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SC SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT IN RESPECT OF DYING DECLARATION

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Case Name: NAEEM. Versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.

Case Number: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1978 of 2024

Dated: March 05, 2024

Quorum: Honourable Justice B.R. Gavaskar & Justice Sandeep Mehta

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The appeals challenge the judgement and order dated December 17, 2019, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1589 of 2018 and 7393 of 2017. The appeals relate to the case of Shahin Parveen, who was admitted to the District Hospital with 80% deep thermal and facial burns on 1st December 2016. She claimed that she was set ablaze by the accused/appellants who pressured her into entering the profession of immoral trafficking and prostitution. A First Information Report was registered at Police Station Katghar, District Moradabad, and Shahin was admitted to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, where she died at 7:55 pm. The case was altered to the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecution case alleged that after the death of Shahin’s husband two years prior, the accused/appellants began pressuring her into entering the profession of immoral trafficking and prostitution. The accused/appellants caught hold of Shahin and poured kerosene on her, igniting a matchstick and throwing it at her. The accused/appellants surrounded her, and she was set ablaze. Her neighbours put out the fire, and her mother and brother, Islam @ Babli, took her to the hospital.

The deceased, who had been a victim of a dispute with her husband, was allegedly set on fire by two accused individuals. The incident occurred on December 1, 2016, and the deceased’s dying declaration revealed that the dispute was related to their shared residence. The accused poured kerosene on the deceased, who was later taken to a hospital in New Delhi. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined eight witnesses, with Papi @ Mashkoor claiming he was absent at the time and the deceased committed suicide. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment and a fine. The accused appealed to the High Court, which dismissed their appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

  1. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860;

● Section-34 (Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) – When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

● Section 302 (Punishment for Murder): Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine.

● Section-307 (Attempt to murder): Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

● Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.

  1. INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872;

● Section 32(1) [ Dying Declaration]: This section states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

ISSUES RAISED:

  1. Whether the dying declaration is cogent, trustworthy, and reliable to base the conviction on the accused or frivolous and vexatious.
  2. Whether the dying declaration can be considered as sole evidence for the conviction of the accused persons.
  3. whether the conviction of all three accused is tenable or not.

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT:

Shri Mohd. Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the conviction is based only on the dying declaration of the deceased. He submits that the dying declaration is not free from doubt. It is submitted that the discharge slip would show that the deceased was discharged from the District Hospital, Moradabad, on December 1, 2016 at 5:00 pm. It is therefore impossible that the dying declaration could have been recorded between 8:48 pm and 9:15 pm. The learned counsel therefore submits that the said dying declaration cannot be said to be trustworthy, reliable and cogent so as to base the conviction solely on the same.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:

Shri Thakur, counsel for the respondent, submits that both the trial court and the High Court, on the correct appreciation of evidence, rightly convicted the accused and appellants, and as such, no interference would be warranted with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. The learned AAG submits that Raj Kumar Bhaskar, the then Naib Tehsildar, has deposed about the dying declaration. Shri Thakur submits that the dying declaration also contains the certification by Dr. A.K. Singh, Emergency Medical Officer, District Hospital, Moradabad, regarding the medical fitness of the victim both prior to and after recording the dying declaration.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The conviction in this case is based solely on the dying declaration, as per the law outlined in the Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi case. The court has held that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court, and if the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement, it was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination. If the court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without further corroboration. The court has observed that if the dying declaration is true, coherent, and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement, there is no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.

The testimony of Raj Kumar Bhaskar, the then Naib Tehsildar, reveals that he was directed by the Tehsildar to record the statement of the victim, Shahin Parveen, at the District Hospital, Moradabad. He deposed that he was in full sense and understood the questions, and that none of the relatives of the deceased were present during the recording.

 

The dying declaration is deemed true and coherent, making it a reliable basis for conviction without independent corroboration. The victim’s statement reveals that the deceased’s motive is attributed to accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, who allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. The statement of Naeema and her brother Naeem, the wife of accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, also reveals their assistance to her devar Pappi @ Mashkoor.

 

However, no specific role for how they assisted was found in the dying declaration. The court finds that the dying declaration can be the sole basis for maintaining the conviction of accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, but in the absence of any specific role attributed to accused No. 2 Naeema and accused No. 3 Naeem, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

As a result, the court passed the following order:

(i) The criminal appeals of Naeem and Naeema, quashed and set aside, are allowed. The trial court’s conviction and sentence from October 24, 2017, and the High Court’s judgement from December 17, 2019, are quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all charges and are directed to be released immediately, unless required in any other case.

(ii) Criminal Appeal No. 1979 of 2022, qua appellant Pappi @ Mashkoor, is dismissed.

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Judgement Reviewed by- Abhishek Singh

Click here to view the full judgement: NAEEM. Versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.

 

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Decoding the Applicability of the Law of Limitation to the Domestic Violence Act: Unveiling Legal Perspectives

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INTRODUCTION

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2002 (referred to as “the Act”) was enacted in 2002 to address the widespread issue of domestic violence against women. The Act has been a significant milestone in safeguarding the rights of aggrieved women, providing them with a wide range of practical reliefs. These include the right to shelter, protection, monetary support, and interim maintenance, among others.

Furthermore, the Act possesses certain unique features, such as the power of a Magistrate to revise their previous orders under Section 25 of the Act and the authority to establish their own procedures.

Despite Section 28(1) of the Act explicitly stating that most proceedings and offenses shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (referred to as “the CrPC”), Subsection 2 of the same section empowers the Magistrate to establish their own procedure for disposing of applications under Sections 12 and/or 23 of the Act.

The literal interpretation of Section 28 suggests that while the court can devise its own procedure, it must be in accordance with the rules of the CrPC.

However, the Act does not specifically address the issue of limitation. Therefore, the crucial question arises as to whether the law of limitation, as per the Limitation Act, 1963, and/or the CrPC, is applicable to proceedings governed by the DV Act.

This brief piece aims to shed light on the recent developments in the legal arena concerning this particular issue.

 

LIMITATION AS PER THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (CRPC):

Chapter 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) addresses the limitation for taking cognizance of certain offenses. A fundamental provision in this regard is Section 468 of the CrPC, which is outlined below:

Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. —

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offense of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be—

(a) six months if the offense is punishable with a fine only;

(b) one year if the offense is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years if the offense is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years..

It is important to note that Section 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2002 stipulates that the punishment for a breach of an order passed under the Act may extend to one year or a fine of up to Rs 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only), or both.

Therefore, considering a holistic reading of Sections 28 and 31 of the Act in conjunction with Section 468 of the CrPC, it can be inferred that a complaint filed under Section 12 of the Act must be done within one year from the date of the offense. Failure to do so would render the concerned court or magistrate unable to take cognizance of the matter in accordance with the law.

It is relevant at this point to refer to the judicial interpretation of the law of limitation regarding proceedings governed by the Act. The courts have provided guidance on this issue, establishing that the limitation period prescribed in the CrPC would indeed apply to complaints filed under the Act. Therefore, aggrieved parties must ensure that they file their complaints within the specified timeframe to enable the court to take cognizance of the matter. The application of the limitation period aims to ensure that complaints are brought in a timely manner, balancing the rights of the aggrieved parties with the need for efficient and effective justice delivery.

 RELEVANT CASE LAWS: –

Inder Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Ors.

In the case of “Inder Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Ors.,” the Supreme Court made observations regarding the time limit for filing a complaint under the Domestic Violence (DV) Act. The Court noted that according to sections 28, 32 of the Act read with section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), the complaint must be filed within one year from the date of the incident. It is important to mention that the main issue in this case was not the limitation period. However, the Court provided its view on the limitation point in a brief manner.

Since the Inder Singh case (supra), various courts have referred to it while dealing with the issue of limitation in proceedings under the DV Act. Some notable cases where the Inder Singh case was relied upon include the following:

The Madras High Court in the case of “V. Nagarajan and Ors. vs. B.P. Thangaveni” held that the complainant, who left the matrimonial home in 2014, filed an application under section 12 of the Act in 2017, which was barred by law as it wasn’t filed within one year from the date of the incident. The Madras High Court relied on the Inder Singh case (Supra) while making this determination.

The Patna High Court in the case of “Santosh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” held that a magistrate cannot take cognizance of complaints filed after the expiry of one year, referring to the Inder Singh case (Supra).

From the analysis of these case laws, it can be stated that proceedings, including section 12 applications under the Act, should generally be filed within one year from the date of the incident. Failure to do so may result in the court refusing to take cognizance of the case.

However, a recent development occurred in the case of “Kamatchi vs. Laxmi” in 2022, where the Supreme Court provided a different and new interpretation of the law regarding limitation in proceedings governed by the DV Act. The Court’s interpretation and its implications are as follows:

Kamatchi Vs. Laxmi Narayan Case, 2022

In the case of Kamatchi vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra), the Supreme Court made a significant ruling stating that an application filed under section 12 of the Act should not be considered a complaint under section 2 of the CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure). Therefore, the application of section 468 of the CrPC, which deals with the law of limitation, cannot be applied to section 12 of the Act. Consequently, the one-year limitation rule does not apply to applications filed under section 12 of the Act.

Notably, the Supreme Court referred to the case of Inder Singh (Supra) and distinguished it on the grounds that in Inderjit Singh Grewal, the allegation of domestic violence occurred after the divorce decree when the relationship between the parties had ceased to exist. While the plea based on Section 468 of the Code was noted in the Inderjit Singh Grewal case, the Kamatchi case highlighted the interplay of Sections 12 and 31 of the Act, which was not considered in the previous ruling.

As a result, the Supreme Court has effectively overturned the previous established law without explicitly overruling the Inder Singh case (Supra). It has solidified the stance that the restrictions imposed by section 468 of the CrPC do not apply to applications filed under the Act.

Although the Kamatchi case (Supra) has settled the matter by reversing the previous law, the Supreme Court has not provided any guidelines regarding the time limit for filing such applications. This lack of guidance may potentially harm innocent respondents in the long run. Therefore, it is necessary for the Apex Court to establish guidelines that regulate and restrict the filing of applications under section 12 and other provisions of the Act to prevent undue and unjustified delays, thereby protecting innocent respondents and saving time from frivolous cases.

CONCLUSION

The interpretation of the limitation period in proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act has undergone significant developments in recent times. Although the Act itself does not specifically address the issue of limitation, the courts have expressed varying opinions on the matter. However, a recent landmark case, known as the Kamatchi case, has brought about a significant shift in the legal landscape by ruling that the limitation period under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) does not apply to applications filed under Section 12 of the Act.

This ruling in the Kamatchi case has undoubtedly provided relief to women who may have previously faced difficulties in seeking legal redress due to the passage of time. By removing the limitation period, the court has recognized the unique nature of domestic violence cases and the challenges faced by victims, often resulting in delayed reporting or seeking legal recourse. The decision acknowledges that victims of domestic violence require the freedom to come forward and seek justice without the added burden of adhering to a strict time constraint.

However, while this ruling has brought respite to women facing domestic violence, it has also raised concerns regarding the potential misuse of the Act and the protection of the rights of respondents. By removing the limitation period, there is a possibility that false or exaggerated allegations may be made against respondents, leading to the abuse of the legal process. This creates a delicate balance that must be struck between providing effective protection to victims while ensuring that the rights of respondents are safeguarded and that there are adequate safeguards against misuse.

In light of these concerns, it becomes crucial for the Supreme Court to establish clear guidelines to address these issues and strike a balance between protecting victims and preventing undue delays and misuse of the Act. The court must provide detailed guidance on factors such as evidence requirements, burden of proof, and the standard of scrutiny to ensure that genuine cases are given due consideration, while also preventing the misuse of the Act for personal vendettas or ulterior motives.

Furthermore, it is essential for the Supreme Court to emphasize the importance of conducting fair and unbiased investigations in domestic violence cases. This includes ensuring that proper procedures are followed, evidence is carefully examined, and both parties are given a fair opportunity to present their case. Special attention should also be given to provide support and legal aid to respondents who may be wrongly accused, ensuring that their rights and reputations are adequately protected.

Additionally, the court may consider establishing alternative mechanisms for resolving domestic violence disputes, such as mediation or counseling, to encourage amicable settlements and reduce the burden on the legal system. This approach can help strike a balance between providing relief to victims and ensuring that the Act is not misused as a tool for harassment or manipulation.

In conclusion, while the Kamatchi case has brought about a significant development by ruling that the limitation period under the CrPC does not apply to applications filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, it is essential for the Supreme Court to provide clear guidelines to prevent potential misuse of the Act. By striking a balance between protecting victims and ensuring the rights of respondents, the court can uphold the spirit of the Act and provide effective remedies to victims of domestic violence while maintaining the integrity of the legal system.

 

REFERENCES

Written by- Abhay Shukla

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”