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Supreme Court quashes petitions; States that without proving the said testamentary instrument, the petitioners cannot not challenge the judgment of the High Court.

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CASE TITLE –  Mohideen Abdul Khadar (Dead) Through Lrs. Versus Rahmath Beevi (D) Thr. Her Lrs. And Ors

CASE NUMBER – 2023 INSC 969 (Neutral Citation)

DATED ON – 01.11.2023

QUORUM – Justice Aniruddha Bose & Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitions have been filed by two nephews of Mohideen Abdul Khadar, who died on 14.06.2019. He had interest in two blocks of lands, adjacent to each other located in Thenkasi Taluk, Kadayanallurpet within the Kadayanallur municipal limits in the State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioners bring this action in the capacity of legatees of said Mohideen. The dispute relates to title of Mohideen in respect of one block out of the two, described as first scheduled property in his plaint which triggered off the suit giving rise to this proceeding. The other part of the dispute is over retention of his possession and tenancy right in respect of second scheduled property, as described in his plaint. The first scheduled property measures approximately 15×15 sq. feet over which Mohideen claimed title whereas the second scheduled property measures approximately 15×18 sq. feet. There is some dispute on its measurement. In respect of the latter block of land, one Rahmath Beevi sued for delivery of vacant possession whereas Mohideen asked for protection of his possession in his suit. The original owner of both these properties was one Ameenal Beevi (since deceased) and she had conveyed the first scheduled property to Mohideen on 16.08.1989 through a deed of sale. So far as the second scheduled property is concerned, the case of the petitioners is that it was rented out to their predecessor by Ameenal Beevi only. Said Ameenal Beevi had conveyed this property to Rahmath Beevi (since deceased) on 30.05.1995 through another deed. Original Suit No. 172 of 1995 was instituted by Mohideen in the Court of Principal District Munsif Judge, Thenkasi. In this suit Mohideen claimed benefit of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. This Statute gives certain additional protection to a class of tenants beyond what is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter ‘1882 Act’). Mohideen along with one Sahul Hameed, who also appears to have had been in occupation of part of the land conveyed to Rahmath Beevi by Ameenal Beevi had been served with notices to quit by Rahmath Beevi in terms of Section 106 of the 1882 Act both dated 11.08.1995. Mohideen wanted declaration of title to the first scheduled land and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing his peaceful possession over the second scheduled property. So far as status of first scheduled property is concerned, Mohideen’s title is not in much dispute. In their counter-affidavit, petitioners claiming to be the legal representatives of Rahmath Beevi (henceforth referred to as the respondents) have taken a plea that Mohideen himself had sold the first scheduled property on 06.12.2017 to his two nephews. They appear to be the petitioners before us. Rahmath Beevi’s (second defendant in O.S. No.172 of 1995, represented by her legal representatives before us) stand has been that she had become owner of the second scheduled property on the basis of the aforesaid registered sale deed. Rahmath Beevi, in the suit instituted by her (O.S. No.464 of 1995) in the same Court claimed relief of mandatory injunction seeking removal of Mohideen and Sahul Hameed from the properties specified by her. They were the first and the second defendants respectively in Rahmat Beevi’s suit. In this suit, she also claimed ground rent from the defendants in that suit. In her suit, she referred to four schedules to describe the suit property representing different interests. The first schedule in O.S. No.464 of 1995 matches with the first schedule of O.S. No.172 of 1995. As regards the second scheduled property, it was Rahmath Beevi’s case that it involved an area of 15×18 sq. feet. The third scheduled property in her plaint comprised of an area of 6.2×6.9 sq. feet within second scheduled land. As recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court in respect of the third scheduled property, Sahul Hameed was the tenant thereof, but he did not contest the suit. It was held by the Trial Court that three-fourth portion of the third scheduled property was within the second scheduled land and the rest of the third scheduled property fell in the first scheduled land. Said Sahul Hameed, as it appears from the cause title of this petition, is the son of Rahmath Beevi. It was the case of Rahmath Beevi that Mohideen had taken on rent the fourth scheduled land from Ameenal Beevi and put up a “temporary shop” there. The pleading in the plaint gives an impression that it was a temporary structure. In her suit, Rahmath Beevi wanted vacant possession of the fourth scheduled property and removal of the construction set up thereon. The Trial Court granted declaration in favour of Mohideen in respect of first scheduled property. His claim on second scheduled property was dismissed.

 

ISSUES

  1. Whether the notice under Section 106 of the 1882 Act is valid.
  2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to protection of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act or not.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

Mohideen appealed against the judgment and decree in both the suits. The First Appellate Court sustained the Trial Court’s finding in O.S. No.172 of 1995 as regards first scheduled property, but the Trial Court’s judgment on second scheduled property was set aside. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No.464 of 1995 was set aside. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had dealt with the matters by a common judgment (of each Court). Rahmath Beevi had filed two appeals before the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the High Court also disposed of both the appeals by a common judgment delivered on 25.09.2018. It is this judgment which is assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the petitioners. Respondents argued that without proving the said testamentary instrument, the petitioners could not challenge the judgment of the High Court in the capacity of legatees. It was further argued that tenancy could not be a subject of disposition under any testamentary instrument. So far as locus of the petitioners is concerned, the Supreme Court had allowed their plea for substitution by an order passed on 31.08.2021. Now by proceeding on the basis that the petitioners were substituted would not determine finally their locus to maintain the present petitions deriving their right from the said testamentary instrument. But as the court have held against the petitioners on merit, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not find the need to examine the issues. The present petitions were accordingly dismissed.

 

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Supreme Court Grants Specific Performance in Land Sale Agreement, Overrides High Court’s Reliance on Land Revenue Code.

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CASE TITLE – Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde

CASE NUMBER – SLP(C) No.29462 OF 2019

DATED ON – 15.02.2024

QUORUM – Justice B.V. Nagarathna & Justice Augustine George Masih

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant-plaintiff and the respondent-defendant entered into an agreement to sell dated 31.07.2001 under which, the defendant agreed to sell his land of 80R situated at Block No.41/1, Mandve (Bk), Tq. Sangamner to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs.2,25,000/-. An advance amount of Rs.1, 55,000/ was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the said date. Thereafter possession was stated to have been given in the year 2003 by the defendant to the plaintiff. On 10.01.2003, the plaintiff paid an additional consideration of Rs.65, 000/- and thus out of a total consideration of Rs.2, 25,000/-, an amount of Rs.2, 20,000/- was paid. Since the defendant did not perform his part of the contract to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff filed Special Civil Suit no.11 of 2005 before the concerned trial Court seeking the decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell and in the alternative, for refund of the advance sale consideration / earnest money of Rs.2, 20,000/- along with interest @ 6% p.a. In response to the suit summons and notice issued by the trial Court the defendant appeared and denied the case of the plaintiff by filing his written statement. The trial court framed the issues for its consideration and ultimately refused the decree of specific performance and granted the alternative relief of refund of Rs.2, 20,000/- with interest 6% p.a. Being aggrieved by the denial of the decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell, the plaintiff preferred his appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial Court but increased the rate of interest from 6% to 14% from the date of the decree. He also directed the plaintiff to hand over possession to the defendant. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred the second appeal, namely, S.A. No.118/2018 before the High Court. The High Court considered Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and observed that such a decree for specific performance could not be granted and thereby, dismissed the second appeal. Hence, this appeal.

 

ISSUES

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 31.07.2001?

STATUTES

Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code, prescribes how Tribal land occupancy cannot be transferred to non-tribals without government approval.

 

CONTENTION OF APPELLANTS

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court was not right in interpreting Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code to the effect that there was a total bar for transfer of any land to be made by a tribal to a non-tribal. Such a transfer by way of sale could be made on the basis of the conditions stipulated therein, that is, with the previous sanction of the State Government. That the stage for obtaining a sanction had not arisen in the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant had not come forward to execute the sale deed. In the circumstances, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell. Even after a decree for specific performance is granted by the Court, the plaintiff was required to seek permission under Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code and thereafter execute such a decree. Merely because Section 36A stipulates a pre-condition for sale of land by tribal to a non-tribal, it would not imply that there is a bar to seeking a relief from specific performance of an agreement to sell entered into by a tribal in favour of a non-tribunal. He contended that in a suit for specific performance for agreement to sell what was required to be considered was conditions and stipulations considered under Sections 10, 16 etc. of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the plaintiff had complied with those conditions inasmuch as out of a total consideration of Rs.2, 25,000/-, the plaintiff had already tendered Rs.2, 20,000/- and he had performed his part of the contract whereas the defendant had not done so. Therefore the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court were not right in granting only the alternative relief. He further contended that Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code was improperly invoked by the High Court. He submitted that in the absence of the defendant coming forward to execute the sale deed, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to seek such a sanction of the State Government that only if the decree for specific performance is passed in favour of the plaintiff herein he would be in a position to seek such a sanction and ultimately the decree would be executed only if the sanction is given by the State Government in terms of Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that in view of the Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code, the defendant had no right to even enter into an agreement to sell and that the plaintiff had no right to seek the relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell. It was contended that the judgments of the High Court and courts below may be set aside and decree of specific performance of agreement to sell may be granted by allowing this appeal.

 

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS

The Learned Counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and contended that Section 36A not only refers to sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease but also uses ‘or otherwise’. That in the instant case, pursuant to the agreement to sell entered into by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, possession also was handed over. That the sale agreement was in violation of Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the transaction itself was void since there was no prior sanction obtained and hence, the decree for specific performance could not have been granted. He therefore contended that there is no merit in this appeal and therefore, the same may be dismissed.

 

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the High Court had focused itself only on the aspect regarding Section 36A of the Land Revenue Code to deny relief to the appellant-plaintiff. The trial Court, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have concurrently held that there was indeed an agreement to sell between the parties and the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.2, 20,000/- out of a total consideration of Rs.2, 25,000/- to the defendant-respondent herein, who had also handed over possession of the subject land to the plaintiff. When all the courts have held that the plaintiff has performed his part of the agreement inasmuch as he had tendered a sum of Rs.2,20,000/- out of a total consideration of Rs.2,25,000/- and he was ready and willing to perform the rest of the obligation under the contract, it was only in the context of  non-performance by the defendant that the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for specific performance. Therefore, on the basis of Section 36A, the trial Court, the first appellate court as well as the High Court could not have declined to grant the decree for specific performance to the plaintiff inasmuch as the considerations under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only had to be made for the purpose of adjudicating the suit between the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that since there was no reason to decline the grant of a decree under the provisions of the said Act, the trial Court, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court ought to have granted the said decree rather than granting an alternative relief. And after looking through all facts and contention the Supreme Court decided to modify the judgment of the High Court, First Appellate Court as well as the trial Court and decree the suit filed by the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 31.07.2001, and held that the suit is to be decreed in the aforesaid terms. The Court further stated It is needless to observe that now that they have granted the decree of specific performance, the appellant-plaintiff shall proceed under Section 36A of the said Section before seeking conveyance of the subject land in his favour in case the defendant is a tribal.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Madhya Pradesh High Court Affirms Dismissal of Review Petition in Land Sale Discrepancy Case, Citing Sale Deed Error as Inadequate Grounds for Review.”

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Case Title – Govind Khandelwal Vs. Shri Suresh Khandelwal & Ors.

Case Number – Review Petition No. 255 of 2024

Dated on – 16th April, 2024

Quorum – Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Gajendra Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Case of Govind Khandelwal Vs. Shri Suresh Khandelwal & Ors., the Appellant in the case, Govind Khandelwal, has instituted a review petition challenging an order dated 23rd of January, 2024, which duly dismissed the Writ Appeal No. 1341/2022. The Appellant in the case was aggrieved by the order of the court made in Case No. 1063-One/13 and 1064-One/13 dated 17th of September,2014 by the Board of Revenue, Gwalior.  These orders of the Board of Revenue permitted the revision of the Appellant and instructed the mutation of Survey No. 219, with an area of 0.314 Aare, to correspond with the details in the sale deed. Thereafter, the Respondents, aggrieved by this decision of the Board, instituted a Writ Petition before the Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore. After a scrupulous examination of the facts and the legal aspects, the Learned Single Bench determined that the Appellant had indeed sold 0.314 hectares of land under Survey No. 219, which was later sold by Chaturbhuj Das to the Respondents. The review petition instituted by the Appellant before the Learned Single Judge was duly dismissed.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS

  1. The Appellants, through their Counsel, contented that the word “Aare” was used instead of the word “Hectare” and that it was a crucial discrepancy in the sale deed.
  2. The Appellants, through their Counsel, contented that the Writ Appellate Court made an error in dismissing the Writ Appeal and that the conclusion drawn in the impugned order were inaccurate.
  3. The Appellants, through their Counsel, contented that therefore, the review petition should be granted and that the impugned order should be annulled.
  4. The Appellants, through their Counsel, contented that the appeal should be reconsidered from scratch

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The Respondent, through their Counsel, contented that the sale deed executed by the Appellant evidently stated the land area as 0.314 Aare, which was then sold to them by Chaturbhuj Das and that the Appellant cannot now dispute the terms of the sale deed, especially since it was properly executed and accepted by all the parties involved in the present case.
  2. The Respondent, through their Counsel, contented that the attempt of the Appellant to ascribe the discrepancies in the sale deed to a clerical error lacks merit and that the decision to use “Aare” instead of “Hectare” was premeditated during the execution of the sale deed and cannot be revised at this stage.
  3. The Respondent, through their Counsel, contented that the review petition of the Appellant is merely an attempt to re-litigate issues already settled by the lower courts and that the Appellant has failed to furnish any new or significant evidence that would justify a review of the previous order.
  4. The Respondent, through their Counsel, contented that the order issued by the Board of Revenue, Gwalior and upheld by the Single Bench of the High Court relied on a scrupulous examination of the facts and applicable laws and that there is no evident error in the record that mandates a review of the judgment.
  5. The Respondent, through their Counsel, contented that granting the review petition would cause undue delays and violates the rights as purchasers of the land in this present case and that the court should not entertain the attempt of the Appellant to reopen the settled matters and the impugned order should remain as it is.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribes for the permission for the review of the judgments based on the discovery of a new and significant matter or evidence, errors presumed on the face of record, or any other sufficient reason.
  2. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribes Review
  3. Section 22(3)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 states that every application under this section must be made by a motion that is supported by an affidavit.

ISSUES

  1. The main issue of this case revolves around whether the grounds exhibited by the Appellant justify the review of the previous order?
  2. Whether the error presumed on the face of the record warrants the review of the judgment?
  3. Whether the sale deed stating “Aare” instead of “Hectare” comprises a sufficient reason for the review?

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Govind Khandelwal Vs. Shri Suresh Khandelwal & Ors., analysed the provisions of the Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and other judicial precedents to understand the extent and the limitations of its review jurisdiction. The court stated that a review is different from an appeal and can only address blatant errors evident on the face of the records. The court in this case, observed that such errors should be probable without necessitating comprehensive investigation or inspection. In his case, the Appellant in the first instance relied on the discrepancies in the sale deed, where “Aare” was used instead of “Hectare” but the court stated that this discrepancy was apparent from the beginning and could have been brought up earlier in the legal proceedings. Moreover, the court observed that this error did not offer sufficient grounds for a review, especially since the sale deed had been properly executed and accepted by all the parties involved in the present case. Further, the court observed in the present case that the Appellant in the case failed to furnish any new or significant evidence that could justify revisiting the earlier order. The court, finally, determined that the grounds raised by the Appellant were insufficient to warrant the exercise of review judgment. Subsequently, the court dismissed the review petition, therefore, upholding the previous order issued by the Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

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“Supreme Court Engages in Addressing Complexities of Forest Land Ownership, Review Jurisdiction, and Title Disputes”

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Case title: The State of Telangana v. Mohd Abdul Qasim (Died) Per LRs 

Case no.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6937 of 2021]

Dated on: 18th April 2024

Quorum: Justice M. M. Sundresh and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Between 1950-1959, a revision of survey and settlement of village Kompally occurred, concluded on 17.11.1960. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F., seeking rectification of a survey error, claiming ownership of the suit land measuring 106.34 Acres in Village Kompally, District Warangal, Survey Number 171/3 to 171/7. However, this application was rejected by the Revenue Authority only on 10.01.1975, after a notification declaring the land as reserved forest was issued on 11.11.1971. Despite the rejection, the Joint Collector allowed the application on 07.07.1981, but subsequent attempts for denotification were dismissed.

A suit was filed by the Plaintiff in 1985 seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction. The trial court granted title but denied the injunction. On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the declaration but affirmed the decision on injunction, holding the suit property as forest land.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the appellants, submitted that the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 defines a forest which is inclusive of all types of forests. The extensive inclusion would take in its sweep even the private forests. Revenue records do not confer title. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in review by entertaining a re-hearing and virtually acted as an appellate court. The Respondents did not satisfy the court on the title, which finding has not been touched.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently contended that the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer have become final. Even the trial court has held that the plaintiff had title. Once title is proved, possession has to follow. As there is an error apparent on the face of record, the power of review has been exercised correctly. The finding that Section 5 of the A.P. Forest Act, has got no application is correct, as there is no attempt to interdict the proceedings. As there is no apparent perversity, this Court need not interfere with the impugned order.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F.: This section pertains to rectification of survey errors and was invoked by the plaintiff to claim ownership of the land.
  2. Section 15 of the A.P. Forest Act: This section deals with the declaration of land as reserved forest, which was done by the State Government.
  3. Section 16 of the A.P. Forest Act: This section provides for the finality and conclusiveness of proceedings under the A.P. Forest Act, once declared, thereby affecting the maintainability of certain legal actions.
  4. Section 5 of the A.P. Forest Act: This section imposes a bar on certain suits during the pendency of proceedings under the A.P. Forest Act.
  5. Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC 1908: This rule allows the appellate court to partly reverse the decree of the trial court.
  6. Forest Conservation Act, 1980: This act defines a forest, inclusive of all types of forests, including private forests.

These sections were invoked and discussed throughout the legal proceedings and played a significant role in shaping the judgment of the court.

ISSUE –

The main issue in this case revolves around the ownership and status of the land in question. Here are the key points regarding the issue:

  1. Title and Ownership: The plaintiff claims ownership of the land based on an application filed under Section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, seeking rectification of survey errors. However, the defendants argue that the land is forest land and has been declared as reserved forest under Section 15 of the A.P. Forest Act.
  2. Jurisdiction: There is a dispute regarding the jurisdiction of various authorities, including the Revenue Department and the Forest Department, in dealing with the land. The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s application under the Land Revenue Act lacks relevancy or connection with the concluded proceeding under the Forest Act.
  3. Validity of Proceedings: The validity of various proceedings, including the rejection of the plaintiff’s application, the subsequent review, and the actions of the District Collector, are called into question. The plaintiff challenges the legality of these proceedings, while the defendants argue that they were conducted within the bounds of the law.
  4. Maintainability of Suit: The defendants question the maintainability of the suit for declaration filed by the plaintiff, arguing that the plaintiff failed to challenge the proceedings under Section 15 of the A.P. Forest Act, which have become final and conclusive.

Overall, the main issue revolves around the conflicting claims of ownership and jurisdiction over the land, as well as the validity and maintainability of the legal proceedings initiated by the plaintiff.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court observed a lack of jurisdiction in the High Court’s actions post-decree, especially considering the land’s status as forest land. It noted the impropriety of the District Collector’s involvement and the absence of necessary parties in the proceedings. The court concluded that the suit was not maintainable due to the finality of earlier proceedings under the A.P. Forest Act.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the original judgment was restored. Costs were imposed on both parties, and the appellant State was directed to investigate and take action against officers responsible for filing incorrect affidavits. The contempt case was directed to be closed.

This case highlights the importance of jurisdictional boundaries, finality of proceedings, and adherence to legal processes in land disputes, especially concerning forest lands.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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After peaceful enjoyment of land for multiple years, there is no cause of action: Bombay High Court

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Title: Nana Narayan Bhalerao v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Decided on: 26th JULY, 2023

WRIT PETITION (ST) NO. 8607 OF 2023

CORAM: G.S. KULKARNI & JITENDRA JAIN, JJ.

Facts of the Case

The petitioner owned 80R of land and due to the Nazare Project, his land was acquired by the Govt in1974. He was given 41R of land in Pune as an alternate. He realised it only later that he had not received a fair valuation for the land he lost.

In 2022, he filed an application before the District Resettlement Officer claiming 80R of land. Since he received no response, he moved to the HC.

Issues

Should the Petitioner get 80R of land even after 49 years of such allotment?

Decision

The Court referred to previous cases especially that of C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology & Mining & Anr., which had similar facts and the decision was that no cause of action arose under Art.226. Such claims were referred to as ‘Deadwood.’ In the present case, the Court reiterated the decision in Jacob’s case and said that the petitioner had enjoyed the land for 40 years without any issue and suddenly had filed for a claim. This according to the Bench was abuse of process. Since there was an unexplained delay in filing the suit, the suit is barred by principles of delay and laches.

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Written by- Aparna Gupta, University Law College & Dept. of Studies in Law

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