The Three Major and Developments in Indian Corporate Law


This paper explores three interconnected topics influencing the evolution of corporate India. Part 1 examines the landmark Supreme Court verdict on tribunalisation of company law in India, highlighting the debate over legislative competence, separation of powers, and the constitutionality of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Part 2 delves into the concept of independent directors, underscoring the need for redefining their roles, responsibilities, and selection processes. It discusses the challenges in maintaining true independence and suggests measures to enhance their effectiveness. Part 3 analyzes the position of statutory auditors in companies, particularly whether they hold an “office of profit.” It examines legal principles, corporate structure, and implications of appointing auditors without shareholder resolutions. By addressing these themes, the paper sheds light on critical facets shaping the trajectory of corporate India.



The corporate landscape in India is undergoing transformative changes due to global market shifts, economic growth, power dynamics, and climate concerns. This paper delves into three interconnected topics that are shaping the evolution of corporate India. Part 1 focuses on the Supreme Court’s watershed judgment on tribunalisation of company law, discussing its implications, challenges, and debates. Part 2 examines the concept of independent directors and their role in corporate governance, suggesting reforms to enhance their efficacy. Part 3 analyzes the position of statutory auditors and the question of whether they hold an “office of profit” under the Companies Act.

Part 1: Tribunalisation of Company Law in India:

The Supreme Court’s judgment on the establishment of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) is a critical development in the evolution of corporate India. This judgment has sparked debates about legislative competence, separation of powers, and the constitutional framework. The court’s decision to uphold the legislative competence of the Parliament to create NCLT and NCLAT is a significant validation of its authority to reform corporate justice. However, the judgment has also deemed specific aspects of the tribunal’s structure unconstitutional, necessitating amendments. This held in the case of Union of India v. R. Gandhi[1].

The question of legislative competence revolves around the constitutional provisions of Article 323A and 323B, which deal with tribunals’ establishment. Some argue that the court’s interpretation of these provisions can lead to potential conflicts with the principles outlined in Schedule VII of the Constitution. While the court’s judgment suggests a harmonious interpretation, concerns are raised about the potential erosion of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. This debate prompts reflection on the delicate balance between administrative efficiency and safeguarding the core principles of governance.

The issue of vesting judicial functions in technical members of the tribunal also draws significant attention. While the court acknowledges the importance of domain expertise, questions arise about the potential compromise of judicial independence. The requirement of technical members to possess certain qualifications might inadvertently dilute the tribunal’s decision-making autonomy. This leads to contemplation on whether expertise can genuinely replace the attributes of impartiality, judicial wisdom, and protection against external influences.

In the case of State of UP v. McDowell & Co.[2], a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court underscored that a law enacted by the legislature could only be invalidated based on two specific grounds: (1) lack of legislative competence, and (2) contravention of any fundamental right enshrined in Part III or other constitutional provisions. These two aspects form the core of the author’s argument, with the remaining aspects being extraneous to the present discussion.

However, the judgment does not definitively clarify whether the Parliament possesses the requisite competence or whether its actions run afoul of Article 323B of the Constitution. An additional concern revolves around the involvement of non-judicial individuals as adjudicators.

In this context, the foundational principle of the “separation of powers,” an inherent element of our constitutional framework, appears to be in jeopardy. While this concern is intuitively comprehensible, the author refrains from delving further into this extensively addressed topic.

Part 2: Independent Directors and Corporate Governance:

The concept of independent directors is integral to maintaining corporate governance and stability. However, the practical implementation often falls short of expectations. The definition of independent directors, as outlined by SEBI in Clause 49, is considered inadequate in ensuring genuine independence. The Enron case, where even the Dean of Stanford Business School failed to detect irregularities, and the Satyam fraud, which exposed gaping weaknesses in governance, underscore the urgency for reform.

The suggestion of statutory protection against arrest for independent directors becomes crucial in light of cases like Nagarjuna Finance, where arrests of former independent directors raised concerns. The fear of legal action can deter competent professionals from accepting directorships, leading to a potential shortage of qualified candidates. Transparency in the selection process, minimizing cozy relationships between boards and independent directors, and addressing conflicts of interest are all necessary steps to enhance the effectiveness of independent directors.

Furthermore, the paper’s recommendation for retirement policies for independent directors is based on the idea of maintaining fresh perspectives and preventing entrenchment. While concerns about industry experience are valid, the role of independent directors as enlightened generalists cannot be understated. Striking a balance between experience and a forward-looking approach is essential for a robust governance framework.

Part 3: Position of Statutory Auditors in Companies:

The role of statutory auditors in corporate financial irregularities has prompted discussions about their liability and accountability. The question of whether they hold an “office of profit” under the Companies Act raises pertinent issues. By examining legal principles and corporate structure, it becomes evident that statutory auditors are appointed by shareholders, indicating a distinction from the company itself. The intention of ensuring independence and an unbiased audit process reinforces the argument against considering them to hold an “office of profit.”

The term “office of profit” remains undefined within the Constitution of India. Through a series of judicial pronouncements[3], the Supreme Court of India has established a set of criteria to determine whether a given position qualifies as an office of profit under the government. These criteria encompass:

  1. The origin of the appointment, whether it emanates from the government;
  2. The authority vested in the government to terminate or dismiss the incumbent;
  3. The source of remuneration, whether disbursed by the government;
  4. The nature of duties undertaken by the holder, including their alignment with government functions;
  5. The extent of control exercised by the government over the execution of these responsibilities.

However, Section 314 of the Companies Act presents a challenge. This section requires shareholder approval for appointments to offices of profit, leading to potential conflicts with the role of statutory auditors. The paper highlights the need for careful consideration of these conflicts and their implications on auditor independence. Balancing the regulatory framework to prevent undue interference while maintaining transparency and accountability is essential.

While assuming an office inherently implies wielding some degree of authority, whether significant or subordinate, on behalf of a company, the assumption of a position or role need not invariably entail exercising authority. [4]In light of this context, it is not legally sustainable to assert that statutory auditors of a company hold a position of profit within the company. According to Section 314(1), the appointment of specified individuals to an office or position of profit necessitates shareholder approval through the passage of a special resolution during a general meeting. This requirement applies to instances like the appointment of a relative of an Independent Director to a position of profit within the company.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned rationale and in conjunction with Section 314 of the Companies Act, it becomes apparent that a statutory auditor can be designated without necessitating a shareholder resolution, even in cases where the auditor has a relationship with one of the Directors. Such a scenario could potentially compromise the autonomy of the Statutory Auditor, undermining their ability to function independently, devoid of undue influence from the company itself


the evolution of corporate India is at a critical crossroads, driven by factors spanning economic shifts, legal transformations, and ethical considerations. The analysis of tribunalisation, independent directors, and statutory auditors exemplifies the intricate landscape that shapes the future of Indian corporates.

The Supreme Court’s stance on tribunalisation highlights the delicate equilibrium between judicial autonomy and operational efficiency. Debates over legislative jurisdiction, separation of powers, and technical expertise underscore the need for a balanced approach that upholds legal principles while accommodating modern business complexities.

Within the realm of independent directors, fundamental challenges arise, evident in cases like Enron and Satyam. Calls for safeguards against unwarranted arrest, transparent selection processes, and well-defined tenures emphasize the urgency to foster a cadre of directors capable of championing robust corporate governance.

Amidst these debates, the role of statutory auditors emerges as a linchpin. The question of whether they hold an “office of profit” intertwines legal interpretation, corporate autonomy, and accountability. As the nexus between shareholder appointments and auditor insulation from direct company influence counters such categorization, their interplay with Section 314 necessitates nuanced consideration.

Overall, these deliberations encapsulate the convergence of legal doctrines, economic realities, and ethical imperatives in the corporate landscape. The pursuit of regulatory oversight while preserving entrepreneurial vigor stands paramount. As India strides forward, these issues signify not just legal concerns, but essential societal benchmarks. They underscore that the transformation of corporate India is not just a process of change, but a profound reimagining. The amalgamation of law, economics, and ethics constitutes a complex mosaic, posing challenges alongside transformative prospects for India’s corporate trajectory.

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Written by- Ankit Kaushik

[1]  Civil Appeal No. 3067 of 2004 with Civil Appeal No. 3717 of 2005, unanimous, judgment dated May 11, 2010, per Justice Raveendran)

[2] (1996)3SCC 709

[3] See Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand and another (1958) SCR 387; M Ramappa v. Sangappa & others, (1959) SCR 1167; Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal & Others, (1964) 4 SCR 311; and Shivamurthy Swami Inamdar & another v. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa & Another, (1971) 3 SCC 870, Pradyut Bardolai v. Swapan Roy, JT (2001) 1 SC 136.

[4] Rendell v. Went [1964]2 All ER 464(HL)

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