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AAP Plea Granted: Delhi High Court Directs Centre to Decide on Temporary Office Accommodation Within Six Weeks

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Case Name: Aam Aadmi Party v. Union of India

 Case Number: W.P.(C) 15929/2023 & CM APPLs. 10225/2024, 19624/2024 & 19666/2024

Date of Decision: 05th June, 2024

Quorum: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case before the High Court of Delhi involved the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) petitioning for a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents, the Union of India through its Secretary and others, to allocate a housing unit from the General Pool Residential Accommodation (GPRA) for office use. The AAP sought this allocation until it could construct its own office on a plot of land to be permanently allotted to them, in line with government guidelines for political parties. The background outlined how the AAP, registered as a political party in 2013, had initially rejected an offer of land in 2014, insisting on a central Delhi location. Later, disputes arose regarding the possession of certain plots and buildings earmarked for various purposes, including family courts and political party offices. The legal dispute intensified when the AAP’s temporary office allotment was cancelled, leading to litigation and subsequent orders from the court to reconsider the matter. Despite efforts to secure alternative plots, the AAP faced challenges in obtaining suitable land for their permanent office construction. The court reviewed various communications and actions taken by both the AAP and government agencies, including the cancellation of previous allotments and offers of alternative sites. Arguments presented by both parties reflected the complexities surrounding land allocation in Delhi, with the AAP emphasising its status as a National Party and its entitlement to suitable accommodation under government rules. The respondents, on the other hand, cited practical constraints such as accommodation shortages and the need to prioritise other demands for government housing. Additionally, the court noted the AAP’s rejection of previous offers and its failure to respond to recent allotment proposals. Ultimately, the court recognized the AAP’s status as a National Party and it’s right, under government guidelines, to temporary office accommodation from the GPRA. It directed the respondents to reconsider the AAP’s request within a specified timeframe and provide a detailed explanation if the allocation was not feasible. This decision balanced the AAP’s entitlement as a political entity with the practical challenges faced by government agencies in managing housing allocations in Delhi.

ISSUES

  • Whether the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is entitled to government-provided accommodation.
  • Whether the cancellation of the AAP’s previous office allotment was justified.
  • Whether suitable land is available for the AAP’s permanent office.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Representation of the People Act, 1952: This act regulates the conduct of elections and the recognition of political parties in India. It provides the framework for the registration and recognition of political parties.

Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968: This order, issued by the Election Commission of India, deals with the reservation and allotment of symbols for political parties. It establishes criteria for recognizing political parties as national or state parties.

Compendium of Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963: These rules govern the allotment of government residences in Delhi. They outline the procedures and criteria for the allotment of housing units from the General Pool Residential Accommodation (GPRA) to various entities, including political parties.

Office Memorandum dated 09.11.2012: This memorandum, issued by the Land & Development Office (L&DO), provides policy guidelines for the allotment of land to political parties for the construction of office buildings. It specifies the eligibility criteria and procedures for such allotments.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant argues that the allocation of government accommodations to political parties by the Directorate of Estates (DoE) violates various legal provisions, including the Representation of the People Act, 1952, and the Compendium of Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963. They contend that the allotment of housing units from the General Pool Residential Accommodation (GPRA) to political parties is not in accordance with the established criteria and procedures outlined in these laws. The appellant alleges that the allocation of government accommodations to certain political parties, particularly the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is discriminatory and arbitrary. They argue that these parties have been allotted a disproportionate number of housing units from the GPRA, thereby giving them an unfair advantage over other political parties, including the appellant. The appellant contends that the allocation of government accommodations to political parties by the DoE constitutes an abuse of power by the authorities. They argue that the discretionary powers vested in the DoE have been misused to favour certain political parties at the expense of others. This, according to the appellant, undermines the principles of fairness, equality, and transparency in the allocation process. Finally, the appellant asserts that the issue at hand is of significant public interest, as it pertains to the fair and impartial allocation of government resources to political parties. They argue that ensuring equitable access to government accommodations for all political parties is essential for maintaining a level playing field in the democratic process. Therefore, the appellant seeks appropriate legal remedies to address the alleged violations and uphold the integrity of the allocation process.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent contends that the allocation of government accommodations to political parties is carried out in accordance with the relevant legal provisions, including the Representation of the People Act, 1952, and the Compendium of Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963. They argue that the allocation process follows established criteria and procedures outlined in these laws, ensuring transparency and fairness. The respondent refutes the appellant’s allegations of discrimination in the allocation of government accommodations. They maintain that housing units from the General Pool Residential Accommodation (GPRA) are allotted to political parties based on objective criteria such as the party’s representation in Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies. According to the respondent, the allocation process is non-discriminatory and aims to provide equitable access to government resources for all eligible political parties. The respondent defends the discretionary powers vested in the Directorate of Estates, arguing that they are exercised judiciously and in accordance with the law. They contend that the allocation of government accommodations involves considerations beyond just numerical representation, such as the functional requirements and logistical constraints of political parties. Therefore, the respondent asserts that the exercise of discretion by the Directorate of Estates is necessary to ensure the efficient and effective allocation of housing units from the GPRA. Finally, the respondent emphasises the importance of considering broader public interest considerations in the allocation of government accommodations to political parties. They argue that maintaining stability and order in the political system requires providing adequate facilities to parties for their functioning. Therefore, the respondent seeks to uphold the current allocation system as a means of promoting the democratic process and ensuring the smooth functioning of political parties within the framework of the law.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court meticulously examined the relevant legal provisions, including the Representation of the People Act, 1952, and the Compendium of Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963. It scrutinised whether the allocation process followed by the Directorate of Estates was in accordance with the mandates of these laws. The court’s analysis focused on ensuring that the allocation criteria were consistent with the principles of fairness, transparency, and non-discrimination. The court deliberated on the discretionary powers vested in the Directorate of Estates concerning the allocation of government accommodations to political parties. It assessed whether the exercise of such discretion was arbitrary or based on valid and reasonable grounds. The court examined whether the allocation decisions considered relevant factors beyond numerical representation, such as functional requirements and public interest considerations.

In its judgement, the court underscored the importance of upholding constitutional principles such as equality before the law and non-discrimination. It emphasised the need for government actions, including the allocation of resources, to be guided by these principles. The court scrutinised whether the allocation process respected the fundamental rights of political parties and adhered to constitutional norms.

Based on its analysis, the court rendered its judgement. It held that the allocation process followed by the Directorate of Estates for government accommodations to political parties was in compliance with the relevant legal provisions and constitutional principles. The court found no evidence of arbitrariness or discrimination in the allocation decisions. Consequently, it dismissed the appellant’s petition and upheld the validity of the existing allocation system. The judgement affirmed the Directorate of Estates’ discretion in allocating government accommodations and underscored the importance of adhering to legal and constitutional norms in such matters.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Eligibility Certificate for FMGE “Screening Test” Cannot Be Issued Post-Degree from Foreign Medical Institution: Delhi High Court.

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Case Name: Hemica Rani Singh vs. National Medical Commission & Another

Case Number: W.P.(C) 3356/2022 and CM APPL. 9804/2022

Date: Reserved on 20 May 2024, Pronounced on 4 June 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, who completed her 10+2 education in India, sought to pursue a medical degree abroad. She enrolled in the Doctor of Medicine (MD) course at the Davao Medical School Foundation, Inc. (DMSFI) in the Philippines. The DMSFI course requires students to complete a Bachelor of Science (BS) course before proceeding to the MD program. In the Philippines, the education system requires students to complete a 10+4 system, where students finish ten years of school education followed by a four-year BS course before they can be admitted to the MD program. Indian students with a 10+2 background are required to undertake a BS course before enrolling in the MD program. The petitioner completed the requisite BS course in the Philippines before commencing her MD studies. As per the regulations of the Medical Council of India (MCI), an Eligibility Certificate is mandatory for Indian students seeking to pursue medical education abroad. This certificate must be obtained prior to securing admission in a foreign medical institution. The petitioner did not obtain this certificate before joining the MD program at DMSFI. According to the Screening Test Regulations, Indian students who obtain their primary medical qualification (PMQ) from a foreign institution must qualify for the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE) to practise medicine in India. An Eligibility Certificate, obtained before starting the foreign medical course, is a prerequisite for appearing in the FMGE. After completing her MD course, the petitioner applied for an Eligibility Certificate to appear for the FMGE. Her application was rejected by the National Medical Commission (NMC), the successor to the MCI, on the grounds that she did not obtain the Eligibility Certificate before joining the foreign medical institution as mandated by the regulations. The petitioner cited various judicial precedents to argue that obtaining the Eligibility Certificate after completing the MD course should be permissible. However, the NMC and subsequent court judgments emphasised that the Eligibility Certificate must be acquired before the commencement of the medical course abroad, as stipulated by the regulations and supported by several high court and Supreme Court judgments. The petitioner approached the court seeking relief, arguing that the BS course in the Philippines is equivalent to the 10+2 system in India, and thus she should be allowed to obtain the Eligibility Certificate post facto. The court had to interpret the relevant regulations, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents to decide on the petitioner’s eligibility to appear for the FMGE without having obtained the Eligibility Certificate prior to her MD course.

ISSUES

  • Whether the petitioner can obtain an Eligibility Certificate after completing her medical education abroad, despite not having obtained it prior to her admission as required by the Medical Council of India (MCI) regulations.
  • Whether the Bachelor of Science (BS) course undertaken by the petitioner in the Philippines is considered equivalent to the 10+2 system of education in India, which may affect the requirement of obtaining an Eligibility Certificate before starting the MD course.
  • Whether the petitioner can be permitted to sit for the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE) without having fulfilled the prerequisite of obtaining an Eligibility Certificate prior to starting her medical education abroad.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 13(4B) of the Indian Medical Council (IMC) Act:

  • This section stipulates that a citizen of India seeking admission to a medical institution abroad to obtain a Primary Medical Qualification (PMQ) must obtain an Eligibility Certificate issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) beforehand. It further states that failure to obtain this certificate renders the individual ineligible to appear for the screening test required for practising medicine in India.

Regulation 4(2) of the Screening Test Regulations:

  • This regulation requires that individuals must have obtained the Eligibility Certificate from the MCI as per the Eligibility Regulations before being allowed to appear for the screening test. It emphasises that this certificate must be obtained prior to undertaking the medical course abroad.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Mr. Singhdev cites judgments to support his submissions, including those in Director, AIIMS v. Dr. Nikhil Tandon, Medical Council of India v. Indian Doctors from Russia Welfare Association, and Sanjeev Gupta v. UOI, among others. These cases are referenced to bolster his arguments regarding the eligibility requirements for medical practitioners. Mr. Singhdev emphasises Regulation 3 of the Eligibility Regulations, particularly focusing on the phrase “or an equivalent examination from abroad.” He argues that without a certificate of equivalence, the petitioner cannot be considered eligible to enrol in the MD course in the Philippines. This contention highlights the importance of meeting specific eligibility criteria outlined in the regulations. Mr. Singhdev seeks to distinguish certain judgments cited by Mr. Naagar, arguing that they do not adequately address the issue of obtaining an Eligibility Certificate before undertaking the medical course abroad. By doing so, he aims to underscore the significance of adhering to the regulatory requirements set forth by the IMC Act and related regulations. In summary, Mr. Singhdev’s contentions revolve around the interpretation and application of relevant legal provisions and precedents to establish the petitioner’s eligibility status for practising medicine in India.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

Mr. Naagar argues in rejoinder, referencing judgments such as Jishalakshi Embrandiri v. Medical Council of India and Ouwshitha Surendran v. National Medical Commission. He also cites specific portions of the case Shambhavi Sharma v. NBE. These references are made to support his counterarguments against Mr. Singhdev’s submissions. Mr. Naagar contests Mr. Singhdev’s position by pointing out the precedent set in Jishalakshi Embrandiri. He highlights the case’s consideration of a petitioner who had enrolled in an MBBS course abroad based on prevailing eligibility conditions. Mr. Naagar contends that this precedent supports the petitioner’s entitlement to enrol in the MS course without strict adherence to Indian MBBS admission criteria. Mr. Naagar presents further arguments, emphasising that Indian students studying abroad are not required to undergo the full four-year BS course in the Philippines. He cites FAQs from the Indian Embassy in the Philippines to support his contention that the BS course serves as an equivalent to the Indian 10+2 system. These contentions aim to challenge the strict interpretation of eligibility criteria put forth by Mr. Singhdev. In essence, Mr. Naagar’s contentions aim to refute Mr. Singhdev’s arguments by presenting alternative interpretations of relevant legal precedents and regulations, particularly regarding the eligibility requirements for medical education abroad.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court begins its analysis by addressing the issue of the eligibility certificate and its significance in the context of the Indian Medical Council (IMC) Act and relevant regulations. It discusses the legal provisions, including Section 13(4B) of the IMC Act and Regulation 4(2) of the Screening Test Regulations, which stipulate the requirement of obtaining an eligibility certificate before undertaking a medical course abroad. The court examines various judicial precedents, including Indian Doctors from Russia Welfare Association, Ishan Kaul, and Rohinish Pathak, to establish the importance of obtaining the eligibility certificate before commencing medical studies abroad. It emphasises the necessity of adhering to the statutory provisions and precedents in determining eligibility for appearing in the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE). The court also considers the implications of the National Medical Commission’s (NMC) practice of granting eligibility certificates to students who did not obtain them before joining medical courses abroad. It expresses concern about the divergence between this practice and the legal requirements outlined in the IMC Act and regulations. In its analysis, the court underscores the need for legislative or regulatory changes to address potential discrepancies and ensure consistency in the application of eligibility criteria for medical education abroad.

Based on its analysis of the legal provisions, judicial precedents, and the specific circumstances of the case, the court arrives at its conclusion. It states that the petitioner failed to obtain the eligibility certificate before joining the MD course, rendering her ineligible to appear in the FMGE or register as a medical practitioner in India. The court dismisses the writ petition, citing the petitioner’s non-compliance with the statutory requirements and the precedents established by higher courts. It refrains from addressing other submissions made during the proceedings, as they are deemed unnecessary in light of the primary issue of eligibility. The judgement was delivered on June 4, 2024, concluding the court’s deliberation on the matter and providing a final resolution to the legal dispute brought before it.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Delhi HC upholds student rights to readmission for attendance issues

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Case Title: Tripurari Kumar Jha v. Faculty of Law, University of Delhi & Anr.

Case Number: LPA 703/2023

 Dated On: Reserved on 03.05.2024, Pronounced on 31.05.2024 

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajiv Shakdher, Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Bansal

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, a student in the LLB program at Delhi University, was detained due to insufficient attendance during the first term of the academic year. The University asserted that there was no provision for readmission if a student was detained for attendance issues in the first term. Delhi University maintained that the amendments made to Ordinance V, specifically Appendix II, in 2007, prohibited the readmission of students who failed to meet the attendance criteria in the first term. This stance was supported by a resolution passed by the University’s Academic Council on December 12, 2007. On July 12, 2012, an amendment to Ordinance IV introduced Article 5(b), which allowed for the readmission of students detained due to a shortage of attendance. This amendment came after the changes to Ordinance V and was argued to supersede it. The appellant argued that the readmission provision in Ordinance IV should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The appellant asserted that under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV, the University had the power to readmit students, and this provision should apply to all disciplines, including professional courses like LLB. The University cited previous judgments to support its position that provisions in the Prospectus or Information Bulletin are binding on students. However, these cases dealt with different contexts and did not specifically address readmission due to attendance shortfalls. The Bar Council of India indicated that students could be readmitted if they failed to meet attendance requirements for genuine reasons. The BCI suggested that such students could be accommodated in the subsequent academic year within the sanctioned seats. The court analysed the hierarchical structure and powers conferred by the DU Act, highlighting that the Court is the supreme authority with the power to review acts of the Executive Council (EC) and the Academic Council (AC). The court found that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV, added later, should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The court concluded that the University’s contention was flawed and that it indeed had the power to readmit students under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The court emphasised the need for the University to exercise compassion and consideration for students facing genuine difficulties, aligning with the BCI’s perspective on maintaining educational standards while accommodating genuine cases.

ISSUES

  • Whether the amendments to Ordinance V in 2007 restricting readmission were superseded by the later insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012.
  • Whether the powers of university bodies like the EC, AC, and Court in matters of readmission were clearly defined under the Delhi University Act.
  • Whether the university’s policies on readmission were in line with BCI recommendations, especially in accommodating students facing genuine difficulties.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Delhi University Act: The primary legislation governing the establishment, structure, and functioning of the University of Delhi.
  • Statutes: Rules and regulations derived from the Delhi University Act, providing detailed provisions on various aspects of the university’s administration and operations.
  • Ordinances: Specific regulations within the university’s framework, derived from the Delhi University Act and statutes, detailing procedures and criteria for matters such as admission, promotion, examination, and readmission.
  • Bar Council of India (BCI) Guidelines: External standards and recommendations provided by the Bar Council of India, particularly relevant in matters concerning legal education, curriculum, and student welfare within the university’s law programs.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant argued that the power of readmission for students detained due to attendance issues is vested in the University under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which seemingly restricted readmission, were superseded by the subsequent insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012. The University’s contention that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV was inapplicable to professional courses, such as LLB, is flawed. The University’s failure to exercise the power conferred upon it by Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV resulted in the erroneous denial of readmission to the appellant. These contentions formed the basis of the appellant’s argument challenging the University’s decision regarding student readmission.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent argued that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV did not apply to professional courses like LLB. They contended that the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which restricted readmission, were still applicable and had not been superseded by the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV. The University maintained that the appellant’s admission was cancelled due to a shortfall in attendance, and they did not have the authority to grant readmission under the prevailing ordinances. Additionally, the University asserted that accommodating readmissions for students like the appellant would adversely affect available seats for fresh admissions, creating logistical challenges. These contentions formed the core of the respondent’s defence against the appellant’s claims regarding readmission.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court examined the provisions of Ordinance IV and Ordinance V to determine the university’s authority regarding readmission for students detained due to attendance issues. It concluded that the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012 superseded the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, thereby conferring the power of readmission to the university.

The court clarified the authority of various university bodies, including the Executive Council (EC), the Academic Council (AC), and the Court, in matters related to readmission. It emphasised that the university had the power to grant readmission, particularly in cases where genuine reasons, such as illness, warranted leniency.

The court highlighted the importance of aligning university policies with the guidelines and recommendations of the Bar Council of India (BCI). It emphasised the need for compassion and understanding towards students facing genuine difficulties, as advised by the BCI.

In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the appellant, allowing the appeal and directing the university to re-admit the appellant with suitable adjustments. The judgement underscored the university’s responsibility to consider genuine reasons for readmission and ensure alignment with BCI guidelines to maintain high standards in education.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Environment conversation, Urban Development with a direction of Municipal Authorities: Delhi High court

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Case Title: Ravinder Tyagi vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another

Case Number: W.P.(C) 4708/2024 & C.M.No.19283/2024

Dated On: 02nd April, 2024

Qoram: Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves a public interest litigation (PIL) filed by Ravinder Tyagi against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and another respondent, with Mr. Nikhil Palli representing the MCD. The petitioner, appearing in person, has raised several issues related to the alleged removal of trees and illegal encroachments in the Gandhi Maidan Parking area and H.C. Sen Road in Delhi. Ravinder Tyagi asserts that 23 Peepal trees, which existed between the entry and exit gates of Gandhi Maidan Car Parking towards the eastern side, were illegally cut or removed by the respondents. He further claims that respondent no. 2 has encroached upon the side pavement, merging it with the space occupied by Omaxe Mall. Additionally, the petitioner contends that iron grills and barricades were installed on the side pavement, resulting in the area being used for staff parking, thereby causing inconvenience to the public. The petitioner references an earlier court order dated 30th August 2018, where the then Deputy Commissioner of Delhi Municipal Corporation assured that 65 trees around the proposed Multi-Level Car Parking at Gandhi Maidan would not be cut for redevelopment purposes. Despite this assurance, the petitioner alleges that the respondents violated this undertaking by removing the trees and making unauthorized constructions. Upon reviewing the petition, the court noted that the petitioner had not provided any prior notice to the respondents before filing the writ petition. Furthermore, the petitioner did not obtain any sanction plan under the Right to Information (RTI) Act from the MCD. The photographs submitted by the petitioner did not provide clear evidence that the 23 Peepal trees were cut for the construction project, contrary to the MCD’s previous undertaking. The court acknowledged the importance of the issues raised and disposed of the writ petition with a directive. The Deputy Commissioner of City Sadar Paharganj Zone, MCD, was instructed to treat the writ petition as a representation and to issue a reasoned order within four weeks, after providing the petitioner an opportunity for a hearing. The court also allowed the petitioner the liberty to pursue appropriate legal proceedings if he is dissatisfied with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision.

ISSUES

  • Whether the respondents illegally removed 23 Peepal trees
  • Whether the respondents engaged in unauthorized encroachment and construction.
  • Whether the installation of iron grills and barricades by the respondents caused public inconvenience.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Environmental Protection Act, 1986: This Act provides a framework for the protection and improvement of the environment and for matters connected therewith.
  • Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: This Act aims to conserve forests and regulate diversion of forest lands for non-forest purposes, which may include tree removal.
  • Public Interest Litigation (PIL): PIL allows citizens to seek judicial intervention in matters of public interest, including environmental issues.
  • Municipal Laws and Regulations: Local municipal laws and regulations may govern land use, construction, and environmental protection within their jurisdictions.
  • Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act): The RTI Act empowers citizens to request information from public authorities, which may be relevant for obtaining documents such as sanction plans for construction projects.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The petitioner contends that 23 Peepal trees between the entry and exit gates of Gandhi Maidan Car Parking were unlawfully removed by the respondents, contrary to an assurance by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. The removal of these trees is alleged to be in violation of prior commitments regarding redevelopment plans for the parking area. The petitioner asserts that respondent no. 2 has engaged in unauthorized encroachment by merging the side pavement with the space occupied by Omaxe Mall. Additionally, unauthorized constructions have allegedly been raised in areas previously occupied by Bapu Market and where the 23 Peepal trees stood. The petitioner claims that respondent no. 2 installed iron grills on the side pavements and placed barricades around the area, causing public inconvenience and restricting access. These installations are purportedly used for parking staff vehicles, leading to inconvenience for the general public.

CONTENTIOS OF TE RESPONDENT

The respondent may deny the allegations of illegally removing 23 Peepal trees and argue that any tree removal was conducted lawfully and in accordance with relevant regulations. They might contend that the removal was necessary for legitimate reasons, such as redevelopment or maintenance purposes. Regarding the alleged unauthorized encroachment and construction, the respondent may argue that any constructions made were duly authorized and compliant with applicable laws and regulations. They might present evidence to support the legality of the constructions and dispute the petitioner’s claims of encroachment. The respondent could justify the installation of iron grills and barricades on the side pavements as necessary measures for public safety or traffic management. They might argue that these installations were implemented in accordance with relevant regulations and were essential for the efficient operation of the area. The respondent may raise procedural defenses, such as the petitioner’s failure to provide prior notice or obtain necessary approvals before filing the petition. They might argue that proper procedures were not followed in initiating the legal action and request the court to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court observes that the petitioner has alleged the illegal removal of 23 Peepal trees, unauthorized encroachment, and construction by the respondent, as well as the installation of iron grills and barricades causing public inconvenience. However, upon reviewing the evidence presented, the court finds it unable to conclusively determine at this stage whether the allegations are valid. The court notes the absence of prior notice to the respondents before filing the petition and the petitioner’s failure to obtain necessary approvals under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Despite the uncertainties regarding the allegations, the court acknowledges the importance of the issues raised by the petitioner. Given the significance of the matter, the court decides to dispose of the petition with a directive to the Deputy Commissioner, City Sadar Paharganj Zone, MCD.

The court instructs the Deputy Commissioner to treat the writ petition as a representation and decide on it through a reasoned order within four weeks. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to provide the petitioner with an opportunity for a hearing before making a decision. In the event that the petitioner is dissatisfied with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision, the petitioner is granted liberty to pursue appropriate legal proceedings in accordance with the law.

This judgment demonstrates the court’s commitment to addressing issues of public interest while ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to legal requirements. The court’s directive allows for the resolution of the matter through administrative channels, providing the petitioner with an opportunity to present their case and seek redressal in a structured manner.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Delhi High Court Dismisses Petition for School Admission Denied Over Discrepancies and Lack of Allotment

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Case title: MASTER HITESH VERMA VS. DAV PUBLIC SCHOOL & ANR.

Case no:  W.P.(C) 2129/2024

Order on: 29.02. 2024

Qoram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Fact of the case:

A student named Hitesh Verma, represented by his father, belonging to the Other Backward Classes (OBC), applied for school admission. Applied for admission under the Disadvantaged Group (DG) category through the Department of Education (DoE). His name was selected through a lottery system run by the Department of Education (DoE). The school he was allotted, DAV Public School, refused to admit him. The petitioner’s father approached various authorities but did not immediately seek judicial redress. A year later, Hitesh’s father filed a writ petition asking for Hitesh to be admitted to Class II at the same school for the subsequent academic year.

Legal provisions:

  • Right to Education Act (RTE Act):

The RTE Act ensures that children have the right to free and compulsory education, which includes provisions for admission of children from disadvantaged groups.

  • Writ of Mandamus:

A writ of mandamus is a judicial order directing a government official or entity to perform a duty that they are legally obligated to complete.

  • Doctrine of Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium:

This legal maxim means “where there is a right, there is a remedy.” It implies that a remedy must be available when a legal right is infringed

Contentions of Appellant:

The petitioner, Hitesh Verma, argued that he was entitled to admission to Class I at DAV Public School based on the allotment by the Department of Education (DoE) through a computerized lottery system. Despite being informed of his selection, the school refused to admit him. Hitesh’s father claimed that he approached various authorities to resolve the issue but received no assistance. Due to the refusal of admission to Class I, the petitioner sought a court order to admit Hitesh to Class II at the same school.

Contentions of Respondents:

The school’s counsel, Mr. Yogesh Kumar, who acted as respondent, pointed out discrepancies between the details filled in the original application for admission and the details provided in the writ petition. The respondent argued that the petitioner had only been allotted a seat in Class I, not Class II. There was no allotment or entitlement for admission to Class II through any subsequent lottery.

Court analysis& Judgement:

The court acknowledged the discrepancies in the details provided by the petitioner’s father. However, the father explained that these errors were due to mistakes made by his wife when filling out the forms. The court emphasized that the right to admission under the Disadvantaged Group (DG) category can only be enforced if it stems from an allotment by the DoE through the computerized draw of lots. The petitioner was only allotted a seat in Class I and did not seek timely judicial redress for the refusal of admission in that class. The court ruled that it cannot issue a writ of mandamus to direct the school to admit the petitioner to Class II without an allotment for that class by the DoE. Such a writ would lack an enforceable right and could unfairly prejudice other students who might have applied and been shortlisted for Class II through the proper procedures. The petition was dismissed. The court stated that without a DoE allotment for Class II, there was no enforceable right to admission. The court did not award any costs and highlighted the importance of addressing such issues contemporaneously.

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Judgement Reviewed By- Antara Ghosh

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