#writpetition Archives - Page 2 of 8

8 Dec

In presence of an alternative remedy to appeal, a Writ petition won’t suffice in the court of law : Bombay HC

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TITLE : Rahibai Laxman Lokhande & Ors. V State of Maharashtra

CITATION : W.P No 7400 of 2023

CORAM : Hon’ble justice Madhav J. Jamdar

DATE: 5^th December, 2023

INTRODUCTION :

The challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the legality and validity of the order dated 18th April 2023 passed by the District Superintendent of Land Records in Appeal.

FACTS :

The contesting Respondents that the Writ Petition be not entertained in view of the availability of the alternate remedy. He submitted that there is Appeal provided under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Section 247 provides that, an appeal shall lie from any decision or order passed by a revenue or survey office specified in column 1 of the Schedule E under this Code or any other law for the time being in force to the officer specified in column 2 of that Schedule whether or not such decision or order may itself have been passed on appeal from the decision of order of the officer specified in column 1 of the said Schedule: Provided that, in no case the number of appeals shall exceed two.

The Petitioners contend that the impugned order itself has been passed in Appeal and therefore, the Second Appeal is not competent under Section 247 of the said Code.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The court held that Section 247 of the said Code very clearly specifies that two Appeals are competent and the Appellate Authorities are described in Schedule E.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed in view of availability of the alternate remedy of statutory Appeal under Section 247 of the said Code, with no order as to costs. It is clarified that the Petitioners can file the Appeal as contemplated under Section 247 of the said Code challenging the impugned order.

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Written by- Sanjana Ravichandran

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1 Nov

The Karnataka High Court has affirmed that unaided educational institutions managed by linguistic minority bodies are eligible to receive funding under Section 98 of the Karnataka Education Act.

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Uncategorized # Writ Petition, #appeal, #Karnataka High Court, #writ, #writpetition

Title: Rajarajeshwari Dental College and Hospital and Dr Sanjay Murgod

Decided on: 12^th, OCTOBER 2023

Writ C No. – 580 OF 2023 (S-RES)

CORAM: The Hon’ble Mr Prasanna B. Varale, Chief Justice and The Hon’ble Mr Justice Krishna S Dixit

INTRODUCTION

A legal dispute concerning the applicability of Section 98 of the Karnataka Education Act to unaided educational institutions run by linguistic minority organizations was brought before the Karnataka High Court in Bengaluru. The court’s ruling on this issue and its consequences for these institutions is outlined in its judgment, which was released on October 12, 2023.

FACTS OF THE CASE

A disagreement exists in this case between Dr. Sanjay Murgod and Rajarajeshwari Dental College. A single judge ruled that Dr. Murgod’s termination notice was invalid and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. In its appeal, Rajarajeshwari Dental College claimed that unaided educational institutions managed by linguistic minority bodies were exempt from Section 98 of the Karnataka Education Act. The court dismissed the appeal after ruling that Section 98 applied to these kinds of institutions.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND DECISION

According to the Karnataka High Court, unaided educational institutions managed by linguistic minority organizations are subject to Section 98 of the Karnataka Education Act. The Rajarajeshwari Dental College’s appeal was denied by the court, which upheld the section’s application to all employees of educational institutions in order to safeguard their employment security and working conditions. The significance of defending workers’ interests in the education sector is emphasized by this ruling.

Written by- Kusuma R

Karnataka Hc 1

31 Oct

The Meghalaya High Court has clarified that Section 23 of the POCSO Act holds individuals responsible for revealing a minor’s identity when reporting or contributing to news.

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Uncategorized # Supreme Court, #primelegal, #writ, #writpetition, bail

Title: Shri Eric Ranee & 2 Ors. Vs. State of Meghalaya & Anr

Decided on: 06.10.2023

Writ C No. – 79 of 2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Three petitioners contested their participation as co-accused in a case involving the disclosure of a child victim’s identity in violation of the POCSO Act in the Meghalaya High Court’s case Crl. Petn. No. 79 of 2023. They contended that they were exempt from liability under Section 23(3) of the POCSO Act because they were social workers and media correspondents.

After weighing their arguments, the court maintained their criminal liability, ruling that news reporters and contributors are covered by Section 23 of the POCSO Act. The case pertained to the construal and implementation of child protection statutes concerning the revelation of victims’ identities in the press.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Meghalaya High Court decided in Crl. Petn. No. 79 of 2023 that three petitioners might face criminal charges under the POCSO Act for their roles in revealing a child victim’s identity to the media. Their claim that they were exempt from liability because they weren’t employed by the relevant newspapers was denied by the court. The case made clear how crucial it is to shield child abuse victims’ identities from the public eye.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The court stressed how crucial it is to preserve the identity of minors who have been sexually abused by interpreting Section 23 of the POCSO Act to include news reporters and contributors. The need to protect the identities of child victims and the legal and moral obligations of news reporters are highlighted by this case.

Written by- Kusuma R

Meghalaya Hc (4)

27 Oct

The Calcutta High Court has emphasized that maritime claims require supporting evidence and should not be characterized by harsh or oppressive measures.

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Title: Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd. vs. Owners of Vessel MT TSM Pollux.

Decided on: 19th October, 2023.

Writ C No. – 9266889

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya.

INTRODUCTION

Alleged carelessness and damage to marine loading arms at Haldia Oil Jetty Port I give rise to an admiralty jurisdiction dispute in the case of Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd. vs. Owners of Vessel MT TSM Pollux. The plaintiff requests compensation, but the court challenges the claim’s validity and emphasizes the need for supporting documentation and just compensation. The case brings to light the intricacies of admiralty law, and an order is made for a joint survey to evaluate the harm.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this instance, an incident happened in September 2023 at Haldia Oil Jetty Port I, where the ship MT TSM Pollux harmed Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd.’s marine loading and unloading arms.

The plaintiff filed a claim under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, alleging the owners of the vessel were negligent. As long as the loss is predictable and a direct result of the breach, Section 73 provides compensation for losses resulting from contract violations.

The plaintiff’s claim was examined by the court, which emphasized the need for supporting documentation and just compensation.

To evaluate the damage, a cooperative survey was mandated. This case serves as a reminder of the intricacies involved in admiralty law and how Section 73 is applied to determine compensation.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND DECISIONThe court acknowledges the plaintiff’s claim for damages caused to marine equipment by the vessel MT TSM POLLUX. Due to the urgency of the matter, the court orders the arrest of the vessel to secure the plaintiff’s claims. The document specifies the conditions for the arrest order, including a deadline for the plaintiff to pay court fees and the possibility of the order being vacated if the defendant deposits a specified amount as security. Various authorities are instructed to assist in implementing the arrest order, and the document sets a returnable date for the application. It also warns that failure to pay the court fees will result in the dismissal of the suit.

Written by- Kusuma R

Calcutta Hc

28 Jul

Delhi High Court dismissed the petition and held that the Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India does not substitute its view for the view of the competent authority.

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Title: RABINDRA KUMAR SAHA versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Judgment delivered on: 18th July, 2023

+ W.P.(C) 9118/2023 & CM APPL. 34697/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

Introduction

The fact that the petitioner’s term has been reduced alone does not mean that the decision was not made with the organization’s best interests in mind. The Delhi High Court denied the plea and ruled that, in using its powers granted by Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, the court cannot substitute its own judgement for that of the appropriate authorities.

Facts of the case

The petitioner requests the quashing of the decision dated 09.06.2023, among other things, on the grounds that it is against the posting policies issued by the respondent on 14.05.1999 and 15.01.2013. Additionally, the petitioner asks the respondent to issue a directive allowing him to keep his position as Chief Engineer (P) at Project Chetak.

By the impugned order dated 09.06.2023, petitioner has been posted to Headquarters, Director General Border Road (DGBR) at New Delhi.

The petitioner challenges the ruling on the grounds that the petitioner’s posting duration was reduced from the customary tenure of two to three years. Furthermore, it is argued that the correct and mandated posting and transfer procedure was not followed in this particular instance. The petitioner’s claims that the proper posting procedure requires the suggestion of posting at his level to be routed via the Additional Director General (HQs) for determination at the level of DGBR.

Analysis of the court

It is a well-established legal principle that the Court, when exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, does not replace the opinion of the competent authority with its own. The decision was made by the appropriate authority, the DGBR, taking into account organisational restrictions and organisational interest. The fact that the petitioner’s term has been reduced on its own does not mean that the decision was not made with the organization’s best interests in mind.

The posting policy, which the petitioner also cites, states that postings must take organisational needs into account and that these needs would take precedence over all other factors.

Given the structure of the organisation, the officer’s personal interests will take a back seat to organisational and functional requirements, which will take precedence over all other factors. There is no question that the Director General of Border Road is the senior and most competent authority with regard to posting. The contested posting order was issued by the Director General Border Road, or DGBR, of the relevant authority.

The competent authority has taken into account both the petitioner’s representation and the ADG (North-West)’s proposal, but due to organisational limitations, he has chosen not to recall either and has rejected the representation.

Additionally, we reject the claim made by the petitioner’s knowledgeable attorney that the proper procedure was not followed. The Director General Border Roads has final say in all matters.

It is not implied that the responsible authority did not take into account all pertinent factors and organisational interest only because it is claimed that the suggestion for the posting was not routed through the ADG (HQs). It is also undisputed that the ADG (HQs) recommendations are not binding on the DGBR, the final decision authority, as the DGBR is a superior authority to the ADG (HQs). It is also undisputed that the DGBR has the authority to reject the ADG’s recommendations.

We believe that the decision made by the competent authority, the DGBR, does not require interference even if there was a procedural error in not passing the file through the ADG (HQs), given that the DGBR has already considered the recommendation and representation and taken a decision in the organization’s best interest. The respondent’s argument that the file should not be sent to ADG (HQs) and that correct procedure has already been followed is, of course, unaffected by this.

we find that no malafide can be attributed to the respondent and impugned posting order does not warrant any interference by this Court.

Merely because there is an instance of an officer whose posting orders have been repeatedly changed citing organizational interest would not imply that in the case of the petitioner, organizational interest has not been kept in mind.

we find that there is no infirmity in the posting order or that the same warrants interference in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India. We find no merit in the petition.

Written By Shreyanshu Gupta

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