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Any unregistered document cannot be looked into by the court and be relied upon on or taken into evidence in view of Section 17(1A) read with Section 49 of the Registration Act. The benefit of Section 53A could be given if and only if the alleged Agreement to Sell cum receipt satisfies the provisions of Section 17(1) A of the Registration Act. These were stated by High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Subramonium Prasad in the case of Joginder Tuli vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. [W.P.(CRL) 1006/2020] on 17.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that the petitioner entered into an Agreement to Sell with one Ravinder Kumar Chugh (now deceased) for purchase of one shop for the sum of Rs.7,20,000. It is stated that the possession of the said property was not handed over to him because the family of Ravinder Kumar Chugh (since deceased) had entered into a collaboration agreement with a builder named M/s Rock Contractors Private Limited and that the said Rock Contractors Private Limited did not construct the said premises. The petitioner entered into Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the said Ravinder Kumar Chugh. The MoU notes that the vacant possession of the property has been handed over to the petitioner. It is stated that after an altercation took place, the police came to the scene of disturbance and asked the Petitioner to show the title documents of the property and the Petitioner supplied the title documents to the Police to demonstrate that he had purchased the property from one Ravinder Singh Chugh. The petitioner mentioned that the property was sealed following the orders of the monitoring committee constituted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the property was de-sealed by the order of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (in short ‘MCD’). The Petitioner wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Delhi Police alleging that he was threatened and was spoken to in a derogatory language at the Police Station. The Petitioner urged the Commissioner of Police to lodge an FIR against K.L. Bakshi’s representatives under Sections 294, 504 and 506 IPC as he was being threatened by them.

The Counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner had entered into an Agreement to Sell and that the possession of the property could not be handed over because the property was under construction. An MoU was entered into between the petitioner and Ravinder Kumar Chugh for which he paid full consideration of the amount and further the vacant possession of the property was handed over to the petitioner. It was submitted that he was called to the police station frequently despite submitting the relevant documents concerning the property. Further, the police have not taken the offenders into custody and that three Investigating Officers have been changed in the matter so far and every newly appointed I.O. asks for the same property papers repeatedly. It was contended that action should be taken against the police official for restraining him from entering his own premises.

The Counsel for the respondent stated that the petitioner was asked to produce the documents and he took some time for producing the documents. She stated that instead of producing the documents, he filed a complaint. She further submitted that other than an unstamped and unregistered MoU, there was nothing to show that the petitioner was in possession of the property. She also stated that no MCD tax receipts, electricity bills or details of payment of rent by tenant etc. was shown by the petitioner to show his possession of the area. It was contended that in the absence of any possession, there is no necessity of conducting any vigilance inquiry. It was also stated that in any event, the property subsequently has been sold to some other person and the building has been demolished.

The High Court of Delhi held that in order to give benefits of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the document relied upon must be a registered document. Any unregistered document cannot be looked into by the court and cannot be relied upon on or taken into evidence in view of Section 17(1A) read with Section 49 of the Registration Act. Thus, benefit of Section 53A could have been given to the respondent, if and only if the alleged Agreement to Sell cum receipt satisfied the provisions of Section 17(1) A of the Registration Act. Had the petitioner been in lawful possession, he definitely would have filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act within six months. The Court stated that the present petition looked like an attempt by the petitioner to get the possession of the property and to get over the limitation for filing the suit. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed with the above observations along with pending applications.

Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

The object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at the time of trial. A person who has never been convicted should only be kept in custody if there are reasons to believe that he might flee from justice or tamper with the evidence or threaten the witnesses. If there is no apprehension of interference in administration of justice then the Court should be circumspect while considering depriving the accused of their personal liberty. Mere vague belief that the accused may thwart the investigation cannot be a ground to prolong the incarceration of the accused. These were stated by High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Subramonium Prasad in the case of Sunder Singh Bhati vs. The State [BAIL APPLN. 3750/2021] on 17.01.2022.

Facts of the case are that the Complainant had received a message and an email from the Company (SMP IMPEX Pvt. Ltd.) stating that if he invested his money, they would give him a 200% return within 1 year. The Directors, Dr. Saroj Mahapatra and Rajesh Mahto called the Complainant and told him about the Company explaining their plans to expand it on the lines of Uber/Ola. They told the Complainant that the Company was registered with RBI and SEBI. It is stated that after much insistence, the Complainant invested Rs. 9,00,000. Further, the Complainant’s friends, namely Rajesh Kumar, Rajender Singh, Yogender Singh, Umed Singh, Ajay, Sunil also invested Rs. 15 to 20 lakhs. It was stated that on the 10th of every month they would receive instalment, however, after the first two months, no instalment was made. The Complainant was informed that he would get the third instalment by 15th of the month, i.e. 15th March, however, the third instalment was not made. On calling the Company, a clip was showed to Complainant from social media showcasing that the Company’s accounts have been frozen. The Complainant and many others were defrauded of their money so a complaint was filed on the basis of which the instant FIR was registered. The Petitioner in BAIL APPLN. was declared absconder/proclaimed offender and was arrested. Anticipatory bail application was dismissed under Section 437 Cr.P.C. as infructuous.

The learned Counsel for Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner was languishing in jail since 09.12.2020. He submitted that no recovery was made from the Petitioner or at the instance of the Petitioner, and that, therefore, there is no link tying the Petitioner to the alleged scam. The Petitioner is neither an authorized signatory nor a director of the accused Company, and that there is nothing to suggest that the Petitioner was associated with the accused Company. He stated that several of the alleged victims received up to 40- 50% of their invested amount within a month which buttressed the fact that early investors had received significant returns from the accused Company. He argued that it is not rational to assume that Petitioner would induce his own relatives to invest in a scheme if he possessed the intention to scam people. It was submitted that the essential ingredient for invoking both Sections 406 and 409 IPC is entrustment and there is no evidence which suggests that the Petitioner had ever been entrusted with any money or property. He further submitted that there is hardly any complaint which ascribes a distinct role to the Petitioner, therefore, the Petitioner is liable to be granted regular bail.

The learned Counsel for respondent submitted that the instant case involves the cheating of a large-scale of money with total investors surpassing 900 and the amount cheated being Rs. 14 crores. She vehemently opposes the instant bail application, stating that the Petitioner in BAIL.  It was further submitted that the Petitioner was a direct recipient of the cheated amount through his relatives and that Rs. 1.59 crores approximately and had previously been declared PO and never joined investigation despite several notices being issued to him. She submitted that there are many statements of witnesses/complainants under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that specifically name the Petitioner and state that he took active part in the meetings/representations for inducement. She submitted that there is no evidence to indicate that the Petitioner had induced the investors and concocted lies about RBI authorization. Further, the Counsel submitted that the Petitioner was merely a non-executive director and that he only received Rs. 11 lakhs, which was his remuneration, out of the alleged cheated amount of Rs. 250 crores. The Petitioner was the beneficiary of the cheated amount, and that a perusal of the bank replies indicates that he was also the authorized signatory of the bank accounts of the accused Company and took active part in the dayto-day affairs of the accused Company.

The High Court of Delhi held that the magnitude of the offence cannot be the only criterion for denial of bail. The object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at the time of trial and this object is neither punitive nor preventative, and a person who has not been convicted should only be kept in custody if there are reasons to believe that they might flee from justice or tamper with the evidence or threaten the witnesses. If there is no apprehension of interference in administration of justice in a criminal trial by an accused then the Court should be circumspect while considering depriving the accused of their personal liberty. Mere vague belief that the accused may thwart the investigation cannot be a ground to prolong the incarceration of the accused. The Court, therefore, held that continued custody of the Petitioners is no longer required. Accordingly, both the bail applications were disposed of.

Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

The issue whether medical professionals can be protected if they commit bonafide errors in their actions similar to public servants was decided upon by the a bench of Karnataka High Court consisting of  Justice Krishna S Dixit in the matters between Dr Ganesh Nayak v. V Shamanna WP No.21688 oF 2009 decided on 14.1 2022.

The facts of the case are that by an order dated 7.5.2009, the Karnataka Medical Council had issued a warning to petitioner Dr. Ganesh Nayak for alleged professional malfeasance, namely certain procedural violations in performing angioplasty on a 65-year-old woman named Smt.Yellamma. This was challenged before the High Court.

The counsel on behalf of the petitioners contended this patient has diabetes, neuropathy, nephropathy etc. It was stated that he suffered from various ailments and was treated at different times by different doctors in different hospitals, but the case was brought only to him. Others were not notified of the reason for the show cause. It was alleged that the patient was already 65 years old and suffered from the natural ailments of a shortened life expectancy, and in old age it was natural that some diseases came and remained as inevitable guests.The patient also suffered from a condition in which the functioning of the heart was affected, which increased the probability of death, furthermore the records show that the patient had a long-standing significant problem with the Cardio Vascular Vein and therefore, angiography was done by the petitioner. However, medical records show that the cause of death was a serious bacterial infection. It was later transmitted. There is a big time difference between Angioplasty performed by the petitioner and the death of the patient.There is nothing to indicate that the alleged lack of professional service resulted in death by accelerating deterioration of health. There is no connection or reasonable connection between these and the actions of the petitioner and the death of the patient.

The counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that no counsel appeared for the respondents, however, the court noted that “absence of the counsel cannot interdict the disposal of this decade old case on merits, without unnecessarily prolonging its pendency.”

The Karnataka High Court held that most cases of medical negligence are initiated recklessly by patients and their relatives in hopes of making quick money. The motivation for those suing for medical negligence is complex, with some suing for money, others sue to plead guilty and others do it to avoid repeating mistakes.The court said the “culture of compensation” acquired in other jurisdictions is increasingly entering the realm of medical services in our society, affecting a healthy doctor and patient relationship. How doctors and paramedics have served our society during the COVID pandemic will not be erased from the public’s memory, and the community should gratefully appreciate the valuable services provided by healthcare professionals.Doctors, like any other professional, is a profession that should be focused towards the motto of service, not profit, and they are obviously not exempted from legal action for medical negligence.

Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar

Dr. Ganesh Nayak -KHC- WP21688-09-14-01-2022

The issue whether intercepted audios and messages can be considered as admissible evidence before the court was dealt by a bench of Delhi High Court consisting of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh in the matters between Jatinder Pal Singh v CBI CRL. MC. 3118/2012 decided on 17.1.2022.

The facts of the case are Singh being intermediary to Ketan Desai, then chairman of the Medical Council of India (MCI),paying a bribe of Rs. 2 crores and it was alleged that there were deficiencies in the 4^th Batch admission process of MBBS at a medical school in Patiala.They seek that the court set aside the 10-year-old order of a special CBI Judge of special court framing charges against Singh, under the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as section 120B of IPC which is punishment for criminal conspiracy. Petitioners appealed to the Delhi High Court.

The petitioners argued that the phone calls on which CBI’s case was based were illegally intercepted and recorded and were never sent for forensic analysis. The petition said the CBI was based on assumptions and assumptions in the talks. It was said that the MCI Rules were not violated and the alleged ₹2 crore bribe was money from the sale of a property. Statement of expense filed by CBI in breach because he had never obtained permission from the Director of the CBI necessary to prosecute a government official.

The respondents argued that the arguments advanced by the petitioners are not appropriate at this stage where charges were faramed only based upon probability of commission of offence, these should be brought up at the stage of final argument.Evidence of the approver has been taken only after following procedure under the code and he has inculpated himself in regard to his confessions so, approver has definitely incriminated himself.The circumstances and evidences recovered during investigation indicate guilt of petitioners and no gross illegality in trial court’s order warranting intervention of this court under revisional jurisdiction.

The Delhi High Court held that allowing illegally tapped messages and voice calls as evidence would be arbitrary and encourage violations of citizens’ fundamental rights. According to Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, a cease and desist order may only be issued in the event of an emergency or in the interest of public safety, according to the law established by the Supreme Court at PUCL. The chief defendant in the case, Ketan Desai, had already been released, and as no public official was involved in the alleged conspiracy, prosecution under the PC Act is null and void. The Court’s order to authorize the Minister of the Interior to wiretap phone calls, framed under the Telegraph Act pursuant to section 419A of the Rules, shall be forwarded to the examining committee within seven days of the order’s passing. However, in this case, no record was found to prove that any investigation was carried out on the order of the Minister of the Interior. The court ruled that the statement was not valid. moreover, it is not possible for the public official accused of taking bribes to be released, and for the public official accused of taking bribes to be prosecuted.Hence, the petition was allowed and the special court’s order was set aside.

Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar

Jatinder_Pal_Singh_v_CBI

The plaintiff sent the photograph of the summon through WhatsApp, hence the Delhi High Court set aside an order that was passed by commercial court that issued a show cause notice of criminal contempt. The following order was passed by Hon’ble Justice Amit Bansal while dealing with a plea that challenged the order of commercial court in the case of ICICI BANK V. RASHMI SHARMA[CM(M) 36/2022.

In the present case, the accused person sent the photograph of the summon to the person who was summoned through WhatsApp, on this subject the commercial court initiated criminal contempt proceedings against the accused. The accused hence filed a writ petition under article 226 impugning the order dated 02.12.2021 that was passed by the district judge at Tis Hazari court for criminal proceedings for sending summons over WhatsApp and in this case the other party had not received any summon from the side of the court even after the plaintiff paying all the required fees. The commercial court on this subject held that this is nothing but “overreaching the judicial system” and said no party can start their own “parallel system”.

Delhi High Court on this matter “In the considered view of this Court, there was no occasion at all for the Commercial Court to issue show cause notice for initiating criminal contempt against the plaintiff. Just because the photograph of the summons was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant through WhatsApp cannot amount to overreaching the judicial system or running a parallel system with the judicial system. The aforesaid observations were completely uncalled for”. The Delhi High Court also gave the reasoning that especially when the plaintiff had paid the fees and taken all the steps for ensuring the summons is also sent through ordinary method such proceedings cannot take place. The court further observed “There is nothing malafide in the same and it cannot be said that that was an attempt to overreach the judicial proceedings. It was not that the plaintiff had sought to send the summons through WhatsApp in substitution of the ordinary service to the defendant” hence setting aside the commercial court order.

Further on the subject of commercial court’s jurisdiction to pass such an order the Delhi High Court observed “A subordinate court can only make a reference to the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings. Therefore, the impugned order is clearly in excess of jurisdiction vested with the commercial court” so it also held that the court was not even empowered to pass such orders.

In such cases what we should see is whether the accused tried to stop the administration of justice or not, because if the accused has taken all the required steps to get the summon served and as an additional measure to get the summon served sent a photo of it via WhatsApp then how is the administration of justice being hindered. Further in line with the judgment of Dr. Prodip Kumar Biswas V. Subrata Das and Ors. the Supreme Court also observed that proceedings for criminal contempt can be initiated only when the act prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the course of judicial proceeding or administration of justice.

click here to read the judgment

Judgment Reviewed by Meenakshi Jena