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Supreme Court Directs Bombay High Court to Scrutinize Legality of Advocates’ Filed ‘Minutes of Order’

Case Title: Ajay Ishwar Ghute and Ors V. Meher K. Patel and Ors

Case no: Civil appeal No. 4786 of 2024

Dated on: 30th April, 2024

Quorum: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Facts of the case:

An Arbitration Petition was filed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before single judge of Bombay High court wherein consent terms were filed in the arbitration petition preferred by the first respondent. In terms of the consent terms the learned single judge recorded that the process of handing over the possession of the suit property by the respondents to the first respondents as commenced. The disputes were related to lands of Parsi Dairy Farm. The seventh respondent filed an interim application after two years of filing the consent terms by stating that High court had directed the Police to give police protection to the parties for completing the process of handing over possession. A compound wall was to be constructed in terms of the consent terms, which according, to the seventh respondent could not be done as local persons obstructed the work. The learned single judge of the Bombay High court disposed the interim application by directing Police/Tahasildar/ Collector/ Gram Panchayat office and all other Government authorities to offer assistance to construct a wall to safeguard the suit property. The persons who had obstructed the construction of the wall were not part to the arbitration proceedings/ interim application. An application was filed to Deputy Superintendent of Land Records by first respondent and five others for measuring the land who vide later dated 20.11.2021 informed the first respondent that several persons have objected, in writing, in carrying out the survey. Hence, holding an enquiry was necessary. First and second respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution for non-compliance with the orders of the Arbitration Petition regarding survey and construction of compound wall. The persons who raised objections were not impleaded in the Writ Petition. The Division Bench on 09.03.2022 ordered the Superintendent of Police to be present. The Superintendent of Police filed an affidavit stating that local tribals have gathered an impression that they were attempted to be illegally dispossessed and they insisted that the lands be demarcated before constructing the compound wall. The District Superintendent of Land Records vide an affidavit stated that there are certain persons to whom the petitioners and others have sold small portions of land and if a compound wall is constructed the third parties are likely to get landlocked. The Division bench without noticing the contentions of the above Government officers, instead of directing impleadment of the affected parties passed an order in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ dated 16.03.2022, for issuing a direction to survey authorities to carry out demarcation of the boundary and to direct the police to provide protection for constructing the compound wall.

Contentions of the appellant:

Of the thirty review petitioners Nos. 7-18 were shown as interveners in the “Minutes of order” though they had not engaged any advocate. The said interveners never met the advocate who is shown to have signed ‘Minutes of order’ on their behalf. The appellants had rights in respect of several properties which were likely to be adversely affected by the construction of the compound wall. The principles of Natural justice were not followed before permitting the construction of the compound wall. The impugned order based on ‘Minutes of order’ is completely illegal and vitiated by the non-joinder of the necessary parties.

Contentions of the respondent:

The compound wall had been built in such a manner that no person was landlocked or in any manner inconvenienced. The owners of the adjacent lands continue to enjoy unhindered and unfettered access to their respective land.

Legal provisions

Article 226- Writ Jurisdiction of High Court.

Issue: 

Whether the High court was justified in passing a order while exercising Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India permitting the first and second respondent to construct a compound wall under police protection in terms of “Minutes of Order”?

Court’s Analysis and Judgement:

The court summarised conclusions regarding the concept of Minutes of order as follows:
a) The practice of filing ‘Minutes of order’ prevails in Bombay High court the object of which is to assist the court.
b) An order passed in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ is not a consent order. It is an order in invitum.
c) The Courts to apply its mind as to whether parties likely to be affected by an order in terms ‘Minutes of order’ have been impleaded to the proceedings and whether such order is lawful? If the court finds that all parties are not impleaded the court to defer passing of the order till all the necessary parties are impleaded.
d) If the court is of the view that an order made in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ will not be lawful court should decline to pass order in terms of ‘Minutes of order’.

It was the duty of the Court to call 1st and 2nd respondent to implead persons who were likely to be affected by the construction of the compound wall. The Division Bench of the High court failed to make an enquiry as to whether the third parties will be affected by the construction of the compound wall. Hence, order dated 16.03.2022 in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The writ Petition to be remanded to the High court. After remand, High court must decide who are the necessary parties to the petition in case of failure of 1st and 2nd respondents to implead the necessary parties the High court is within its power to dismiss the Writ Petition and pass an order of restoration of status quo ante by directing demolition of the compound wall.

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Supreme Court Directs Implementation of Standard Operating Procedure for Filing Paper Books.

Case title: Anjumol V.A. and Ors V. Kerala Public Service Commission and Ors.

Case no: petition (s) for special leave to appeal (C) No. 13242/2021

Dated on: 16.04.24

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol.

Facts of the case:

The Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 13242/2021 is arising from final. Judgment and Order dated 04-06-2019 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum) in OPKAT No. 62/2017.

Court’s  Analysis and Judgement 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while hearing the above case, has perceived various practical difficulties both on miscellaneous or non-miscellaneous days and some of them are as mentioned herein below:

(i) The Orders passed during the proceedings are not attached to the paper books;

(ii) In Service matters, the counsels for the Petitioner are not attaching the relevant Service Rules with Appendix in the SLP paper book or the same is not referred in the pleadings. The Rules, sometimes, are filed in piecemeal with Applications or with additional documents, due to which matters are postponed. This causes financial burden upon the parties and further results in delay in adjudication;

(iii) Counter Affidavits are sometimes attached to the main SLP paper book without flagging, inviting attention and sometimes as separate paper book which requires unnecessary search and wastage of time by the Judges;

(iv) Upon directions and after filing the convenience compilation, the same is not sent to the residential offices of the Judges either in hard copy or by way of email and even during the hearing;

(v) The IA number is not properly exhibited on its face. The Applications are not attached date wise, with paper books. This causes inconvenience to the Judges;

(vi) Other ancillary issues in various paper books is also causing difficulty in day to day court functioning.

In view of the above, the Secretary General and the Registry Officers, in particular the Registrar (Judicial) shall prepare a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for properly maintaining the SLP paper books and also to eliminate the difficulties mentioned above. The SOP is to be notified after seeking appropriate orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. The due compliance shall be made as expeditiously as possible for efficient functioning of the court. Learned counsel for the parties were heard the hearing is concluded. The Learned State Counsel and the Counsels for Respondents are granted two weeks’ time to file affidavit clarifying how many persons have been appointed along with their qualifications and the status of the Petitioners in the present Special Leave petition.

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Karnataka HC upholds that signing Jaya Bharata Jananiya Tanujate the State anthem in a particular tune will not infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19(1)(a) and (1)(g)

Case title: Kikkeri Krishna Murthy and the State of Karnataka and Ors.

Case no: Writ petition No. 19801 of 2022

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Krishna S Dixit

Facts of the case:    petitioner is a well- known singer who has filed a complaint before the court by filing a writ petition against the State Govt of Karnataka order dated on 25.09.2022 whereby the State Government had directed the rendition of the State anthem ‘Jaya Bharata Jananiya Tanujate’ in a specific tune or raaga that was composed by Shri. Mysore Ananthaswamy .

Contentions of the appellant:

The impugned order constitutes an unreasonable restriction onto right to expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution, asking citizens to sing a song in a particular tune or raaga is constitutionally impermissible unless it is authorized by law. There is no restrictions for citizens prescribed to sing any particular tune or raaga. Just because, a committee had recommended a particular tune or raaga in which the Naadageethe needs to be sung the impugned order does not get validated.

Contentions of the respondent:

Petitioner has not mentioned as to which right of his has been infringed by the impugned order. After, taking the unanimous report of the committee into consideration the State has prescribed a particular tune or raaga for rendering the naadageethe. In schools, Naadageethe has to be sung in a certain manner in order to maintain uniformity amongst the students; Similarly, in offices or Governmental bodies it’s made compulsory to sing in official occasions only. It is always open to citizens the said song in any tune or raaga of their choice. Under, the provisions of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. The Govt has power to issue the impugned order which otherwise also has executive power that is vested under Article162 of the Indian Constitution.

Legal provisions:

Section 3(1) of Karnataka Education Act, 1983- generates general education, professional education, medical education, technical education at all levels in accordance with provisions of the act.

Article 19(1) (a) and 19 (1) (g)- guarantees its citizens the freedom of speech and expression. Also, grants its citizens the freedom to practice any profession or trade or business of his/her choice.

Article 162- extent of executive power of the state.

Issue:

Whether the action of the State Govt in prescribing a particular raaga or tune for the State anthem is arbitrary and unreasonable?

Court analysis and judgement:

The impugned order does not come in his way of singing the naadageethe in his tune or raaga . Despite the vehement submissions the petitioner isn’t in a position to demonstrate his right to sing in qualified spaces like schools, governmental bodies that is composed by other stalwarts in the variance once specified. Since, the impugned order does not infringe any right of the petitioner to sing naadageethe in any raaga anywhere anytime except in certain qualified places; he is not an “aggrieved person”. No school has come forward to challenge the order and the petitioner is not supporting cause of any school and hence the impugned order does not give a proper cause of action in maintaining the petition. Permission of singing the national anthem in any specified raaga is permissible under Article 162 of the constitution. In, Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur V. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR 225 it was observed that when there is an residue of government function that remains after legislative and judicial function are taken away that is when the executive powers come into actions, and if such action effects rights of citizen the authority of law would be required. The contention of petitioner that his right to speech and expression under Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) has been infringed by imposing unreasonable restrictions does not merit acceptance. The question of adjudging reasonable restrictions arises when the substantive right and curtailment is demonstrated. However, such demonstration lacks in the case. As, the petition is devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed.

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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Delhi High Court’s Jurisdiction Limited to Cases of Perversity in Industrial Tribunal Decisions

Case title: Director General, Delhi Doordharshan Kendra v. Mohd. Shahbaz Khan, Tej Pal Manohar Paswan, Danvir Hans Raj.

Case no: LPA 242/2024, LPA 243/2024, LPA 244/2024, LPA 245/2024, LPA 246/2024,

Dated on: 22nd March, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Rekha Palli and Hon’ble DR. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain.

Facts of the case:

Appeals filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent LPA 242/2024 & other connected appeals to assail five similar orders dated 12.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of Writ Petitions. Vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2023, the learned Single Judge has rejected the Appellant’s challenge to the award dated 15.10.2007 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal (Tribunal), wherein the learned tribunal after holding that the termination of the respondents’ service by the Appellant was illegal, has directed the Appellant to reinstate them with 25% back wage.

Contentions of the appellant:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have failed to appreciate that the respondents were never employed with the Appellant but had in fact, been engaged by one M/S Navnidh Carriers who was engaged by the appellant on 31.07.1998, to provide manpower services as and when required. The learned Tribunal has not examined as to whether the Respondents had completed 240 days of continuous service in the year immediately preceding their termination, which aspect the learned Single Judge also over looked. Instead of placing the onus to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship on the respondents, the learned Single Judge has wrongly shifted the said onus on the Appellant.

Contentions of the respondent:

The learned Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that the respondents had been working with the Appellant/Organization much prior to 31.07.1998, i.e; the date when the appellant had, with malafide intention, engaged M/S Navnidh Carriers for providing manpower services and therefore, it was evident that the respondents had initially been engaged by the appellant itself. The experience certificate dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents wherein it has been categorically stated that he had been working with the appellant as a casual labourer since July 1997 and was an honest and hardworking worker. The appellant admittedly does not have any licence to engage workmen through a contractor as is mandated under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act), it is evident that the respondents were to be treated as employees of the appellant itself. He, therefore, prays that the appeals be dismissed.

Legal provisions:

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act)- regulated the employment of contract labor in certain establishments and provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. Article 226 of the Constitution- gives the High court the power to issue orders, directions and writs to any person or the authority including the Govt for the enforcement of Fundamental rights.

Issue:

Whether Respondents were engaged by the Appellant and were illegally terminated? When can Writ Court interfere with the factual findings of fact of Labour/Industrial Tribunal?

Courts judgement and analysis:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge, after taking into account the gate passes as also experience letter dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents have come to a conclusion that the respondents were employed with the appellant/ organisation and had been illegally terminated. Both the learned Single Judge as also the learned Tribunal found upon appreciation of evidence that the purported contract by the appellant in favor of M/s Navnidh Carriers was sham and an attempt to conceal the engagement of the respondents with the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to give any explanation whatsoever for the issuance of the said experience certificate if the respondent namely Mohd. Shahbaz Khan was not their employee. The Appellant did not have any license, as mandated under the CLRA Act, 1970, to engage workmen through a contractor, hence it is evident that they were directly engaged by the appellant. In the light of these categoric factual findings by the learned Tribunal, which cannot, in any manner, said to be perverse or contrary to the evidence lead before the learned Tribunal, we are of the view that it was neither open for the learned Single Judge to interfere with these findings in exercise of its writ jurisdiction nor is it open for this Court to examine these questions of fact. In Dinesh Kumar v. Central Public Works Department, 2023 SCC On-Line Del 6518, wherein the co-ordinate Bench after examining various decisions of the Apex Court held that writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact recorded in the industrial award only if the same are perverse or are entirely unsupported by evidence. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is quite limited. In Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless the same is perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High Courts can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt, (2006) 13 SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has applied wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on extraneous considerations. In the present case, the Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion based upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings of fact again after minutely scanning the entire evidence, and therefore, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge to hold that the respondents were engaged by the appellant and were illegally terminated. The appeals being meritless are, along with all pending applications, dismissed.

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.

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