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The effect of striking off the defense under Section 15(7) of the Act is not only in form of depriving the tenant of his right to defend the Eviction Petition, but would also lead to him losing the protection under Section 14(2) of the Act. Therefore, there can be no denial that such power is to be exercised sparingly and judiciously. This was held in SATISH PARASHAR V. PREM BIHARI (SINCE DECEASED) [TCM(M) 476/2020] in the HIGH COURT OF NEW DELHI by a single bench consisting of JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA.

Facts are that the respondent had filed an eviction petition, against the petitioner under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. The learned ARC passed the order U/S.15(1) of the Act. The petitioner aggrieved by the ARC order filed an application seeking review along with condonation of delay, which was dismissed. And on subsequent dismissal by RCT, the present petition was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of Arc proceeded on an incorrect presumption of the rate of rent. The reason for the delay in filing the application seeking review was the legal advice received in form of an application under Section 152 of the CPC. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Rafiq & Ors. vs. Munshilal & Ors.

The counsel for the respondent contended that the two Courts below had exercised their discretion in not condoning the delay and had allowed the application of the respondent under Section 15(7) of the Act, this Court should not interfere with the same in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The court also made reference to the judgement of the Apex court in, Miss. Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and Ors., wherein it was held that “Section 15(7) of the Act is a penal provision and is discretionary in nature. It has a built-in self-restraint and is to be resorted to in only exceptional circumstances and not in a routine manner following upon a mere failure to pay rent. It is an extreme power and therefore, should be exercised where the Court finds a willful failure, deliberate default, or volitional non-performance. It is not an automatic weapon and therefore, the last resort must not be converted into the first resort.”

The court in order to shed light on the use and application of section 15(7) DRC, Act, to strike out defense, also made reference to the Supreme Court judgement in Kamla Devi (Smt.) vs. Vasdev, wherein the following observations were made, “It is not obligatory for the Rent Controller to strike out the defense of the tenant under Section 15(7) of the Act if the tenant fails to make payment or deposit. It would depend upon the facts of the case and the discretion of the Controller whether such drastic order should or should not be passed.”

Considering the law and the facts of the case the court held that, there was a mistake in the order passed by the learned ARC wherein Rs.850/- per month was taken as the rate of rent, which was an issue of dispute between the parties. The same should have been rectified by the learned ARC. The court held that both ARC and RTC had failed to exercise the jurisdiction which was vested in them in failing to condone the purported default of the petitioner and consequently, striking off his defense. Thus the court set aside the order passed by RTC, allowing the petition.

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In matters concerning administrative appointments, the seniority of the transferee shall prevail as opposed to the direct recruits if the seniority predates the vacancy generated for the office of the latter. A bench comprising of Rajiv Sahai, J. and Amit Bansal J. observed in the matter of Yash Rattan v Union of India [W.P.(C) 3576/2021] that seniority shall not be claimed to a public office prior to induction into cadre.

The petitioners herein were appointed as Inspectors in the Delhi Commissionerate of the respondents in the year 2016 under the direct recruit quota. The private respondents (who were the petitioners before the CAT) were also direct recruits recruited in the year 2011 in various zones outside Delhi. At their request, they were transferred to the Delhi Zone in the year 2014. The main ground of challenge in the OA No. 2955/2019 was that the petitioners who had joined the department after the joining of the private respondents cannot be placed above them in the seniority list. The CAT set aside the seniority list, subsequent to which the present writ petition has been filed.

The counsel contending on behalf of the petitioners relied on the judgment of Union of India v N.R. Parmar ((2012) 13 SCC 340) and opined that the recruitment year would be the year of initiating the recruitment process against a vacancy year. The corresponding counsel pointed out that the judgment in N.R. Parmar stood prospectively overruled in K. Meghachandra Singh &Ors. Vs. Nigam Siro & Ors ((2020) 5 SCC 689). He further added that seniority position was not settled when the K. Meghachandra Singh judgment was delivered, as the private respondents had filed objections against the seniority list of 15th March, 2018 and further had challenged the same before the CAT before the K. Meghachandra Singh judgment was delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is wrong to state that the seniority position was settled.

The Court after a careful reading of the K. Meghachandra judgment followed through that seniority of direct recruits had to be fixed from the date of appointment and not from the date of initiation of the recruitment process, and any person aspiring to a vacant post does not have any vested right to it. The court further observed that “In service jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed from the date when the incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre and therefore, norms on assessment of inter se seniority, suggested in N.R. Parmar case was disapproved; decision in N.R. Parmar case is overruled, however, the decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R. Parmar case and the same is protected. Decision will apply prospectively.”

The bench opined that the CAT had correctly applied the dicta in the K. Meghachandra Singh case in the present case by quashing the seniority list. The court rendered the judgment that, “It is also an admitted position that in the present case requisitions for the appointment of the petitioners were sent to SSC the recruiting authority on 11th February, 2015, after the private respondents had already joined the Delhi Commissionerate. Therefore, even in terms of OM dated 4th March, 2014, the petitioners cannot be placed above the private respondents.”

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The CA being a determinable contract, under the provisions of Section 14(1)(c) of the SRA, no injunction could have been issued for howsoever short a duration and the impugned order to the extent it directs that the termination notice to be kept in abeyance is against the settled law. This was held in NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. PANIPAT JALANDHAR NH-I TOLLWAY PVT.LTD[FAO(OS)(COMM)55/2021] in the High Court of New Delhi by division bench consisting of JUSTICE MANMOHAN and  JUSTICE ASHA MENON.

Facts are that the respondent and the appellant had entered into a  Concession Agreement in which the appellant had issued a ‘Suspension Notice’ under Clause 36.1 of the CA suspending all rights of the respondent under the CA, which was followed by a Termination notice. The respondent had filed a petition U/S.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the court-ordered interim reliefs. The same has given rise to the present appeal by the appellant.

The counsel for the appellant the NHAI has prayed that interim order be set aside. The action taken by the appellant was fully in accordance with the terms of the CA, to suspend all rights of the concessionaire which relate to the collection of fee and other revenues and authorize itself or some other person to collect these revenues during the suspension period, that termination was not dependent on time limits. It was submitted that Articles 36 and 37 provide for a “composite scheme”.

The learned counsel for the respondent contended the Termination Notice was a colorable exercise of the power. It was further argued that none of the orders in the previous proceedings approved of such exercise of power of termination by the NHAI. If such termination was allowed, it would render the challenge of the respondent of the suspension, infructuous. Therefore, the interim order was just, fair, and equitable and called for no interference.

The court in order to discuss the maintainability of such appeals that are under the purview of an appellate court referred to the judgment of Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., wherein the following observations were made, “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions…”

The court also made reference to the judgment of the Apex court in, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others., wherein it was held that, “The finding in the award being that the Distributorship Agreement was revokable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is ‘a contract which is in its nature determinable. In the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which also may be attracted in the present case since clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to ‘the law governing such cases’ The grant of this relief in the award cannot, therefore, be sustained.”

Considering the facts of the case and keeping in mind the settled proposition of law on the subject. The Court held that as per the articles and clauses of the CA there was no doubt that the CA was determinable in nature. Just as in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra), both parties had been given a right to seek termination of the CA by issuing a notice under Article 37. The CA being a determinable contract, under the provisions of Section 14(1)(c) of the SRA, no injunction could have been issued for howsoever short a duration. The court thus allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.

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The courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Maharashtra and others [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 330 OF 2021] by The Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah.

The complainant had filed the appeal with the impugned interim order passed by  of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition, by which, in an application filed by under Article 226 of the Constitution of India r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings, the High Court had directed that “no coercive measures shall be adopted” against the accused in respect of the said FIR,. The appellant herein had lodged an FIR against accused at Worli Police Station, Mumbai for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Apprehending their arrest in connection with the aforesaid FIR, the accused filed anticipatory bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. The interim protection, which was granted, was further extended from time to time and continued nearly for a year thereafter. Liberty was granted to the original accused to file rejoinder. The High Court has passed the impugned interim order directing that “no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioners in respect of the said FIR”.

The court opinioned that, “Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases, Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule. The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation.”

The appeal was allowed by the court stating that, “The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court. The impugned interim order/direction contained in clause (d) of the impugned interim order by which the High Court has directed that “no coercive measures to be adopted” against the petitioners is hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is made clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits of the case, more particularly the allegations in the FIR and the High Court to consider the quashing petition in accordance with law and on its own merits”

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Transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused at the stage of framing the charge is not permissible. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 407 OF 2021] by The Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay caused in filing the special leave petition was condoned. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order was passed by the High Court of Rajasthan, had quashed the order passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Bharatpur, framed the charge against the respondent-accused for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and consequently had discharged the accused of the alleged offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the State had preferred the present appeal. The original accused was serving as a Patwari. The complainant submitted a written report before the police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bharatpur stating that for the purpose of issuing Domicile Certificate and OBC Certificate of his son, he had submitted an application enclosed with complete certificates before the accused for endorsing his report. In lieu of endorsing his report over the said application demanded a bribe of Rs.2,800/-. A charge sheet filed against the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. It was found that there was a prima facie case made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered at this stage. In high court it was also contended that on reading the entire transcript the factum of demand of Rs.2,800/- is not revealed.

The learned council referred the case of P. Vijayan v. State of Kerana, (2010) 2 SCC 398; Srilekha Sentil Kumar v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, (2019) 7 SCC 82; Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency (2019) 7 SCC 148; and State of Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515.

The court opinioned that, “High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 Cr.P.C. For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in detail the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused which exercise at this stage to consider the discharge application and/or framing of the charge is not permissible at all.”

The court allowed the appeal stating that, “the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court discharging the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is unsustainable in law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is hereby restored. Now the case is to be tried against the accused by the competent court for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, in accordance with law and its own merits.”

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