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JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: SUPREME COURT REITERATES THAT LOWER OR SUBORDINATE COURTS DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONTRADICT THE DECISIONS OF HIGHER COURTS

Case title: Mary Pushpam vs Telvi Curusumary

Case no.: civil appeal no. 9941 of 2016

Decided on: 03.01.2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The appellant has filed this civil appeal in the Supreme Court of India challenging the correctness of the judgement and order dated 21.07.2009 passed by Madras High Court, which allowed the defendant-respondent’s Second Appeal, set aside the judgement and decree passed by the Sub-Judge, Padmanabhapuram dated 13.10.2003, and restored and confirmed the Trial Court’s judgement and decree dated 30.06.1997.

The appellant previously filed a civil suit against the respondents, in the Court of District Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate at Eraniel, seeking a declaration of title, possession, and a permanent injunction. The suit was brought because, in 1976, the respondents filed an ejectment suit against the appellant. The High Court dismissed the suit of respondents in the first appeal, and the second appeal on March 30, 1990.

Now, the appellant retained possession of the property in the matter. Nonetheless, since the respondents attempted to interfere with the appellant’s possession, she filed the suit.

The Trial Court decreed the suit for declaration of title, possession, and permanent injunction on June 30, 1997, but only for the portion of the suit property where the house property was located, out of a total of 8 cents. The suit for the other property was dismissed.

Aggrieved by this the appellant preferred an Appeal. The Sub-Judge altered the Trial Court’s judgement and decreed on October 13, 2003, declaring that the appellants were entitled to the entire suit property for relief of declaration of title, permanent injunction, and setting up their boundary to secure the said property. In this judgment, the learned Sub-Judge relied primarily on the High Court’s judgement dated March 30, 1990.

Aggrieved, the respondents filed a second appeal with the High Court. By the impugned judgement, the High Court allowed the appeal, overturned the Sub-Judge’s decision, and reinstated the Trial Court’s decree. The plaintiff, who is dissatisfied with the outcome, has chosen to appeal.

PRINCIPLES DISCUSSED:

Rule of Judicial Discipline and Prosperity:

In ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’, Lower or subordinate courts lack the authority to overturn the decisions of higher courts.

Doctrine of Merger:

It is a common law doctrine based on the idea of upholding the decorum of judicial and administrative hierarchy. The doctrine is based on the simple premise that more than one operative order governing the same subject matter cannot exist concurrently.

Rule of precedent:

When a decision of a coordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the bench’s attention, it is to be respected and binding, subject to the bench’s right to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench.

ISSUE RAISED:

Whether the Honourable High Court of Madras’ decision in 1990 applies to the entire 8 cents of the suit property or just the house on a portion of it?

APPELLANTS CONTENTION:

The appellant contended that in the first round, the High Court specifically stated in its judgement dated 30.03.1990 that the dispute was over 8 cents of land and the structure built on it. In the current round of litigation, the Trial Court or the High Court could not have limited it to the construction rather than the entire portion of land measuring 8 cents. It is also argued that, under the law of merger, the judgements of the Trial Court and the First Appeal Court in the first round of litigation merged with the judgement of the High Court dated 30.03.1990, and that judgement alone must be read as final and binding between the parties. It is also argued that the First Appeal Court, in its current round judgement dated 13.10.2003, specifically stated that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the High Court’s decision. In its challenged decision, the High Court violated judicial discipline by taking a position that contradicted the previous decision.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

The respondents contended that the Trial Court and High Court’s decisions in the current round were correct in law and fact. The respondents’ previous round of litigation was solely focused on the appellant’s constructions, which they had obviously lost. The respondents had always had possession of the 8 cents of land. The appellants were never in possession thereof. Both the Trial Court’s and the High Court’s decisions deserve to stand.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT:

The court determined that there was no defence for the respondents to raise because the appellant had already perfected her rights through adverse possession of the suit property, which was 8 cents of land. And it held that the respondents never sought clarification on the High Court’s findings or observations, nor did they challenge them in any higher forum. The judgement dated 30.03.1990 attained finality. Any other interpretation of the aforementioned judgement, which was clear in itself, would clearly constitute judicial misconduct. In its decision dated 13.10.2003, the Sub-Judge correctly stated that the Trial Court had no authority to interpret the High Court’s judgement dated 30.03.1990 in any way other than what was recorded therein.

According to the Doctrine of Merger, the judgements of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court from the first round of litigation are incorporated into the High Court’s judgement dated March 30, 1990. This 1990 judgement should be considered the final and binding order from the initial litigation.

The court also ruled that no record of the actual boundary or measurements of the property in question exists. The suit for possession must accurately describe the property in question, including all measurement and boundary details. This was totally lacking. A suit for possession of such property would likely be dismissed due to its identifiability.

The appeal is granted, and the High Court’s judgement was set aside, while the First Appellate Court’s decision by Sub-Judge Padmanabhapuram is restored and upheld.

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Written by – Surya Venkata Sujith

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Relationship Between Logic & Experience Important While Invoking Precedents’: Allahabad High Court Rejects Anticipatory Bail

CASE TITLE:  Kusum Devi And Another v. State of U.P. and Another [Criminal Misc Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. – 1907 of 2023]

DECIDED ON: 24.08.2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Krishan Pahal,J.

INTRODUCTION

On Thursday, the Allahabad High Court emphasized the significance of comprehending the interplay between reasoning and practical knowledge when utilizing legal precedents to determine cases with resemblant facts and conditions. The court underscored that a mechanical application of these principles is inappropriate. In line with this perspective, Justice Krishan Pahal dismissed the plea for anticipatory bail made by the mother of a deceased individual who had passed away by suicide in her residence.

FACTS

Reportedly, the spouse of the person providing information resided with his parents due to his father’s illness, and his earnings were directed to his father’s bank account. The informant was staying at her maternal residence when she was informed about her husband’s suicide. She received an alleged suicide note from her husband’s phone, which was being used by her father-in-law. Subsequently, she lodged a First Information Report (FIR) against her in-laws.

The legal representatives for the applicants argued that imprisonment would harm the reputation of the female defendants. They pointed out that one of the co-accused individuals had already been granted regular bail, and no direct witness was available in the ongoing case. Additionally, they highlighted the delay of one month in filing the FIR, and with the chargesheet submitted, there was minimal risk of evidence tampering. Hence, the counsel contended that the circumstances were appropriate for granting anticipatory bail.

The applicants drew support from the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Kamlesh & Anr. vs. The State of Rajasthan & Anr., and Vinod Kumar Sharma & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., along with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dr. Rajni Tripathi vs. State of U.P. In these cases, the courts determined that seeking anticipatory bail under Section 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) remains valid even after the rejection of an application filed under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Furthermore, the applicants referred to the instance of Udit Arya vs. State of U.P, where the Allahabad High Court granted anticipatory bail despite the initiation of proceedings under Section 82 of the CrPC. Conversely, the informant’s representative cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Prem Shankar Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Anr., highlighting that anticipatory bail was not viable after the conclusion of proceedings under Section 82 (regarding a proclamation for an absconding person) and Section 83 (regarding the attachment of property of an absconding person).

CASE ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The court noted that concerning the current applicants, their prior challenge to the chargesheet had not succeeded, whereas in the case of Kamlesh, the practice at the Rajasthan High Court involved challenging the First Information Report (F.I.R.) through a Section 482 Cr.P.C. petition. This procedure allowed the consideration and decision of the application under Section 438 Cr.P.C., even after challenging the F.I.R.

In a differentiation from the Vinod Kumar case, the court observed that the precedent established in that case, suggesting that the term ‘regular bail’ encompasses the provisions of Section 483 of the CrPC, did not directly apply to the circumstances of the present case.

“The learned Senior Counsel for the applicants has also drawn upon the judgment in Vinod Kumar Sharma (above-mentioned), which suggests that the phrase ‘regular bail’ includes the provisions laid out in Section 438 Cr.P.C. This argument is valid and indeed, even after a decision for regular bail is granted, the option for anticipatory bail remains. However, this legal precedent does not pertain to the current situation. We must assess this case based on its individual merits. Furthermore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Rajni Tripathi (previously mentioned) has been built upon the aforementioned verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Sharma (aforementioned). Therefore, these decisions are not applicable to the current circumstances.”

Furthermore, the court pointed out that the proclamation under Sections 82 and 83 of the CrPC had concluded over six months ago and that the suicide had occurred within the applicants’ residence. Consequently, the exception established in the Udit Arya case would not be pertinent to the present scenario.

Lastly, the court determined that the applicants’ attempt to assert that the case was per incuriam (decided without considering relevant law) did not hold, and as a result, the request for anticipatory bail was dismissed.

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Written by- Mansi Malpani