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A conditional offer made with a further condition will not result in a concluded contract until and unless the original offeror accepts the further condition proposed by the acceptor. The Supreme Court bench consisting of J. Navin Sinha and J. Indira Banerjee, reversed the decisions given by the lower courts and decided upon the requirements for a concluded contract in the matter of M/s Padia Timber Company (P) Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam [Civil Appeal No. 7469 of 2008].

The respondent, on 17.7.1990, had floated a tender for supply of Wooden Sleepers to which the appellant submitted their offer and mentioned specifically that the inspection of the sleepers would be conducted at the depot of the appellant only. The appellants disagreed to two of the clauses in the original tender which said the purchaser would not pay separately for transit and that the purchaser had 30 days to notify any loss/damage and if so found, then the same would be rejected and returned to the supplier. The appellant rather made a counter offer and also deposited Rs. 75,000/- towards earnest deposit. The appellant made it clear that if the respondent wanted to inspect the goods at the site of the respondent, then the appellant would charge 24% above the rate quoted for the supply. The respondent accepted the offer but further imposed a condition that the transport would have to by road at the cost of the appellant and a request was made to extend the delivery period. The appellant did not accept this offer and sent a letter rejecting the proposal and requesting the respondent  to return the earnest money deposited. On the same day, the controller stores of the respondent put up an office notice seeking sanction against the Chairman for placing orders from the appellant. The respondent warned the appellant that if the supply was not made then the risk purchase would be made at the cost of the appellant and stated that the order was placed duly well within the period of validity of the price quoted by the appellant.

Since the appellant failed to supply the good, the respondent filed a suit before the court of II Additional Subordinate Judge seeking damages for breach of contract. Later, the respondent submitted the written statement and filed another suit claiming the refund of earnest money deposited. The two suits were heard together and the Trial Court held that the contract had been concluded and that the appellant had breached its obligations and the respondents were entitled  to damages as claimed. On appeal, the High Court dismissed the same, affirming the trial court’s orders.

The Supreme Court, in the present appeal, relying on the case of Harwinder Singh v. Bagun Sumbui and Ors. [AIR 1972 SC 1242], held that “ It is a cardinal principle of the law of contract that the offer and acceptance of an offer must be absolute. It can give no room for doubt. The offer and acceptance must be based or founded on three components, that is, certainty, commitment and communication. However, when the acceptor puts in a new condition while accepting the contract already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts that condition”. Further the court stated that an acceptance with variation is no acceptance at all and that a counter proposal is to be accepted by the original proposal before a contract is made. The SC held that the appellant was not in breach of contract therefore, was not liable to pay the damages and the respondents were ordered to return the earnest money deposited to the appellants.

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Repetition of a bailable offence by a person can render the bail granted as cancelled and he/she can be arrested by the police. This was laid down by Hon’ble Justice Sreenivas Harish Kumar in the case Aluka Sundra Orewa vs. State of Karnataka [Criminal Petition 6286 of 2020] in the High Court of Karnataka.

In the instant case, the petition for granting bail was filed by a foreigner living on a student visa, who was accused of an offence punishable under Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act. The complainant had lost Rs.90000 from her bank account that was withdrawn from an ATM counter. It was discovered in the course of the investigation that the accused had used a forged ATM card made by using a skimmer and withdrew the money from the bank account of the complainant.

The main task for the court was to decide the relevant provisions that cover the aforesaid crime and whether it fell under the category of bailable or non-bailable offences. This required a close analysis of the nature of the crime committed. The counsel for the petitioner stated that the allegations made do not fall under section 420 of IPC and cannot be considered cheating as there had been no dishonest inducement.

On the other hand, the government pleader highlighted the fact that the accused has been involved in some other 60 cases of similar nature. He called the petitioner a habitual offender who would most likely repeat the crime if left unchecked. Moreover, the pleader also attempted to frame charges on the accused under Section 420 and Section 468 of the IPC by creating a link between ‘fixing the device to the ATM’ and ‘cheating’.

The court made an interesting observation with respect to the grant of bail. It said even when bail is related to the liberty of an individual this liberty cannot be misused. The court relied on the case of Supreme Court- Ratilal Bhanji Mithani vs Assistant Collector of Customs [AIR 1967 SC 1639] where it was held “cancellation of bail by the High Court under its inherent power does not deprive the personal liberty of an individual if his conduct subsequent to grant of bail hampers the trial”

After listening to both sides of the arguments the court proceeded to decide in favor of the petitioner. The court stated that even though the act amounts to cheating and dishonest inducement after the I.T. Act came into the picture, the court shall apply the provisions of the latter Act here. This implies that the offence is bailable nature and she was granted bail.

Nevertheless, the court reprimanded the accused that any future involvement in a crime would render her bail canceled and she could be immediately arrested.

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There is no prohibition in possessing skins of dead animals and the intention of the Parliament in the relevant statue is clear regarding in by only focusing on the word ‘flesh’ and not ‘skin’. This ratio was laid down by the Bombay High Court presided over by J. V.M. Deshpande & J. A.S. Kilor in the case of Shafiquallah Kha Ashfaqullha Kha Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [Criminal Application (APL) No. 688 of 2018].

The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged by the Bajrang Dal president alleging that the Applicant’s vehicle was found to be carrying 187 skins of cow species. The animal husbandry confirmed that the skin was of different cow species. The FIR consisted that the possession of skin was illegal. Aggrieved by the FIR of the Police the Applicant filed the present application to quash the FIR.

The Applicant contended that the Applicant was merely a driver who was transporting the skin to a Merchant who had a valid license for selling raw hide. Further, there was no contravention of any section of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976. The Prosecution’s case is that the Applicant is liable for the alleged crimes committed under Section 5-(A), 5-(B), 5-(C) and 9-(A) of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act 1976.

The division bench of the Bombay High Court allowed the Application in the present case and quashed the FIR. The Court firstly analyzed the relevant section of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976. The Court was of the opinion that the Sections cited by the Prosecution prohibit transfer and sale of cows or bullocks for the slaughter but in this case only skin of the dead cows was being transported there was no contravention of the above given sections. Further, there was no contravention of Section 5-(C) of the Act as it only prohibited possession of the ‘flesh’ of cows, bulls and bullocks and in the present case the Applicant was just in possession of the cow skins. The intention of the legislature was quite clear when they included and focused on the words ‘flesh’ hence the Applicant is not in contravention of any section of the statue and has not carried out any illegal activity.

The Court in this case has relied upon its previous rulings in the case of Shaikh Najir Shaikh Umar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Israrul Haq Nisar Ahmed & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. in both these cases the court held that raw skin of the cattle is not covered under the Statue.

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“A promise of marriage cannot be held as an inducement for engaging in sex over a protracted and indefinite period of time.” The Delhi High Court laid down this ratio while dismissing an appeal of a woman that challenged the order of the lower court acquitting the man, she had accused of raping her on the pretext of marriage. The court presided over by J. V. Bakhru in the case of X Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), [CRL.A. 613/2020 & CRL.M.A. 16968/2020].

The facts of the case are that the Appellant filed an FIR against the accused alleging that she has been raped by him. The woman alleges that she shared a physical relationship with this man in the year 2008 and after a period of 3 to 4 months, the man promised to marry her but later he had a relationship with another woman. Therefore, the woman has alleged that she has been raped by the accused.

The trial court after analyzing the evidence and testimony acquitted the Accused and they further observed that the Appellant continued to have physical relationship even after the accused was with another woman and therefore stated, “It is thus evident that the prosecutrix established physical relations with the accused of her own free will and accord as she had genuine affection for the accused and that in the first instance her consent for physical relations had not been obtained by the accused by making any promise of marriage to her.” The Appellant aggrieved by this order filed an Appeal in the High Court.

The Single bench judge of the Delhi High Court upheld the order of the trial court and stated that “In some of the cases, people agree to have sex after the promise of marriage is made. However, the same does not apply to cases with long-term intimacy.” The Court with respect to consent stated that, “In certain cases, a promise of marriage may induce a party to agree to establish sexual relations, even though the party does not desire to consent to the same. Such inducements in a given moment may elicit consent, even though the concerned party may want to say no.” But in this particular case physical relationship between the two was much before the promise to marry.

The Court also relied on the landmark judgment of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Another: (2019) SCC online SC 1073, in which the court held that “Consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action.”

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Power to order reinvestigation or transfer of investigation needs to be exercised judiciously. The High Court bench consisting of J. Yogesh Khanna, in the matter of CD Pharma India Private Limited v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. [W.P. (CRL) 999/2020 & Crl. M.A. No. 8526/2020], decided upon when ordering a reinvestigation was necessary.

The writ petition filed is on the account of subversion of entire process of law by the Investigating officer and other officers to shield an accused due to the undue influence of the lawyer of the accused. During the proceedings in Switzerland against the accused for money laundering, it is submitted that the lawyer, Mr. Bagianti asserted that during his visit to India, he met police officials who were incharge of the investigation and was also provided direct access to the entire case file. Mr. Bagianti categorically stated that he directly examined the case file which included the names of witnesses, witness statements and other incriminating evidence against the accused. The learned counsel for petitioner argued that this was completely illegal and strictly prohibited under Section 172 of the Cr.P.C. and the investigation was hence compromised. It was pleaded that the court ordered transfer of investigation from Delhi Police to CBI/ Crime Branch as a deep rooted nexus was apparent between the accused and the State machinery. It was further argued that the main accused was never summoned despite there being an FIR against him.

The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the case of the petitioner is based on the fact that Mr. Bagianti got access to the case diary and had prior knowledge of the closure of this case, though on merits there was no actual challenge before the court. The counsel further argued that the investigation was complete way before the lawyer had the access as stated by the petitioner and hence, the investigation itself was not compromised.

The HC stated that “The power to order reinvestigation or transfer of investigation needs to be exercised judiciously and not at the mere asking. It can be ordered only if the conscious of the Court is shaken to the standard of investigation”. Relying on K. V. Rajendra v. Superintendent of Police, Chennai & Ors. [(2013) 12 SCC 480], where it was held that “where the investigation is complete & charge-sheet filed, ordinarily superior courts should not reopen the investigation and it be left open to the court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law”, the HC said the power of de-novo investigation needed to be exercised in rare and exceptional cases in order to do justice, where the investigation lacked credibility. However, the HC ordered that it would be appropriate if a senior officer of EOW of the level if Special Commissioner, not earlier associated with the investigation, looked into the case hereon, and hence, without ordering re-investigation, disposed off the petition.  

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