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The case of the department appeared to be that office value was nothing but it was the value of the goods indicated in the transport permit granted from time to time. Such an opinion was held by The Hon’ble High Court Of Tripura before The Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Akil Kureshi and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.G. Chattopadhyay regarding the case of  ITC Limited vs. . The State of Tripura and Ors [W.P.(C) No. 340 of 2021]. 

The facts of the case were related to a challenge made by the petitioner against the order dated 26.02.2021 passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Agartala. A sum of Rs.1,18,79,583/- was demanded by way of unpaid taxes with interest and penalty for the assessment year 2015-16 under Tripura Value Added Tax Act. Another order dated 23rd March 2021 was also challenged by the petitioner. It seemed the petitioner challenged these orders on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice. Further, it appeared in the first half of 23rd November 2020 no one was present on behalf of the petitioner before the Assessing Officer. Moreover, the Assessing Officer had other commitments due to which the hearing could not be conducted. The petitioner was sent many notices regarding new dates of hearing but nobody participated from their side. The Assessing Officer had no choice and concluded the hearing upon which the impugned order of assessment was passed. 

The advocate representing the Government contended that the proposal of hearing of assessment proceedings was not mentioned in the rules under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act. Hence, the Assessing Officer had no facility for conducting the same. Furthermore, the petitioner stated that his representative was present during the hearing dated 23.11.2020 before the Assessing Officer, which the officer didn’t deny. Also, the officer did not conclude the proceedings on 23.11.2020. It was found strange that the company suddenly abandoned the assessment proceedings and incurred the risk of substantial ex-parte liability after duly attending all previous hearings. The Hon’ble Court stated “In a given case, we will examine the provisions under the relevant statute more closely and will also take into account the viewpoint of the administration in resisting such virtual hearings. In the present case, however, in the interest of justice, we would permit such virtual hearing.” The Court also stated that it revoked the very order due to inadequate hearing, so to examine the legality of the case was unnecessary. 

Thus,  The Hon’ble High Court Of Tripura after considering all the submissions stated that “… he assessment proceedings are revived and restored to file of the Assessing Officer. To avoid any confusion regarding intimation of the date of next hearing, it is provided that such hearing shall take place before the Assessing Officer on 8th November, 2021 at 11 am if so convenient to the Assessing Officer… The petitioner shall not ask for adjournment of the hearing. If, however, the Assessing Officer requires the hearing to take place on some other day in addition to the hearing of 8th November, 2021 it would be open for him to do the same so however, that the subsequent hearing shall also take place virtually in the same manner provided above… The assessment shall be framed afresh latest by 28th February, 2022… Petition disposed of accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.”

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Judgment reviewed by Bipasha Kundu

The election can be questioned only on the ground that the election has not been free election by reason that corrupt practice or bribery or undue influence has extensively prevailed in that election and that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination as held by the High Court of J&K through the learned bench of Hon’ble Chief Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Rajnesh Oswal in the case of Farooq Ahmed Vs State of J&K and others [LPA No. 259 of 2019].

The  Appeal was been filed on the grounds that as per sub rule 4 of Rule 36 of the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (hereinafter “the Rules”).

The brief facts are that the election was held for the post of Panch in ward No. 10, Panchayat Halqa, District Poonch under the supervision of respondent No. 6. The total votes polled were 100 out of which 02 votes were declared invalid as per rules. Farooq Ahmed, the appellant herein received 49 votes, Mohd Younis-respondent No. 5 got 48 votes and Mushtaq Ahmed got one vote only. Respondent No. 5 filed an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Poonch, and respondent No. 4. The appellant filed his response to the appeal before respondent No. 4 and denied all the allegations leveled by respondent No. 5 in the appeal. Respondent No. 4 without hearing the appellant, passed an order dated 15.07.2019 for recounting of the votes without assigning any reason and fixed the date for recounting of votes on 31.07.2019.

The appellant impugned the order dated 15.07.2019 as being illegal and arbitrary contrary to the provisions of section 43 of the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989 (for short the Act) but the learned Single Judge vide order dated 26.07.2019 dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner-appellant. Hence, this appeal was filed.

Learned counsel for the appellant, Sh. Ajay Singh Kotwal has vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge has not considered that the appeal of respondent No. 5 before respondent No. 4 was misconceived, particularly in view of section 43 of the Act and further that the narrow margin of the victory could never have been a ground for upholding the order of recounting passed by the appellate authority-respondent No. 4.

Sh. D. C. Raina, learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents has vehemently submitted that the appellate authority has the power to pass all the orders as per Rule 43 of the Panchayati Raj Rules and also that it includes order with regard to the recounting of the votes as well.

After hearing both the sides, the hon’ble court was of the view that “The victory margin being narrow could not have been a ground for issuing order of recounting of votes in absence of any finding with regard to existence of any of the grounds prescribed by section 43 of the Act.”

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Judgment Reviewed by – Aryan Bajaj

 The mandatory compliances that had to be followed to move a motion of no confidence (NC) against the Chairman (CHMN) or Deputy Chairman (DC) of Panchayat Samiti were laid down in the recent judgment of Sau. Pranaya & Anr. v. The Collector Chandrapur & Ors. [WP. Stamp no. 8394 of 2020], dated 25^th September 2020 by the Coram of Justice R.K. Deshpande and Justice Pushpa V. Ganediwala.

The facts of the case mostly initiate with the test in this petition is to the ‘no-confidence motion which was passed in Special Meeting dated 14-7-2020 by the Panchayat Samiti Nagbhid, Taluka Nagbhid, District Chandrapur against the petitioners, who are the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti, Nagbhid.

In this judgement, it had been stated in sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, that such requisition has to be delivered to the Collector or it is to be sent to him by the registered post acknowledgement due.  It is the Collector under sub-section (3) therein who has to call a meeting within seven days from the date of requisition. However, in this present case the requisition was not delivered personally to the Collector nor was it sent to him by the registered post acknowledgement due. It is urged that the requisition was delivered in the present case, to the Deputy Collector/Deputy District Election Officer, Chandrapur on 2-7-2020 and the meeting was called on that basis by the Collector by issuing notice dated 3-7-2020, thus it was the issue of the law and fact which was disputed.

Along with it, Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads Presiding Authorities (No Confidence Motion) Rules, 1962 states the manner in which requisition should be made. Thus the established law states that Sub-section (2) of Section 72 read with Rule 3, reproduced above, makes it clear that the requisition is required to be delivered personally to the Collector or it is required to be sent by the registered post acknowledgement due. The issue is sensitive and hence these aspects are very significant.

However, it had been held that “It is an undisputed position that the motion of no-confidence was delivered to the Deputy Collector/Deputy District Election Officer, Chandrapur who has made an endorsement “please put as per rules”, the requisition is not delivered to the Collector, and it was also not sent by registered post acknowledgement due. The calling of the meeting to pass ‘no-confidence motion is, therefore, in total contravention of the aforesaid mandatory provisions. The same, therefore, cannot be sustained.”

As the learned judges had also stated that “In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the following order is passed : (1) The motion of ‘no-confidence’ passed against the petitioners in a special meeting of Panchayat Samiti, Nabhid on 14-7-2020, is hereby quashed and set aside. (2) The petitioners are directed to be restored in the office. The rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.”

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Judgement reviewed by-Sarita Kumari

Courts do not have the right to change the name of their respective court – Allahabad High Court

While squashing the plea to rename the Court as Prayagraj High Court or Uttar Pradesh High Court held that in a constitutional democracy, all organs of the State, i.e. executive, legislature and judiciary, are required to act and performed their respective functions within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of India held by Justice Pankaj Kumar Jaiswal and Justice Dinesh Kumar Singh in the case of Asok Pande Vs UOI [PIL Civil No 14171 of 2020].

The State Government changed the name of the city of Allahabad to Prayagraj on 16 October 2018 and, in this backdrop, this petition has been filed by an advocate.

The Court briefly discussed the history of setting up this Court. East India Company, which was incorporated by Charter of 1600, got amalgamated with English East India Company. In due course, the East India Company conquered vast territory and became the Ruler. The East India Company strengthened its hold on the native Indians. First major freedom movement exposed the vulnerability of the East India Company which led the Queen to issue a proclamation in the year 1858 and the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, 1858. Consequently, the East India Company and its affairs were taken over by the British Government. The British Government wanted to establish judicial institutions for rendering better justice to alleviate the corrupt practice in the judicial system.

For the aforesaid purpose, the British Parliament passed ‘Indian High Courts Act, 1961’. Under this Act, provisions were made not only for the replacement of the Supreme Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and for the establishment of High Courts in their places, but also for the establishment of High Court by Letter Patent in any part of other Majesty’s territories, not already included in the jurisdiction of any other High Court.

The Court further reflected that “In 1864, the Secretary of State for India asked the Governor-General in council ‘to take into your consideration the question of establishing High Court in the North-Western Provinces and furnish me with your opinion on the subject at an early date as practicable. Four years later from the establishment of three High Courts in Presidency Towns, on 16^th March 1866, the High Court of Judicature for the North-Western Provinces came into existence under Letters Patent, replacing the only Sudder Diwani Adalat and Nizamut Adalat. Letters Patent, as subsequently amended, are the present Charter of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Aforesaid Charter conferred jurisdiction upon newly formed High Court in respect of Civil, Criminal, Testamentary and Interstate as well as Matrimonial matters. The first sitting of High Court took place at Agra in 1866, but in 1868 it was shifted to Allahabad.”

In 1902, a new name to two Provinces was given i.e. ‘United Province of Agra and Oudh’. It became ‘Uttar Pradesh’ in1950 under the United Provinces (Alteration of Name) Order, 1950. By Government of India Act, 1915-1919, the name of ‘High Court for the North-Western Provinces’ was changed to ‘High Court of Judicature at Allahabad’. All the enactments have now been consolidated and repealed by the provisions of the Constitution of India which came into force on 26^th January 1950.

The Court held that “With the aforesaid historical backdrop, it is evident that High Court of Allahabad was created by Royal Charter. Initially, it was called as ‘High Court of Judicature for North Western Provinces’ which had the area of aforesaid Province but Oudh was a different Province, not governed by North-Western Provinces. ‘High Court of Judicature for North Western Provinces’ subsequently became ‘High Court of Judicature at Allahabad’.”

The Court further reiterated that, “Article 225 of the Constitution of India deals with the High Court, existing at the time of enacting the Constitution of India, which allowed the existing High Court to continue with respective powers as were exercising immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. Article 215 provides that there shall be a High Court for each State. Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.”

By the aforesaid provision, the court interjected that “By virtue of Article 372 until and unless the Parliament amends the amalgamation order, the name of the high court, which is ‘High Court of Judicature at Allahabad’ cannot be changed.”

High Court held that “The Courts cannot direct the Legislature to enact a particular law and, therefore, this Court finds that the present writ petition is nothing but a ‘publicity stunt litigation’ which has been filed to get some publicity.”

Finally, the petition has been dismissed, but Court refrained from imposing cost as the petitioner was none other than a practising Advocate of this Court.

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Judgement reviewed by-Sarita Kumari

The substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well, and also the same was held in the judgement passed by a single bench judge comprising HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TASHI RABSTAN, in the matter Mohammad Yaqoob Lone and V. Hamidullah Lone and others, dealt with an issue mentioned above.

A civil suit i.e Annexure-II to the writ petition, titled Hamidullah Lone and others vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Lone and others have been filed by the respondents before the Trial Court, in which they state that the respondents and petitioner no.1 herein are the real brothers and are the owners in joint possession of the land measuring 47 Kanals and 17 Marlas. It is maintained by the respondents in their plaint that petitioner no.1 herein is issueless, without having a wife and was, therefore, residing with his brother, i.e., plaintiff no.3.

It is also contended by the respondents in their civil suit that in the year 2019, petitioner no.1 changed his residence from respondent no.3 to the house of his sister, namely, Mst. Zarafa W/o Nazir Ahmad and taking undue advantage of this position, Mst. Zarafa and her husband, during the lockdown in August 2019, managed two documents consecutively.

According to the plaintiffs/respondents, the suit land included the land mentioned in the documents also, is joint and unpartitioned as no legal partition of the suit land by metes and bounds have taken place in between the parties to date and in this way, the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 are the co-owners/co-sharers of the suit land under law, and also the defendants have started the preparations to raise the construction on the land in such a way which will not only oust the plaintiffs from the joint possession of suit land but also devalue the rest portion of the land falling under Survey No.209 as they are trying to raise the constructions on the best portion of the land.

It was also been mentioned by the defendants/petitioners in their written statement that in the year 2009, the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 had decided to partition the leftover property of their father, 7 CM(M) No.127/2021 CM No.5797/2021 Ramzan Lone, privately in metes and bounds with the consent of each shareholder, Objections to the interim applications had also been filed by the petitioners/defendants before the Trial Court.

Mr M. A. Qayoom, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has stated that merely because a party has a prima facie case, the temporary injunction cannot be granted by the court unless the party 12 CM(M) No.127/2021 CM No.5797/2021 seeking injunction satisfies the court as to the balance of convenience as well as irreparable loss and injury, being caused to the party.

Learned counsel for the petitioners also states that while considering the application for grant of injunction, the court has to consider the conduct of the parties and if the party has approached the court with unclean hands and has suppressed the material facts, it is not entitled to grant of injunction. He, in support of his contentions, has placed reliance on Jai Singh & Ors vs. Gurmej Singh, 2009 (15) SCC 747; Skyline Education Institute (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. S. L. Vaswani, AIR 13 CM(M) No.127/2021 CM No.5797/2021 2010 SC 3221;

The court perused the facts and argument’s presented, it believed that- “the High Court was not justified in permitting the respondent therein to change the nature of the property by putting up the construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property whatever may be the condition on which the same is done since in the event plaintiff‘s claim being found baseless, ultimately it was always open to the respondent to claim damages or inappropriate case, the court may itself award damages for the loss suffered. 19 CM(M) No.127/2021 CM No.5797/2021 If that being the position, the Appellate Court, in the present case, has been right to set aside the Trial Court order and grant interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. 22. Because of the aforesaid analysis, the writ petition at hand lacks in merit and is, accordingly, dismissed with connected CM”.

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Judgment Reviewed by; Mandira BS