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Supreme Court Upholds Privacy Rights: Landmark Ruling on ‘History Sheets’ and Protection of Innocent Family Members

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Case Name: Amanatullah Khan v. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors 

Case No.: SLP (Crl.) No.5719/2023 

Dated: May 07, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Surya Kant and Justice K V Viswanathan 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The appellant filed a writ suit in the Delhi High Court pursuant to Article 226 of the Indian Constitution read in conjunction with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking the annulment of the “History Sheet” that had been opened against him and the proposal to designate him as “Bad Character” by placing his name in the Surveillance “Register-X, Part II, Bundle A” at the Delhi Police Station.  

These proceedings have been initiated as a result of the Single Judge of the High Court dismissing the appellant’s writ petition, as evidenced by the contested judgement of 19.01.2023.  

Following notification, the Delhi Police made an appearance through seasoned senior attorney Mr. Sanjay Jain. He was informed of the disturbing details in the History Sheet regarding the appellant’s and his wife’s school-age children, for whom there didn’t seem to be any negative information that should have been included in the History Sheet.  

Subsequently, it was informed that the rule 23.8 and rule 23.9 of the Punjab Police Rules 1934 (also known as the “1934 Rules”), which were in effect in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, stipulated the format for the history sheeters. Despite the fact that Mr. Jain, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, fairly consented to revisit the antiquated regulations, it is important to protect the privacy, dignity, and self-respect of innocent individuals who just so happen to be a suspect’s family members.  

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The name, address, school, or any other information that could identify a child in trouble with the law, a child in need of care and protection, a child victim or witness to a crime, involved in such matter, under any other law currently in effect, may not be disclosed in any newspaper, magazine, or other form of communication regarding any inquiry, investigation, or judicial procedure. Nor may the picture of any such child be published. As long as the Board or Committee conducting the inquiry determines that such disclosure is in the child’s best interest, it may approve it for reasons that must be documented in writing. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS: 

Amanatullah Khan filed a writ petition in accordance with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. He asked for the “History Sheet” that had been opened against him to be quashed and for the idea to designate him as a “Bad Character” to be rejected. 

His name was entered into the Surveillance “Register-X, Part II, Bundle A” at Jamia Nagar Police Station in the South-East of Delhi District. The petitioner claimed that there were significant irregularities and improper behaviour on the part of the police officers, along with a dishonest and perverse behaviour. 

Further, the appellants argued that the amended Standing Order stipulated that, in the “relations and connections” column, the names of the criminal’s accomplices, abettors, and receivers, as well as their ability to pay for a history sheeter or bad character shelter in the event that the offender is wanted by the police or is fleeing the scene, must be included.  

No information on any minor relatives—son, daughter, or siblings—should be included anywhere in the History Sheet unless there is proof that the minor has provided the offender with refuge in the past, as stated in the modified Standing Order. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The revised Standing Order makes it even clearer that the “History Sheet” is an internal police record and not a report that is available to the general public. It has advised police officers to exercise caution in ensuring that the identities of just those minor relatives be recorded in the History Sheet where there is proof that the minor previously provided the offender with sanctuary when he was evading the authorities. 

The court observed that the modified Standing Order also makes recommendations for the protection of personal information such as phone numbers, Aadhar cards, EPIC numbers, email addresses, social media accounts, and so on. 

The court’s primary motive was to instruct law enforcement officials to implement the modified Standing Order of March 21, 2024, starting immediately in the appellant’s case as well. Additionally, the court ordered the Delhi Commissioner of Police to appoint a senior police officer, at least the rank of Joint Commissioner of Police, to audit and review the information contained in the History Sheets on a regular basis.  

The court also observed that the person will also be responsible for maintaining confidentiality and granting permission to remove the names of any adults, juveniles, or minors who are found not guilty during an investigation and whose records should be removed from the category of “relations and connections” in those sheets.  

Apart from the National Capital Territory of Delhi, the court was aware that no States or Union Territories were in front of them. They haven’t received any attention. Therefore, it is not possible to issue them with a positive mandamus. Additionally, the court is ignorant of the Standing Orders or current Rules/Policies that are in effect in various States and Union Territories.  

Thus, in order to ensure that the court’s observations are implemented in full, the court decided it was appropriate at that point to order all States and Union Territories to review their policy regimes and determine whether any appropriate modifications based on the “Delhi Model” were necessary. 

 

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Taxability of Interest-Free Loans as Perquisites Confirmed by Supreme Court Under Section 17 of the Income Tax Act

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Case Name:  All India Bank Officers’ Confederation v. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors 

Case No.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7708 OF 2014 

Dated: May 07, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Sanjeev Khanna and Justice Dipankar Datta 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The definition of “perquisites” in Section 17(2)(viii) of the Act includes “any other fringe benefit or amenity” and “as may be prescribed.” In accordance with Section 17(2)(viii), Rule 3 of the Rules specifies extra “fringe benefits” or “amenities” that are taxable as perquisites. Additionally, it specifies how certain privileges should be valued for taxes purposes. As per Rule 3(7)(i) of the Rules, bank employees who receive interest-free or concessional loan benefits from banks may be subject to taxation as “fringe benefits” or “amenities” if the interest rate charged by the bank on these loans is lower than the interest rate determined by the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate.  

The Central Board of Direct Taxes is accused of being given an excessive and unwise delegation of vital legislative functions, which is the basis for challenging Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i). A further argument against Rule 3(7)(i) is that it is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution since it regards the PLR of SBI as the reference point as opposed to the real interest rate that the bank charges a client for a loan. 

The validity of Section 17 (2) (viii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) and Rule 3 (7) (i) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (IT Rules) was contested by Staff Unions and Officers’ Associations (Appellants) of several banks located throughout India. “Any other fringe benefit or amenity as may be prescribed” is included in the definition of perquisites found in Section 17(2) (viii). Interest-free or concessional loan benefits offered by banks to bank employees are taxable as “fringe benefits” or “amenities,” according to Rule 3 (7) (i) of the IT Rules, if the interest rate charged by the bank on such loans is less than the interest rate charged in accordance with the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of the State Bank of India (SBI). 

 

ISSUES:  

  • Does Section 17(2)(viii) and/or Rule 3(7)(i) lead to a delegation of the ‘essential legislative function’ to the CBDT 
  • Is Rule 3(7)(i) arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it treats the PLR of SBI as the benchmark 

 

LEGAL PROVISION: 

  • Section 15 of the IT Act. specifies the amounts of income that qualify as “salaries” for income tax purposes. 
  • Section 17 (1) of the IT Act. Wages, annuities or pensions, gratuities, fees, commissions, perks, or profits in lieu of or in addition to salary or wages, advance salary payments, payments made to an employee for unutilized leave, yearly accumulation to the balance to the credit of the employee participating in a recognised provident fund, etc. are all included in the definition of “salary.”  
  • Section 17 (2) of the IT Act. What is meant by “perquisite” is the amount of rent-free housing that the assessee’s employer provides for him, calculated in a way that may be specified; additionally, it includes the amount of any accommodations that his employer provides for him at a discounted cost.  
  • Rule 3 (7) (i) of the IT Rules. stipulates that interest-free or concessional loan benefits given by banks to bank employees are subject to taxation as “fringe benefits” or “amenities” in the event that the interest rate on the loans is lower than the interest rate determined by the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate (PLR) (SBI). 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: 

Section 17(2)(viii) of the IT Act was contested by the appellants. In Section 17(2) (viii), “any other fringe benefit or amenity as may be prescribed” is included in the definition of perquisites. In their argument, the appellants claimed that this clause was overly delegated and that any additional amenity or fringe benefit should be subject to a rule imposed by the relevant body. 

The IT Rules’ Rule 3 (7) (i) was also contested by the appellants. As per Rule 3 (7) (i), bank employees who receive interest-free or concessional loan benefits from their banks may be subject to taxation as “fringe benefits” or “amenities” if the interest rate charged by the bank on these loans is lower than the interest rate determined by the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate (PLR). Because the SBI PLR was used as the benchmark rather than the actual interest rate that the relevant bank paid a customer on a loan, the appellants claimed that this practice violated Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The appellants contested Section 17(2)(viii) of the IT Act. “Any other fringe benefit or amenity as may be prescribed” is included in the definition of perquisites in Section 17(2)(viii). The appellants argued that this clause was unduly delegated and that any further amenity or fringe benefit need to be governed by a regulation enforced by the appropriate agency. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

According to the responders, the purpose of the disputed circular was to neutralise and deter bank officers from joining a trade union. The circular, they argued, was intended to promote a “management culture” by elevating directorship over union affiliation. 

The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the Income Tax Rules’ Rule 3 (7) (i), which considered interest-free or concessional loans as taxable perquisites, was endorsed by the respondents. They contended that “any other fringe benefit or amenity as may be prescribed” might be included in accordance with IT Act Section 17(2)(viii). They interpreted the rule as a lawful use of power that had been assigned to them. 

It was also argued that according to Section 41(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, the petitioner, the All India Bank Officers’ Confederation, was not regarded as a “person,” according to the respondents. Citing the petitioner’s registration under the Trade Unions Act of 1926, they argued that this status precluded them from invoking the Companies Act’s provisions for the correction of the member register. 

According to the respondents, the bank had good cause to reject the share transfer. The bank claimed that the petitioner’s trade union membership was a pertinent element, even though they did not state which specific provisions of the Companies Act they believed to have been violated. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

As per the court’s ruling, determining the legislative policy and formulating it as an obligatory code of behaviour constitutes the “important legislative function.” Lawmakers can therefore delegate the remaining tasks to subordinate legislation after they have established the legislative policy and standard through legislation. The subsidiary statute is supplemental to the main statute in these situations. As long as it is made consistent with the main legislation and stays within the bounds of the policies and standards set forth by it, it is in line with its framework.  

As long as it is made coherent with the main legislation and stays within the bounds of policy and standards established by it, it is in line with its framework. It is consequently up to subordinate authorities to decide whether the legislative policy and criteria that form the basis of the delegated legislation have been sufficiently specified in the main legislation. 

According to the court’s ruling, anything falls within the framework of the primary legislation so long as it is made consistent with it and adheres to the policies and standards it has established. Therefore, the decision as to whether the legislative policy and standards that serve as the foundation for the delegated law have been appropriately specified in the primary legislation rests with subordinate authorities conveyed as “fringe benefits or amenity.” It is our opinion that the clause provides explicit advice to the rule-making authority and clearly reflects the legislative policy.  

“Perquisites” is defined in a “inclusive” manner in Section 17(2). Certain specific categories of privileges are provided for in Section 17(2)(i) through (vii)/(viia). These are not the only kinds of prerequisites, though. A residuary clause is found in Section 17(2)(viii), and it defines “any other fringe benefits or amenities” as those that are periodically mandated and fall within the category of “perquisites.” 

It is also appropriate to point out that laws pertaining to tax or fiscal measures have more flexibility than other statutes in terms of universal application. In these kinds of cases, the Legislature ought to have some latitude, and this Court ought to be more willing to defer to the wisdom of the legislature. Because they address a variety of issues and are contingent, commercial and tax laws are frequently quite delicate and complicated. This Court would prefer not to meddle with the relevant legislation, which guards against abuse potential and fosters clarity.  

 It is neither unfair, onerous, or severe for the tax payers. A straitjacket formula has been used to solve a complex problem, and the solution has been accepted by the courts. A different ruling would negate the wisdom of the legislature and cause numerous other complications. In this instance, the universal criteria is reasonable, fair, and practical. As a result, it is decided that Rule 3(7) is unconstitutional vides Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.  

 

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Refund under Section 38(3) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act,2004 is mandatory: Supreme court while upholding the decision of high court

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CASE TITTLE: COMMISSIONER OF TRADE AND TAXES. V.  FEMC PRATIBHA JOINT VENTURE

CASE NO: Civil Appeal no. 3940 of 2024

ORDER ON: May 01, 2024

QUORUM: J.PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIM, J.PRASANNA BHALACHANDRA VARALE

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The facts which lead to the present appeal is that the Respondent is a joint venture engaged in the execution of works Contracts for the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation and makes Purchases for this purpose. It claimed refund of excess tax credit  for the 4th quarter of 2015-16 Through revised return filed on 31.03.2017 and For the 1st quarter of 2017-18 through return filed on 29.03.2019, Along with applicable interest under Section 42 of the Act. The Appellant did not pay the refund even until 2022, pursuant to Which the respondent sent a letter dated 09.11.2022 for the Consideration of their refund. The Value Added Tax Officer passed An adjustment order dated 18.11.2022 to adjust the respondent’s Claims for refund against dues under default notices dated 30.03.2020, 23.03.2021, 30.03.2021, and 26.03.2022. The Respondent then filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court For quashing the adjustment order and the default notices.By judgment dated 21.09.2023, impugned herein, the High Court quashed the adjustment order and directed refund for the 4th quarter of 2015-16 and for the 1st quarter of 2017-18, along with Interest as per Section 42 till the date of realisation. The present appeal is restricted to the issue of quashing the Adjustment order.

 LEGAL ISSUES:

Whether the timeline for refund under Section 38(3) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act,2004 must be mandatorily followed?

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 38(a)(ii)of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004- refunds

Any amount Remaining after the application referred to in sub-section (2) of this section shall be at either –

 (a) refunded to the person, –

(ii) within two months after the date on which the return was furnished or Claim for the refund was made, if the tax period for the person claiming refund is a Quarter

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELANT:

The appellent through their Learned counsel submits that the timelines specified in Section 38(3) are only to ensure that interest is paid if the refund is delayed,Beyond the statutorily prescribed period. However, The timeline cannot be used to denude the power to adjust refund Amounts against outstanding dues under Section 38(2). The Refund can be adjusted as long as outstanding dues exist at the Time when the refund is processed, even if it is beyond the Stipulated timeline.

CONTENSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

The respondent through their learned counsel Supported the reasoning of the High Court and has placed reliance On several judgments of the Delhi High Court that affirm this Position of law.therefore, the counsel submits that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment, Which follows the view that has been consistently adopted by the High Court.The finding of the High Court is based on the plain Language of Section 38 of the Act

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court on hearing both sides, observed that  Sub-section (3) of sec 38, provides The assesse with the option of getting the refund or carrying it Forward to the next tax period as a tax credit. In case of refund, Section 38(3)(a) provides the timeline for refund from the date on which the claim for refund is made. Sub-section (4) Provides that if notice has been issued under Section 58 or Additional information has been sought under Section 59, then the Amount shall be carried forward to the next tax period as tax Credit. Sub-section (7) Provides certain exclusions while calculating the period under Sub-section (3), The language of Section 38(3) is mandatory and the Department must adhere to the timeline stipulated therein to fulfil the object of the provision, which is to ensure that refunds are Processed and issued in a timely manner. In the present case, Section 38(3)(a)(ii) is relevant as both the Refunds in the present case pertain to quarter tax periods. Therefore, as per Section 38(3)(a)(ii), the refund should have been Processed within two months from when the returns were filed, which comes up to 31.05.2017 and 29.05.2019. The default notices are dated 30.03.2020, 23.03.2021, 30.03.2021, and 26.03.2022. It is therefore evident That the default notices were issued after the period within which The refund should have been processed. Sub-section (2) only Permits adjusting amounts towards recovery that are “due under The Act”. By the time when the refund should have been processed As per the provisions of the Act, the dues under the default notices Had not crystallised and the respondent was not liable to pay the Same at the time. Therefore, the appellant-department is not Justified in retaining the refund amount beyond the stipulated Period and then adjusting the refund amount against the amounts Due under default notices that were issued subsequent to the Refund period. Further, the appellent contention that the purpose of the Timeline provided under sub-section (3) is only for calculation of Interest under Section 428 would go against the object And purpose of the provision. Therefore this contention is hence rejected. In view of the above,the court further dismissed the present appeal and affirm The impugned judgment directing the refund of amounts along With interest as provided under Section 42 of the Act

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Medial Board to consider physical emotional well-being of pregnant person- SC

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Case title: A (mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra and Anr

Case no: Civil Appeal No. 5194 of 2024

Dated on: April 29th, 2024

Quorum: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra.

Facts of the case:

This appeal arises from the judgement of a division bench of the High court judicature at Mumbai dated 4th April 2024. It basically denied the minor from terminating her pregnancy. ‘X’ is a minor around 14 years old and has been alleged of a sexual assault in September 2023. ‘X’ revealed this on 20thMarch 2024 by then she was 25 weeks into her pregnancy. It was said that ‘X’ always had irregular periods and could not have assessed her pregnancy earlier. ‘X’ was taken to a hospital on 21 March 2024 for medical examination and then transferred to the JJ Group of Hospitals, Mumbai for termination of her pregnancy. On 28 March 2024 the Medical Board constituted under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 opined that ‘X’ was physically and mentally fit for termination of her pregnancy subject to the permission of the High Court. The Appellant moved to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the termination of pregnancy of her daughter. On 3rd April 2024, the Medical Board issued a ‘clarificatory’ opinion, without re-examining ‘X’. The report denied the termination of pregnancy on the ground that the gestational age of the foetus was twenty-seven to twenty-eight weeks and that there were no congenital abnormalities in the foetus. By the impugned judgment the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the pregnancy exceeded the statutory period of twenty-four weeks. In the present appeal, it was observed that the medical report does not contain evaluation of the physical and mental status of the minor, having regard to the background leading up to the pregnancy. The Medical Board was directed to apprise as to whether carrying the pregnancy to the full term would impact the physical and mental well-being of the minor who is barely fourteen years old. The minor was examined by a team of six doctors who after examining ‘X’, opined that the gestational age of the foetus was 29.6 weeks and continuation of pregnancy will negatively impact the physical and mental well-being of ‘X’.

Issues:

Whether carrying of the pregnancy to the full term would impact upon the physical and mental well-being of the minor who is barely 14 years?

Legal provisions:

Section 376 of IPC- Punishment of Rape. 
Sections 4 of the POCSO Act- This section deals with penetrative sexual assault on a child. 
Section 8 of the POCSO Act- Punishment for sexual assault. 
Section 12 of the POCSO Act- Punishment for sexual harassment.

Contentions of the appellant:

The appellant had moved High Court initially to permit them to terminate the pregnancy. Upon denial by the Hight Court, an appeal was preferred under 136 of the Constitution. The medical team reported that while initially the parents were agreeable to the stoppage of the foetal heart on 24 April 2024, on 25 April 2024 the appellant stated that she desires that the pregnancy be taken to term and that she would thereafter give the child in adoption.

Courts analysis and Judgement:

In X v. State (NCT of Delhi), it was recognized that the fear of prosecution among registered medical practitioners is a barrier for pregnant persons to access safe and legal abortions. The purpose of the opinion of the RMP bears the legislative intent of the MTP Act which is to protect the health of a pregnant person and facilitate safe, hygienic, and legal abortion. The right to abortion is to protect right of dignity, autonomy and reproductive choice and this right is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.   The court in XYZ v. State of Gujarat,11 held that the medical board or the High Court cannot refuse abortion merely on the ground that the gestational age of the pregnancy is above the statutory prescription. The powers vested under the Constitution in the High Court and this Court allow them to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. When a person approaches the court for permission to terminate a pregnancy, the court apply their mind to the case and make a decision to protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn.14, a three-judge Bench of this Court has held that the right to make reproductive choices is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to choose and reproductive freedom is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, the court must regard the view of the pregnant person as an important factor while deciding the termination of the pregnancy. In the present case view of ‘X’ and her parents to take the pregnancy to term are in unison.  In the facts and circumstances the following directions are issued: (i) All the expenses in regard to the hospitalization of the minor in respect of her delivery to be borne by the Hospital (ii) In the event that the minor and her parents desire to give the child in adoption, the State Government to take all necessary steps to facilitate this exercise.  The Court concludes as follows: (i) The MTP Act protects the RMP and the medical boards when an opinion is formed in good faith regarding termination of pregnancy; (ii) The medical board opinion must not be restricted to the criteria under Section 3(2-B) of the MTP Act but should consider the physical and emotional well-being of the pregnant person (iii) When issuing a clarificatory opinion the medical board to support with reasons for change in opinion and circumstances; and (iv)The consent of a pregnant person in decisions of reproductive autonomy and termination of pregnancy is paramount. In case there is a difference of opinion between the pregnant person and her guardian, the opinion of the minor or mentally ill pregnant person must be taken into consideration to enable the court to arrive at a conclusion. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of. 

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In a domestic abuse case, the Supreme Court emphasizes the necessity of legislative reforms to safeguard the rights of all parties involved

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 Case Name: Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana and Ors 

Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 2379 OF 2024 

Dated: May 3, 2024 

Quorum: Justice J B Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Mirsa 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The case concerns the First Informant Tanu Gupta, who is a resident of Hisar, the wife of Achin Gupta and the daughter of Harish Manocha. She is a peace-loving and law-abiding woman, and she married Accused No. 1 in New Delhi in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. It was said that the First Informant suffered physical and psychological harm as a result of the Appellant and his family members’ claimed dowry demands. According to the FIR, the First Informant’s family gave the Appellant and his family her “stridhan” at the time of the marriage and spent a significant amount of money on it.  

But not long after they were married, the First Informant became the target of harassment from the Appellant and his family, who claimed she hadn’t fulfilled her responsibilities as a wife and daughter-in-law and also put pressure on her to pay additional money. According to the allegations, the appellant was a habitual drunkard who would forcefully touch the First Informant and mistreat her.  

The Appellant and his family would retain the First Informant’s full income while she worked as an assistant professor, according to her allegations. Every time the First Informant asked for money, the Appellant would physically attack her and tell her that she should ask her family to cover her personal costs.  

The Appellant is also accused of having an extramarital affair with a different woman, and he threatened to harm the First Informant if she revealed his affair to others. After carrying on with the extramarital affair for a considerable amount of time, the appellant filed for divorce in July 2019 on completely false and unfounded allegations.  

The Appellant is accused of disconnecting the water supply at their married residence and removing their young son in the early days of the Covid-19 lockdown. The First Informant was forced to return to her parents after marrying and was left with no other choice in these circumstances.  

The appellant in this case filed a quashing petition with the High Court in an attempt to have the criminal proceedings halted. In exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (also known as the “Cr.P.C.”), the High Court rejected to quash the criminal proceedings in its judgement and order dated April 5, 2022 (also known as the “impugned order”). Because of the aforementioned, the appellant is presenting the current appeal to this court.  

 

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 323 of IPC: Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. If someone intentionally causes harm, with the exception of the situations allowed by section 334, they may be penalised with a fine of up to one thousand rupees, one year’s worth of imprisonment of any kind, or both.  
  • Section 406 of IPC: Punishment for criminal breach of trust. If a person violates the law by intentionally betraying another person, they may be sentenced to three years in prison, a fine, or both. 
  • Section 498A of IPC: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Anyone who submits a woman to cruelty while she is her spouse or a family member of her husband faces up to three years in prison as well as a fine. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS: 

The learned counsel for the appellant argues that Both a domestic abuse case and a divorce petition had been filed by the appellant and his family against the First Informant in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The First Informant left her married house more than 11 months ago, and the FIR No. 95 of 2021, dated April 9, 2021, was only filed in response to this when she was served with a summons in the domestic abuse case. Why there has been such a delay has not been explained. 

As per the allegations of the appellants The purpose of filing the FIR was to exact revenge on the appellant, albeit a covert one. For more than a decade, the Appellant and the First Informant were wed. 

The appellant claimed that there were no particular instances of criminal behaviour, only broad, general accusations that formed the basis of the criminal charges. It was a misuse of the court system to file a criminal trial based only on such broad accusations. In an effort to stop the abuse of the legal system in marriage cases, the appellant asked the court for relief.  

The appellant’s specific argument was that the complainant, the second respondent, was uninformed of the events detailed in the First Information Report (FIR).The appellant made it clear that neither the second respondent nor any other parties had filed a civil lawsuit against him. The purpose of this argument was to refute the accuracy of the claims stated in the First Information Report. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

 The learned counsel representing the respondents argued that After the marriage, the appellant and his family insisted on receiving more money as dowry. The First Informant used to get beat up and have her entire income taken away by them. 

They also contended that the appellant had no choice but to leave the married residence and go back to her parents’ house in Hisar after the divorce petition was filed because she was no longer receiving any maintenance payments and had disconnected essential utilities like the water supply. 

It was also contended that With a different woman, the appellant had an affair. She remained silent and didn’t let the others know about it, only wanting to keep the marriage intact. It is utterly baseless and vexatious that a domestic abuse case has been brought against the First Informant. It was not disclosed to this Court by the appellant that he had withdrawn the divorce action he had taken against the First Informant.  

The learned counsel for the state contended that after receiving the first information report, the police opened a fair investigation. After the inquiry was finished, the cases against four of the five suspects were dropped. Nevertheless, considering the claims made, the investigating officer felt it was appropriate to submit a charge sheet against the appellant. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The appellant filed for divorce in July 2019 on the grounds of cruelty, and the court noted this after receiving notice of it. Due to the appellant’s difficulty caring for his child and making the lengthy trip to Hisar on the dates set by the court, the divorce petition was dropped. Under the terms of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the appellant’s mother was required to file a domestic violence complaint against the First Informant in October 2020.  

The court further noted that the First Informant’s claims are quite broad, general, and imprecise, and they do not specifically mention any instances of illegal behaviour, based on a plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet documents.  

The court observed that it was also important to remember that no precise time or date of the alleged incident or offence has been included in the FIR. Even the police decided it was appropriate to end the investigation into the other appellant family members. Consequently, we believe that the First Information Report (FIR) filed by Respondent No. 2 was only a response to the divorce petition and the domestic abuse case. 

The court also noted that The field of investigating an offence was solely reserved for Police Officers, who had unrestricted authority in that regard as long as their investigative powers regarding cognizable offences were lawfully used in strict accordance with Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. In carrying out its duties under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the court does not serve as an appellate or revisional court.  

The inherent jurisdiction under the Section, while broad, should only be used when it is warranted by the strict criteria outlined in the Section itself. It should be used rarely, cautiously, and with prudence. It was to be used ex debito justitiae to carry out substantial and true justice, the administration of which is the exclusive function of courts. The court’s authority is intended to further justice, and should any attempt be made to misuse it in order to bring about injustice, the court has the right to stop it. Allowing any activity to occur that would obstruct the advancement of justice and lead to injustice would be an abuse of the legal system.  

In order to prevent both of the new provisions from going into effect, the court asked the Legislature to investigate the above-highlighted issue, taking into account the practical realities, and consider making the required adjustments in Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appeal was so granted as a result of its success. It is now decided to set aside the contested decision and order from the High Court.  

In order for the Government of India to present this ruling to the Honourable Ministers of Law and Justice and Home, the court instructed the Registry to deliver one copy of each decision to the Union Law Secretary and Union Home Secretary.  

 

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora. 

Click to view judgment.

 

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