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Supreme court upholds CESTAT view that the process of labeling/ re labeling, packing / re-packing amounts to “manufacturing”.

Case title: Commissioner of central excise Belapur V. Jindal Drugs Ltd

Case no: Civil appeal No. 1121 of 2016 and 788-790 of 2022

Dated on: 30th April, 2024

Quorum: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Facts of the case:

This is an Appeal against the Order dated 16.04.2015 passed by Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) against Appeal No.E/86389/13-Mum.The Respondent is engaged in the business of exporting cocoa butter and cocoa powder. Its factory at Jammu manufactures cocoa butter and cocoa powder. Respondent has another unit located at Taloja. The Cocoa butter manufactured at Jammu are received by the Respondent’s unit at Taloja. In the Taloja unit, respondent affixed two labels on two sides of the packages of the goods received from its Jammu factory and had claimed rebate of the duty paid on the exported goods. Further, respondent availed cenvat credit of the duty paid on those two goods at the time of clearance from Jammu. Respondent also imported cocoa butter and cocoa powder from China and Malaysia which was received at Taloja.The factory of the respondent at Taloja was visited by the officials of the appellant and it was found that the respondent was not only putting labels on the good bought from the Jammu unit but also was putting labels on the imported goods. As the labels were already fixed on the boxes containing the two goods additional labels affixed did not amount to manufacture as the additional labels affixed would not enhance the marketability of the goods which were already marketable. The appellant then issued a show cause notice to the respondents on 09.10.2012 to show cause as to why activity of labelling undertaken by the respondent on the product received from the Jammu unit and also on the imported goods are not to be held as activity of manufacturing in the terms of Note 3 chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act. It was alleged that the respondent had wrongly availed cenvat credit amounting to Rs. 23,02,53,752/. from the period of June, 2008 to July 2012. It was also alleged that the rebate amounting to Rs. 13,22,30,368 from the period of June, 2008 to July, 2011 was erroneously sanctioned. Thereafter, hearing the respondent, appellant passed an order on 25.02.2013 that the cenvat credit availed was irregular and the rebate sanctioned was erroneous thereby, the respondent was made liable to refund the credit availed for Rs. 23,02,53,752/- and a rebate of Rs. 13,22,30,368/- along with interest and penalty of 23,02, 53,752/- However, the penalty could be reduced to 25%, if the assessee paid the duty within 30 days of order. The Respondent preferred appeal before CESTAT. After hearing the matter CESTAT passed an order dated 16.04.2015 by stating that activity undertaken by respondent is covered by Note 3 to chapter 18 which amounts to manufacture and that there was no suppression or misrepresentation of the material fact by the respondent. That being the position the cenvat credit and the refund availed by the respondent was right and hence no penalty could be imposed. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has now preferred appeal.

Contentions of the appellant: 
The activity undertaken at the Taloja unit i.e; putting labels on both the sides of the cartons that were labelled at Jammu is not a manufacturing activity. Note 3 to chapter 18 Central Excise Tariff Act cannot be read in the manner that the activity of the labelling amounted to manufacture. The Technical Member of CESTAT had given a good reason to why such an activity cannot be considered as a manufacturing activity.

Contentions of the respondent: 
In Note 3 chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, Parliament has consciously replaced the word ‘and’ by the word ‘or’, vide amendment dated 01.03.2008, thereby making it clear that the activity of labelling or re-labelling amounted to “manufacture”.

Legal provisions:

Section 11A (1) of the central excise act- deals with recovery of duties not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded. 
Rule 14 of Cenvat credit rules 2004- credit has been taken wrongly or erroneously refunded. 
Rule 3 of cenvat credit rules- A manufacturer or producer of final products shall be allowed to take credit.   


Issues: 
Whether the activity of labelling amounts to manufacture?

Courts analysis and judgement:

Supreme court examined the definition of “manufacture” under Section 2(f)(ii) under Central excise Act “manufacture” includes any process, (i)incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. 
(ii) which is specified in relation to any goods in the Section or Chapter notes of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act (5 of 1986) as amounting to manufacture; or 
(iii) which, in relation to the goods specified in the Third Schedule, involves packing or repacking of such goods in a unit container or labelling or re-labelling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to render the product marketable to the consumer, and the word “manufacturer” shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account; Therefore, the word ‘manufacture’ includes any process which is incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product; any process specified in Section or chapter notes of the first schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act or any process in relations to goods specified in 3rd schedule which involves packing or re-packing, labelling or re-labelling, declaration or alteration of retail sales price or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to render the product marketable. Further, post-amendment of 01.03.2008 to Note 3 to chapter 18 of the Central Excise and Tariff Act, “manufacture” contemplates any of the three processes. The three processes are- 
i) labelling or re-labelling of containers; or 
ii) repacking from bulk packs to retail packs; or 
iii) the adoption of any other treatment to render the product marketable to the consumer. 
If any one of the above three processes is satisfied, then the same would amount to “manufacture” under Section 2 (f) (ii) of the Central Excise Act. There is no dispute as to the activity carried out by the respondent at the Taloja unit. Whether the goods are brought from Jammu or are imported, those re-labelled on both the sides of the pack containing the goods at the Taloja unit and thereafter, introduced in the market or sent for exports, in terms of Note 3 to the chapter 18 this process of re-labelling amounts to “manufacture”. The view taken by the CESTAT is correct and no case for interference is made out. Accordingly, the civil appeal 788-790 of 2022 stands dismissed.

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Karnataka HC upholds that accidental fall from train entitles to receive compensation from the railway tribunals even if that falls within the ambit of “self-infliction”‘.

Case title: Rojamani (since deceased represented by LRs) and Union Bank of India.

Case no: M.F.A. NO.3651/2016 (RCT)

Dated on: 19thApril, 2024

Quorum: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.P. Sandesh

Facts of the case:

On 22.02.14 the deceased Jayamma along with her sister went to Channapatna railway station and purchased the railway ticket to go to Ashokapuram Mysore. Both the of them had to board the Tuticorin express and realised that the said train would not go to Ashokapuram they alighted from the train while alighting the deceased lost her balance and sustained injuries resulting in her death. The respondent railway disputed the claim and denied their liability by stating that the death was not due to accidental fall, within the Section 123 of the railway Act alighting from train which amounts to self-inflicted injuries by virtue of provision of sect124 of railway act. The railway tribunal while affirming that deceased was a bona-fide passenger but denied the compensation on the grounds that the fall of deceased was due to her own voluntary act.

Contentions of the appellant:

Tribunal failed to appreciate that the deceased was an aged person and not a daily commuter. So, when she realized that she boarded the wrong train she alighted suddenly and lost her balance resulting to fatal injuries. In Jameela V. UOI, the counsel for the appellant held that the act amount to mere negligence and not criminal negligence. The counsel relied on the judgement of the SC of Rina Devi V. UOI , reported in 2018 AIR (SC) 2362 that death or injury in course of boarding or deboarding the train will be an untoward incident. Victim will be entitled to compensation and wont fall under section124A merely on plea of negligence as contributory factor. In, Anuradha V. UOI held that “Even the deceased boarded in a wrong train having a valid journey ticket and died while alighting the train that does not mean that he was not a bona fide passenger and on that ground claim cannot be rejected”.

Contentions of the respondent:

The counsel of respondents contended that it’s a clear case of attempt to deboard from running train when it was noticed that they boarded the wrong train for which they relied on Kerala court decision on Joseph P.T. V. UOI AIR 2014, Kerala. Held that passenger moving from a boarded train off side is amounting to carelessness and would be self-inflicting and cannot claim compensation.

Legal provisions:

Section 16 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987- A person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub-section (1) 8 [or sub-section (1A)] of section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal.

Section 124A of Indian Railway Act, 1989- Section 124A of the Indian Railways Act, 1989 pertains to compensation for untoward incidents.

Issue:

Whether the fall amounts to accidental fall within the purview of section of 123 of the Indian Railways Act?

Court analysis and judgement:

Its clear that from section 124 of the act has no compensation if passenger dies or suffers from injuries due to suicide, self- inflicted harm or due to insanity. The court considered that principles laid down in Jameela V UOI, that the deceased dead is not criminal and railway cannot claim compensation. The court has relied on apex court on UOI V. Prabhakaran held that strict liability can hold railways for compensation due to his own fault. The court goes ahead and states that strict liability is also to be considered. Principles laid down in Rine devi and Anuradha’s case is also applicable to the present case. In view of the aforesaid appeal the miscellaneous appeal was allowed and the order of railway tribunal is set aside by compensating an amount of 4,00,000 with 7% interest from date of filing. The tribunal committed in envoking section 124 of Indian Railways Act by concluding that it’s a self -inflicted injury and reasoning of tribunal is erroreneous and judgements referred above by appellants comes to their aid. The court says that if the compensation is less than 8,00,000 it will be compensated compeletly.

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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Mere membership of banned organizations is a sufficient ingredient to incriminate without there being an overt act :SC

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul V. State of NCT of Delhi.

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024.

Dated on: 24th April, 2024.

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain.

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing live cartridges. These were seized. During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant had earlier moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed, and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favor and was dismissed by the learned trial court vide impugned Order dated 16.11.2023. Such, Order is under challenge now.

Contentions of the appellant:

There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial are not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clear-cut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered possession and the fact he had purchased the same from four juveniles was found to be correct. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices, and it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps
Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization
Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.
Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.



Issue:

  • Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?

  • What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him?
  • Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.




Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. In National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 elaborate guidelines was laid about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive.  As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of co- conspirator to be relevant as against the others. Appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true.  The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.  However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. Resultantly, finding no substance in the appeal, we hereby dismiss the same.

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Delhi High Court’s Jurisdiction Limited to Cases of Perversity in Industrial Tribunal Decisions

Case title: Director General, Delhi Doordharshan Kendra v. Mohd. Shahbaz Khan, Tej Pal Manohar Paswan, Danvir Hans Raj.

Case no: LPA 242/2024, LPA 243/2024, LPA 244/2024, LPA 245/2024, LPA 246/2024,

Dated on: 22nd March, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Rekha Palli and Hon’ble DR. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain.

Facts of the case:

Appeals filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent LPA 242/2024 & other connected appeals to assail five similar orders dated 12.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of Writ Petitions. Vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2023, the learned Single Judge has rejected the Appellant’s challenge to the award dated 15.10.2007 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal (Tribunal), wherein the learned tribunal after holding that the termination of the respondents’ service by the Appellant was illegal, has directed the Appellant to reinstate them with 25% back wage.

Contentions of the appellant:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have failed to appreciate that the respondents were never employed with the Appellant but had in fact, been engaged by one M/S Navnidh Carriers who was engaged by the appellant on 31.07.1998, to provide manpower services as and when required. The learned Tribunal has not examined as to whether the Respondents had completed 240 days of continuous service in the year immediately preceding their termination, which aspect the learned Single Judge also over looked. Instead of placing the onus to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship on the respondents, the learned Single Judge has wrongly shifted the said onus on the Appellant.

Contentions of the respondent:

The learned Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that the respondents had been working with the Appellant/Organization much prior to 31.07.1998, i.e; the date when the appellant had, with malafide intention, engaged M/S Navnidh Carriers for providing manpower services and therefore, it was evident that the respondents had initially been engaged by the appellant itself. The experience certificate dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents wherein it has been categorically stated that he had been working with the appellant as a casual labourer since July 1997 and was an honest and hardworking worker. The appellant admittedly does not have any licence to engage workmen through a contractor as is mandated under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act), it is evident that the respondents were to be treated as employees of the appellant itself. He, therefore, prays that the appeals be dismissed.

Legal provisions:

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act)- regulated the employment of contract labor in certain establishments and provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. Article 226 of the Constitution- gives the High court the power to issue orders, directions and writs to any person or the authority including the Govt for the enforcement of Fundamental rights.

Issue:

Whether Respondents were engaged by the Appellant and were illegally terminated? When can Writ Court interfere with the factual findings of fact of Labour/Industrial Tribunal?

Courts judgement and analysis:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge, after taking into account the gate passes as also experience letter dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents have come to a conclusion that the respondents were employed with the appellant/ organisation and had been illegally terminated. Both the learned Single Judge as also the learned Tribunal found upon appreciation of evidence that the purported contract by the appellant in favor of M/s Navnidh Carriers was sham and an attempt to conceal the engagement of the respondents with the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to give any explanation whatsoever for the issuance of the said experience certificate if the respondent namely Mohd. Shahbaz Khan was not their employee. The Appellant did not have any license, as mandated under the CLRA Act, 1970, to engage workmen through a contractor, hence it is evident that they were directly engaged by the appellant. In the light of these categoric factual findings by the learned Tribunal, which cannot, in any manner, said to be perverse or contrary to the evidence lead before the learned Tribunal, we are of the view that it was neither open for the learned Single Judge to interfere with these findings in exercise of its writ jurisdiction nor is it open for this Court to examine these questions of fact. In Dinesh Kumar v. Central Public Works Department, 2023 SCC On-Line Del 6518, wherein the co-ordinate Bench after examining various decisions of the Apex Court held that writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact recorded in the industrial award only if the same are perverse or are entirely unsupported by evidence. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is quite limited. In Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless the same is perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High Courts can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt, (2006) 13 SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has applied wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on extraneous considerations. In the present case, the Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion based upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings of fact again after minutely scanning the entire evidence, and therefore, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge to hold that the respondents were engaged by the appellant and were illegally terminated. The appeals being meritless are, along with all pending applications, dismissed.

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.

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