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23 Feb

NCDRC overstepped its authority and jurisdiction by disregarding the Agreement’s binding covenants: Supreme court

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Case title: Venkataraman Krishnamurthy vs Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd.

Case no.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 971 OF 2023

Decided on: 22.02.2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Aniruddha Bose, Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kumar

Hon’ble Justices stated that, “it was not open to the NCDRC to apply its own standards and conclude that, though there was delay in handing over possession of the apartment, such delay was not unreasonable enough to warrant cancellation of the Agreement. It was not for the NCDRC to rewrite the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties and apply its own subjective criteria to determine the course of action to be adopted by either of them.”

BRIEF FACTS:

The complainants, who planned to buy an apartment in a Mumbai building that the respondent company was going to build, were the appellants. The complainants received a flat as a result of the parties’ execution of an Agreement to Sell. The sale consideration was to be paid in four instalments of “application money” in accordance with the payment schedule, with the remaining sum due when fit outs started. According to the agreement, the complainants were to receive possession of the flat by June 30, 2016, or within a grace period of one year, so they could fit it out.

The complainants went to the NCDRC, claiming that the company had terminated the agreement and failed to deliver possession of the flat for fit outs by the specified date. In addition to reimbursement for the money they had paid, they prayed for damages for the harassment, mental anguish, and torture they had endured, as well as reimbursement for the costs of the lawsuit. The complainants were before the supreme Court because they were unhappy NCDRC order.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court ruled that the contract condition required payment of delay compensation, and that if the delay lasted more than twelve months after the end of the grace period, the allottee could terminate the contract and receive a refund of his payment. The contract condition, however, stated that the refund would be made without any interest.

The Court went on to say that the appellants’ desire to avoid the additional tax liability resulting from the implementation of the Goods and Service Tax regime could not be used against them or attributed to them as an underhanded reason for withdrawing from the agreement.

After analysing the evidence and the parties’ agreement, the court concluded that the NCDRC exceeded its authority and jurisdiction by ignoring the binding covenants in the Agreement and introducing its own logic and rationale to determine what the parties’ future course of action, particularly the appellants, should be.

The court orders the respondent-company to refund the deposited amount of Rs. 2,25,31,148 in twelve equal monthly instalments via post-dated cheques, with simple interest at 12% per annum, from the date of receipt of the amount or parts thereof until actual repayment.

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Written by – Surya Venkata Sujith

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23 Feb

Supreme court upholds taxation of enemy property , asserts it’s not property of the union

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Title: LUCKNOW NAGAR NIGAM & OTHERS VERSUS KOHLI BROTHERS COLOUR LAB. PVT. LTD. & OTHERS

Citation: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2878 OF 2024 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.17402 of 2017

Dated on: 22.2.2024

Coram: HON’BLE JUSTICE B.V NAGRATHNA & JUSTICE UJJAL BHAYUN

The Lucknow Nagar Nigam has filed an appeal against the High Court’s decision to relieve the respondent from paying property tax on enemy property vested in the Custodian under the Enemy Property Act, 1968.Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan decided the dispute and rendered the ruling.

Brief facts of the case

The lawsuit revolves around a building called House on Mahatma Gandhi Marg in Lucknow, which has historical significance as an enemy property Enemy property is defined as any property belonging to, held or managed on behalf of an enemy, an enemy subject or an enemy firm. Enemy includes any country that committed an act of aggression against India, and its citizens and companies. The property was originally owned by the Raja of Mahmudabad, who moved to Pakistan in 1947, and has since been the subject of legal contention. The property is currently occupied and used for profit by the respondent-assesses.
Historically, the Municipal Corporation assessed property taxes under Rule No. 174 ‘ka’ of the Act of 1959. However, the revelation of commercial activity on the grounds resulted in a reassessment based on capital value. This resulted in a series of legal processes, with the Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property for India declaring the property as enemy property in 2002. the taxes had to be paid to the property by the custodian.

Legal conflicts ensued between the Municipal Corporation, tenants, and the Custodian’s office. Despite efforts by the Raja’s son, Raja Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan, to secure the release of enemy properties, possession surrender orders were issued. During these procedures, in 2011, the Municipal Corporation issued a recovery notice requesting payment from the assesses.
The assesses challenged the property’s taxation and filed a writ petition requesting relief, citing the property’s status as an enemy property. In 2017, the High Court granted the writ petition, quashing the recovery order and directing representations for any prior payments paid by the respondent.

Appellants arguments

Firstly, it was argued that the property in question, while in the custody of the Custodian of Enemy Property, did not belong to the Union Government. They noted that the lack of legislation specifically stating the property as belonging to the Union Government demonstrated that the Custodian’s responsibility was restricted to management rather than ownership. They also emphasized the transient nature of the Custodian’s control over enemy possessions, implying that ownership did not rest permanently with the government. Furthermore, they invoked constitutional rules governing the acquisition of private property, arguing that the Union Government must follow due procedure and offer fair compensation if it claims possession. The appellants also contended against the applicability of Article 285 of the Constitution, claiming that it only applied to properties directly. They also used legal precedents to support their argument that concessions made by municipal governments could not bind the state against its plenary jurisdiction to raise taxes. Finally, they asked the court to overturn the High Court’s verdict in light of their arguments.

Respondents’ arguments

They Respondents maintained that the property in question, which was declared enemy property and vested in the Custodian, was immune from state taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. This immunity, they argued, was supported by judicial precedents and specific provisions of the Enemy Property Act of 1959. Furthermore, they stressed the clarity brought about by the 2017 Amendment Act on the property’s status, as well as the fact that declaring it enemy property was a legitimate exercise of police power. Overall, the respondents encouraged the court to uphold the challenged verdict, which accurately evaluated the law and facts of the case.

Court analysis and judgement

The Supreme Court ruled that enemy property vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property for India under the Enemy Property Act of 1968 did not constitute the property of the Union of India, and so is not free from state taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. The Court further ruled that the respondent, as a lessee of the enemy property, cannot claim the exemption and must pay property tax and other local taxes to the appellant, the Lucknow Nagar Nigam. The Court based their ruling on the following grounds:
The Enemy Property Act of 1968 does not transfer ownership of the enemy property to the Custodian or the Union, but rather vests the property in the Custodian for preservation and management until government decided otherwise.

The Custodian acts as a trustee or fiduciary for the enemy property, not as an owner. The Custodian cannot dispose of enemy property without the prior approval of the Central Government.
The enemy property remains the property of the enemy subject or the enemy firm unless the Central Government acquires it through a particular notification under Section 12 of the Act.
The enemy’s property does not fall under Article 285 of the Constitution, which exempts Union property from state taxation. Article 285 only applies to property owned by the Union, not property vested in the Union or its officers for a specified purpose.

The responder, as a private person and not an agency of the Union, is not entitled to the benefits of Article 285 and must pay local taxes in accordance with municipal legislation. The respondent cannot avoid tax duty by claiming that he occupies enemy property as the Custodian’s lessee. As a result, the contested HC order was reversed, allowing the appellant to levy taxes beginning with the current fiscal year. No refunds for previously paid taxes were issued to ensure conformity with applicable regulations.

Written by- Namitha Ramesh

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23 Feb

Supreme Court Endorses Existing Government Initiatives, Declines Mandate for Community Kitchens

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Title: ARUN DHAWAN V UNION OF INDIA

Citation: WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1103 OF 2019

Dated on: 22.2.2024

Coram: HON’BLE JUSTICE BELA MTRIVEDHI AND JUSTICE PANKAJ MITTHAL

The Supreme Court decision made by Justices Bela Mtrivedhi and Justice Pankaj Mitthal of India on a writ suit filed by certain social activists seeking directives to adopt the concept of Community Kitchens to battle hunger, malnutrition, and starvation in the country. The Court considered the different initiatives and programs undertaken by the Central and State Governments under the National Food Security Act of 2013, which aims to provide food and nutritional security to the people, and delivered directives accordingly.

Brief facts of the case

The issue arose from a petition under Article 32, which asked the Supreme Court to direct States and Union Territories to establish Community Kitchens to combat hunger. Despite court orders, governments defended existing projects such as the Poshan Abhiyan, underlining their commitment to combating malnutrition and famine. The central government mentioned measures like the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana and the National Food Security Act of 2013 (NFSA). The petitioners proposed a constitutional duty to maintain fundamental sustainability. The petitioners also sought orders against the National Legal Services Authority for developing a scheme under Article 50(1)A of the Constitution and against the Central Government for establishing a National Food Grid beyond the boundaries of the Public Distribution Scheme.

The governments stated that there had been no reported deaths from famine or malnutrition, emphasizing their commitment to fighting these challenges through current programs. The petitioners contended that, while governments had established numerous plans, they still owed a constitutional duty to secure the basic survival of human life, regardless of whether hunger, malnutrition, or famine resulted in death.

Court Analysis and Judgement

The Supreme Court ruled that, despite the petitioners’ claims and the court’s previous directions, states would not be required to install Community Kitchens. The court noted the comprehensive framework given by the National Food Security Act of 2013 (NFSA), which aims to secure food and nutritional security using a rights-based approach.
It mentioned the many programs already in place, such as Poshan Abhiyan, Mid-Day Meal, and others, which were created to combat hunger and malnutrition. The court recognized the national and state governments’ attempts to execute these initiatives.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the NFSA offers a strong legislative framework for providing food security and nutritional support. It left space for states to explore.

Written by- Namitha Ramesh

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22 Feb

Supreme Court Affirms Application of Limitation Act in Criminal Appeals: Upholds Revocation of Acquittal Despite Delay

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Title: MOHD ABAAD ALI & ANR VDIRECTORATE OF REVENUE PROSECUTION INTELLIGENCE

Citation: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 2052 OF 2017)

Dated on: 20.2.2024

Corum: HON’BLE JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA & JUSTICE PRASANNA BHALACHANDRA VARALE

The Supreme Court decision was delivered by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale in a criminal appeal filed by the appellants, who were acquitted of charges under the Customs Act of 1962 by the trial court but faced a belated appeal by the respondent, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, challenging their acquittal.

Brief Facts

In the present case the appellant found himself in a legal battle after being acquitted in a case brought under Section 135(1)(b) (offenses related to evasion of duty or prohibitions) of the Customs Act, 1962. After being exonerated by the Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi, on October 6, 2012, the appellant’s reprieve was brief. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, displeased with the verdict, filed an appeal against the acquittal on June 27, 2013. However, this appeal was plagued by a 72-day delay, causing the appellant to seek condonation for the delay, which the Delhi High Court approved on May 18, 2016. Resilient, the appellant filed a legal challenge under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to have the ruling recalled. His argument was based on the claim that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to appeals against acquittals, citing the self-contained nature of Section 378(5) of the CrPC, which defines the term for filing such appeals. Despite this plea, the Delhi High Court dismissed the application summarily on January 20, 2017, without stating any substantive reasons.

Court analysis

The Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which deals with the extending of the stipulated term in specific circumstances) to appeals against acquittals under Section 378 of the CrPC. The Court contrasted the precedent established in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh from subsequent decisions such as Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Court noted that Section 5 applies under the present CrPC and the Limitation Act of 1963, unless expressly excluded by the special statute. It also dismissed arguments based on instances such as Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain and Mishra and Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar which exclusively dealt with s.5 ‘s applicability.

Written by- Namitha Ramesh

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22 Feb

Supreme court upholds revocation of college principals resignation, grants employment entitlements

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Title: DR. MRS SUMAN V JIAN Vs MARWADI SAMMELAN THROUGH ITS SECRETARY AND OTHERS.

Citation: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1480 OF 2012

Dated on: 20.2.2024

Corum: HON’BLE JUSTICE J.K. MAHESWARI & JUSTICE K.V VISWANATH

The current verdict from the Supreme Court of India concerns a civil appeal filed by Dr. Mrs. Suman V. Jain, the principal of a trust-run college. Dr. Jain had filed her resignation, effective on a future date, citing health grounds. She attempted to rescind her resignation before it became effective. The Trust denied Dr. Jain’s request to retract her resignation, forcing her to file an appeal with the Supreme Court heard by the two-judge bench by Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice KV Vishwanath.

Brief Facts of the case

In 1992, the appellant was appointed Principal of B.M. Ruia Girls and G.D. Birla Girls Colleges. Following a change in management in 1998, the appellant claimed interference and inappropriate statements from a new appointment. In 2003, the appellant, who was upset by the circumstances, wrote a complaint letter with coworkers but later removed it. Following charges of financial irregularities and indiscipline against her, the appellant resigned for health reasons, effective September 2003. The Trust President informed her of a thorough investigation by a Fact-Finding Committee and directed her to go on leave, with an officiating Principal. Three days later, the President sought his unequivocal resignation. The letter that said:

“If you want to resign unconditionally of your own volition with immediate effect and settle the controversy on this footing, the management can perhaps consider your request to drop the enquiry subject to affirmation of managing committee. Your resignation with effect from 24.09.2003 is not acceptable to the management. Six months’ notice can be waived on both sides in view of the present situation is not mandatory. If you are not willing to resign unconditionally with immediate effect, it is your choice. If you want to resign with immediate effect, the management may perhaps be persuaded to drop the proposed enquiry in larger interest of the institute. If no reply is received from you within 48 hours from receipt of this letter, the management shall take appropriate action in the matter as deemed fit.”

Further Dr. Mrs. Suman V. Jain, the appellant, requested that her resignation be accepted on a future date, citing medical reasons and adherence to government notice procedures. Despite her plea, management accepted her resignation with six months’ notice, effective the requested date. The appellant’s subsequent letter addressed false charges but did not acknowledge her resignation terms. The courts found no proof that the resignation was filed to evade an investigation, and the appellant’s requests for a future retirement were not agreed upon by management, resulting in a disagreement over acceptance terms.

Court analysis and judgement

The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted the appeal and overturned the decisions of the College Tribunal and the High Court, which had dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the rejection of her resignation. The court determined that the appellant’s resignation was a prospective or possible resignation that may be revoked at any moment before it became effective, unless there was a contrary regulation or contract. The court further determined that the trust’s acceptance of the resignation was unilateral and did not constitute an implied agreement or understanding with the appellant. The court distinguished Rev. Oswald’s case, which had been relied on by the lower courts, as not appropriate to the facts of this case. The Hon’ble justice JK Maheswari while delivering the judgement ordered the trust to regularize the appellant’s service period from the date of acceptance of resignation to the date of entering the new college as principal, and to count it as time spent on duty for all reasons, including pension. The court, however, denied the petitioner any back earnings or income for that period since she had not worked for the trust. The court further ordered the trust not to take any departmental action against the appellant in response to previous complaints.

Written by- Namitha Ramesh

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