In a typical case of an acid attack carried out, the counsel for the accused argued on inconsistencies in the approach towards the witness by the court. The Delhi High Court in its single judge bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru, sternly stated that the failure of the counsel in cross examining a witness or his absence in court to do so will under no circumstances render the accused not guilty in the matter of Jagdish v State (NCT of Delhi), [CRL.A. 283/2017].  

In the present case, the accused threw acid on his wife and son while they were coming back from a public washroom at 6.45 am one morning, accompanied by the accused’s sister who had been staying with them as the wife alleged that the husband was not only a drug addict but also indulged in violent acts against her in an intoxicated state. The counsel for the appellant pointed out various inconsistencies to defend his client which were held not maintainable by the court. Firstly, he stated that since the victim went home after the attack and not directly to the hospital, the injuries received should be defined as “simple injuries” and punishment should be given accordingly. Secondly, the fact that the investigating officer failed to collect evidence in form of the clothes of the victim. Thirdly, that in the area where the attack took place being so densely populated, the failure to produce a public witness signifies the innocence of the accused. And lastly, the absence of the counsel in court himself to cross examine a witness should lead to the decrease in reliability of the witness. All the inconsistencies were countered by the counsel for respondent and the court too.

The court contended that “The first and foremost question to be addressed is whether the prosecution has established that the injuries suffered by the victims (Bimla and Sunny) were due to acid thrown at them as alleged”. Another observation made by the court was that, “It is also relevant to keep the timelines in mind.”

The court opined that “The inconsistency in the statement of PW2 and PW5, as to the number of public persons that had gathered at the spot, is also not material and does not to raise any doubts as to whether the appellant had committed the crime, for which he has been convicted.

The fact that the witnesses had not been cross-examined does not render the trial unfair. Undisputedly, the appellant was given full opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses and to test the veracity of their testimonies. As pointed out by Mr. Singhal, it was apposite for the investigation agency to have sent the clothes worn by the victim to FSL and also to have conclusively ascertained the acid/chemical thrown on the victims. However, their failure to do so in the given facts of this case, does not raise any doubt that the appellant is guilty of the crime for which he has been convicted.

The court further stated that “The contention that there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses is also unpersuasive. The statement of PW2 was recorded at the hospital. PW2 as well as PW10 had testified to the aforesaid effect. PW4 had also stated that he had given his statement in the hospital. In his cross-examination, PW4 had clarified that the statement of her sister (Bimla) was also recorded at the hospital. The inconsistency in the statement of PW2 and PW5, as to the number of public persons that had gathered at the spot, is also not material and does not to raise any doubts as to whether the appellant had committed the crime, for which he has been convicted”.

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There arises great travesty of justice for the rights of the victim in case of a faulty investigation done by the investigating officer. It is crucial that for the offence of murder that the investigating officer should investigate not only throughout the process but from when the information regarding the offence is brought into picture. “Therefore, it becomes essential that the investigation be conducted with the utmost regard for the procedure to be followed.” This remarkable judgement was passed by the Hon’ble The Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Kumar at Patna High Court in the matter of State of Bihar versus Niranjan [Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 491 of 2018].

The accused were charged for committing offences under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and was awarded death sentence by the Session court. Niranjan (one of the accused) was charged of murdering his wife and three kids to get her property. After the investigations conducted by the investigating officer, there were sufficient evidence against accused Niranjan while Birendra (another accused) was acquitted by the Session Court. Thus Niranjan filed this petition against his conviction and death sentence.

This court marked that it is a tough reality that the cases are judged upon material facts, evidences; and this lacks originality and stated that “It remains trite law that in judicial proceedings, the crime is proved by means of production of evidence, which is either oral or documentary. Evidence can subsequently be either direct or circumstantial. In a case, which primarily relies upon circumstantial evidence, the motive in a crime serves attains greater significance”.

The court relied on the judgement passed by the court in the matter of Govinda v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 SC 29 stating that “holding that the circumstances from which conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, should be conclusive and there must be a chain of evidence so as not to leave any ground consistent with the innocence of the accused and show within all human probabilities that act is done by the accused”.

The Court relied on the golden principles of the standard of proof required in a case sought to be established on circumstantial evidence which was given in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 and Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 and Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 stating that: “a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

The court contended that “It notes that not all circumstantial evidence may lead towards the complicity of one accused, sometimes it may mislead or false clues may be laid by the accused to shift the suspicion on another”.

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‘A batch of writ petitions’ were dismissed by the Kerala High Court wherein the court observed that since the court could not facilitate the completion of the election process, it could not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The single judge bench consisting of J. P B Suresh Kumar, shed light upon the scope of jurisdiction of the court in matters of election in the case of Biju Jacob v. State Election Commission [WPC 23297 of 2020].

The petitioner in this batch of writ petition challenged the allocation of reserved seats to different wards/divisions alleging that the aforesaid wards/divisions were successively reserved for two consecutive years (2010 and 2015) and have been reserved again this year. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on K.T. Eldhouse v. State of Kerala [WP (C) No. 21038 of 2020(D)], argued that “reserving a seat successively beyond two occasions, when reserved seats could be distributed in a manner that no seat would go reserved more than twice successively, is against the scheme of Articles 243D and 243T of the Constitution and also the relevant provisions contained in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994”. In the aforementioned judgement, the court directed the respondents to re-allocate the reserved seats. In the present case, the petitioners too were seeking such directions from court.

The counsel for the Election Commission, referring to the petitioner as ‘fence sitters’, argued that the court should not interfere with the decisions of the commission as it would interrupt and protract the election which has already been announced on 06.11.2020. Further it was argued that “if the writ petitions are allowed  if the writ petitions are allowed, as the nomination for the election needs to be submitted from 12.11.2020, there would be hardly any time to comply with the directions, for allocation of reserved seats afresh involves draw of lots after public notice regarding the time, date and place fixed for draw of lots”.

The HC, relying on the judgment of A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman v. Union of India [(1982) 2 SCC 218], wherein it was held that “if interference in a matter relating to election is likely to interrupt, obstruct or protract the election in any manner, the Court shall not exercise the power under Article 226”, decided to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction in this matter. The court also relied on Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar [(2000) 8 SCC 216] and further held that “the court shall interfere in matters relating to election only if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. True, the election process has not formally commenced inasmuch as the notification is yet to be published. But in so far as the election has already been announced and since it is found that this Court may not be in a position to complete the adjudication in these matters before the date for filing of the nominations, having regard to the spirit of the judgments of the Apex Court aforesaid, I am of the view that I should refrain from exercising my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in these matters. I take this view also for the reason that the term of the local bodies in the State is due to expire on 11.11.2020 and the mandate of Articles 243E and 243U of the Constitution is that the election to constitute new local bodies is to be conducted before the expiry of the term of the earlier local bodies. In the circumstances, the writ petitions are dismissed”.

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Non-endorsement of the driving license of the driver who holds a valid license will not eliminate the liability of the insurer of providing compensation. The High Court of Karnataka, in the case of The Legal Executive of Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Ltd  v. Smt. Sharmila and others [MFA 3608/2017] benched by J. S Sujatha and J. Sachin Shankar Magadum shed light on whether the non-endorsement of driving license of a light motor vehicle would amount to breach of policy.

Bharath Kumar while travelling to Bengaluru in a Maruthi Wagon R, met with a road traffic accident owing to the actionable negligence of the driver of a Tractor and Trailer (offending vehicle), due to which he sustained fatal injuries and died on spot. The claimants being the wife and the children of the deceased instituted a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking for compensation. The deceased having been the sole earning member of the family, his untimely death  had caused unbearable loss a to the family.

The appellants contended that the accident had occurred owing solely to the negligence of the deceased and further, since at the time of the accident neither deceased nor the driver of the tractor had valid driving license on them, the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner of the offending vehicle. Also, that since the owner of the owner if the tractor breached the terms and conditions of the policy by transporting sand and hence, using it for commercial purpose, the insurer was not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal eventually awarded a total compensation of Rs.20,400/- with interest of 6% p.a. from the date of petition till its realization.  Aggrieved, the present appeal was filed by the insurer challenging the liability as well as the quantum of compensation. The counsel for the appellant argued that since the wife of the deceased is not an eye witness, her testimony is not to be relied upon. Also, that since the tractor was used for commercial purposes, a breach arose, and hence, the insurer had no liability and finally it was argued that the compensation awarded was exorbitant and unjust.

The HC, relying on Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited [(2017) 14 SCC 663] held that “no endorsement was required to drive the transport vehicle, the offending vehicle in question being a light motor vehicle as per the definition clause of Section 2(21) of the Act”. In the same case it was also held that “non-possessing of an endorsement on the driving license to drive the transport vehicle by the driver holding the valid and effective driving license to drive the light motor vehicle would not be a breach of the policy conditions and the same would not disentitle the claimants in claiming vehicular accident compensation”. Further it was stated that the mere fact the tractor was used for carrying sand does not mean that it was for a commercial purpose and hence, the insurer cannot be exonerated from his liability on the basis of breach of policy conditions.  

Relying on the judgement of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others [(2017) 16 SCC 680] and New India Assurance Company Limited v. Somwati and others [Civil Appeal No. 3093 of 2020], the HC calculated the compensation and enhanced the quantum of the same.

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The question that was argued upon can be set aside only if it is per-versed. The Delhi High Court in its single judge bench of Justice Yogesh Khanna laid down the conditions that must be met in order to invoke section 19 and 23 of the Domestic Violence Act in the matter of Sara Carrierre Dubey v Ashish Dubey, [CRL.M.C. 574/2020, CRL.M.A. 2364/2020, CRL.M.A. 2365/2020, CRL.M.A. 4751/2020, CRL.M.A. 7150/2020, AND CRL.M.A.No.13177/2020]. The court cleared the question stating that once the Court had exercised its power under Section 19(1)(f) and if the order was a reasoned one, then can such an order be set aside under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because the High Court believes there could be some other possibility. 

In the present case, the petitioner (wife) and the respondent (husband) were married and had 2 children from the wedlock. They also owned property, jointly to the extent of 50% each. The wife alleged the husband of cruelty, domestic violence and infidelity. According to her, the husband projected violent behavior on her and the children because of which she left the house and went to a hotel to live in. since she could not afford to live in a hotel for a long period of time, she along with her children moved to the lady’s friend’s house and were at the friend’s mercy thereafter. The wife also alleged that her husband was in a relationship with another lady named Ruchika Dua from Dubai. When the wife went back to her matrimonial home, which she jointly owned, she saw Ruchika Dua in her bedroom and clicked photos of her in order to produce it as evidence. The petitioner also produced evidence in the form of hospital bills proving injuries caused to her by her husband.

Based on these allegations, the magistrate ordered the respondent to provide the petitioner and the children with a housing facility in the neighborhood which the petitioner herself declined on a continuous basis. The respondent did not refrain from accepting that he was a friend of Ruchika Dua but denied the allegations of infidelity. Thus, the respondent prayed for the quashing of the petition.

It was held that, “To invoke the jurisdiction of this Act (DV Act) the petitioner/wife must prima facie disclose the husband/respondent has committed or is committing or there is likelihood of committing domestic violence. What Section 19 and 23 requires to pass is an interim order, upon satisfaction of the learned Magistrate, where the application prima facie discloses the respondent having committed or is committing the acts of domestic violence or there is likelihood he may commit any act of domestic violence.

Though the learned counsel for respondent argued the learned MM in Samir’s case (supra) had rather formed a prima facie opinion of violence because of affidavits of respondent’s daughters supporting their mother, but here too the learned MM had gone through the allegations made in early hearing application and otherwise, to form such an opinion and thus per Section 23(2) of the Act had passed a removal order considering likelihood of violence. Thus, on facts the order of learned MM was not a perverse order to be set aside by the impugned order”.

The matter was set aside stating that “The respondent is given ten days’ time from today to remove himself from the property in dispute. Needless to say in case of any failure on the part of the respondent, the learned MM shall proceed in accordance with law. The respective right(s) in the subject property and/or disputes interse qua harassment etc, may be raised before the appropriate forum. The observations made above shall not influence the Courts below and allegations/counter allegations be dealt purely on merits”.

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