. State Election Commission & others [Writ Petition no.26 of 2021] presided over by the bench of Hon’ble Chief Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice A.S. Gadkari & Justice G.S. Kulkarni.

In the instant case, the petitioners had approached the High Court challenging the orders passed by the returning officer of the village panchayat rejecting their nomination forms to contest elections to Bhose Village Panchayat. The State Election Commission had challenged the maintainability of the petitions. Petitioners had referred to the case of Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade vs. Returning Officer, Akot and Anr. and Sudhakar s/o. Vitthal Misal vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. and Smt. Mayaraju Ghavghave vs. Returning Officer.

The issue which rose in front of the bench was whether the writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable challenging the orders of rejection of nomination forms in a village panchayat election.

There were arguments including that petitioners can’t approach HC for grievances under Article 226 because it is neither a civil right nor a fundamental right and there was an argument that returning officers reject nomination papers for absurd reasons possibly because they are ignorant of relevant laws or because of extraneous considerations and hence, the High Court must intervene and lay down situations where writ petition under Article 226 could be entertained.

High Court opined that “The legislature expresses the will of the people through legislation enacted by it. Any issue which could be dealt with by the legislature cannot be solved by judicial fiat, having regard to Article 243-O(b) of the Constitution read with the MVP Act.”

Therefore, HC took the decision that Petitions before High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of nomination paper by returning officer to contest village panchayat elections, would not be maintainable, by the virtue of Article 243-O of the Constitution which bars interference from courts in electoral matters except in the manner provided by the law made by the State legislature.

HC Stated that “Article 243-O(b) is a bar on an entertaining petition under Article 226 challenging the rejection of nomination in village panchayat election”.

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Testimonies by victims of hideous crimes cannot be rendered unreliable due to existence of minor discrepancies in their statements. The High Court bench consisting of J. Vibhu Bakhru in the matter of Vijay v. State (G.N.C.T. of Delhi) [CRL. A. 969/2017], convicted the accused under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

The appellant was charged of barging in the jhuggi of the victim and assaulting the prosecutrix and was an FIR was registered under Section 376/377 of IPC and Section 6, 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act. The statement of the prosecutrix confirming the incident was recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and she also stated that the accused had been following her for the past few days. Upon examination, no injury marks were found on the prosecutrix and her mother refused to get her internal examination conducted. The accused was convicted under Section 6 of POCSO and was sentenced to serve 10 years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. Further that any default in payment of fine would lead to an additional period of simple imprisonment for 8 months. the accused filed an appeal before the High Court and the counsel contended that the appellant had been falsely implicated and relied upon the discrepancies in the statements given by the prosecutrix.

The High Court examined the evidence and found that the testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be considered as unreliable. The court held that “Considering the manner in which the offence was committed, the inconsistency regarding whether he had inserted his finger in the vagina or had felt it, would not be of much relevance. In any event this Court is of the view that the said inconsistency does not in any manner raise any doubts as to the allegations made by the prosecutrix”.

 Further the court added “The contention that he had been falsely implicated because the name of the accused was not mentioned to the concerned doctor who had examined the prosecutrix, is also unpersuasive. It is material to note that the prosecutrix was taken for the medical examination by the concerned police official and her mother. There is no reason to believe that her mother knew the name of the appellant and it appears that the mother had narrated the incident to the doctor”, and dismissed the appeal finding no merit in the same.

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