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Supreme Court: Even if the plea of limitation is Not set up as a defence, the Court has to dismiss the suit if it is Barred by limitation.

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CASE TITTLE:S. SHIVRAJ REDDY(DIED)THR HIS LRS. AND Anr V S. RAGHURAJ REDDY AND OTHERS

CASE NO: CIVIL APPEAL OF 2024(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 23143-23144 of 2016)

ORDER ON: May 16, 2024

QUORUM: J. B.R. GAVAI and J.SANDEEP MEHTA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The present appeal is preferred for assailing the judgment Dated 27th March, 2014 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.

The facts leading to the present appeal in question is that, Respondent/plaintiff, along with defendants And deceased M. Balraj Reddyhad constituted a partnership firm, namely “M/s Shivraj Reddy & Brothers. Further Respondent/plaintiff instituted original suit, Seeking relief of dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts,wherein, The learned II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, allowed the original suit filed by respondent/plaintiff and passed a decreedeclaring the firm to be Dissolved and directed defendant Nos. 2 to 4 to tender accounts of The firm from the year 1979 onwards till October, 1998 and Further, granted liberty to respondent/plaintiff to file a Separate application seeking appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for taking accounts of the firm and for other Appropriate reliefs.Being aggrieved, defendant No.1 and 2  preferred Appeal before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.wherein, the Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment Allowed Appeal on the ground that the earlier case was barred by limitation as one of the partners in Subsisting partnership firm, Shri M. Balraj Reddy expired in 1984, Therefore the firm stood dissolved immediately on the death of the Partner. Since the original suit was filed in 1996, it was barred by Limitation. Aggrieved by the decision of learned Single Judge, respondent/plaintiff preferred LPA before the learned Division Bench of the High Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment dated passed by the Learned Single Judge, observing That the plea of limitation was never raised during the pleadings in The trial Court and learned Single Judge ought not to have dealt With that issue at all. Being aggrieved, appellants have preferred The present appeal by special leave.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932 talks about Dissolution on the happening of certain contingencies

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLEANT:

The appellant through their counsel urged that the Suit was filed by respondent/plaintiff for dissolution of thefirm and for the rendition of accounts in the year 1996.The counsel further referred to the partnership deed dated 25th April, 1978, Whereby submitted that the firmwas constituted and urged at a partnership at will. The counsel also drew the attention Of the Court to Section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932, Further the counsel submitted that as per Section 42(c) of the Act, the death of a partner leads to automatic dissolution of the Firm.the counsel submitted that Shri M. Balraj Reddy i.e. Partner No. 3 in The firm admittedly expired in the year 1984 and consequent to his Death, the firm stood dissolved automatically. The counsel further urged that it is settled law that it is the duty of theCourt to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of Limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defenceAnd thus, the learned Division Bench erred in allowing LPA  and interfering with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on the basis that the plea Of limitation was never raised during the pleadings and thus, the counsel On these grounds, urged Thatthe decree passed by the Learned trial Court to dissolve the firm and Directing the partners to tender the accounts being  upheld is ex facie Illegal, and therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

The Respondent through their counsel submitted that there is documentary Evidence on record to show that the firm continued To exist and its business activities continued even after the death Of Shri M. Balraj Reddy. The counsel therefore, urged that the contentions Put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants that the firm Stood dissolved automatically on the death of Shri M. Balaraj Reddy is misconceived. The counsel  further contended that the issue of limitation was never Raised before the trial Court and thus, the same could not have Been allowed to be taken at the first appellate stage. On these Grounds, the counsel sought dismissal of the appeal.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court on giving thoughtful consideration to the Submissions advancedand having gone through the Impugned judgment and the material placed on record.The court opined that theReasoning given by the learned Division Bench while dismissing LPA, that the learned Single Judge ought not to have considered the question of limitation as the defendants did Not choose to raise the plea of limitation in the trial Court is erroneous.The court further opined that  Law in this regard has been settled by this Court Through a catena of decisions. Therefore, the court also  referedjudicial precedents and Thus, the court observed that it is a settled law that even if the plea of limitation is Not set up as a defence, the Court has to dismiss the suit if it is Barred by limitation.The court also observed thefact that the firm was a partnership at will, is not in dispute. It Is also not disputed that one of the partners of the firm, namely,Shri M. Balraj Reddy expired in the year 1984. This event leaves No room for doubt that the partnership would stand dissolved Automatically on the death of the partner as per Section 42(c) of The Act, The court further observed that  A fervent pleathat the firm continued to exist even after the death Of Shri M. Balraj Reddy, and the business activities were continued By the firm.therefore the court opined that, Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the Partners were carrying on the business activities after the death of Shri M. Balraj Reddy, there cannot be any doubt that the firm Stood dissolved automatically in the year 1984 as mandated under Section 42(c) of the Act unless and until there was a contract Between the remaining partners of the firm to the contrary. The court further observed that There Is of course, no such averment by the respondents, further business Activities even if carried on by the remaining partners of the firm after the death of Shri M. Balraj Reddy, would be deemed to be Carried in their individual capacity in the circumstances noted Above.The court opined that the period of limitation for filing a suit for rendition of Account is three years from the date of dissolution.Hence in  the present Case, the firm dissolved in year 1984 by virtue of death of Shri M. Balraj Reddy and thus, the suit could only have been instituted Within a period of three years from that event. Indisputably, the Suit came to be filed in the year 1996 and was clearly time-barred, Therefore,the court opined that  learned Single Judge was justified in accepting theAppeal and rejecting the suit as being Hopelessly barred by limitation. As a consequence, the court opined that the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench in LPAdoes not Stand to scrutiny and the court hereby reversed and set aside, the court further allowed the appeal accordingly.

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Separate Framing of Issues Not Fatal If Appellate Court Already Addressed Them: SC

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Case title: Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Ors v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.

Case no: Civil Appeal Nos. 16956-16957 OF 2017

Dated on: May 10th, 2024

Quorum: Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar.

Facts of the case:

The two appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 18.06.2013 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The Division Bench allowed the first appeal filed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and dismissed the cross-objection filed by the respondents. Aggrieved by the same, the said respondents filed the present appeals. The suits were filed against the Corporation seeking compensation of ₹1,63,97,673/- with interest thereon @ 18% p.a. or, in the alternative, allotment of land, i.e., an extent of 974 sq. mts., in any Town Planning Scheme in the western zone of Ahmedabad. The Trial Court, decreed the suit by accepting the alternative prayer to allot an extent of 974 sq. mts. In any Town Planning Scheme in the western zone but rejected the compensation claim of ₹1,63,97,673/- with interest thereon and the plaintiffs were directed to repay the amount of compensation received by them @ ₹25/- per sq. mt. The Corporation preferred the subject first appeal before the High Court while the plaintiffs filed their cross-objection therein. The High Court held that it was not open to the Plaintiffs to claim any damages by accepting the smaller plot and the compensation for the shortfall of 974 sq.mts. without protest.

Issues:

Can a plot owner who surrendered his land pursuant to a Town Planning Scheme, be allotted any land after reconstitution of the plots?

Legal provisions:

Various provisions of Town Planning Schemes Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979.

Contentions of the appellant:

The plaintiff/ Appellant father was the owner of original Plot Nos. 144, 150/P and 151/P in Survey Nos., admeasuring 19823 sq. yds./16575 sq. mts. The Corporation prepared Town Planning Scheme No.6, Paldi, where the plaintiffs’ father was required to contribute 21.40% of his lands, i.e., 4247 sq. yds./3552 q. mts., to the Corporation for public purposes. For the remaining extent, the Corporation allotted two separate plots, viz., Plot No. 478, measuring 11686 sq. yds and Plot No. 463, measuring 3890 sq. yds. The vacant possession of Plot No. 478 was delivered to the plaintiffs’ father but the Corporation failed to deliver possession of Plot No. 463 as it was occupied by slum dwellers. The Corporation then prepared a second varied scheme whereunder, Plot No. 463 was taken for the purpose of slum upgradation and the plaintiffs were offered Plot No. 187, measuring 2724 sq. yds thereby reducing the land allotment by 974 sq. mts. The compensation awarded to them for the shortfall of 974 sq. mts. was meagre. The plaintiffs were constrained to file for compensation for the damages as they had suffered huge monetary losses as they could not enjoy the property since 1963 and thus prayed for compensation of ₹1,63,97,673/-

Contentions of the respondent:

The plaintiffs were paid compensation @ ₹25/- per sq. mt. for shortfall of land under the scheme. The plaintiffs accepted possession of Final Plot No. 187 and the compensation, without protest and without challenging the same. The grievance was required to be preferred under Section 54 of the Act of 1976. The plaintiffs could not pray for compensation on the basis of the original Town Planning Scheme for the reason that upon variation of the scheme, the original scheme ceased, and the varied scheme came into existence.

Courts analysis and judgement:

The High Court has set out all the issues framed by the Trial Court in the body of the judgment and was, therefore, fully conscious of all the points that it had to consider in the appeal. Further, we do not find that any particular issue that was considered by the Trial Court was left out by the High Court while adjudicating the appeal. In effect, we do not find merit in the contention that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on this preliminary ground, warranting reconsideration of the first appeal by the High Court afresh. When allotment to plaintiff was modified by the second variation of Town Planning Scheme, where the plaintiffs were allotted Plot No. 187 which was of a lesser area but was silently accepted by them and they neither chose to seek implementation of the original scheme, where under they were allotted a larger plot, or challenge the varied 36 scheme, whereby they were given a smaller plot. Having accepted the plot and upon variation of the scheme, the plaintiffs cannot seek to reopen the negligence and delay, on the part of the Corporation. Upon the preparation or variation of a Town Planning Scheme, the rights in the earlier plots of land stands extinguished and rights accrued, if any, becomes extinct then it cannot be the basis for a later cause of action. The plaintiffs did not choose to adduce any evidence in support of their claim for the quantified damages of 1,63,97,673/-. Though it has been contended that the plaintiffs never actually received the compensation for the shortfall of 974 sq. mts. @ 25/- per sq. yd., but pursuant to the judgment of the Trial Court, the plaintiffs deposited the sum of 24,350/-, being the compensation for 974 sq. mts. @ ₹ ₹25/- per sq. mt., as directed by the Trial Court. If they did not receive such compensation, they ought not to have abided by the direction of the Trial Court and deposited that amount. This voluntary act precludes them from contending that compensation was never paid to them and that they had deposited the amount as it was only a paltry sum. The contention of the plaintiffs that the Act of 1976 does not contemplate a second reduction in the reconstituted plot area cannot be accepted as Section 45 of the Act of 1976 deals with reconstitution of plots. In Prakash Amichand Shah and Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Mandal, it was held that a plot owner who has surrendered his original land for the purposes of the Town Planning, is not assured of allotment of a reconstituted plot in lieu thereof then in such case, he is entitled only to compensation. Section 71 postulates that in case of variation of the Town Planning Scheme is to be made then the same needs to be published and sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1976, which means that the entire exercise would be undertaken afresh, therefore, further reduction of a plot which is notified in the original Town Planning Scheme is implicit. The plaintiffs, were aware of the fact that Plot No. 187 allotted to them under the second varied Town Planning Scheme No. 6, Paldi, was of lesser area, and was accepted by them without any protest or raising right to a larger area and their conduct of depositing ₹24,350/- thereby implying receipt of the compensation amount foreclosed their right, to either challenge the allotment of a plot of lesser area or to seek more compensation. In this regard, it is noted that Section 54 provides an appellate remedy to the person aggrieved by any decision of the Town Planning Officer. The quantification of compensation was amenable to appellate review but the plaintiffs did not avail the said remedy. The plaintiffs’ main prayer was for quantified compensation, in the alternative, to allot land in the western zone of Ahmedabad. The Plaintiff did not adduce evidence values of the two final plots. The monetary value of two plots depend upon situation, development, proximity and access to the main road or highway, etc., and the same cannot be concluded without adequate proof. The High Court was fully justified in allowing the first appeal filed by the Corporation. There is no need for any interference. Therefore, the appeals are accordingly dismissed.  

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“Supreme Court Upholds High Court’s Bail Grant to Businessman in UAPA Case Linked to Maoist Funding”

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Case title: Union of India v. Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Mrityunjay @ Sonu Singh

Case no: Criminal appeal no. 2024 @ Special leave petition (Criminal) No.2024 @ Diary no. 27308 of 2023.

Dated on: May 10

Quorum:   Hon’ble Justice Mr. Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and   Hon’ble Justice Mr Aravind Kumar.

Facts of the case:

On 22.11.2019, at about 8.00 PM, the patrolling party of Chandwa Police Station during their routine patrol had stopped at Lukuiya More where the banned terrorist organization CPI (Moist) fired indiscriminately at them resulting in the death of four (4) police personnel. The arms and ammunitions of the martyred police personnel was looted and after raising slogans the moist fled away. One of the home guards, Dinesh Ram, who escaped unhurt rushed to Chandwa Police Station and lodged a complaint which resulted in lodging FIR against 18 named and few unknown persons. The Central Government directed the NIA to take up investigation whereby FIR was re-registered for the offences under IPC, Arms Act and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Respondent herein is one of the people apprehended who preferred appeal against the order of the Special Judge, NIA. The Union of India is now challenging High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi order dated 30.01.2023 whereby the respondent appeal was allowed, and bail was extended thereby setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi.  

Issues:

Whether High Court was right in enlarging the bail of the Respondent?

Legal provisions:

Sections 120(B), 121, 121(A), 122, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396 and 427 of IPC and under Sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40 of UAP Act and under Sections 25(1B)(a), 26, 27 and 35 of the UAPA Act.

Contentions of the appellant:

The respondent was a key partner of a construction firm M/s Santosh Construction and was closely associated with Regional Commander of CPI-Maoist Ravindra Ganjhu and provided financial as well as logistics support for the terrorist activities. The respondent managed the terrorist fund by showing dubious entries and investments in his company/firm’s accounts. The respondent is directly connected to the incident which led to the killing of four (4) police personnel of the Jharkhand Police. The search at the house of the respondent resulted in recovering unaccounted cash of Rs.2.64 crores for which there was no justifiable explanation. There are other three (3) cases registered against the respondent which gives sufficient grounds to reject the bail. The respondent and his associates are threatening the life of the complainant and pressurizing him to withdraw the case. The respondent is an influential person and would try to threaten or influence witnesses.  

Contentions of the respondent:

The conditional bail was granted on 30.01.2023 and even after lapse of more than 1 year and 3 months, there is no allegation of violation of bail order. The prosecution is seeking for setting aside the impugned order for the reason that respondent is involved in three (3) cases apart from the case registered by NIA. The case registered by Chandwa PS has resulted in acquittal and in the case No.108 of 2015, the respondent has been enlarged on bail by the High Court of Jharkhand. In the case No.4 of 2020, the respondent has been granted anticipatory bail by the High Court of Jharkhand. The purported criminal antecedent did not sway the mind of High Court while considering the prayer for grant of bail. The pendency of three (3) other cases would have no bearing for the continuation of the bail order granted in favour of the respondent.   


Courts analysis and judgement:

The High Court has scrutinized the entire material on record and has recorded a finding that name of the respondent did not figure in the initial FIR registered or in the statements of witnesses and most of the statements did not mention the respondent’s name. It is well settled position that an accused cannot be detained under the guise of punishing him by presuming the guilt. In Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, it was been held that the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the presumption of guilt. The broad probability of accused being involved in the committing of the offence alleged will have to be seen. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, it was held that it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to opine that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. The satisfaction to be recorded is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea. The court must take into account the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. In an order granting bail, reasoning should demonstrate application of mind. In Puran v. Rambilas it was held that at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case need not be undertaken. In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. it was held that the considerations to be weighed by the court while granting bail in non-bailable offences and they are — the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances peculiar to the accused; possibility of non-securing the presence of accused at the trial; apprehension of witnesses tampering; the larger interest of the public or the State. The elaborate examination or discussion of evidence is not required. The Court is only expected to record a finding of the probabilities of the involvement of the accused in the commission of an offence. The respondent has been ordered to be enlarged on bail by the High Court on 30.01.2023 upon conditions. The prosecution has no case that the stipulated conditions have been violated. In the absence of a strong prima facie case of violation of the bail order, it would not be appropriate to reverse or set aside order after a lapse of fifteen (15) months. In Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, it was held that considerations for grant of bail and cancellation of bails are different and if conditions of bail is misused or bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions or bail was obtained by playing fraud then bail granted to the accused can be cancelled. The arguments that the respondent is involved in three (3) other cases and by considering that the respondent has been enlarged on bail or is on anticipatory bail would reflect that respondent having been enlarged on conditional bail and the conditions stipulated have not been violated and the appellant not seeking for cancellation of the bail till date are prime reasons for not entertaining this appeal.There is no other overwhelming material on record to set aside the order granting bail which outweighs the liberty granted by the High Court under the impugned order. Hence, interference is not warranted. However, to allay the apprehension of the prosecution, the prosecution can seek for cancellation of the bail in the event any of the conditions being violated by the respondent. The observations made is restricted to the consideration of the prayer for bail and the jurisdictional court shall not be influenced by any of the observation above. Subject to the above observations, the appeal stands dismissed.

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Appellate Courts Can Overlook Separate Framing of Issues if Adequately Addressed: Supreme Court

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CASE TITLE – Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation       

CASE NUMBER – Civil Appeal (16956-16957)

DATED ON – 10.05.2024

QUORUM – Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, two appeals have been filed under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1976’) with the Supreme Court of India. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (for brevity, ‘the Corporation’) prepared the Town Planning Scheme No.6, Paldi under the provisions of The Act of 1976. This required the Plaintiff’s father to give up 21.40% of his land, i.e., 4247 sq. yds./3552 sq. mts., to the Corporation for public purposes. For the remaining extent of 15576 sq. yds./13023 sq. mts., the Corporation allotted two separate final plots, viz., Final Plot No. 478, admeasuring 11686 sq. yds./9771 sq. mts., and Final Plot No. 463, admeasuring 3890 sq. yds./3252 sq. mts. The Corporation failed in allotting the Final Plot No. 463, due to it being occupied by slum dwellers. However, after the implementation of the second varied scheme, they offered the plaintiffs Final Plot No. 187, measuring 2278 sq. mts. where the land allotment was reduced by 974 sq. mts.. The Corporation also paid compensation for the shortfall of land @ Rs.25/- per sq. mt. under the scheme. Both the terms were accepted and unchallenged by the Plaintiffs. After which the plaintiffs sought an appeal with the Civil Court stating that the compensation was meager and that they should also be compensated as per the current land rates along with interest, which amounted to a total of Rs. 1,63,97,673. The Corporation filed the first appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2008 passed by a learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, in Civil Suit No. 4583 of 1998.  The suit was filed by the appellants herein against the Corporation seeking compensation of ₹1,63,97,673/- with interest thereon @ 18% p.a. or, in the alternative, allotment of land, i.e., an extent of 974 sq. mts., in any Town Planning Scheme in the western zone of Ahmedabad. While the Trial Court rejected this claim, they had instructed the Corporation to provide an alternative extent of land measuring 974 sq. mts. And also asked the plaintiffs to return the amount provided as compensation by the Corporation, which was Rs.24,350. These two appeals recently brought forward, arise out of the common judgment dated 18.06.2013 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in First Appeal No. 3596 of 2009 and Cross-Objection No. 81 of 2010 in First Appeal No. 3596 of 2009. Thereby, the Division Bench allowed the first appeal filed by the Corporation and dismissed the cross-objection filed by the respondents in the first appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the said respondents filed these appeals. The High Court held that it was not open to them to claim any damages, having accepted the smaller plot allotted to them under the varied scheme and the compensation for the shortfall of 974 sq. mts. @ 25/- per sq. mt. without protest. The High Court, accordingly, concluded that the cross-objection deserved to be dismissed. It is on this basis that the High Court allowed the first appeal filed by the Corporation and dismissed the cross-objection of the plaintiffs.

ISSUES

  1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant failed perform its legal obligation to give vacant and peaceful possession of Final Plot No. 463 due to alleged reasons?

  1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the compensation awarded, for the difference of 974 sq. meter. At the rate of Rs. 25 per sq. meter, was merely an eye wash in view of the prevailing prices of land in Paldi area in the year 1991?

  1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to the interest at the rate of 10% p.a. on Rs. 5,83,500/- which have turned out in investment at compound rate of interest comes to Rs. 1,63,97,673/- as alleged?

  1. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff had not raised any objection at the proper time as alleged?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 40 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the making and the contents of a Town Planning Scheme and empowers the appropriate authority to make one or more Town Planning Scheme(s) for a development area

Section 41 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the appropriate authority and it’s duty to inform Govt authorities about Town Planning Schemes,

Section 42 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the proseger to the making and publication of a draft scheme and states that, within 9 months from the date of declaration of intention under Section 41.

Section 44 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Acr, 1976, prescribes the details of the contents of the draft scheme and provides that it should contain the particulars enumerated under it’s Clauses,

Section 45 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, pertains to the reconstitution of plots.

Section 47 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the procedure for objections being raised against the draft scheme.

Section 48 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, empowers the State Government to sanction the draft scheme.

Section 50 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the State Government to appoint a Town Planning Officer within one month from the date on which the draft scheme has been sanctioned and notified in the Official Gazette.

Section 51 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976  , prescribes the duties of the Town Planning Officer.

Section 52 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976  , prescribes the contents of the preliminary and final schemes.

Section 54 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes for an appeal against any decision of the Town Planning Officer.

Section 67 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes that the final plots shall become subject to the rights settled by the Town Planning Officer.

Section 68 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes the procdure to evict a person on a land he is not entitles to occupy.

Section 71 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes when a town planning scheme be varied by a subsequent scheme.

Section 81 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, prescribes when a original plot can be tranferref into a Final Plot.

Section 82 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, Prescribes when and how an aggrieved person can claim compensation.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF

The plaintiffs claimed that the market rate of the land allotted to the plaintiffs was about ₹150/- per sq. yd. in the year 1963 and, therefore, the value of 3890 sq. yds. would come to ₹5,83,500/.  They asserted that if this amount had been invested at 10% p.a. compound rate of interest, it would come to ₹1,63,97,673/-. 5 They prayed for compensation of ₹1,63,97,673/-. They further stated that the scheme was framed as per the provisions of the Act of 1976, whereby deduction of 21.40% of their land was necessitated, but they were finally allotted land with a further deduction of 974 sq. mts. illegally. They, therefore, sought allotment of that land in the alternative.

CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

The suit, as framed, was not maintainable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it and grant the reliefs prayed for therein. The suit also required to be dismissed for non-joinder of parties, as the State Government had not been impleaded therein. Even on merits, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. The plaintiffs were allotted Final Plot No. 187, measuring 2278 sq. mts., under the scheme, which had been varied after following the due procedure. As regards the shortfall of land, the plaintiffs were paid compensation @ ₹25/- per sq. mt. under the scheme itself and, as such, the plaintiffs accepted possession of Final Plot No. 187 and the compensation, in respect of the remaining area of land, without protest and without challenging the same. Therefore, it was not open to them to make out a grievance either concerning the remaining area of land and/or the quantum of compensation.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs, being well aware of the fact that Final Plot No. 187 allotted to them under the second varied Town Planning Scheme No. 6, Paldi, was of lesser area, accepted the same without any protest and without agitating a right to a larger area in the light of the initial allotment of Plot No. 463, and their conduct in depositing ₹24,350/- thereafter, implying receipt of the compensation amount for the shortfall area of 974 sq. mts. @ 25/- per sq. mt., foreclosed their right, if ₹ any, to either challenge the allotment of a plot of lesser area or to seek more compensation. It was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to adduce evidence in support of their claim for this pre-determined sum. However, no evidence whatsoever was produced by them in support of the land values relevant to any point in time, be it of the original final plot or the final plot that was ultimately given to them. In the absence of such crucial material, the plaintiffs’ prayer for compensation necessarily had to be negated. Further, as there was never any guarantee that a plot owner who surrendered his land pursuant to a Town Planning Scheme would be allotted any land after reconstitution of the plots, the plaintiffs cannot assert any vested right in that regard. When this was contested in the Supreme Court, it held up the High Court’s decision, stating that it was completely justified, due to the appeals being bereft and should accordingly be dismissed.

 

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Supreme court refuses to entertain impleading and restoration petition by a stranger .

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Case title: Vijaylaxman Bawe v. P & S Nirman PVT LTD

Case no:  Civil Appeal of 2024 arising from SLP 4034 of 2023

Dated on: 8th May 2024

Quorum: Justice B R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta

Facts of the case:

The present appeal is against the judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay whereby the High Court dismissed the revision application of the appellants herein filed for challenging the order of the Civil Judge for condonation of delay in filing application for restoration and seeking thereby to restore the Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002, which was dismissed for want of prosecution. The present appeal is concerned with lands situated at Sonkhar Village where there are rival claims with respect to the ownership of the suit land. The Government of Maharashtra, through the Special Land Acquisition Officer, acquired the subject land for public purpose, and handed over to (CIDCO). In the year 2002, Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002 was filed by the original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas Thakkar (Kanani) (since deceased and now represented by his legal heirs, in the trial court against the Government of Maharashtra, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Vijay Laxman Bhawe (Defendant No.3) (since deceased and now represented through his legal heirs), Union of India and CIDCO for relief of declaration that the acquisition is illegal, null and void, however if the court upholds acquisition then a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to 12½ % Gaonthan Extension Scheme,as per the Gaonthan Extension Scheme of CIDCO. In the year 2005, the original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas Thakkar passed away. The legal heirs of the original plaintiff, through their Power of Attorney holder, filed application for condonation of delay and for bringing the legal heirs of the plaintiff on record. The trial court allowed the application for condonation of delay as well as the application for bringing the legal heirs on record in the subject suit. However, the trial court dismissed the subject suit for want of prosecution. On 7th November 2019, respondents No. 2 and 3, i.e., the legal heirs of the plaintiff, filed application, seeking condonation of delay of 8 years and 4 days in filing an application for restoration of subject suit. This application is still pending adjudication. Meanwhile, Respondent No. 1, a private limited company, claiming to be the “assignee”, filed an application, seeking condonation of delay of 9 years and 11 months in filing the application for restoration of the subject suit. The trial court allowed the restoration application. Aggrieved by the order, the appellants filed Revision Application before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the civil revision application. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal is filed.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court was right in allowing the application of the Respondent for restoration of suit?

Legal provisions:

 Impleading Legal Heirs and restoration of suit under Cpc.  

Contentions of the Appellant:

The respondent No.1 is totally a stranger to the proceedings. When an application is filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, i.e. respondents No. 2 and 3 for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the subject suit is pending since 7th November 2019, the learned trial court ought not to have considered the application filed by a stranger. The subject suit itself is a frivolous one. The suit land belonged to the predecessors of the appellants, and it was acquired by the State and the compensation was duly received by the appellants. The proceedings for enhancement are also pending before the High Court. It was argued that entertaining the application of a stranger for condonation of delay is mockery of justice.

Contentions of the Respondent:

The respondent No.1 has accrued a right on account of an Agreement entered between it and the legal heirs of the original plaintiff. As the respondents No.2 and 3 were not prosecuting the application for condonation of delay for restoration of the subject suit, respondent No.1 was justified in filing such an application.

Courts judgement and analysis:

The approach of the trial court in entertaining the application of respondent No.1 is unsustainable in law that too when the claim of respondent No.1 is on an unregistered Agreement for Sale. Further, entertaining an application by a stranger for condonation of delay and restoration is totally unsustainable in law. The respondent No.1 has not even been impleaded in the subject suit and hence filing the application filed by a stranger, who is not a party to the proceedings, is totally illegal. If the approach adopted by the trial court is approved, any person can move application for condonation of delay and restoration of the suit even if the person is not a party to the subject suit especially when an application for condonation of delay and for restoration filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff is pending since 7th November 2019. It is difficult to understand as to what was the need for the trial court to entertain the application after a period of two years. The trial court could have decided the application on merits. Though, it was argued by the appellants before the High Court that respondent No.1 was a stranger and the reasons given for condonation of delay did not constitute the “sufficient cause”, the High Court totally ignored the same. In light of the view taken, the reasoning given by the trial court as well as the High Court for condoning such an inordinate delay will not come under the ambit of “sufficient cause” as has been discussed by this Court in a catena of judgments. The order of the trial court as well as the High Court are not sustainable in law. The appeal is therefore allowed.

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.
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