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Delisting of Apps from Google Play Store: Google v. Indian Developers

Introduction

The Android Smart phones occupy a large market in India. Google’s Play Store constitutes the main distribution channel for app developers in the Android mobile ecosystem, which allows its owners to capitalize on the apps brought to market. For app developers, app stores have become a necessary medium for distribution of their apps to the end users and the availability of app store(s) is directly dependent on OS installed on a smart device. The US tech-gaint Google, thus, exercises a dominant position over this market by providing a platform for app downloads of various companies and start-ups on Google Play store[i].

According, to the Google Play Billing System (GPBS) and Google’s payment policies for android phones, the companies are obligated to pay a fees ranging from 11% to 30% depending upon their revenue for the access of in-app features and digital services. The developers under the policy have to pay Google 15% service fee for the first $1 million revenue earned by them and 30% of over $1million. The regulation of internet which, decades ago, was governed by the legislations of the Government is now being determined by the tech giants Apple and Google.

The payment of service charge for using the platform was never an issue for the developers, but the amount levied to avail the services rendered expensive and burdensome for the Indian market.

Events leading to removal of Apps from Google Play Store

On March 1st morning, Google announced that it would remove the apps of over a dozen companies from its marketplace for android phones that are non-complaint with its payment policy. Following this, Google delisted at least 23 apps from nine Indian developers from its Play Store. These include all thirteen apps from Matrimony.com – such as Bharat Matrimony, Kerala Matrimony and Jodi; three apps from InfoEdge – Naukri.com, Naukri Recruiter and 99 Acres; People’s Interactive’s Shaadi.com; Alt Balaji’s streaming service ALTT, and streaming services aha and stage. This affected around 95% of Indian Smart Phones market as the users were unable to search and download the apps from Google Play Store.

This action transpired when the Supreme Court declined to restrain Google from removing apps from its Play Store if they don’t comply with its billing policy.

Google, however, reinstated dozens of apps in spirit of cooperation that were de listed by the company on March 1 for resisting the firm’s platform fees on in app payments.

CCI’s anti-trust battle against Google

CCI imposes a monetary penalty of Rs. 1337.76 Crore on Google for anti-competitive practices in relation to Android mobile devices.

The antitrust watchdog had on October 20 imposed a penalty of Rs 1,337.76 Crore on Google for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets with its Android mobile operating system (OS), and prescribed a set of about a dozen key measures that the company has to comply with.

It directed Google to refrain from participating in anti-competitive practices that were found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 and modify its conduct within a defined deadline. Google however paid the entire penalty amount of Rs 1,337.76 Crore imposed by CCI in the Android case after contesting it before different forums.

CCI imposes a monetary penalty of Rs. 936.44 crore on Google for anti-competitive practices in relation to its Play Store policies 

This is the second ongoing case against the tech giant by the CCI. India’s anti-trust regulator, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), on October 25, 2023 imposed a penalty of Rs 936.44 crore on Google for abusing its dominant position with respect to its Play Store policies. The commission has also issued a cease-and-desist order in which the regulator prescribed eight corrective measures that Google Play needs to implement to correct the anti-competitive practices[ii].

Legal battle over the Google Play Billing System

Post the CCI order, Google expanded its User Choice Billing (UCB) policy to all developers in India and updated its UCB policy. Accordingly, Google started allowing the developers in India to offer alternative billing systems. Developers choosing to do so had their service to Google reduced by 4%.

To comply with the policy, Google has given developers three options: opt for GPBS, have an alternative billing system, or operate on a consumption-only basis without paying a service fee. But app developers in India are not satisfied for two main reasons- first, despite opting for an alternative billing system, they were still obligated to pay Google an 11% or a 26% fee, which they say is unfair, and second, this, they argue, violates, the CCT’s order. the service fee charged was as high as 26% (just 4 percentage points drop from its earlier policy).

Eventually, 14 companies, including those whose apps were delisted, challenged Google Play Billing System (GPBS) in Madras High Court Two additional lawsuits by Disney+ Hotstar and Test Book followed. The Madras HC granted interim protection to all of them, but 12 of the original 14 companies filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court. On February 9, the apex court did not grant these 14 companies protection from getting delisted but Disney+ Hotstar and Test Book’s protection continued[iii].

Conclusion

Google’s dominance in the smart phone apps market in India and its control over the online search market has been the issue of tussle. The decisions serves as a reminder to tech giants that market dominance comes with a responsibility to operate fairly and to avoid engaging in anti-competitive practices that restrict competition and harm consumers. As the technology industry continues to evolve, it will be essential for companies to operate in a manner that fosters fair competition, innovation, and consumer protection. The Billing Policy of Google is a long-standing issue. It is high time the Government intervenes and make regulations and administer the dominant players in the market.

[i] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1870819

[ii] https://legal.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/litigation/googles-appeal-against-ccis-rs-936-cr-penalty-delayed-by-nclat/105518431#:~:text=On%20January%2011%2C%20the%20tribunal,it%20later%20withdrew%20the%20case.

[iii]https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/google-moves-a-motion-before-madras-hc-seeking-dismissal-of-disneys-suit/article67202541.ece

iv www.hindustantimes.com

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Cartels and Competition Law in India

Abstract

This Article gives an analysis on the topic of cartel and their nature and new era cartels. It also looks into the matter of impact of cartels on the competition in a market and how Indian competition law comes in rescue of market from the impacts of cartel and lastly, we would discuss the recent amendments to the competition act regarding cartel operation.

Introduction

A cartel is a group of similar independent companies who join together to control prices and limit competition[1] for example, Oil cartels like OPEC or OPEC+, they manage and influence the prices of crude oil all around the globe.

Definition & Nature

Cartel has been defined under section 2(c) as –

“an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services”[2]

The General nature of a cartel involves increase in the profitability of its members and overall increase in the strength of cartel in the market. These cartels usually undertake four forms of activities to influence the market, they are –

  • Price Fixing, includes determination of Price for commodity, setting a minimum resale price etc
  • Collective bidding
  • Sharing of markets as per areas or sectors or products
  • Controlling production

Laws on cartel

Cartel arrangement which aims at distortion of competition through controlling market conditions and determining prices are held illegal per se and violative of competition act. These arrangements are clearly violation of Section 3 of the competition act which prohibits all those agreements which causes or likely to cause AAEC[3].

Now, referring to the definition, It is quite clear that these cartels are based out off agreement and as per section 2(b) of the act as –

“agreement” includes any arrangement or understanding or action in concert[4]

Generally, these agreements are not based out in a formal setting, when it aims to control the market, they are based out in a clandestine manner usually behind the closed door so, proving its existence is usually difficult but as per the Raghavan Committee “there is no need for an agreement to be formal or written to be considered illegal. In principle any kind of agreement is illegal if it violates law.”[5]  And similar view has also been held in the case of Director General (Supplies & Disposals) v. Puja Enterprises, 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 55, “It may be observed that the definition of ‘agreement’ as given in section 2(b) of the Act requires inter alia any arrangement or understanding or action in concert whether or not formal or in writing or intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings. The definition, being inclusive and not exhaustive, is a wide one. The understanding may be tacit, and the definition covers situations where the parties act on the basis of a nod or a wink[6].

And to prove the existence of these arrangement there is need of evidence but usually finding direct evidence in these situations is usually difficult and next to impossible as these arrangements are so clandestine in nature that many times evidences are destroyed. So, finding its whole existence is under the shades and it could only be proved trough various circumstantial evidence implicating the existence of such arrangement. As the same thing has been observed in Director General (supra) “There is rarely a direct evidence of action in concert and the Commission has to determine whether those involved in such dealings had some form of understanding and were acting in co- operation with each other. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice must be inferred from a number of co-incidences and indica which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of the existence of an agreement.[7]” and Hon’ble SC in Rajasthan Cylinders & Containers Ltd. vs UOI (2020) 16 SCC 615 “There may not be a direct-evidence on the basis of which cartelisation or such agreement between the parties can be proved as these agreements are normally entered into in closed doors. The standard of proof which is required one of Probability,[8]

Here, standard of probabilities is such that for a fact is said to be true when either the court believes it to be true or its existence is so probable that any prudent man, ought under the circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists meaning if a prudent man would be given similar circumstances to dealt with then the analysis of the given circumstances would make him conclude about the existence of a cartel. These circumstantial evidences might include, parallel business behaviour, exchange of sensitive information etc.

The competition law in India proscribes all those arrangement which causes or likely to cause AAEC and Cartels are always presumed to AAEC, as has been held by Raghavan Committee that “The presumption is that such horizontal agreements and membership of cartels lead to unreasonable restrictions of competition and may, therefore, be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”[9] And also held in FICCI – Multiplex Association of India v United Producers/Distributors Forum(2009), where Commission specifically held that Cartels are most pernicious form of arrangement and they are presumed to AAEC under section 3 (3) of the act.[10]

Indian Laws on competition have provision to tackle the problems posed by Horizontal and Vertical agreement and it also has provisions to make them liable for their actions as Section 27 provides for imposition of penalty for formation of cartels which could amount to three times or ten percent of the profit in the year of agreement, whichever is higher. And Commission has powers to initiate Investigation under section 26 of the act.

It may seems like the competition act got enough teeth to bite threat to competition but that’s definitely not the case in real world as many times these cartels form indirect arrangements for collusion, commonly known as a Hub & Spoke Cartel, where a Hub provides all the necessary support for the existence and survival of cartel, its support ranges from providing sensitive information among rivals, calculating prices, organising meetings etc. and all these activities are connected to spokes which cooperatively controls the market. In this new era there is generally an involvement of an Algorithm which usually works as a hub for the enterprises and creates a cartel, these arrangements are generally tacit in nature thus forming an tacit algorithmic cartel. CCI has also explained these arrangement as “A hub and spoke arrangement generally requires the spokes to use a third-party platform (hub) for exchange of sensitive information, including information on prices which can facilitate price fixing. For a cartel to operate as a hub and spoke, there needs to be a conspiracy to fix prices, which requires existence of collusion in the first place, earlier mentioned arguments clearly indicates these circumstances which proves the existence of hub and spoke cartel. It also held that a hub-and-spoke cartel would require an agreement between all parties to set prices through the platform, or an agreement for the platform to coordinate prices between them”[11]

Prior to the amendment, Competition law only prohibits arrangement between traders at same level of production meaning it covers only Horizontal agreements but this Hub & spoke arrangement has element of both horizontal and vertical arrangement thus it lacks powers to penalise the offenders leading disruption of competition in the market. But after the competition amendment act 2023, it has amended the definition of cartel in section 3(a) of the act as –

“Provided further that an enterprise or association of enterprises or a person or association of persons though not engaged in identical or similar trade shall also be presumed to be part of the agreement under this sub-section if it participates or intends to participate in the furtherance of such agreement.”[12]

After this amendment any arrangement between enterprises aiming at disruption of competition would be prosecuted irrespective of their position in the production level, irrespective of the nature of trade or business conduct of the enterprises meaning all kinds of tacit algorithmic cartels would be prosecuted with provisions of penalty as per section 27.

Conclusion

This amendment is in right direction as the time is changing, and with more influence of technology in the business. It would eventually create new loop holes to exploit by these violators of competition, thus to maintain fairness, equity and uphold the law of natural justice, strong steps had to taken in order to tackle and empower the commission in maintaining the just level field of competition in the market.

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Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

[1] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cartel

[2] Section of 2(C) of the Competition Act 2002

[3] Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition

[4] Section 2(b) of the Competition act 2002

[5] Para 4.3.2 of the Raghavan Committee

[6] Para 25, Director General (Supplies & Disposals) v. Puja Enterprises, 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 55

[7] Para 26, Ibid

[8] Para 81, Rajasthan Cylinders & Containers Ltd. vs UOI (2020) 16 SCC 615

[9] Para 4.3.8, Raghavan Committee

[10] Para 23.6 FICCI – Multiplex Association of India v United Producers/Distributors Forum(2009)

[11] Para 18 Samir Agarwal vs ANI Technologies 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 86

[12] Section 3 (a) of the Competition amendment act 2023, https://www.cci.gov.in/images/legalframeworkact/en/the-competition-amendment-act-20231681363446.pdf