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Title: Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran Versus The State of Madhya Pradesh

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2888 of 2023

Date of Judgment: February 05, 2024

CORAM: Justice C.T. Ravikumar & Justice Rajesh Bindal

Facts of the Case:

The case revolves around the brutal rape of a 7-year-old girl, referred to as X, by the petitioner-convict. The incident occurred on 21st May 2018 when the victim, X, was taken by the convict to a temple where he raped her after disrobing both himself and the child. The victim’s grandmother, Munni Bai, reported the incident to the authorities. During the trial, the prosecution presented compelling evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence confirming the rape.

The Trial Court found the petitioner guilty under various sections, including Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as amended by Act No.22 of 2018, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The Trial Court originally awarded capital punishment to the convict. However, upon appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur commuted the capital punishment to imprisonment for life, considering factors such as the manner of the offense, the absence of prior criminal record, and the possibility of rehabilitation.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2888 of 2023 in the Supreme Court of India, challenging the judgment of the High Court dated 11th October 2018. The petitioner sought to contest the commutation of the capital punishment and argued for a reduction in the sentence imposed.

Laws Involved:

Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as amended by Act No.22 of 2018, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)

Issues framed by the Court:

1. Whether or not the crime committed by petitioner is barbaric and brutal”?
2. Whether the commutation of capital punishment to sentence of life imprisonment requires further interference?
3. Whether or not the paragraph 1 of the impugned judgment which mentions conviction and sentence under Section 366, IPC is maintained, can also be in relation to the conviction under Section 363, IPC and the sentence imposed therefor?

Courts Judgment and Analysis:

On the first issue the court analyzed the distinction between the terms “barbaric” and “brutal” in the context of the crime committed by the petitioner. While acknowledging that the crime may not have been “brutal” in the sense of being excessively violent, the court concluded that it was indeed “barbaric.” The distinction between the two terms was drawn based on their meanings:

– “Barbaric” was defined as wild, uncivilized, or crude, characteristic of barbarians or uncultured persons.

– “Brutal” was defined as characteristic of or like a brute, cruel, or savage.

The court noted that the offense committed by the petitioner, although not necessarily brutal, was still barbaric in nature. Despite not being excessively violent, the petitioner’s actions were deemed barbaric due to their lack of civilization or cultural sensitivity.

The court based this conclusion on the evidence presented, which indicated that the petitioner, aged 40, had raped a 7-year-old girl in a temple after disrobing both himself and the victim. The court held that even though the crime may not have been excessively brutal, the act of using a young girl to satisfy his lust in such a location demonstrated a lack of cultural or moral regard, thus constituting a barbaric act.

On the second issue the court analyzed whether further interference was warranted in the commutation of capital punishment to a sentence of life imprisonment in the case. It first highlighted the provisions of Section 376 AB of the IPC, which stipulates imprisonment for life as the minimum punishment, extending to the remainder of the convict’s natural life, with a minimum term of 20 years.

Referring to previous judgments, particularly the case of Shiva Kumar, the court reiterated the power of the constitutional courts to impose modified or fixed-term sentences, even in cases where capital punishment is not imposed. The court emphasized that the fixed punishment cannot be for a period less than 14 years, as mandated by Section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Considering the circumstances of the case, including the brutal rape of a 7-year-old victim in a temple, the court acknowledged the gravity of the offense. It noted the physical and psychological trauma suffered by the victim and the potential long-term impact on her life.

Furthermore, the court took into account the petitioner’s age and the time already served in incarceration. After considering all these factors, the court concluded that a fixed term of 30 years, including the period already undergone, would be an appropriate modified sentence of imprisonment.

However, the court also pointed out certain oversights in the impugned judgment, particularly regarding the failure to impose separate sentences for offenses under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and the lack of consideration for fines to cover medical expenses and victim rehabilitation. As such, the court deemed it necessary to rectify these deficiencies in its final decision.

Overall, the court’s analysis focused on balancing the gravity of the offense, the principles of justice, and the need for rehabilitation and reformation, ultimately leading to the determination of an appropriate modified sentence.

On the third issue the Supreme Court analyzed the contention raised by the learned counsel regarding paragraph 1 of the impugned judgment. The counsel argued that the order in paragraph 35 maintaining the conviction and sentence under Section 366, IPC could also be applicable to the conviction under Section 363, IPC and the sentence imposed for it. The Court endorsed this contention, noting that paragraph 1 of the impugned judgment indicated that the petitioner-convict was convicted under both Section 376 AB, IPC and Section 363 IPC. Therefore, the Court confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner-convict.

Moreover, the Court observed that although the petitioner-convict was convicted for an offense under Section 3/4 and 5 (m)/6 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence was imposed due to the provision under Section 42 of the POCSO Act. The Court then modified the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 376 AB, IPC, awarding 30 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rupees One Lakh. It clarified that this sentence would also include the period of sentence already undergone and any period ordered by the Trial Court for set off. The imprisonment awarded for the conviction under Section 363, IPC was ordered to run concurrently, and the amount of fine imposed for this offense was to be added to the fine imposed for the conviction under Section 376 AB, IPC.

Furthermore, the Court directed that the petitioner-convict should not be released from jail before completion of the actual sentence of 30 years, subject to observations made in the matter of computation. Ultimately, the Special Leave Petition was partly allowed based on the above considerations.

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Written by- Aditi

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