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The Bombay High Court in its judgment on the 20th of January, 2023 stated that Franco Indian Pharmaceuticals Private Limited  had not established a claim of trademark infringement or passing off against Corona Remedies Private Limited . The Court established that  it had not  called for such a severe interim order. Therefore, the contested order and decision from March 1, 2021 were reversed. The court made it plain that the aforementioned observations were merely offered as a preliminary basis for reviewing the appeal. The case was presided over by Honourable Justice KR Shriram. 

The case of  Corona Remedies Private Limited V/s  Franco Indian Pharmaceuticals Private Limited were as follows. The Appellant “ Corona “ who was the defendant in the suit was prohibited from using the name “STIMULET” in connection with medicines. The Respondent, “Franco” had filed a suit against Corona for the infringement of their trademark “ STIMULIV” thus seeking an injunction from a single bench court for which the appeal had been taken up by the High Court. 

FACTS OF THE CASE : 

Franco’s mark “STIMULIV” was an Ayurvedic remedy supplied in syrup and tablet form for liver function and Corona’s “STIMULET” was an allopathic formula used in the treatment of breast cancer and infertility. 

Franco’s contention was that they were ardent users of their trademark “ STIMULIV “ ever since the year 1975 and hence obtained a conjunction against Corona for their use of “ STIMULET” 

 Franco’s position is that it has invested a significant amount of time and money in developing its mark and has begun exporting its goods with the mark “STIMULIV” to a number of nations, including Bhutan and Mauritius.

Franco asserts that on November 19, 2020, it also submitted a notice of protest to the trade mark registry in order to prevent the word mark “STIMULET” from being registered. Franco claimed that Corona was violating its “STIMULET” trademark as a result. As a result, it requested and was granted an order of injunction against trademark infringement as well as a comparable injunction against passing off, all of which are challenged in the appeal.

The name “STIMU” is an acronym taken from the dictionary word “STIMULATE,” which means “to make anything active,” and the word “LET,” which stands for “stimulate,” according to Corona. Together, these two words from the mark STIMU-LET. The word “LET” is obtained from the chemical name “LETROZOL,” which is the substance used in the Corona product, according to Mr. Kamod, who claimed that it is a common expression that is also used by many third parties with regard to their items.

JUDGMENT : 

The Court held that Corona was justified in impugning the injunction passed against them and that it is very evident from Section 28(3) of The Trademarks Act, 1999 and the law is also well established that once a trade mark is registered, the registered proprietor is not subject to an infringement claim. It stated that Franco appeared in court and claimed the marks were the same or comparable. In its defense, Corona made the valid argument that if the circumstances were comparable or identical, Corona was not subject to an infringement claim under Section 28(3) of the Act.

The Court  acknowledged that Corona is the registered owner of the trade mark STIMU-LET, and Franco had not brought any legal action to correct the registration’s errors as of yet.

Corona’s trademark registration is so legitimate and active. Even a cursory reading of section 28(3) makes it plainly evident that Franco cannot invoke the exclusive rights granted to it based on its trade mark registrations to prevent Corona from using its registered trademark.

Thus no claim of trademark infringement against Corona may be raised as long as its registration is active and effective.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- which  must be paid within 4 weeks by check made out to the advocates of Corona. 

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY SREYA MARY. 

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In this Public Interest Litigation case, the Apex Court took into account allegations of negligence and misconduct on the part of adoption agencies while allowing international adoptions. In its ruling, the Court established measures to ensure that foreign adoptions would be handled in a way that promoted children’s welfare and their right to family life.

Forum: 

Supreme Court of India

 

Date of the Ruling: 

February 6 1984

 

Type of Forum: 

Domestic

 

Summary: 

Lakshmi Kant Pandey, an attorney who wrote to the Supreme Court, later converted to petition, alleged negligence and misconduct on the part of social groups and for-profit adoption businesses that assisted in placing Indian children with foreign parents. He underlined the lengthy and perilous journeys these kids took to other nations and cases of neglect from their adopted parents that led to the children’s impoverishment or sexual exploitation. The ground for public interest litigation was established when the Court considered his letter as a writ petition, which is a filing made with a higher court to seek a quick examination of an issue.

 

In its ruling, the Court emphasized that the lack of legislative oversight of international adoptions in India might be extremely harmful to Indian children, who could be exposed to abuses like profiteering or trafficking, for instance. The Court established a comprehensive framework of normative and procedural safeguards for regulating inter-country adoption in order to protect children’s welfare and to ensure their security in healthy, decent family life. The Court did this in consultation with several social or child welfare institutions. The Court referred to many pertinent laws and regulations when establishing standards and processes, including  Articles 15(3), 24, and 39 of the Indian Constitution regarding child welfare and the principles embodied in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959). The defined safeguards include, among other things, that foreigners who want to adopt be sponsored by appropriately licensed agencies in their own country, that no adoption application from a foreigner should be entertained directly by any adoption agency in India, and that organizations engaged in international adoptions that the Government of India licenses must meet certain requirements and undertake specific responsibilities in ensuring the safety of the adoptees.

 

The written submission:

 

The Indian Council of Social Welfare was the first to submit written arguments in response to the Court’s notice, and its written statement, which was submitted on September 30, 1982, not only contained a substantial amount of information that was relevant to the issue of adopting Indian children by foreign parents, but it also contained a number of suggestions and recommendations that the Court should take into account when establishing the rules and guidelines for approving such adoptions and laying out the law. The only written argument presented at the writ petition hearing on October 12, 1982, before the Court was that neither the Union of India nor the Indian Council of Child Welfare had responded to the Court’s notice, nor had the Indian Council of Social Welfare.

 

However, the Swedish organization Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner wrote a telegram to the Court indicating that it wanted to participate in the writ petition hearing and provide the Court with pertinent information. S.O.S., Children’s Villages of India also made an appearance through their attorney, Mrs Urmila Kapoor, and requested permission to intervene at the writ petition hearing in order to make their arguments on the adoption of Indian children by foreign parents. Since S.O.S. Children’s Villages of India is a recognized organization dedicated to the welfare of children, the Court granted them permission to intervene and present their arguments in Court by order dated October 12, 1982.

 

Enforcement of the Decision and Outcomes: 

 

Over many years, the rules established by the Supreme Court governed adoption and served as a useful instrument for advocates for children’s rights. Following the decision, several social services or child welfare organizations that place children for international adoption believed that there were some challenges in putting the standards and guidelines established by our decision into practice. As a result, they asked the Court for clarification. The Court addressed these matters in an additional judgment dated September 27, 1985. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled in another case where the petitioners claimed that the adoption safeguards had not been followed that any adoption that did not follow or violate the instructions outlined in this judgment could result in the adoption being declared invalid and subject the adoptee to legal repercussions.

 

The Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA), which established criteria for the adoption of Indian children and codified the protections outlined in the Supreme Court verdict and other related decisions by the Court, was one of the Court’s orders that the Government of India complied with. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (amended in 2006) and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, were additional, if not substantial, legislative improvements. India, however, still lacks a comprehensive national adoption law. N.G.O.s have been lobbying the government to enact pertinent national legislation for years as dishonest practices in the domain of international adoptions persist.

 

Significance of the Case: 

This case perfectly illustrates how India’s procedural innovation in public interest litigation has relaxed the standards of standing (which govern who can bring a lawsuit) to make the legal system more accessible to underrepresented groups in society. It also serves as an illustration of the Indian Supreme Court’s judicial activism. The Court did not hesitate to offer detailed instructions to govern adoptions and safeguard kids from prostitution and slave labour when faced with a legal vacuum on a subject with significant social repercussions.

Case summary by Vaishnavi Singh

Madras High court

In this a writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dated 31.01.2022 made in W.P. No. 1754 of 2018 in which there is direction issued to the respondents/appellants herein to treat the writ petitioner’s maternity leave period from 19.03.2014 to 19.07.2014 and 20.07.2014 to 14.09.2014 as duty period for all purposes. The case was Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) ltd and another V/S B Rajeswari [(Mad)15 2023] Case no.- W.A.No.1692 of 2022 The Judgment was reserved on 13.12.2022 and pronounced on 12.01.2023. The case was presided by THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ.

Facts of the Cases

1. The original Writ petitioner was employed in the transport corporation as a temporary employee. She had to go through mandatory training period. Since she was pregnant she had to take Maternity leave and her maternity leave was granted by transport corporation but it was with a loss of pay.
2. The writ petitioner employee went to the Court and the Court also allowed the same and the Single Judge directed the corporation to treat her leave period as duty period and also extended all service and Maternity benefits during its period.
3. Upon the appeal in Madra High Court, the transport corporation contended that as per Government order passed by tye Transport Department in which there was no provision for eligible maternity leave during the training period. Only a non-permanent women employee who had completed 160 days of work in 12 months was eligible to claim maternity leave. Since, the petitioner had completed only 145 days of works , she was not eligible for maternity leave.

JUDGEMENT

The Madras High Court however disagreed with this thought and said that interpretation of welfare legislation should not have the effect of nullifying the benefits.

The court relied on the decision of the APEX Court of the case Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. FemaleWorkers (Muster-roll) and another Where SC held that female worker or daily wages workers should be given the Maternity Benefits.

The Court did not interfere in the judgment of the single bench and directed the corporation that they should pay the sum within 4 months and if not then they have to pay 50,000 of sum.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY NAMRATA SINGH

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On 31^st August 2007 the Odisha High Court passed a Judgement relating to the case of Paradip Post Trust and General Secretary. And the Judgement was given by A.K. Ganguly, C.J. and I. Mahanty, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

With regard to exercise of judicial review in matters relating to industrial award, this Court in Paradip Port Trust v. General Secretary, Utkal Port & Dock Workers Union, 104 (2007) CLT 763, held that when a reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal, it has to be presumed that there is a genuine industrial dispute between the parties which requires to be resolved by adjudication.

JUDGEMENT:

The Courts exercising judicial review should attempt to sustain the awards made by the Tribunal as far as possible instead of picking holes in the Award on trivial points, ultimately frustrating the entire adjudication process before the Tribunal by striking down awards on hyper-technical grounds. In other words, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, Court can interfere with an award of the Tribunal if the same is patently perverse or is based on no evidence or the same is based on such conclusion as cannot be entertained by men of ordinary prudence. But the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not the same as that of adjudicatory authority which is vested in a Tribunal on a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Orissa High Court has also rendered several judgments on criminal laws which will ever shine in the annals of judicial history.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY AMRIT BEHERA.

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On 30^th April 1976, the Odisha High Court passed a judgement in relation to Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and The Insurance Act, 1938. This Judgement was passed by Jusctice R Misra, Justice B Ray and Justice N Das.  

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In dealing with a motor accident claim appeal under section 110-D of the old Act, i.e., the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the case of National Insurance Company v. Magikhaia Das, reported in 42 (1976) CLT 648, a Full Bench of this Court had the occasion to interpret the provision of section 96 thereof (section 149 of the 1988 Act), which provided for the duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.

JUDGEMENT:

Hon’ble Justice Ranganath Misra, (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Full Bench of this Court ruled that the insurer is entitled to raise those pleas which could be raised by it before the Claims Tribunal and the appeal would not be maintainable on the grounds which could not be raised before the Claims Tribunal by the insurer. The statutory provision is clear that an insurer who has been made a party to the proceeding for recovery of compensation can resist the claim only on the ground mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the old Act and it is not open to raise any other plea. This decision of the Full Bench was found to be the correct legal position in many a judgments of the Supreme Court.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY AMRIT BEHERA.

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