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delhi high court

Justice, not law, is, what we have given to ourselves in our constitutional scheme- Delhi High Court

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Case title: Dr. Sri Kiruba Nandini M v. National Board of Examination and Anr.

Case no: W.P.(C) 5633/2024

Dated on: May 10

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Facts of the case:

The petitioner has approached this Court, through Writ Petition, seeking an appropriate writ, order or direction, to set aside the letter dated 12-15 March 2024 whereby the Petitioner’s DNB candidature was cancelled. The petitioner completed her MBBS from Annapoorana Medical College and thereafter she appeared for NEET and was admitted to the DNB post-MBBS in Obstetrics and Gynaecology by the Respondent 1 – National Board of Examinations (NBE) where she was to undergo training in Apollo Hospital. In the third year of her training, the petitioner was diagnosed as suffering from Acute Myeloid Leukemia (AML). Chemotherapeutic treatment of the petitioner started on 30 September 2022. Due to Covid-19 pandemic her condition worsened and was placed on ventilator support. On 15 November 2022 she was discharged from the hospital after having undergone 50 days continuous treatment. On 18 January 2023, the petitioner was again admitted to Apollo Hospital where she underwent allogenic stem cell transplant. On 23 May 2023, Fitness Certificate was issued by certifying that the petitioner was on intensive anti-cancer treatment since 27 September 2022 and that she was fit to rejoin work on 10 July 2023. On 21 July 2023, the petitioner rejoined duties at the Apollo Hospital. On 3 October 2023, the Apollo Hospital wrote to the NBEMS, informing that the petitioner was diagnosed with AML on 27 September 2022, for which she had been on continuous treatment; and that she had taken 296 days of leave. The petitioner was extending her course from 19 August 2023, and that the course would be completed on 10 June 2024. On 11 February 2024, the petitioner apprised the NBEMS of her health condition and requested to extend her DNB training programme from 18 August 2023 to 10 June 2024. On 22 February 2024, the NBEMS wrote to Apollo Hospital expressing serious concerns regarding availment of leave without prior approval from NBEMS. The Apollo Hospital replied by stating that they had informed the NBEMS of the critical state of health of the petitioner and the hospital was waiting for the petitioner to recover to submit the requisite documents.  

Issues:

Whether NBEMS was justified in cancelling the candidature of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner remained absent from DNB training, without prior approval of the NBEMS?  

  Contentions of the appellant:

The petitioner submitted her response explaining the health issues and to accept her leave under extraordinary circumstances and extend the course from 17.08.2023 to 10.06.2024. The NBEMS vide the impugned communication dated 12-15 March 2024 informed the hospital that the petitioner’s DNB candidature had been cancelled by stating that the training institute did not inform NBEMS regarding her absence and that a DNB Trainees can avail a maximum of 30 days of leave in a year and under normal circumstances leave of one year will not be carried forward to the next year and in exceptional cases such as prolonged illness, the leave may be clubbed with prior approval of NBE.  

Contentions of the respondent:

If the petitioner was indisposed for the period during which she did not attend training, she ought to have submitted a leave application so that her request for leave shall be considered by the NBEMS. Prior approval of NBEMS is necessary before a candidate proceeds on leave. It was only on 3 October 2023 that the Apollo Hospital, Chennai wrote to the NBEMS, informing the petitioner’s prior period of absence. It was only six months after the petitioner had rejoined duty in Apollo Hospital that she addressed an application to the NBEMS, seeking regularisation of the period of her absence from duty of 297 days.

Courts analysis and Judgement:

It is clear from the sequence of events and records that the petitioner was in a critical state of health for the entire period during which she remained absent from training. The petitioner was not in a position to submit leave application or forward medical document either to the Hospital or to the NBEMS. The NBEMS does not dispute the bona-fides of the petitioner’s contention that she was undergoing treatment for the critical illness. The claim is also supported by medical documents. On interpreting Rules 4 to 6 of the Leave Rules, it is observed that they do not stipulate that absence from training without prior approval of the NBEMS can result in cancellation of the candidate’s DNB candidature. Rule 5 states that unauthorised absence from DNB/FNB training for more than seven days may lead to cancellation of registration and hence the usage of the word “may” indicate element of discretion. While deciding whether or not to cancel the DNB candidature, the NBEMS is required to keep all these relevant factors and judiciously exercise the said discretion. A distinction needs to be drawn where the absence of the candidate is negligent or unjustified, from a case in which the absence is bona-fide and owing to circumstances which is beyond the control of the candidate. The NBEMS has to keep in mind the overall public interest. The cancellation of the entire DNB program for the reason that the petitioner did not seek leave in advance would not only destroy her morale but would also do complete disservice to the cause of justice. Any decision to cancel the petitioner’s DNB candidature would clearly result in injustice to the petitioner. The two factors which the NBEMS is required to see is whether the seat is carried over, or whether grant of extension to the candidate would compromise the training of existing trainees but no such contention was averred. The petitioner had never issued any show cause notice proposing to cancel her DNB candidature. The communication dated 22 February 2024 is cautioning her to adhere with the NBEMS leave rules. Cancellation of the DNB candidature of a candidate is an extremely serious matter. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. U.O.I. concerning strict compliance with the principle audi alteram partem would apply here with all force. No such decision can be taken without issuing a show cause notice wherein the Candidate is not only required to show cause against cancellation of her candidature, but must also set out the reasons and thereafter an opportunity of personal hearing before taking a decision. The Respondent has failed to follow these procedures and hence the impugned decision cannot sustain in law. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 12/15 March 2024 is quashed and set aside. The DNB candidature of the petitioner is restored. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly, with no orders as to costs.  

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“Supreme Court Upholds High Court’s Bail Grant to Businessman in UAPA Case Linked to Maoist Funding”

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Case title: Union of India v. Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Mrityunjay @ Sonu Singh

Case no: Criminal appeal no. 2024 @ Special leave petition (Criminal) No.2024 @ Diary no. 27308 of 2023.

Dated on: May 10

Quorum:   Hon’ble Justice Mr. Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and   Hon’ble Justice Mr Aravind Kumar.

Facts of the case:

On 22.11.2019, at about 8.00 PM, the patrolling party of Chandwa Police Station during their routine patrol had stopped at Lukuiya More where the banned terrorist organization CPI (Moist) fired indiscriminately at them resulting in the death of four (4) police personnel. The arms and ammunitions of the martyred police personnel was looted and after raising slogans the moist fled away. One of the home guards, Dinesh Ram, who escaped unhurt rushed to Chandwa Police Station and lodged a complaint which resulted in lodging FIR against 18 named and few unknown persons. The Central Government directed the NIA to take up investigation whereby FIR was re-registered for the offences under IPC, Arms Act and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Respondent herein is one of the people apprehended who preferred appeal against the order of the Special Judge, NIA. The Union of India is now challenging High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi order dated 30.01.2023 whereby the respondent appeal was allowed, and bail was extended thereby setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi.  

Issues:

Whether High Court was right in enlarging the bail of the Respondent?

Legal provisions:

Sections 120(B), 121, 121(A), 122, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396 and 427 of IPC and under Sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40 of UAP Act and under Sections 25(1B)(a), 26, 27 and 35 of the UAPA Act.

Contentions of the appellant:

The respondent was a key partner of a construction firm M/s Santosh Construction and was closely associated with Regional Commander of CPI-Maoist Ravindra Ganjhu and provided financial as well as logistics support for the terrorist activities. The respondent managed the terrorist fund by showing dubious entries and investments in his company/firm’s accounts. The respondent is directly connected to the incident which led to the killing of four (4) police personnel of the Jharkhand Police. The search at the house of the respondent resulted in recovering unaccounted cash of Rs.2.64 crores for which there was no justifiable explanation. There are other three (3) cases registered against the respondent which gives sufficient grounds to reject the bail. The respondent and his associates are threatening the life of the complainant and pressurizing him to withdraw the case. The respondent is an influential person and would try to threaten or influence witnesses.  

Contentions of the respondent:

The conditional bail was granted on 30.01.2023 and even after lapse of more than 1 year and 3 months, there is no allegation of violation of bail order. The prosecution is seeking for setting aside the impugned order for the reason that respondent is involved in three (3) cases apart from the case registered by NIA. The case registered by Chandwa PS has resulted in acquittal and in the case No.108 of 2015, the respondent has been enlarged on bail by the High Court of Jharkhand. In the case No.4 of 2020, the respondent has been granted anticipatory bail by the High Court of Jharkhand. The purported criminal antecedent did not sway the mind of High Court while considering the prayer for grant of bail. The pendency of three (3) other cases would have no bearing for the continuation of the bail order granted in favour of the respondent.   


Courts analysis and judgement:

The High Court has scrutinized the entire material on record and has recorded a finding that name of the respondent did not figure in the initial FIR registered or in the statements of witnesses and most of the statements did not mention the respondent’s name. It is well settled position that an accused cannot be detained under the guise of punishing him by presuming the guilt. In Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, it was been held that the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the presumption of guilt. The broad probability of accused being involved in the committing of the offence alleged will have to be seen. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, it was held that it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to opine that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. The satisfaction to be recorded is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea. The court must take into account the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. In an order granting bail, reasoning should demonstrate application of mind. In Puran v. Rambilas it was held that at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case need not be undertaken. In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. it was held that the considerations to be weighed by the court while granting bail in non-bailable offences and they are — the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances peculiar to the accused; possibility of non-securing the presence of accused at the trial; apprehension of witnesses tampering; the larger interest of the public or the State. The elaborate examination or discussion of evidence is not required. The Court is only expected to record a finding of the probabilities of the involvement of the accused in the commission of an offence. The respondent has been ordered to be enlarged on bail by the High Court on 30.01.2023 upon conditions. The prosecution has no case that the stipulated conditions have been violated. In the absence of a strong prima facie case of violation of the bail order, it would not be appropriate to reverse or set aside order after a lapse of fifteen (15) months. In Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, it was held that considerations for grant of bail and cancellation of bails are different and if conditions of bail is misused or bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions or bail was obtained by playing fraud then bail granted to the accused can be cancelled. The arguments that the respondent is involved in three (3) other cases and by considering that the respondent has been enlarged on bail or is on anticipatory bail would reflect that respondent having been enlarged on conditional bail and the conditions stipulated have not been violated and the appellant not seeking for cancellation of the bail till date are prime reasons for not entertaining this appeal.There is no other overwhelming material on record to set aside the order granting bail which outweighs the liberty granted by the High Court under the impugned order. Hence, interference is not warranted. However, to allay the apprehension of the prosecution, the prosecution can seek for cancellation of the bail in the event any of the conditions being violated by the respondent. The observations made is restricted to the consideration of the prayer for bail and the jurisdictional court shall not be influenced by any of the observation above. Subject to the above observations, the appeal stands dismissed.

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Supreme court refuses to entertain impleading and restoration petition by a stranger .

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Case title: Vijaylaxman Bawe v. P & S Nirman PVT LTD

Case no:  Civil Appeal of 2024 arising from SLP 4034 of 2023

Dated on: 8th May 2024

Quorum: Justice B R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta

Facts of the case:

The present appeal is against the judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay whereby the High Court dismissed the revision application of the appellants herein filed for challenging the order of the Civil Judge for condonation of delay in filing application for restoration and seeking thereby to restore the Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002, which was dismissed for want of prosecution. The present appeal is concerned with lands situated at Sonkhar Village where there are rival claims with respect to the ownership of the suit land. The Government of Maharashtra, through the Special Land Acquisition Officer, acquired the subject land for public purpose, and handed over to (CIDCO). In the year 2002, Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002 was filed by the original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas Thakkar (Kanani) (since deceased and now represented by his legal heirs, in the trial court against the Government of Maharashtra, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Vijay Laxman Bhawe (Defendant No.3) (since deceased and now represented through his legal heirs), Union of India and CIDCO for relief of declaration that the acquisition is illegal, null and void, however if the court upholds acquisition then a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to 12½ % Gaonthan Extension Scheme,as per the Gaonthan Extension Scheme of CIDCO. In the year 2005, the original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas Thakkar passed away. The legal heirs of the original plaintiff, through their Power of Attorney holder, filed application for condonation of delay and for bringing the legal heirs of the plaintiff on record. The trial court allowed the application for condonation of delay as well as the application for bringing the legal heirs on record in the subject suit. However, the trial court dismissed the subject suit for want of prosecution. On 7th November 2019, respondents No. 2 and 3, i.e., the legal heirs of the plaintiff, filed application, seeking condonation of delay of 8 years and 4 days in filing an application for restoration of subject suit. This application is still pending adjudication. Meanwhile, Respondent No. 1, a private limited company, claiming to be the “assignee”, filed an application, seeking condonation of delay of 9 years and 11 months in filing the application for restoration of the subject suit. The trial court allowed the restoration application. Aggrieved by the order, the appellants filed Revision Application before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the civil revision application. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal is filed.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court was right in allowing the application of the Respondent for restoration of suit?

Legal provisions:

 Impleading Legal Heirs and restoration of suit under Cpc.  

Contentions of the Appellant:

The respondent No.1 is totally a stranger to the proceedings. When an application is filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, i.e. respondents No. 2 and 3 for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the subject suit is pending since 7th November 2019, the learned trial court ought not to have considered the application filed by a stranger. The subject suit itself is a frivolous one. The suit land belonged to the predecessors of the appellants, and it was acquired by the State and the compensation was duly received by the appellants. The proceedings for enhancement are also pending before the High Court. It was argued that entertaining the application of a stranger for condonation of delay is mockery of justice.

Contentions of the Respondent:

The respondent No.1 has accrued a right on account of an Agreement entered between it and the legal heirs of the original plaintiff. As the respondents No.2 and 3 were not prosecuting the application for condonation of delay for restoration of the subject suit, respondent No.1 was justified in filing such an application.

Courts judgement and analysis:

The approach of the trial court in entertaining the application of respondent No.1 is unsustainable in law that too when the claim of respondent No.1 is on an unregistered Agreement for Sale. Further, entertaining an application by a stranger for condonation of delay and restoration is totally unsustainable in law. The respondent No.1 has not even been impleaded in the subject suit and hence filing the application filed by a stranger, who is not a party to the proceedings, is totally illegal. If the approach adopted by the trial court is approved, any person can move application for condonation of delay and restoration of the suit even if the person is not a party to the subject suit especially when an application for condonation of delay and for restoration filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff is pending since 7th November 2019. It is difficult to understand as to what was the need for the trial court to entertain the application after a period of two years. The trial court could have decided the application on merits. Though, it was argued by the appellants before the High Court that respondent No.1 was a stranger and the reasons given for condonation of delay did not constitute the “sufficient cause”, the High Court totally ignored the same. In light of the view taken, the reasoning given by the trial court as well as the High Court for condoning such an inordinate delay will not come under the ambit of “sufficient cause” as has been discussed by this Court in a catena of judgments. The order of the trial court as well as the High Court are not sustainable in law. The appeal is therefore allowed.

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Supreme Court upholds compulsory retirement intra vires CRPF Act.

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Case title:  Union of India v. Santosh Kumar Tiwar

Case no: Civil Appeal No.6135 of 2024

Dated on:  8th May 2024

Quorum: Justice D.Y.Chandrachud, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra

Facts of the case:

This appeal is against the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, preferred by the appellants against the judgment of the Single Judge has been dismissed and the order of the learned Single Judge has been affirmed. The respondent was a Head Constable in Central Reserve Police Force. He was charge-sheeted for assault and abusing his fellow colleague. In the enquiry proceedings as the charges were proved, the respondent was compulsorily retired from service vide order dated 16.02.2006. The respondent filed a departmental appeal, which was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General (P), CRPF on 28.07.2006. The respondent filed a Writ Petition before a Single Judge Bench who vide order dated 14.01.2020 allowed the writ petition, on the ground that the punishment of compulsory retirement was not punishment specified in Section 11 (1) of the CRPF Act, 1949. Aggrieved with the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants preferred writ appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court found no merit in the writ appeal and dismissed the same giving rise to the present appeal.

Issue: 

1. Whether the punishment of compulsory retirement can be imposed by relying upon the provisions of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules? 
2. Whether Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules provides for punishments other than those specified in Section 11 of the CRPF Act? 
3. Whether the punishment of compulsory retirement suffers from any procedural infirmity?

Legal provisions: 

Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules 
Section 11 of the CRPF Act.

Contentions of the Appellant:

The only ground pressed by the original petitioner was that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not imposable under Section 11 of the CRPF Act is not correct. The High Court failed to consider that Section 116 of the CRPF Act has expressly made rules where the Commandant or any other authority or officer may award in lieu of or in addition to suspension or dismissal any one or more punishments whom he considers guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or other misconduct can award punishments such as (a) reduction in rank; (b) fine not exceeding one month’s pay and allowances; (c) confinement (e) removal from any office. The punishment for compulsory retirement is specifically provided as one of the punishments imposable on a non-gazetted officer, like the respondent. The impugned order of the High Court is in ignorance of the relevant provisions of the Act as well as the rules. Once an enquiry is held and charge of gross indiscipline is found proved, and further, the Respondent being a member of a disciplined force, the punishment awarded, was not liable to be interfered with by the High Court.

Contentions of the Respondent:

Punishment of compulsory retirement as specified in Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules is ultra vires the provisions of Section 11 of the CRPF Act, and no punishment beyond what is specified therein can be imposed. Punishment which is not contemplated under the statute cannot be introduced by way of a rule. Dismissal and compulsory retirement are two different kinds of punishment and cannot be treated as interchangeable. In the absence delegation of power to frame rules, introducing the punishment of compulsory retirement, is ultra vires the CRPF Act; The charge levelled on the original petitioner was not established, as there were no eyewitness to prove the alleged claim. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority acted in a mechanical manner.  

Courts judgement and analysis:

The CRPF Act is “an Act to provide for the constitution and regulation of an armed Central Reserve Police Force (for short the Force)”. The superintendence and control over, vests in the Central Government. Section 9 enumerates “more heinous offences” and Section 10 “less heinous offences”, For “more heinous offences”, the punishment is transportation for life or for a term of not less than seven years or with imprisonment which may extend to 14 years or with fine. The punishment for “less heinous offences” is imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine. The Commandant or any other authority subject to any rules under the Act, award in addition to, suspension or dismissal anyone or more of the punishments specified therein guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, other misconduct. Section 18 confers rule-making power on the Central Government. An overview of the CRPF Act, makes it clear that the Central Government has overall superintendence and control over the Force. The CRPF Rules provide for imposition of the punishment of compulsory retirement though the CRPF Act wherein the Act itself does not provide in specific terms. In Subash Chandra Yadav it was observed that “Before a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions are to be complied (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority framing the rule” Section 11 does not use common expressions such as “dismissal from service” or “removal from service” while describing the punishments, though, Rule 27 uses those expressions. The High Court opined that only punishments which can be awarded under the section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the Force. This interpretation is not correct, cause as per the section punishments may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal. The words “in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal”, shows that the authorities can award punishment of dismissal or suspension who is found guilty in addition to, punishment mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded. To determine whether the punishment of compulsory retirement is ultra vires the CRPF Act, it would be apposite to first examine the scope of rule-making power conferred on the Central Government by the statute. In order to decide whether Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, which prescribes additional punishment of compulsory retirement, is intra vires or ultra vires of the CRPF Act, the following facts needs to be considered (a) whether the intention of the legislature was allow the Central Government to prescribe any other minor punishment than what has already been prescribed (b) whether it conflicts with provisions of the CRPF Act. While enacting the CRPF Act, the intention of legislature was not to declare that only minor punishments could be imposed as it was left open for the Central Government to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and the punishments. The concept of “control”, as per P. Ramantha Aiyer’s Advanced Law Lexicon implies that the controlling authority must be in a position to dominate the affairs of its subordinate. The word ‘control’ is very wide and includes disciplinary control. Hence, if the CRPF Act envisages vesting of control over the Force in the Central Government then the various punishments imposable under Section 11 are subject to the rules made under the Act. The Central Government can ensure full and effective control over the Force including the punishment of compulsory retirement. It is therefore held that punishment of compulsory retirement is intra vires the CRPF Act and is an imposable punishment. There is no such perversity in the enquiry report. There is no error in the conduct of the enquiry. There is no need to interfere with the punishment and the appeal is allowed.

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Modification of Market value for acquired lands in land acquisition case: SC

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Case title: Shripal and Anr v. Karnataka Neravari Ltd. and Anr.

Case no: Civil Appeal No. 4042 Of 2024 Civil Appeal No. 4043 Of 2024 and Civil Appeal No. 4041 Of 2024.

Dated on: 07th May 2024

Quorum: Justice B.R. Gavi and Justice Sandeep Mehta.

Facts of the case:

The appellants were land losers, had approached the court to seek enhancement of compensation pursuant to acquisition of their lands from the respondents for the purpose of construction of canals under the Hippargi Barrage project. There is no dispute that the lands of the appellants were irrigated lands. The land acquisition notification was issued on 12th April, 2007. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded a compensation of Rs.1,31,263/- per acre to the landowners. Upon reference by the Landowners, the Reference Court enhanced the compensation by fixing the market value at Rs. 3,00,000/- per acre. Aggrieved by the same, the beneficiaries Karnataka Neravari Nigam Ltd. filed M.F.A. before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench. The Appellant-claimants filed cross-objections seeking enhancement of further compensation.

Issues:

Whether Appellants are entitled for higher compensation for their land acquired?

Legal provisions:

Section 4(1) of the Land Acquistion Act 1894- land in any locality is needed or likely needed for any public purpose or for company, a notification shall be put up in the Official Gazette.  

Contentions of the appellant:

In the High Court, the Appellants herein contended that in another M.F.A. the High Court had awarded compensation by fixing the market value at Rs. 3,69,000/- per acre along with statutory benefits for the irrigated lands. The said matter arose out of an acquisition notification of the years 2004-2005 and the order passed by the High Court has been confirmed by this Court with dismissal of Special Leave Petition(C) No. 8107 of 2016 filed by the beneficiary. The appellants drew the Court’s attention to an order dated 17th April 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka wherein, for the very same project, the landowners had been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per acre in respect of lands which are covered under the notifications issued between 2004- 2008. It was urged that the appellants are entitled to the same relief too.

Contentions of the respondent:

The High Court committed a glaring error in construing the affidavit filed by the respondents in MFA No.101083 of 2016. The affidavit filed was pertaining to acquisition of 2009, wherein the Reference Court had determined compensation at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per acre.

Courts analysis and judgement:

The respondents themselves have agreed to award at the market value for a rate of Rs. 3,69,000/- per acre along with statutory benefits for the lands acquired under the notification of the years 2004-2005. For the market value fixed in the years 2004-2005 at the rate of Rs.3,69,000/- per acre, 5% escalation per year has already been applied. For the lands which were acquired in the year 2009, the market value had been fixed by the Reference Court at Rs. 5,00,000/- per acre and above. However, the lands of the appellants were acquired in the year 2007. In this background, to meet the ends of justice, the market value of the lands acquired from the appellants is fixed at Rs. 4,50,000/- per acre by modifying the order dated 2nd February 2018 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the appellant-claimants shall be entitled to compensation towards the acquired lands at the rate of Rs. 4,50,000/- per acre with all statutory benefits, interest and costs. The direction of the High Court to deny interest for the period of delay in filing the cross-objections is sustained. This order is passed considering the peculiar facts of the present case and shall not be treated as precedent. The appeals are allowed.

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