#delhi Archives - Page 16 of 22

4 Sep

Trademark Infringement in Composite Marks: Insights from the latest judgment of the Delhi High Court

Prime Legal

Blog #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #trademark, #trademarks

Case Title: Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club Ltd. & Ors. v. Lifestyle Equities C V & Ors

Date of Judgment: 28.08.2023

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 168/2019, CM APPL. 32083/2019 & CM APPL. 44128/2022

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan

Introduction

The case involves a dispute between Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club Ltd. & Ors. (referred to as ‘Berkshire’) and Lifestyle Equities C V & Ors. (referred to as ‘BHPC’) over the alleged infringement of a logo mark used in the sale of fragrance products.

Factual Background

The appellants, Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club Ltd. & Ors. (referred to as ‘Berkshire’), appealed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act against a judgment dated 06.05.2019. The judgment was passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Suit bearing No. C.S. (COMM) 1031/2018. The learned Single Judge had granted an interim injunction against Berkshire, restraining them from selling or advertising products using a logo mark that the respondent, Lifestyle Equities CV & Ors. (referred to as ‘BHPC’), claimed was deceptively similar to their own logo mark.

Contentions of the Appellants

The appellants argued that the logo of a polo player on a horse is a common and descriptive image related to polo sports. They contended that BHPC’s claim of exclusivity over this image was unfounded, and several other companies, including Ralph Lauren, used similar imagery. The appellants also pointed out that they had been using their logo since 1985 and that the word “polo club” was not objected to by BHPC.

Contentions of the Respondent

BHPC claimed that they held the registration of a logo mark depicting a “charging polo pony, the rider and the polo stick of mallet,” which they considered to be a distinctive and well-known trademark. BHPC claimed that their logo mark, consisting of a distinctive polo player device and the stylized word mark “Beverly Hills Polo Club,” was registered in various countries, including India, and was well-known. They alleged that Berkshire’s logo mark, which also included a polo player and horse, was deceptively similar to their logo mark and likely to cause confusion among consumers. They sought an injunction against Berkshire from using any product with a logo mark similar to theirs.

Key Legal Issues

Whether Berkshire’s logo mark was deceptively similar to BHPC’s logo mark?

Whether there was a likelihood of confusion among consumers regarding both the trademarks?

Whether BHPC was entitled to an injunction against Berkshire’s use of the logo mark?

Court’s Analysis and Decision

The Division Bench of the High Court, comprising Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan, set aside the impugned judgment. The Court observed that while the Single Judge had correctly identified the essential feature of the respondent’s mark as the polo player device, the learned Single Judge erred in finding deceptive similarity based solely on this feature.

The Appellate Court found that the learned Single Judge had misinterpreted the principles regarding trademark infringement. The Court emphasized that the competing marks should be considered as a whole and not dissected into individual components. It was noted that both companies used variations of the polo player device, which was also used by other entities like Ralph Lauren. The Appellate Court highlighted the dissimilarities in the marks, including the direction of the horses depicted, the positioning of the polo player device, and the co-existence of similar marks in various countries.

The Court noted that both parties used the polo player device in conjunction with their respective names (“Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club” for the appellants and “Beverly Hills Polo Club” for the respondents). It was also highlighted that the marks were co-existing in other countries. The Court concluded that Berkshire’s use of its logo mark, along with its actual name “Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club,” did not constitute infringement under Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999. It was held that the marks belonging to the two polo clubs were distinct and not likely to cause confusion among consumers. The Court ruled that the marks were not deceptively similar when viewed as a whole and that BHPC’s claim of infringement was not justified.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates the complexity of determining trademark infringement when dealing with composite marks. The judgment emphasized that trademarks must be analyzed in their entirety and not dissected into individual elements for comparison, especially when dealing with marks that are used in conjunction with different words and upheld the importance of the overall commercial impression created by the mark.

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Written by – Ananya Chaudhary

Click here to view judgment

1 Sep

Delhi High Court Awards Damages to Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. in Trademark Battle Against Pressure Cooker Manufacturers

Prime Legal

Blog #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #trademark

Case Title: Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v Mangal Yadav & Anr.

CS(COMM) 666/2019 and I.A. 773/2023

Date of Decision: 25th August 2023

Coram: Justice Prathiba M. Singh

Introduction

The case involves a dispute over the trademark “TATA.” The Plaintiff, TATA Sons Pvt. Ltd., seeks a permanent injunction against the Defendants for infringing registered trademarks and copyrights, passing off, dilution, and tarnishment of trademarks related to the mark “TATA.” The mark “TATA” is highly reputed and well-known, associated with the TATA group of companies founded in 1868.

Factual Background

The case involves a dispute over the trademark ‘TATA’ and its unauthorized use by the defendants, Mangal Yadav and Sanjeev Jain. The plaintiff, TATA Sons Pvt. Ltd., is the principal investor and promoter of the TATA group of companies, seeking relief for infringement of registered trademarks and copyrights, passing off, dilution, and tarnishment of trademarks. The ‘TATA’ mark is well-known and has a history dating back to 1868. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were manufacturing and selling pressure cookers under the ‘TATA’ mark.

Key Legal Issues

Whether the Defendants’ use of the “TATA” mark on pressure cookers constitutes trademark infringement and passing off ?
Whether the Defendants’ use of the “TATA” mark causes dilution and tarnishment of the Plaintiff’s trademark ?

Court’s Analysis and Observation:

The Plaintiff established the well-known nature of the “TATA” mark through various documents, including trademark registrations, news articles, and website references. The Defendants’ manufacturing and selling pressure cookers with the “TATA” mark constitute infringement and passing off. The Defendants’ admission of documents and the seizure of infringing products by the local commissioners strengthen the Plaintiff’s case.

Decision of the Court

Justice Prathiba M. Singh granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court found that the Defendants’ use of the “TATA” mark on pressure cookers constituted infringement of the Plaintiff’s registered trademarks and passing off. The Court held that the mark “TATA” was well-known and recognized globally, and its use by the Defendants could dilute and tarnish the Plaintiff’s trademark. The Court issued a permanent injunction restraining Defendants from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in pressure cookers bearing the “TATA” mark. Damages and costs were awarded to the Plaintiff against both the Defendants, with Defendant No. 1 being directed to pay Rs. 11 lakhs and Defendant No. 2 to pay Rs. 1 lakh. The infringing stock was ordered to be destroyed in the presence of the Plaintiff’s representative.

Conclusion

The judgment underscores the importance of protecting well-known trademarks from unauthorized use. It highlights the court’s willingness to grant summary judgment when defendants admit infringement or fail to provide valid defenses. The damages awarded emphasize the potential consequences of trademark infringement, including monetary penalties and destruction of infringing goods.

Written by – Ananya Chaudhary

Click to view judgment

25 Aug

Delhi High Court’s Ruling on Gold Smuggling and Prohibited Goods: Impact on Economy and Legal Consequences

Prime Legal

Uncategorized # government, #customs, #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #gold, #ministry

Title: Nidhi Kapoor and Ors. v. Principal Commissioner and Ors.

Decided on: 21st August, 2023

+ W.P.(C) 8902/2021

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA & HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA

Introduction

In a recent case before the Delhi High Court, the intricate legal landscape surrounding gold smuggling and its ramifications on the economy came under scrutiny. The court’s verdict shed light on the burden of proof, the definition of prohibited goods, and the extensive economic and legal consequences associated with such smuggling activities.

Facts

The case centered around an individual apprehended while attempting to smuggle a substantial quantity of gold into India. The individual contended that the gold was received as a gift, while authorities suspected illicit smuggling activities. Central to the case were questions regarding whether gold smuggling constituted prohibited goods and the allocation of the burden of proof in such cases.

Analysis

Economic Implications and Legal Ramifications: The court acknowledged the ripple effect of gold smuggling on India’s economy, encompassing alarming levels of money laundering, black money generation, and potential connections to unlawful activities, including financing terrorism. This emphasis underscored the gravity of the offense and its broader implications.
Burden of Proof: The court delved into the legal principle enshrined in Section 123 of the Customs Act, wherein the onus to establish that seized goods are not smuggled rests upon the person from whom the goods were confiscated or the individual claiming ownership.
Precedent: The court addressed a plea based on a prior incident involving a passenger who was apprehended with gold but subsequently released. The court dismissed the relevance of this precedent, emphasizing that a single instance did not constitute a binding legal basis.
Gift Claim Scrutiny: The petitioner argued that the gold in question was a gift. However, the court ruled that the presented gift deed lacked the essential elements of acceptance and legal validity, rendering it inadequate to prove ownership.
Definition of Prohibited Goods: The court engaged in an insightful analysis of the definition of “prohibited goods” outlined in Section 2(33) of the Customs Act. It clarified that this definition encompassed goods subject to import/export prohibition and extended to goods imported against prescribed conditions.
Import Policy and Constraints: The court referenced the government’s prerogative to restrict the export and import of goods. A circular was cited, underscoring that the import of gold was limited to licensed individuals and public notices.
Section 111 of Customs Act: The court examined Section 111 of the Customs Act, a pivotal provision addressing dutiable or prohibited goods, including those imported in contravention of conditions or those that have been concealed.
Interpretation of “Prohibited Goods”: The court’s inference that goods imported against stipulated conditions fall within the ambit of “prohibited goods” aligned with the legislative intent to encompass goods adhering to import conditions.
Adjudging Officer’s Discretion: The court held that an infringement of import conditions fell within the realm of Section 2(33), thereby conferring the Adjudging Officer with discretionary authority over the release or redemption of such goods.

Conclusion

Through its detailed examination of gold smuggling, prohibited goods, and the evidentiary burden, the Delhi High Court’s ruling enriched our comprehension of the legal complexities at play. The judgment underscored the interconnectedness of smuggling, economic well-being, and legal obligations. By offering a comprehensive analysis, the court’s decision navigated through the intricate web of legal nuances, contributing to a clearer understanding of the legal framework encompassing gold smuggling and its repercussions on both the economy and the legal system.

Written by- Ankit Kaushik

Click here to view judgment

25 Aug

Delhi High Court Affirms Maternity Benefits for DSLSA Empanelled Advocates

Prime Legal

Blog #advocates, #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #maternitybenefitact, #MaternityBenefits

Title: Annwesha Deb v. Delhi State Legal Services Authority
Decided on: 26th July, 2023

+ W.P.(C) 11016/2017 & CM APPL. 2071/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

Introduction

The Delhi High Court has ruled that female advocates empanelled with the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) are entitled to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. The court emphasized the importance of allowing women to balance both their careers and motherhood without being forced to choose between the two.

Facts

The court addressed a writ petition filed by a female advocate empanelled with DSLSA. She sought directions to grant her consecutive maternity benefits similar to those provided to regular female employees.

Analysis

Justice Chandra Dhari Singh, presiding over a Single Bench, highlighted that maternity benefits are not solely a statutory or contractual entitlement between employer and employee. Instead, they are integral to a woman’s identity and dignity when she decides to start a family. The court underlined that the liberty to become a mother is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The environment should support a woman’s ability to make decisions about her personal and professional life, ensuring that women who choose both a career and motherhood are not forced into a difficult “either-or” situation.

The court emphasized that obstructing a woman’s exercise of this right without proper legal procedure is not only against the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution but also violates the core principles of social justice.

Key Points

The petitioner was appointed as a legal aid counsel on a daily fee basis by the Juvenile Justice Board-I in New Delhi. During her contractual period, she became pregnant and applied for seven months of maternity leave in October 2017.

The petitioner’s request for maternity benefits was denied by DSLSA, stating that such benefits were not provided for legal services authorities. Dissatisfied with the decision, the petitioner approached the court seeking remedy.

The court highlighted the historical struggle women faced in achieving equal treatment in both skilled and unskilled work, stressing the importance of understanding that equal treatment doesn’t always mean identical treatment.

The court noted that the changes a woman undergoes during pregnancy go beyond just biological aspects, and accommodating her needs is essential. Pushing pregnant women to work on par with others can result in grave injustice and violate the principles of equity and equality envisaged by the Constitution.

The court rejected the argument that the petitioner’s relationship with DSLSA was that of a client and advocate, emphasizing that the nature of payment didn’t negate the employer-employee relationship.

The court ruled that the petitioner’s case falls within the definition of wages under the Maternity Benefit Act and that the Act’s intent was not to limit relief based on the nature of employment.

The court criticized DSLSA’s denial of maternity benefits to contractual employees despite extending these benefits to regular employees.

Emphasizing that maternity benefits are essential for the well-being of both mother and child, the court called for a change in perspective to ensure women can balance family and career.

The court concluded that withholding maternity benefits violates both constitutional rights and the spirit of social justice. It urged the state and all subjects of the Act to uphold its provisions and objectives.

Held

The Delhi High Court’s decision to uphold maternity benefits for female advocates empanelled with DSLSA is a step toward gender equality and women’s empowerment. The ruling emphasizes the importance of recognizing the fundamental rights of women to balance career and motherhood without being compelled to make a difficult choice.

Written by- Ankit Kaushik

Click here to view judgment

24 Aug

Compliance Report by Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology on Regulation of Social Media Platforms: Delhi High Court

Prime Legal

Blog # government, #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #ministry, #regulation

Title: X & Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

Ordered on: 17th August, 2023

+ CRL.M.C. 2214/2020, CRL.M.C. 2399/2020 & CRL.M.C. 2215/2020

CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Introduction

The Delhi High Court received a compliance report from the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) in response to a previous order seeking compliance with the court’s judgment. The judgment had addressed the regulation of social media platforms and intermediaries to make them safer by curbing the use of vulgar language and profanity.

Facts

The compliance report was submitted as per the court’s order dated April 12, 2023. The court had requested compliance with its judgment issued on March 6, 2023, in petitions related to the regulation of social media platforms. The Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) filed the report, acknowledging the court’s directions and observations and assuring that the concerns raised by the court would be considered in the formulation of policies and regulations.

Analysis

The compliance report stated that MeitY had taken note of the directions and observations provided in the court’s judgment, along with subsequent orders dated April 12, 2023, and June 1, 2023. The report highlighted specific paragraphs (60, 76, 84, and 85) of the judgment that were of relevance. MeitY affirmed that it would incorporate rules and regulations to regulate social media platforms and intermediaries in order to make them safer from the use of vulgar language, profanity, and bad words, as per the court’s judgment.

Order

The court, after reviewing the compliance report, acknowledged that the matter pertained to a policy decision to be taken by the Ministry and the legislature. The court expressed satisfaction with the compliance report, considering it as sufficient compliance with its order. The court was assured that the concerns raised in its judgment would be addressed and incorporated into future rules and regulations pertaining to social media platforms.

Conclusion

The compliance report submitted by the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology reflects the government’s acknowledgment of the court’s concerns regarding the regulation of social media platforms. The court’s decision to accept the compliance report as sufficient indicates its confidence that the Ministry will undertake the necessary policy measures to address the issues raised in the court’s judgment and ensure a safer online environment.

Written by- Ankit Kaushik

Click here to view Order

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