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Law does not require a particular number of circumstances so as to establish the chain. It altogether depends upon the nature of the transaction. In a particular case, there may be few circumstances that are strong enough which leads to the guilt of the accused. There may be more circumstances that may be relied upon by the prosecution. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. This remarkable judgment was passed by the Bombay High Court in the matter of SANDIP BABURAO WAIDANDE V THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 974 OF 2019] by Honourable Justice Prasanna B. Varale and Justice S. M. Modak.

This case was a criminal appeal filed against the judgment and conviction under section 302 of IPC by Sessions Judge and the HC was required to upon the issue of circumstantial evidence through a narrow compass since the issue involved in this appeal is whether the link in between the incident of murder and the accused is established on the basis of proved circumstances.

In the present case, the accused and his wife were labourers and on the day of the incident, both the accused and deceased went from duty a little early due to the stomach pain of the accused and then slept. On next day when the first informant went to wake them up, he saw Nirmala’s dead body but did not notice the accused and went and lodged a complaint. Police arrested accused and filed a charge sheet for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.

The prosecution relied upon the circumstances of- Last seen theory, Motive, noticing soaked blood stains on the clothes of the accused and Absconding himself from the spot of the incident even though his wife is murdered.

The Court in this regard stated that they will rely on the golden principles laid down for appreciating circumstantial evidence. “The principles are: –

1. a) The circumstance relied upon must be fully established.
2. b) They must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused.
3. c) They should be conclusive in nature. Only inference about guilt of the accused is to be inferred.
4. d) There should be complete chain of evidence so as not to lead any doubt about the involvement of the accused.”

The HC relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 and stated, “last seen circumstance has to be proved just like any other circumstance. The only difference is once the prosecution will prove that both the deceased and accused were found lastly together then certainly it is for the accused to explain about whereabouts or what has happened about his companion. In this exercise, the time of last seen and time of death also plays important role.”

The Court observed that “Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Court to put questions in two eventualities. One is optional and it may be at any stage of the proceeding. Whereas 2nd is mandatory and it is after prosecution witnesses were examined” and decided to neither remit the matter nor put the questions to the accused since “the circumstance of the last seen together is considered, we do not think that other circumstances are sufficient enough to prove the guilt of the accused i.e., neither recovery at the instance of the accused nor there is direct evidence. Even evidence on the point of motive is insufficient. So, certainly, we are of the opinion that prejudice is caused to the accused.”

Additionally, High Court found the Trial Court’s decision about the arrest of the accused to be flawed since there were no supporting documents. Also, the Bench stated that, “merely because there was a huge time gap in between the timing of last seen together and probable timing of death the evidence of last seen together could not be rejected in all cases.”

Thus, on basis of analyzing the witnesses and the prosecution and accused statements and submissions, the Court stated, “Prosecution had sufficiently proved the circumstances of last seen together. However, the Court opined that the circumstance of motive is not proved and evidence on the point of arrest and seizure of clothes was not trustworthy. So, Court felt that the chain of circumstances was not established.”

Hence, High Court held that there was grave suspicion on the accused that he had committed the murder of his own wife but suspicion could not take place of proof hence conviction was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

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Scheduled offense investigated by the NIA can be tried only by a Special Court that has been constituted by the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act. Only one Special Court in terms of Section 11 of the NIA Act has been constituted for whole of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and there is no other Special Court, constituted by the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act, which is located within the jurisdiction of this High Court.This was held in Davinder Singh V. Union of India and others.[Trp (Crl) No. 11/2020] in the High Court of Jammu And Kashmir by single bench consisting of JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR.

Facts are that NIA has submitted a challan against the petitioner and other accused U/S.173 (2) of Cr. P. C alleging commission of offenses under IPC, UAPA, Arms Act and Explosive Substances, Act before the Court of Special Judge Jammu. The petitioner U/S.407 of CrPC seeking transfer of from the Special Court Jammu to the Special Court in Srinagar for trial.

The counsel for petitioner contended that most of the witnesses whose statements are yet to be recorded in trial Court pertain to Kashmir division and it would be convenient to hold the trial at Srinagar. It is further contended that the petitioner is a resident of Indra Nagar, Srinagar he has no relation to Jammu where the trial is to be conducted.

The counsel for respondent contended that there is no ground for transfer of the case from Jammu to Srinagar. There is only one Special Court in whole of the Union Territory, which has been designated as a Special Court in terms of S.11 of the NIA Act as such the challan which is subject matter of the instant petition cannot be tried by any other Court in Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The court made reference to Section 11 of the NIA Act which empowers the Central Government to constitute one or more Special Courts for trial of scheduled offenses. Section 13 of the same Act provides for jurisdiction of the Special Court. The Court interpreted of law under section 11, 13 and 22 of the  NIA act and observed that, “A case pertaining to scheduled offense investigated by the NIA can be tried only by a Special Court that has been constituted by the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act. Transfer of such a case can be made to only to any other Special Court constituted by the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act and not to any other Special Court constituted under any other provision of the Act.”

Considering the law and the facts of the case the court held that, the Special Court constituted at Srinagar lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the cases pertaining to offenses under scheduled enactments which have been investigated by the National Investigating Agency. Thus the challan cannot be tried by the Special Court at Srinagar, dismissing the petition.

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The Court cannot condone the delay beyond the period of ninety days as stipulated under Rule 4 of DHC(OS) Rules. There is no provision to the aforesaid effect. Once it has been held that the provisions of Rule 4 of DHC(OS) Rules are mandatory and, the Court does not have jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond a period of ninety days. This was held in MR. HARJYOT SINGH v. MRS. MANPREET KAUR [IA No. 3129/2020 & IA No. 2945/2020] in the High Court of New Delhi by a single bench consisting of JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU.

Facts are that the plaintiff had filed a suit in which the Court had directed issuance of summons as well as notice of the applications filed by the plaintiff seeking interim relief under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. The Court had passed ex-parte ad-interim orders. After which the defendant filed the written statement along with the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the same.

The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the written statement was filed beyond the period of 120 days from the receipt of summons. He referred to Rule 4 of Chapter-VII of the DHC Rules and submitted that although the court could condone the delay for a period of 90 days, the delay beyond the said period cannot be condoned. The defendant had not established that she was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the written statement within the period as stipulated in Rule 4 of the DHC Rules.

The learned counsel for the respondent contended in noncommercial suits, the Court had the discretion to condone the delay in filing the written statement even beyond the period as prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Desh Raj v. Balkishan (Dead) through LR’s Ms. Rohini. And he contended that the defendant had not been served with the summons in the suit.

The court in order to discuss the limited discretions in condoning the delay that is under the purview of a court referred to the judgement of Ram Sarup Lugani and Another v. Nirmal Lugani and Others., wherein the following observations were made, “The Division Bench of this Court had interpreted the words ‘but not thereafter as used in Rule 4 of the DHC(OS) Rules, as limiting the jurisdiction of this Court to condone the delay only to the period as mentioned, which in the case of the written statement is 90 days. The court had also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Desh Raj v Balkishan”

Considering the facts of the case and keeping in mind the settled proposition of law on the subject. The Court held that Rule 4 of the DHC Rules is a rule of procedure and insofar as expedient, a liberal view in condoning the delay ought to be taken by the Court, however, that does not mean that the said Rule can be completely ignored or should be interpreted to render it meaningless. Consequently, the court allowed the plaintiff’s application for removing the written statement on record and documents filed by the defendant.

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Affinity test may not be regarded as a litmus test for establishing the link of the applicant with a particular Caste. Thus, the affinity test may be used to corroborate the documentary evidence and should not be the sole criteria to reject a claim. This remarkable judgment was recently passed by Bombay High Court in the matter of SHRI VIJAYSING AJABSING PATIL V RESEARCH OFFICER, DISTRICT. CASTE VERIFICATION COMMITTEE [WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 7238 OF 2021] by Honourable Justice K.K.Tated and Justice Abhay Ahuja.

Through this Writ Petition, the Petitioner is seeking quashing and setting aside of the order passed by District Caste Verification Committee, Thane invalidating the caste claim of the Petitioner as ‘Rajput Bhamta’.

It is the claim of the Petitioner that he belongs to Hindu Rajput Bhamta caste which falls in V.J. category and has therefore submitted proposal for caste verification after which the caste claim of the Petitioner was subjected to inquiry by the Vigilance Cell. Through the Vigilance report it was submitted the petitioner’s caste appeared to be ‘Rajput Bhamta’ and hence the Petitioner was should file a fresh proposal and later received a notice issued by Additional Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai that he was called for hearing.

Petitioner participated in the said hearing and a request to submit caste validity certificate within a period of 15 days or else suitable action would be initiated against the Petitioner. After submission of documents, scrutiny of documents was directed and issued notice to submit written explanation as the documents were insufficient and inconclusive to prove caste claim.

Petitioner submitted that the caste scrutiny committee has noted that the said documents have been verified with the original copy and found to be true and therefore there is no reason why the caste scrutiny committee has not considered the same to grant the caste claim of Petitioner.

The Court further observed that “From the Genealogy set out above, Petitioner is the real brother of Suryasing and his father is Ajabsing and grandfather is Waman. His cousin uncle is Narendrasing who is the son of Prakash comes from the lineage of cousin great grandfather Daulat. Thus, it is evident that the caste scrutiny committee has considered the documents that have been submitted by the Petitioner. Petitioner’s real brother Suryasing Ajabsing Patil in respect of the caste claim of ‘Rajput Bhamta’

The Court also added that “Petitioner’s grandfather Waman Gulaba Khanderao, the caste has been mentioned as ‘Rajput’. The original record of village form produced by the Tahasildar office before the committee, at that time it was noticed that the caste of the grandfather was mentioned as ‘Rajput’ and not as ‘Rajput Bhamta’.”

The Court relied on Supreme Court in the case of Madhuri Patil V/s. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Department AIR 1995 SC (94) and observed that, “It is obvious that Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to issue Cast certificate and it is a void certificate.”

And also added that “When the Vigilance Squad made enquiry in respect of the said School Leaving Certificate, they noticed that the caste mentioned in the said document is only ‘Rajput’ and not Rajput Bhamta. The entries made in the school and Revenue proofs of the grandfather, submitted by the Applicant along with the Application are from the pre-independence period and the same is very important entries.”

Thus, the HC stated that “No fault can be found with the findings of the Scrutiny Committee. Based on clear evidence as recorded in the Impugned Order, we find that Form No.14 in the name of the grandfather as well as the School Leaving Certificates of grand-father refer to the caste as “Rajput” and not “Rajput Bhamta”. Even the father’s School Leaving Certificate mentions the caste as ‘Rajput’ and not ‘Rajput Bhamta’. Real brother Suryasingh’s caste certificate has been invalidated earlier. With respect of the Petitioner’s affinity test, the committee has clearly found that no similarity is seen as per the affinity test given by the Petitioner during the course of the hearing on 10th March, 2021 and the same has not been held to be valid for the Petitioner’s claim to ‘Rajput Bhamta’ caste.”

The HC dismissed the writ petition and since they agreed with the findings of the District authorities as the petitioner’s caste claim was invalid.

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It is for the High Court to proceed with the writ petition and decide the same, including the maintainability of the PIL, after hearing arguments on which point the orders were reserved. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of Justice V. Eshwaraiah v. Union of India & Ors. [SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.6100 OF 2021] by The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.

This special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner, a non-party, to the Writ Petition PIL questioning the order passed in the writ petition. The respondent, BC SC ST Minority Student Federation, a registered society under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 has filed the Writ Petition as the Public Interest Litigation praying to implement its guidelines in true spirit in order to prevent Covid-19 pandemic from spreading further, by its own machinery and State machinery in coordination to function effectively. The respondent, filed a preliminary counter affidavit, the locus of the Society to file the PIL was questioned. It was pleaded that PIL is not a genuine PIL having substantial public interest, that petition had been filed by a political person to political gain and to malign the High Court. The former Justice V. Eswaraiah had also submitted a complaint with the same allegations to the President of India referred herein against the Chief Justice. After retirement Justice had obtained a post retirement office and after achieving the said post retirement office, he wanted to support the State Government under the cover of BC association maligning the High Court. It was pleaded in the preliminary counter affidavit that filing of the petition is mala fide and to achieve the oblique intention.

The court opinioned that, “The High Court in its judgment as extracted above has clearly observed that the enquiry will not have any direct bearing on the issue involved in the main writ petition except to the extent of deciding the allegations made in paragraph 13 of the preliminary counter affidavit. High Court had closed hearing on the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the PIL and when I.A. Nos. 7 and 8 of 2020 were filed to reopen the writ petition, the question before the High Court was only with regard to maintainability of the writ petition.”

The Special leave petition was disposed of stating that, “We are of the view that the High Court ought not to have embarked on any other enquiry in the matter except to the maintainability of the PIL of the writ petitioner and the conversation filed before the High Court as well as the enquiry report sought was only with the above purpose. We have not issued notice in the special leave petition neither have entered into the merits of the writ petition, nor expressing any opinion on the maintainability of the Writ Petition, it is for the High Court to proceed with the writ petition and decide the same, including the maintainability of the PIL, after hearing arguments on which point the orders were reserved.”

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