#CPC Archives - Page 4 of 4

16 Aug

[POCSO Act] The absence of injuries to a victim’s private parts does not rule out penetrative sexual assault, according to the Delhi High Court.

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Blog # Pocso Act, #CPC, #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #Sexual Assault

Title: Ranjeet Kumar Yadav v. State of NCT of Delhi

Decided on: 14th August, 2023

+ CRL.A. 50/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

Introduction

The Delhi High Court recently delivered a significant judgment regarding the interpretation of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The case involved the conviction of an appellant for sexual offenses against a young victim. The central issue revolved around the absence of injuries on the victim’s private parts and its implications on the nature of the assault.

Facts

The appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, along with sections 363 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), for sexual offenses against a four-and-a-half-year-old victim. The defense argued that there were contradictions in the victim’s statements and that the prosecution’s case rested solely on the victim’s testimony, lacking sufficient corroboration. They contended that the absence of certain injuries suggested a lesser offense of “touching” rather than penetration under the POCSO Act.

Analysis and Held

Justice Amit Bansal, upholding the conviction, clarified that the absence of injuries on the victim’s private parts cannot automatically negate the possibility of a penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act. He emphasized that injuries are not necessary in every case of sexual assault. The Court referred to previous judgments and established that the mere lack of injuries should not undermine the credibility of the victim’s testimony.

The Court addressed the alleged inconsistencies in the victim’s statements, noting that minor contradictions, particularly considering the young age of the victim, do not render her testimony unreliable. The Court highlighted the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which places the onus on the accused to rebut the presumption by leading evidence or discrediting the prosecution’s case.

In conclusion, the Delhi High Court held that the absence of injuries does not automatically disprove the occurrence of a penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act. The Court underscored the importance of evaluating the victim’s testimony in its entirety and considering the overall context of the case. The conviction of the appellant was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

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Written by- Ankit Kaushik

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16 Aug

Patents Act| Revocation Petition Under Section 64 Is Not A Suit Under Section 10 Of The CPC- Delhi High Court Rules

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blog, Blog #CPC, #delhi, #delhicourt, #delhihighcourt, #lab, #patentsact

Title: Dr Reddys Laboratories Limited & Anr. vs The Controller of Patents & Ors.

Decided on: 3rd August, 2023

+ C.O.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 3/2021

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR

Introduction

A recent ruling by the Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice C Hari Shankar, addressed the question of whether a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act can be considered a “suit” under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The court held that a revocation petition cannot be treated as a suit for the purposes of Section 10 of the CPC.

Facts

The case pertained to a revocation petition (CO (Comm. IPD-PAT) 3/2021) filed by the petitioners challenging a patent held by respondent Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH under various clauses of Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970. Respondent Boehringer had also filed a lawsuit (COMS 5/2021) accusing the petitioners of patent infringement based on the same patent. The petitioners argued that the issues in both the revocation petition and the lawsuit were identical.

Counsel J Sai Deepak represented the petitioners, while CGSC Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar represented the respondents.

Analysis

The central issue was whether a revocation petition can be considered a “suit” under Section 10 of the CPC, which deals with the stay of proceedings in a suit. The court examined the provisions of the CPC and observed that Order IV Rule 1(1) of the CPC indirectly defines a “suit” as a plaint presented to a court or its appointed officer.

The court noted that a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act cannot be treated as a suit unless there is a provision deeming it so. It emphasized that the creation of deeming fictions is typically the prerogative of the legislature and cannot be undertaken by the court.

Held

The Delhi High Court held that a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act cannot be considered a suit for the purpose of invoking Section 10 of the CPC. Section 10 does not bring proceedings to a halt; it only stays the trial of a suit. The court clarified that even if Section 10 applies, the court hearing the later suit can still issue interlocutory orders. The court cited previous cases to support its position and concluded that the revocation petition should not be treated as a suit under Section 10 of the CPC.

Furthermore, the court observed that even on merit, a case existed for staying the revocation petition pending the outcome of the suit filed in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh.

In essence, the Delhi High Court’s ruling clarified that a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act cannot be equated with a suit for the purpose of applying Section 10 of the CPC.

Written by- Ankit Kaushik

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11 Aug

Suppression Of Material Facts Detrimental To Grant Of Temporary Injunction: Karnataka High Court

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Blog #CPC, #Karnataka High Court

Title: Nanjamma & Others AND Rajamma & Others

Case No: M.F.A No 2172/2023

Date of Order: 04-08-2023

CORAM : HON’BLE JUSTICE H.P SANDESH

INTRODUCTION

The Karnataka High Court recently ruled that the granting of a temporary injunction as per the regulations stated in Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is a discretionary solution. This decision involves a delicate equilibrium between the necessity for interim relief and the continuation of the legal process.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Briefly, the case involves a challenge to an injunction issued by the Trial Court during a pending appeal. The Trial Court’s order restrained the appellants from interfering with the respondents’ property rights and a construction project. The main question was whether the current case’s basis was truly different from a previous one, justifying the injunction.

The appellants claimed the respondents misled the court by suggesting the High Court had denied the injunction, when in fact, it was pending. They argued this concealed facts and the Trial Court shouldn’t have granted the injunction, given the pending appeal.

The defendants countered that the appellants’ earlier case lacked merit and was dismissed, so initiating an appeal doesn’t nullify the respondents’ right to a new lawsuit. They maintained the new lawsuit’s cause of action is distinct.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

In summary, the appellants had previously filed a lawsuit in 2014 to claim ownership of a specific property, based on various events dating back to 2008. In 2022, they returned to court seeking an injunction against the respondents who were allegedly interfering with their construction activities on the same property. Upon careful examination of both lawsuits, the Court determined that the underlying legal reasons for both cases were essentially identical. The appellants were seeking the same relief in both instances – to stop the respondents from interfering with their construction work on the disputed property.

The Court criticized the respondents for not waiting for the ongoing appeal’s resolution and for initiating a new lawsuit seeking injunctive relief. This behavior was seen as unscrupulous and potentially causing conflict between the appeal and the new suit. The Court highlighted that the mere possibility of a different outcome in the appeal did not justify the Trial Court’s decision to grant an injunction. It stressed that the Trial Court should have been more cautious, considering the pending appeal’s authority to reevaluate both factual and legal aspects of the case.

Additionally, the Court noted that when a judgment is being appealed, the original Trial Court decision loses its absolute finality and becomes subject to reevaluation. Consequently, the Bench concluded that the Trial Court’s decision to grant a temporary injunction was mistaken, and thus, the appeal was accepted.

Written by- Shreya Sharma

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12 Jul

Delhi high Court Dismissed the revision petition seeking dismissal of trial court order under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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Blog #CPC, #delhihighcourt, #HighCourt, #law, #primelegal, #revisionpetiton, Blog, Prime Legal

Title: ANUJ SHARMA vs AMIT SHARMA

Date of Decision: 10th July, 2023

+ C.R.P. 64/2022 & CM APPL. 20882/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Introduction

Delhi high Court Dismissed the revision petition seeking dismissal of trial court order under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and held that plaint deserves not to be rejected as being barred by law and no interference is warranted in the impugned order.

Facts of the case

According to the relevant factual matrix, the plaintiff asserts ownership of a 55 square yard piece of property with the following address: No.4138/1, Ground floor, Gali No.108, B-Block, Near Kapoor Garments Store, Sant Nagar, Burari, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”). The ground level of the suit property is allegedly in the hands of the defendant, who is the plaintiff’s biological brother. By way of Registered GPA, Agreement to Sell, and other related agreements dated 20.10.2004, Plaintiff acquired the suit property from its former owner. Water and electricity metres were also put in Plaintiff’s name.

According to the Plaintiff, he gave the Defendant permission to live on the suit property with his family as a licensee and permissive user upon the Defendant’s request, even though no licence fee was paid.

However, the Plaintiff asked the Defendant to leave the land and provide physical ownership to him since he needed the property and the Defendant was bothering him and his family. Legal notice dated 09.10.2019 was delivered on the Defendant, ending the licence and requesting that he leave the suit property within 15 days after the Defendant failed to leave. When the defendant failed to transfer ownership of the property within the allotted period, the plaintiff brought the current lawsuit for mandatory and permanent injunction as well as damages.

Analysis of the court

The ruling of the Trial Court that dismissed the Defendant’s application under ruling VII Rule 11 CPC is being contested in the current revision petition. It is essential to carefully evaluate the criteria that limit the study and adjudication of the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint, before delving into the current situation. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives and Others, Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 7 SCC 366.

In this instance, the justification provided in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC states that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit cannot be maintained since he has no legal possession or title to the suit property. by virtue of papers such as a GPA, an agreement to sell and buy, an affidavit, a will, a receipt, a letter of possession, etc. It is common knowledge that no right, title, or interest in immovable property may be transferred without accompanied by a Deed of Conveyance/Sale Deed that has been properly stamped and registered in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court ruled in Suraj Lamps (supra) that a power of attorney merely authorises transactions, not the transfer of any right, title, or interest in real estate the Attorney to carry out the tasks listed there. Furthermore, it was decided that the court would not treat transactions of the type of “GPA sales” or “SA/GPA/Will/Transfers” as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances because they do not convey title, do not constitute transfers, and cannot be recognised as legal methods of transferring real property. The Supreme Court stated that, with the exception of the restricted provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, these papers cannot be recognised as deeds of title.

The Trial Court took account of this conclusive Supreme Court ruling while determining the Defendant’s application in the current case. The application has been denied, though, on the basis of the ruling in O.P. Aggarwal (supra), in which the court ruled that while documents like an agreement to sell or a general purchase agreement do not grant ownership rights as held in Suraj Lamps (supra), they would nonetheless create certain rights in immovable property in favour of a person who has such documents executed in his favor—rights that do not necessarily grant ownership but instead give the person the right to claim possession of the suit property. The order of the Trial Court, in my opinion, is without error since it is consistent with the ruling of this Court where it is held that documents in the nature of GPA/Agreement to Sell, etc. may not transfer title but do create certain rights, such as possessory rights, which cannot be disturbed by a third party.

High Court bring up a recent Supreme Court ruling in Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 725, in this connection. In the aforementioned case, the Plaintiff/Respondent had filed a lawsuit, claiming that the Defendant/Appellant was the rightful owner of the property due to an Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, payment receipt, will, memo of possession, etc., and that he should be forced to leave the suit premises as well as pay damages. The Plaintiff was given possession of the suit premises, but upon the Defendant’s request, the Plaintiff later permitted him to use the ground floor and one room on the first floor for three months as a licensee. Defendant did not leave the premises when it was time to do so.

Regarding the facts of the case, the Trial Court correctly observed that the plaintiff had alleged in the plaint that the suit property had been transferred to her by means of a Registered GPA, an Agreement to Sell and Purchase, etc. According to the ruling in Ghanshyam (supra), the plaintiff would therefore be presumptively entitled to possessory rights that must be safeguarded from the licensee. Therefore, the licensee must turn over possession at the conclusion of the licence period, and the fact that the Plaintiff establishes a title on papers like the GPA or the Agreement to Sell does not prevent the Plaintiff from suing the licensee for a mandatory or permanent injunction. Moreover, the Court was only obligated to review the averments in the plaint on a mere demurrer and the papers that were affixed thereto at the stage of resolving an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. In addition to the averments listed above, the plaintiff has also presented supporting papers such GPAs, etc. Therefore, it cannot be declared at this time that the complaint ought to be dismissed as being banned by law and that there should be no interference.

Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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