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The Compassionate Appointment Has Certain Conditions: In Gauhati High Court

Compassionate appointment if a missing government employee is not automatic and must meet specific criteria, such as a vacancy, fulfilling the conditions laid down. The High Court Of Gauhati upheld this through a Single Learned Bench MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA in RAJU PATOWARY V. THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS. (WA/280/2021).

Facts of the Case – The appellant’s late father worked as a ‘Gram Sevak’ for the Assam government’s Department of Panchayat and Rural Development’s Chamaria Development Block. On September 27, 2011, the appellant’s father, late Kumud Patowary, died in captivity. The appellant submitted his application for a compassionate appointment on November 25, 2011, in response to the loss of his father. His application was then sent to the Government of Assam’s District Level Committee for compassionate appointment consideration. The District Level Committee denied his case due to a lack of openings. His case was heard again by a District Level Committee on September 28, 2012, and his candidacy was denied because he was unqualified for the position of ‘Gram Sevak.’ As a result of the District Level Committee’s rejection of his candidacy for the second time. Since no judgment had been reached on the applicant’s application, he filed a writ petition with this Court.

The proposal was denied in the appellant’s case because the deceased father of the appellant did not meet the requirements of “3 Years of Service” of the deceased employee as outlined in Government O.M. No. ABP 50/2006/Pt/182 dated 01.06.2015. The present writ appeal has been filed because the plaintiff has been wronged.

The learned counsel for the writ appellant contends that the authorities first denied the petitioner’s application due to a lack of vacancy. It was noted in the minutes that his case would be addressed as and when the vacancy occurred. The appellant’s skilled counsel contends that the authorities could not have rejected the appellant’s plea for a compassionate appointment three times based on three different grounds.

Mr. M. Nath, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 6, contends that the appellant’s consideration for appointment on compassionate grounds dates from 2011 and that as the same was refused in 2012, the appellant could not have filed a new application. The appellant has also failed to present evidence that the new application was submitted on the Department’s request or advice.

The Department’s learned counsel refutes such assertions made by the appellant’s skilled counsel. The learned counsel for the respondents cites this Court’s judgment in Achyut Ranjan Das and Ors. V. State of Assam and Ors., reported in 2006 4 GLT 674, in which this Court established specific rules for considering compassionate appointment cases across multiple ministries in Assam.

The Learned Judge sees that compassionate appointments are no longer Res Integra to help the family members of the dead employee cope with the immediate hardship and tragedy that has befallen them as a result of the death of the family’s lone earner. As a result, the primary goal of the compassionate appointment program is to help the family cope with the immediate difficulty created by the death of a family member who worked for the Department. According to the legislation put forth by the Apex Court in this case, the purpose of a program is not to provide any member of the family a job, much less a position held by a deceased relative. In this regard, the law established by the Apex Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal V. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 138, and the Apex Court’s subsequent decisions are relevant.

In light of the preceding arguments and light of the law established by the Apex Court and this Court in the Achyut Ranjan Das case, the Judge finds no flaw in the order entered by the learned Single Judge, resulting in the appeal having no merit.

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Reviewed by Rangasree.

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The Sentence Can Be Reduced Based On The Accused’s Trial: In Gauhati High Court

 In most cases, a court retains the ability to overturn an improper sentence. This implies that if a clerical error resulted in the sentence, the Court could update the abstract of judgment to reflect the proper verdict. The High Court Of Gauhati upheld this through a single Learned Bench of  MRS. JUSTICE RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN in PRADIP BASUMATARY V. THE STATE OF ASSAM and ANR (Crl. Rev.P./32/2015).

Facts of the case – The prosecution case is that on 02.07.2000 at around 11:00 a.m., the accused Pradip Basumatary was driving Tata Sumo bearing Regn. No. AS-01/H-8743, from Krishnai to Dudhnoi, collided head-on with the Maruti Van bearing Regn. No. AS18/3467 was driving in the opposite direction, causing grievous injury to Maruti Van’s driver, Sri Amulya Rava. The other two passengers, Smt Prabhati Boro and Smt Arpana Khaklary were just injured, resulting in substantial damage to both automobiles. ASI Abdus Swaheed has filed an FIR under IPC Sections 279/337/338/427. The witnesses’ statements were recorded during the investigation, the accused was detained, and he was released on bail. The I.O. also seized the vehicles involved in the accident, prepared a seizure list for them, and made the necessary arrangements for the vehicle’s mechanical examination. After the investigation was completed, the police filed a charge sheet against the current accused/petitioners under Sections 279/337/338/427 of the IPC. The prosecution called eight witnesses throughout the trial, while the defense called none. The accused was found guilty and convicted after the trial.

Mr. H. Das, learned counsel for the Petitioner, puts forth that the Accused Petitioner comes before this Court with the present revision petition. It challenges the aforementioned concurrent findings, claiming, among other things, that the learned appellate Court erred in law in sustaining the learned trial Court’s verdict and order of conviction.

Although the PW.1, PW.2, and PW.3 did not see the specific event, they came to the scene shortly after the incident and discovered the PW.5 injured. With their help and support, the wounded was sent to the hospital for medical care. These three witnesses had firmly claimed that the front sides of both automobiles had been damaged due to the incident. On the other hand, these witnesses were unable to say with certainty who was to blame for the disaster.

Except for the wounded, there was no other eye witness to the collision in this case. Still, the evidence of the two injured, PW.4 and PW.5, indicated that the accident occurred due to Tata Sumo’s hurry and careless driving. Although no other eye witness to the incident exists, the effect of the damage to both cars, where the petitioners is a big vehicle, has caused considerable damage to both cars, and such reckless driving falls under the ambit of Section 279 of the IPC.

After examining the facts and shreds of evidence, The Learned Judge Based on the evidence presented, the trial court’s judgment concerning the accused’s guilt under Sections 279/337/338/427 of the IPC appears to be proper, and the learned appellate Court has correctly maintained it. However, in light of the Petitioner’s experienced counsel’s position, this Court also recognized that the current Petitioner, as a private car driver, has suffered dramatically due to the protracted lawsuit, which has lasted around 21 years and thus deserves some indulgence.

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Reviewed by Rangasree.

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FB Post Against General Bipin Rawat is an uncivil remark but no IPC Offence: Madras High Court

“Who ? What ? and Where?” test which is employed to determine whether the words amount to a hate speech or not can be invoked in the context of Section 153 of IPC also. The petitioner had only posted the text on his Face Book page. They are no doubt defamatory. These were upheld by Madras High Court through the learned bench of Honourable Mr. Justice G.R. Swaminathan in the case of G.Sivarajaboopathi v. State, rep.by The Inspector of Police & Dharmaraj (Crl MP(MD)No.78 of 2022).

The petitioner’s act raised the hackles of the defacto complainant who brought it to the notice of the Inspector of Police, Cyber Crime Police Station, Nagercoil. Crime No.32 of 2021 was registered against the petitioner and another for the offences under Sections 153, 505(2) and 504 of IPC on 15.12.2021. The petitioner has filed this Original Petition to quash the same. The person who died was no ordinary person. He was the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS). The circumstances in which he died were extremely tragic. It was nothing short of a national calamity. The conduct of the petitioner would certainly outrage the moral sense of most persons. But the issue on hand must be adjudicated on the basis of an objective criteria. The only question that I should pose to myself is whether the act committed by the petitioner amounts to a cognizable offence. If the answer is in the negative, then the impugned FIR has to be quashed.

The honorable court also took the reference of Muniswami Naicker Vs. (1949) 2 MLJ 767, it was held that the gravamen of the offence under
Section 504 of IPC lies in the utterer provoking the victim by his words to
commit an immediate breach of the peace. That can only occur if he utters the words in the presence of the victim or has them conveyed to him by letter or messenger. When the accused uttered the abuse in the absence of the complainant, he cannot be convicted under Section 504 of IPC unless he asked his hearers to convey it to the complainant.   

The bench of Honourable Mr. Justice G.R. Swaminathan in this case concluded that the petitioner’s post does not involve two groups at all. There is no reference to religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. It has been held that unless one group is sought to be pitted against the other on the aforementioned grounds, the penal provision is not attracted. Looked at from any angle, the essential ingredients constituting the offences of Sections 153, 504 and 505(2) of IPC are absent in this case. The impugned FIR is not maintainable. It is quashed. The criminal original petition is allowed.

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Judgement reviewed by Himanshu Ranjan

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Defendant can only participate in the complaint after Ex-Parte Opposition Decision is set aside, unable to submit a Written Statement: Orissa High Court

When an ex parte decree is set aside and the suit is restored to file, the defendants cannot be relegated back to the position prior to the date of hearing of the suit. He would be debarred from filing any written statement in the suit, but then he can participate in the hearing of the suit inasmuch cross-examine the witness of the plaintiff, adduce evidence and address argument. These were upheld by the Hight Court of Orissa through the learned bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra in the case of Himansu Sekhar Srichandan v. Sudhir Ranjan Patra (since dead) Jully Patra & Ors, (CMP No.1423 of 2019).

The crux of the case is the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his right, title, interest and ownership of the property in the suit schedule and a declaration declaring that Respondent number 1 does not have the authority to withdraw the case land. Respondent number 2 and 3 immediately sought time to file a written statement. However, despite repeated postponements, they did not file a written statement. In the end, matter proceeded ex parte and decree was drawn. Next, Defendants number 2 and 3 have filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decision mentioned above and an application for condonation of the delay. The Senior Civil Judge, after considering the circumstances described by the parties, allowed the delay and set aside the announcement of the ex party. The same was challenged in this suit.

The petitioner has submitted that the application limit under Order IX Rule 13, CPC is regulated under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, which provides two ways to determine the starting point of limitation. The first is when the summons was not properly served on the Respondent. Secondly, if the summons is properly served, the respondent must show sufficient reason to satisfy the Court for not appearing on the date on which the trial was called. It was argued that in a speedy trial, Defendant No. 2 and 3 appeared in court through their Attorney and despite the adjournment several times he did not include his written statement. The court while exercising its discretion will not be able to set aside the obligatory requirements under the provision. In a speedy case, the Chief Justice did not consider the conduct of the party seeking independence or negotiating legal requirements while approving the disputed order. Finally, it depends on the scale of the State of Orissa & Anr. v. Smt. Sitanjali Jena, ((2016) 121 CLT 492), has filed a motion to set aside the ex-party decision even though the case has been returned to the file, but the Defendants cannot be adjourned before the date of the hearing. They will be barred from completing the written statement.

The attorney representing the defendant withholding that ‘sufficient reason’ under the Limitations Act should be construed as a touchstone of pragmatic boundaries as set out in Nakul Swain v. Jogendra Das, (1996 (1) OLR 534). The expression ‘reason enough they should get free construction’ in order to promote greater justice, as set out in the case of GMG Engineering Industries and Others v. ISSA Green Power Solution and Ors., ((2015) 15 SCC 659). In addition, he argued that the reduction law is based on public policy. Restrictions are not intended to infringe on the rights of parties found under the law as they are held by the N Supreme Court. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamuthy, ((1998) 7 SCC 123). There may be some error on the part of the plaintiff concerned. That alone is not enough to deny his plea and close the door on him.

The learned bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra relying on Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., (AIR 1955 SC 425) and Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors., (AIR 1964 SC 993), concluded that on a close reading of the impugned order, it appears that learned Senior Civil Judge has made his best endeavour and discussed the matter in detai with reference to materials available on record to set aside the ex parte decree. Hence, no interference is warranted with regard to setting aside the ex parte decree. However, it was clarified that the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be permitted to file their written statement. They can only take part in the hearing of the suit without propounding their own case. However, they can advance their argument on the basis of the materials available on record only.

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Judgement reviewed by Himanshu Ranjan

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In order to hold a person guilty of cheating, the intention of a person must be dishonest and there must be mens rea. : Kerala High Court

In order to hold a person accountable for the offence of cheating, it is necessary that the person was deceiving from the very beginning and had an intention to cheat. It is necessary to show that the intention while making the promise was dishonest. Mens rea cannot be proven by the mere fact that a promise could not be fulfilled. This was held by Justice Sophy Thomas in the matters between Sundareswaran K. & Others v State of Kerala and another in CRL.MC NO. 4863 OF 2019 decided on 9th Febraury,2022.

The petition is filed by three accused with  a pleading to quash the proceedings of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioners are accused of running am unlicensed lab and then cheating the respondents and are therefore charged under Section 420, 502 read with Section 32 of IPC, and Section 442 read with Section 543 of the Kerala Municipal Act. The respondents have stated that the accused collective samples of his wife and then issued a faulty result and also criminally intimated him.

The petitioners have submitted that an offence under Section 420 has not been committed since there was no fraudulent intention on part of petitioners to deceive the complainant. In fact, the petitioners had clearly asked the complainant to get the test verified. Moreover, they has no role in the process  other than collecting samples. To this, the respondents submitted that the clinic was not working under a proper license and the respondent had to face a lot of embarrassment due to the test results, which later turned out to be false. Therefore, he was cheated on by the petitioners.

After observing the laws and the facts of the present case, the court stated that ‘to bring home the offence of cheating, intention must be established.’ In the present case, no facts and circumstances have stated that the accused have intended to cheat. Following the precedent set out in Chidambaram Chettiar vs Shanmugham AIR 1938 Mad 129, the court stated that four cardinal assets of humanity-body, mind, reputation and property have not been harmed. For the offence under Section 506, the evidences must be examined.

The court ruled that there has been no trace of cheating and thus, the offence under Section 420 is not attracted. Quashing the proceedings under Section 420, the court ordered the proceedings under other sections to be continued.

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Reviewed by Namisha Choudhary.

 

 

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