A tenant can be given protection under Delhi Rent Control Act from eviction only where the jurial relationship of tenant and landlord is not disputed. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act, which gives protection to a tenant against eviction, clearly shows that this protection is available only to the person who is undisputedly a tenant and does not claim himself to be the owner of the premises. The moment a person refuses the title of the landlord and claims title in himself he ceases to be a tenant in the eyes of law and the protection of Delhi Rent Control Act is not available to him. These were stated by High Court of Delhi consisting, Justice Amit Bansal in the case of Indra Kumari (deceased) vs. Bimla Rani (deceased) [CM(M) 964/2019] on 25.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that the demised premises were let out by the deceased landlady, Lt. Smt. Indira Kumari by way of rent deed in favour of Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna, the deceased husband of Lt. Smt. Bimla Rani. After the death of Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna in 1995, the tenancy devolved upon Lt. Smt. Bimla Rani and other legal heirs of Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna. Since rent in respect of the demised premises was not paid by the tenant to the landlady with effect from July, 1995, a legal notice was served by the landlady upon the legal heirs of deceased Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna. The said notice was duly replied wherein the factum of tenancy was admitted. On 3rd September, 1997 the deceased landlady filed eviction petitions before the Rent Controller under Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act against the legal heirs of Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna.

 The Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the landlady had entered into an agreement to sell in respect of the demised premises and therefore, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further contended that in 1998, the deceased landlady filed a criminal complaint against the tenants and chargesheet in respect thereof has been filed before the competent Court. In the said criminal proceedings, the police also filed report of the FSL which shows that the signature of deceased landlady has been forged on the agreement to sell and other documents relied upon by the tenants.

The Counsel for the respondent submitted that the tenants purchased the demised premises from the deceased landlady by their predecessor Lt. Sh. Manmohan Singh Sarna vide agreement to sell and all the ingredients of Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act have been proved by the landlord and that the respondent is entitled to recovery of arrears of rent from July, 1995 till date of the judgment of the Rent Controller as also of future rent till the date of eviction the tenants from the demised premises.

The High Court of Delhi held that a tenant has been given protection under Delhi Rent Control Act from eviction only where the jurial relationship of tenant and landlord was not disputed and the tenant claims himself to be the tenant and not the owner. A perusal of Section 14, which gives protection to a tenant against eviction, clearly shows that this protection is available only to the person who is undisputedly a tenant and does not claim himself to be the owner of the premises. The moment a person refuses the title of the landlord and claims title in himself he ceases to be a tenant in the eyes of law and the protection of Delhi Rent Control Act is not available to him. The landlord can recover possession only if the case falls within the ambit of Section 14 of DRC Act. Where a tenant repudiates the title of the landlord and does not recognize him as landlord or as an owner of the premises, the protection from eviction under Delhi Rent Control Act is not available to him. In view of the above, the Court observed that that the benefit under Section 14(2) of the DRC Act cannot be given to the tenants in this case and there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal that requires interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitions were dismissed.

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Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman.

The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) u/s 37 of NDPS Act are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is reasonable grounds which means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence. According to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the test required while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. These were stated by High Court of Delhi consisting, Justice Chandra Dhari Singh in the case of Muhsin Ali vs. Narcotics Control Bureau [BAIL APPLN. 3861/2021] on 25.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that on 27th August 2020, the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) directed Investigating Officer to carry out controlled delivery operation of parcels lying at the Cargo Terminal, IGI Airport, New Delhi. Accordingly, on 1st September 2020, search operation was conducted, and the investigating team seized 970 grams of heroin and collected samples of substance found in impugned parcel. On 2nd September 2020, Wahid Ali was arrested and his statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act was recorded. During inquiry, various incriminating documents were found in his phone including images of invoice pertaining to parcel containing drugs (second parcel), which he disclosed was due to arrive on 4th September 2020. On 4th September 2020, another search was conducted by the NCB team at Hotel Shalimar near IGI Airport where petitioner was staying along with three other persons namely Muhammed Haneef T, Muhammed Shajahan PP, and Munasir Ek. All the three co-accused were arrested on the recovery of five grams of Heroin from a bag in the room. On 5th September 2020, Bethlehem & Emmanual were both arrested who were supposed to receive the parcel. Subsequently on 15th September 2020, Peter was arrested at the instance of Bethlehem. Subsequently, on 1st July 2021, the petitioner filed First Bail Application which was rejected by the court.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the bail should be granted on the ground of parity in terms of other co-accused since the Trial Court granted a bail to three other accused namely Mohd. Hanif, Munaser E.K. and Shahjahan. He argued that the statement of other co-accused and the accused recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inadmissible and cannot be relied upon to implicate the Petitioner. It was argued that the contraband of five grams was not in the “conscious possession” or “constructive possession” of the petitioner but was recovered from a bag inside a hotel room where the petitioner was residing along with the three other accused and even if the recovery of five grams is taken into account, it would tantamount to small quantity and not commercial quantity for which the Petitioner can be sentenced for a maximum period of one year, out of which he has already undergone for a period of more than 12 months in custody. The Counsel further submitted that the petitioner should be granted bail as he has never avoided any investigation or court order.

The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted the petitioner’s statement was not statement simpliciter but led to the discovery of the impugned parcel, thus is admissible. On the ground of parity, he argued that the other co-accused who were released on bail were not implicated in other recoveries. On the other hand, the role of the Petitioner is ascribed in other recoveries. He further contended that the sequence of events prima facie establishes conspiracy on the part of petitioner. It was also submitted that the petitioner was part of a drugsyndicate indulging in illegal business of drug-trafficking and thus is not entitled to bail on the contours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

The High Court of Delhi held that the limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. In view of the gravity of the consequences of drug trafficking, the offences under the NDPS Act have been made cognizable and non-bailable. The Section does not allow granting bail for offences punishable under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A and for offences involving commercial quantity. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is reasonable grounds which means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence. According to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the test which Courts are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. In the present case, the Petitioner is charged for commercial quantity and his bail application needs to be decided as per Section 37 of the Act. Thus, the ground of parity for seeking bail is erroneous and is rejected at the very outset. Accordingly, the instant Bail Application stood dismissed.

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Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman.

Criminal revision petition challenging the impugned order  dismissed as the order does not call for revisional jurisdiction – Jharkhand high court

A criminal revision petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order passed under section 125 CRPC and directed the petitioner to give maintenance to opposite parties the petition was heard and dismissed by a single judge bench of HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY in the case of Kaleshwar Rabani versus The State of Jharkhand and Ors  Cr. Rev. No. 641 of 2014.

The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners submits that the impugned order passed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is fit to be set aside as the order of maintenance was decided based on petitioner conviction under section 498A of the Indian penal code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and an appeal is also pending against the matter of conviction and during the pendency of present petition the said appeal against the judgment of conviction is set aside by the appellate court as marriage in the matter could not be proved. the marriage could not be proved in the criminal case the impugned order based out on the matter of conviction is also fit to be set aside.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the impugned order was passed not only on considering the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case for the offenses under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, but also the evidence the opposite party in her cross-examination in which the fact was made clear that she was forcefully married to the petitioner and she denied the marriage. this shows that the marriage was performed by force. the counsel also submitted that merely because the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case, the same will not amount to erasing the other materials on record regarding the marriage between the parties. The counsel submits that the impugned order is neither illegal, nor perverse, nor suffers from any material irregularity calling for any interference in revisional jurisdiction.

The court hearing both sides is of the view that the marital status between the petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2, which is not found valid in a criminal case, has no concern in the present matter as the dispute regarding marital status and there is enough evidence which shows the prima-facie finding of marriage between the petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 and there is sufficient material on record to maintain the impugned order of maintenance hence, the court does not find any illegality in the order and no need for revisional jurisdiction and the criminal revision petition in the matter is dismissed.

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Judgment reviewed by Naveen Sharma

Matching trades with the same counterparty is not  a coincidence but an outcome of concurrence -The Security and Exchange Board of India

SEBI observed large scale reversal trades in stock options and Ms. Arpita Sikaria(Notice)was found suspicious of creating false and misleading trades and was given show cause notice the present proceedings were conducted in response to those proceedings and an adjudicating officer was appointed section 15I read with 15HA of the SEBI Act, 1992 and rule 3 of SEBI adjudication rules,1995  and AMIT KAPOOR was appointed in the [ADJUDICATION ORDER NO. Order/AK/JS/2021-22/14784]

An investigation was conducted and it was observed that a total of 2,91,643 trades comprising 81.38% of all trades executed in the stock options segment and these trades resulted in the creation of artificial volume to the tune of 826.21 crore units or 54.68% of the total market volume in stock options segment of BSE during the Investigation Period the allegations were made against the noticee for violation of  Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of SEBI Regulations,2003

The show-cause notice was given to noticee asking for noticee response as to why an inquiry should not be initiated against the Noticee and why penalty should not be imposed upon the Noticee. the noticee responded and the proceeding started to know the validity of the response of the Noticee .

The allegations were that the noticee executed reversal trades and these reversal trades are alleged to be non-genuine trades as they are not executed in the normal course of trading, lack basic trading rationale, lead to a false or misleading appearance of trading in terms of generation of artificial volumes, and hence are deceptive & manipulative. The non-genuineness of these transactions executed by the Noticee is evident from the fact that there was no commercial reason behind the point that why noticee reversed the trades in a short period of time. this short span show gives a clear indication that there was pre-determination in the prices by the counterparties while executing the trades. the officer notes that it is not mere coincidence that Noticee could match her trades with the same counterparty with whom it had undertaken the first leg of the respective trades. This is the outcome of the meeting of minds between noticee and her counterparties and relied on the judgment of SEBI v Kishore R Ajmera (AIR 2016 SC 1079).

The trading behaviors also confirms that such trades were not normal and the wide variation in prices of the trades in the same contract in almost no time without any basis for such wide variation, all indicate that the trades executed by the Noticee were not genuine and being non-genuine, created an appearance of artificial trading volumes in the said contract. and relies on the case of  SEBI Vs. Shri Ram Mutual Fund [2006] 68 SCL 216(SC)

The above observations make it clear that noticee was involved in the reversal of trades and have violated Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1), and 4(2)(a) of SEBI Regulations,2003 and a penalty of Rs. 5,00,000 was imposed under Section 15-I of the SEBI Act read with Rule 5 of the Adjudication Rules.

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Order reviewed by Naveen Sharma

The object of any criminal jurisprudence is reformative in character and to take care of the victim. It is towards this objective that Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is enacted in the statute. The objective of which is to apply whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied on payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence. The same was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Samaul SK. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. [Criminal Appeal No. 894 of 2021].

In the present case, it is one of voluntarily offering the amount albeit to seek a reduction of sentence. The facts of the case are that Hena Bibi, the respondent-2/complainant, claimed to be the appellant’s legally married wife, claiming that their marriage was legitimated on 8.2.2000 according to Muslim customs and rituals. The appellant was previously married to Mastra Bibi, and he had an alleged extramarital affair with Hena Bibi, which resulted in their marriage. The two parties are said to have been married for about a year and a half and have two children as a result of their marriage.

The Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (for short ‘SDJM’) in Pakur, Punjab, has passed a verdict in favour of the first wife of respondent No.2 and against her second husband on grounds of torture and demands of dowry. During the course of the alleged demand for dowry, the respondent-2 conceived for the second time. The case went to trial, and according to the verdict of the SDJM, Pakur, the appellant was found guilty and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, plus a six-month additional punishment if the amount was not paid. The appellant filed Criminal Appeal against the SDJM’s ruling, which was dismissed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pakur. Following that, the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition (abbreviated as “SLP”) in the Supreme Court.

During the SLP hearing, the petitioner/appellant requested an extension of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which was denied on July 26, 2021. The Supreme Court stated that it was open to the possibility of a sentence reduction if the petitioner provided adequate compensation to respondent No.2 for herself and her children in addition to whatever maintenance was being paid under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellant stated that he was willing to pay compensation of Rs.3.00 lakhs to respondent No.2 for herself and the children, and that he needed around six months to raise the money. Because respondent No.2 failed to appear despite serving, skilled counsel for the State was asked to verify respondent No.2’s position on which she agreed. 

The Supreme court held that, “if the petitioner/appellant is showing remorse and is willing to make arrangements for respondent No.2 and his two children born out of the wedlock, we would not like to come in the way of such an arrangement, which should be beneficial to respondent No.2 and her children”. The court also held that the above-mentioned amount of Rs.3.00 lakh shall be apart from the requirement of paying fine of Rs.10,000/- directed by the trial court. However, the court made it clear that if the amounts are not deposited, the appellant will have to undergo the remaining part of the sentence of 3 years.

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Judgment Reviewed by Meenakshi Jena