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delhi high court

Delhi High Court upholds EC Commissioner order for compensation to parents of deceased employee by upholding that the deceased person was an “Employee”

Case title: M/S Madras Trading Co v. Ramjeet @ Ramjeet and Anr

Case no: FAO 119/2017 & CM APPL. 9580/2017, CM APPL. 28069/2018

Dated on: February 13th, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharmesh Sharma

Facts of the case:

The appellant herein is a proprietorship concern run by Mr. Sukhpreet Singh, and it is engaged in a small business of sale of air conditioners and spare parts. The respondents were the claimants before the Employee Commissioner and are the legal heirs/parents of the deceased. The claimants filed Statement of Claims before the Commissioner on 27.07.2015, stating that that their deceased son Tata, was employed with the appellant as an AC Mechanic at a monthly wage of Rs. 15,000/-. On 30.04.2014, Sh. Tata was sent by the appellant to do AC repair work wherein the AC compressor burst resulting in fatal injuries and his death at the age of 25 years. An FIR was registered on 01.05.2014 at P.S. Kirti Nagar, on statement of coworker Sh. Sanjay Kumar who along with the deceased had gone to carry out work when the accident occurred. He stated that both of them were employed with the appellant firm and are entitled for compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- along with penalty of 50% and interest @12% per annum, payable from the date of the incident till realization. The appellant on 09.12.2015 replied by denying the “employer-employee‟ relation and objected for non-enclosure of any documents/proofs to prove such employer- employee relationship. The learned Commissioner framed the following issues “(i) whether the employee – employer relationship exists between the parties? – (ii) Whether accident resulting into death of the deceased is caused out of and during the course of employment and if so, to what amount of death compensation, the dependents of the deceased are entitled to? (iii) Relief, if any? The learned Commissioner decided in favor of the claimants/respondents by holding that the claimant’s evidence was reliable and sufficient in proving the events. However, the respondent firm (appellant herein), failed to prove that there exists no employer- employee relationship. The learned Commissioner held that the claimants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 8,67,640/- along with simple interest @12% per annum w.e.f. 29.07.2015. Hence, this appeal.

Contentions of the appellant:

The learned Commissioner finding is perverse. The “employer-employee‟ relation between the deceased and the appellant firm, was decided solely on the FIR by completely ignoring the contradictions in the testimony of the claimants during cross-examination. An FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence as it requires corroboration through documentary, circumstantial or oral evidence. It is contended that apart from the “Control Test‟, “Integration Test‟ also needs to be considered such as the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, deduct insurance contributions and the “mutual obligations‟ between the employer and the employee as well. The only evidence put forth by the respondents/claimants is a photocopy of the visiting card of the appellant. The testimony of respondent No.1 as well as of Sanjay Kumar was inconsistent. The appellant firm is not engaged in the business of AC repair but is a small proprietorship concern engaged in the sale of Air Conditioners and that they have not employed any persons.  

Contentions of the respondent:

The order passed by the learned Commissioner is well reasoned and has been passed after a thorough consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed on the record. The grounds taken by the appellant in the present appeal are misconceived and baseless. There is no substantial questions of law involved.

Issues:

Whether the Respondents are entitled to claim compensation under the EC Act?  

Legal provisions:

Compensation Claim under EC Act- Workers can file claims for compensation directly with the Commissioner or through a lawyer.  

Courts analysis and Judgement:

An appeal under Section 30 of the EC Act lies to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner ie (a) an order awarding as compensation; (aa) an order awarding interest or penalty (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half- monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependents of a deceased employee, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependents; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under Section 12 (2). It is further provided by way of a proviso that no appeal lies against any order unless a “substantial question of law‟ is involved in the appeal. In the case of North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. Sujatha, the Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 30 of the EC Act as to what would constitute “substantial question of law‟, the question such as “whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependants of the deceased employee the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident, etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act” The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact.” The learned Commissioner has given a categorical finding that the deceased workman suffered fatal injuries during the course of his employment with the appellant. The reliance by the Commissioner on the contents of the FIR and statement of co-worker cannot be faulted. The proceedings under the EC Act are summary in nature and hence strict adherence to provisions the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be applied. There are grounds by which it can be presumed that the facts were truthfully revealed regarding the circumstances which resulted in the fatal accident and was correctly incorporated by the Investigating Officer. The claimants are from poor background who are illiterate and ignorant. The Visiting card in possession is sufficient to show the connection of the appellant as an employer with the Respondent’s deceased son. Once the Claimants had laid the basic foundation to the claim, the onus then shifted upon the appellant to disprove the fact that there existed no employer-employee relationship between the parties. The appellant could have even summoned and examined the co-worker Sanjay Kumar to disprove the relationship of employer and employee. The plea of respondent No.1 acknowledging that he did not know the proprietor of the appellant can be taken considering the background of the parents. There is no apparent reason for the Investigating Officer to have fabricated the FIR or for the co-worker Sanjay Kumar to have given a false statement soon after the accident. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order does not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity or incorrect approach adopted in law. The present appeal is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000/- which be paid to the respondents No. 1 and 2 in equal share within one month from today, failing which they shall be entitled to claim the same with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of this order till realization. The pending applications also stand disposed of accordingly.  

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delhi high court

Unaided recognized private school is not required to take prior approval before fees hike- Delhi High Court.

Case title: Action committee unaided recognized private schools v. Directorate of Education.

Case no: W.P. (C) 5743/2024 and CM APPL. 23712/2024, CM APPL.23713/2024

Dated on: April 29th, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar.

Facts of the case: 


Directorate of Education (DoE) issued Order dated 27.03.2024 that as per Section 17 of DSEAR, 1973 no private unaided school in Delhi which has been allotted land by the Govt. Agencies shall enhance fee without prior sanction of the Director of Education. All the Head of Schools/Managers of Private Recognized Unaided Schools, seeking prior sanction for increase in fee, to submit their proposals, for the academic session 2024-25, online from 01.04.2024 through website of Directorate latest by 15.04.2024. The proposals submitted by the schools shall be scrutinized by the Director and in case, no proposal is submitted, the school shall not increase tuition fee/fee. In case of complaint regarding increase of any fee without prior approval will be viewed seriously and will make the school liable for action against itself as per the statutory provisions. The said Notification was challenged by the Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools and which has come up for hearing.

Contentions of the appellant: 


Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools v. DoE1 and Mt. Carmel School v. DoE2. Both were decided by a common judgment dated 15 March 2019. The The impugned order is in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in Action Court to rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Modern School wherein was held that schools which are subject to the “land clause” have to take prior approval of the DoE before enhancing their fees.   
Contentions of the respondent: 


Upon reference in para 140 of Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools case, this Court has accorded license to the principle that schools which are situated on land, to which the land clause applies, could not increase their fees without prior approval. From Modern School the propositions emerged was; (i) The issue for consideration, before the Supreme Court, was whether schools were charging excessive and disproportionate fees and whether, the DoE acted within its jurisdiction in issuing directives (ii) Unaided educational institutions enjoyed greater autonomy, in the matter of determination fee structure. Such institutions to be allowed to plan their investment and expenditure, to generate reasonable profit. (iii) Charging of capitation fees, and profiteering, could not be allowed. (iv) Balance, to be struck between autonomy of the institutions and measures to be taken to prevent commercialization of education. (v) These regulatory measures could not, trespass on the autonomy of the unaided educational institutions. (vi) The right to establish and administer minority educational institutions, conferred, by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, was subject to reasonable regulations. (vii) Subject to the prohibitory parameters, regarding charging of capitation fee and profiteering, fees chargeable by unaided educational institutions could not be regulated. (viii) The “issue”, condensed by the Supreme Court, was “as to what constitutes reasonable surplus”. (ix) The directions, issued to the DoE is to “ascertain whether terms of allotment of land by the Government to the schools have been complied with, by the schools”. In the event of non-compliance being detected, the DoE was directed to take “appropriate steps in that regard”.  

Issue: 


Whether unaided recognized private school is required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fees, irrespective of whether the land clause? 

Legal provision: 


Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973- which mandates prior approval for dismissal orders.  

Courts analysis and Judgement: 

 Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools v. DoE1 and Mt. Carmel School v. DoE2 the Court observed that “the schools are entitled to complete autonomy in the matter of fixation of their fees and management of their accounts, subject only to the condition that they do not indulge in profiteering, and do not charge capitation fee, thereby “commercializing” education. There is no requirement for the school to take “prior approval”, of the DoE, before enhancing its fees”. The resultant legal position, following Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools, is that an unaided recognized private school is not required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fees, irrespective of whether the land clause. The principle that private unaided schools do not have to seek prior approval before enhancing their fees, so long as they do not indulge in profiteering or commercialization of education by charging capitation fees and making of profits, is undisturbed till date though it is subject to decision of the Division Bench. The DoE, even if dissatisfied with the judgment of this Court in Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools has to respect the verdict so long as it stands. The attitude of the DoE in continuously issuing Circulars threatening recognized unaided schools is objectionable and cannot be allowed. The grievances are to be ventilated before Division Bench where the Appeal is pending, and not issue continuous circular thereby driving the schools to drive to litigations and repeatedly re-arguing the same points which were considered in Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools. As long as there is no prohibition by the Division Bench, with the principle in Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools the DoE is required to respect that position. In view of the aforesaid reasons, why rule nisi should not be issued? And until next hearing DoE Circular dated 27.03.2024 shall stand stayed.    

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.

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Delhi High Court Deems Monthly Pension of ₹3K for Building and Construction Workers Minuscule in a City Like Delhi.

Case title: Delhi Building and other Construction Workers Welfare Board v. Dulari Devi and Anr.

Case no: LPA 372/2023 and CM APPL.20067/2023

Dated on: 01st May, 2024.

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Shakdher and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bhansal.

Facts of the case: 

The appeal is directed against a common judgement dated 23.02.2023 rendered by learned single judge in WP (C) 13969/2022 and WP (C) 14432/2022. Respondent No.1 in the appeal is the wife of the deceased worker, Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta, while the respondent No.2 is the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The respondent No.1/ Smt. Dulari Devi had preferred WP (C) 13969/2022, an order dated 23.08.2022 passed by the appellant, i.e; Delhi Building and the Other Construction Workers Welfare Board was assailed. Shri Shankar Gupta had been employed as a building worker in Delhi for decades. He registered as with the welfare board for the first time on 17.12.2007, when he was 58 years old. At the time of the registration, Shri Shankar Gupta had deposited the contribution for three months i.e; 17.12.2007 and 17.03.2008. Acknowledging the fact that Shankar Gupta had reached 60 on 01.01.2009. Upon completing 60years, Gupta preferred an application for pension with the Welfare Board. An official had informed him with the fact that his application to grant pension has been rejected by the Welfare Board on 19.08.2020. Aggrieved by the decision, Shri Shankar Gupta lodged an appeal on 19.01.2021 under Rules 273(4) of the BOCW rules. Unfournately, Shri Shankar Gupta expired on 05.05.2021, nearly three weeks after the order dated 16.04.2021 was passed. Respondent No.1/ Smt Dulari Devi received a fresh notice dated 28.07.2021 to conduct a hearing for the same. Based on the advice of the Legal Advisor, Labour Department, the Secretary, welfare Board directed the Deputy Secretary, North-West to decide the matter afresh, after hearing Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta. Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta expired on 05.05.2021. Respondent no.1/Smt Dulari Devi (wife) received fresh notice to conduct hearing in the matter. Another deficiency letter dated 02.09.2021 was issued by the Welfare Board advising to produce documents related to the renewal of Shri Guari Shankar Gupta’s membership for the period 17.03.2008 and 16.10.2012. Since the receipts were unavailable and not submitted, the application preferred by the deceased Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta for granting a pension was temporarily closed. Respondent no.1/Smt Dulari Devi and others protested against the closure of the application. In response, the Secretary of the Welfare Board suggested to file affidavits to overcome the objections raised by the Welfare Board. As per records one, Ms Badam Verva, who was in a similar situation, filed an affidavit in substitution of the renewal receipts. Since Ms Badam Verva application for pension was not processed by the Welfare Board, she approached this Court, where High Court issued directions to consider the affidavit filed by Ms Badam Verva. Respondent no.1/Smt Dulari Devi, taking note of this Order filed affidavit on 10.05.2022, but the Welfare Board rejected the application for pension vide order dated 23.08.2022. Aggrieved by the order dated 23.08.2022, respondent no.1/Smt Dulari Devi filed WP (C) 13969/2022 which was disposed vide the impugned judgment.  

Contentions of the appellant: 

Under the BOCW Act and BOCW Rules, a building worker is not entitled to pension solely upon reaching 60 years of age. The building worker is required to apply for pension in the prescribed form, in accordance with Rule 272 of the BOCW Rules. Section 14(2) of BOCW Act, provides that a construction worker would be eligible for a pension if he fulfils the following criteria. (i)He should have attained the age of 60 years. (ii) He should have been a beneficiary continuously for three (3) years immediately before reaching the age of 60. The explanation to Section 14 (2) permits inclusion in the stipulated timeframe, i.e., three (3) years, any period for which the building worker has been a beneficiary with any other Welfare Board immediately before his registration with the concerned Welfare Board. Since the deceased, Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta had been registered with the Welfare Board only for three months, between 17.12.2007 and 17.03.2008, he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria as provided in Section 14(2) of the BOCW Act. The impact of the impugned judgment is that any person who acquires membership of the Welfare Board, even for a day between the prescribed age span, i.e., 18 years and 60 years, is entitled for pension and such an interpretation by the learned Single Judge would put severe financial burden on the Welfare Board. The Supreme Court in in NCC-CL v. Union of India & Ors. Held; pension constitutes permanent liability which the states may not be able to sustain in the long term, the State Welfare Boards may formulate pension schemes depending upon their financial capacity. However, pension should be admissible to only those registered of 10 years. In this regard the State Welfare Board should issue a certificate to the effect that a BOC worker has remained registered for a period of 10 years.

Contentions of the respondent: 

BOCW Act is a welfare legislation and under Section 22(1)(a) to (g) of the BOCW Act and Clause (h) of Section 22(1) of the BOCW Act, the Welfare Board can make provisions for and improvement of such other welfare measures and facilities. As far as pension payment to beneficiaries was concerned, as per Section 22 (1) (b) pension would be paid to beneficiaries who completed 60 years of age. This provision had to be read with Section 2(1)(b), which defines beneficiary as a building worker registered under Section 12 of the BOCW Act. Section 12, provides that only that building worker could register himself with the Welfare Board who had completed 18 years of age but had not reached 60 years of age and who had been engaged in any building or construction work for not less than 90 days for the preceding 12 months. Under Section 14 of the BOCW Act, the registration acquired by the building worker ceases once the building worker attain 60 or when he is not engaged in building or other construction work for 90 days or more in a year. Under Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 14 (1), the Board had power to make provisions or improvements in the welfare measures and facilities as may be prescribed from time to time. A building worker could avail welfare measures or improvements only if he had been a beneficiary for at least three years immediately preceding the date he completed 60 years of age. For availing pension, the building worker was not required to fulfil the criteria stipulated in Section 14(2). No eligibility criteria was provided in the BOCW Act for a pension grant. The eligibility criteria was, provided in Rule 272 of the BOCW Rules wherein, a building worker, who was a member of the fund would become eligible for pension upon completion of 60 years of age, if he had been working for not less than one year after the commencement of the BOCW Rules. It was contended that contrary to the submissions advanced on behalf of the Welfare Board, there was no inconsistency between the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules.  

Issues:  

Whether Smt. Dulari Devi would be entitled to receive pension in terms of the BOCW Act read with the BOCW Rules? 

Legal provisions:

 Section 12 of the BOCW Act- there is no restriction for a worker to avail or get registered after fulfilling the conditions. 
Section 14(2) of BOCW Act- The members of the export committee shall be paid such fees and allowances for attending the meetings of the committee as may be prescribed.

Courts analysis and judgement: 

There is no contestation that Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta was a building worker within the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(1)(e) of the BOCW Act. There is no dispute that Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta fulfilled the criteria for registration as a beneficiary, as prescribed under Section 125 of the BOCW Act. Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta’s application for registration renewal was allowed on 31.01.2012. The exercise of the power of registration/renewal in Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta’s case, as observed in the order dated 16.04.2021 was in in accordance to Section 17 of the BOCW Act. It is not disputed that Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta had deposited Rs.532/- as his contribution for the period between 17.03.2008 and 16.10.2012. The renewal of registration as a beneficiary would relate back to March 2008 and therefore, on the date Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta reached 60, he fulfilled the eligibility criteria concerning registration and crossing the threshold of 60 years of age to claim a pension from the Welfare Board. The point to considered as whether Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta should have been registered as a beneficiary in the immediately preceding three years before attaining the age of 60 years as for claiming pension? Under Section 22 (1) (a) to (g) of the BOCW Act invest in the Welfare Board power to accord specific benefits to registered beneficiaries. The Welfare Board has been, among other things, conferred with a specific power to grant pensions to beneficiaries who have reached 60 years of age. However, the BOCW Act does not provide eligibility criteria as regards the qualifying period for which the building worker should have worked before he reached 60. The stipulated eligibility criteria of having been a beneficiary for at least three (03) years preceding the date when the beneficiary completes 60 years of age cannot apply to specific benefits which are the subject matter of Section 22 (1) (a) to (g). Pension is one such specific benefit, provided in Section 22 (1) (a) to (g), and cannot be controlled by the eligibility criteria provided in sub- Section (2) of Section 14. The eligibility criteria concerning pensions are expressly provided in Rule 272 of BOCW Rules 8. The said provision, in no uncertain terms, states that a member of the fund who is a building worker would be eligible for a pension on reaching 60 years of age if he has worked for a period of not less than one year. Although Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta had asserted that he had been working as a building worker in Delhi for several decades before his registration with the Welfare Board on 17.12.2007, even if it is assumed that he commenced his work from the said date, he would have met the minimum eligibility criteria of one year provide in Rule 272 before the date when he completed the age of 60 years. 21. It is not disputed that Shri Gauri Shankar Gupta turned 60 on 01.01.2009, at which point he had already worked as a building worker for more than one (01) year. Therefore, the order dated 23.08.2022 passed by the Welfare Board was contrary to the provisions of the BOCW Act and BOCW Rules. The object and purpose of the BOCW Act is not only to regulate employment and conditions of service for building workers but also to provide safety, health, and other welfare measures from time to time. The Welfare Board, have to find resources, like increasing the rate of levy of cess, to gather funds to extend benefits to building workers. The financial burden that may fall on the Welfare Board cannot be a basis for non-implementation of the will of the legislature, which can very well be gathered in the scheme of the BOCW Act and Rules. In view of the aforesaid reasons, it is not required to interfere with the impugned judgment and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.  

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Delhi High Court Navigates Quorum Quandaries and Remedies in PMLA Appeals 

Case Title: Gold Croft Properties Pvt Ltd vs. Directorate of Enforcement 

Date of Decision: 19th September 2023 

Case Number: LPA 167/2023 

Coram: Hon’ble Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Subramonium Prasad 

 

Introduction 

 

This case involves an appeal against a judgment passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition. The appellant, Gold Croft Properties Pvt Ltd, challenged an order by the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which denied their application for deferment of proceedings. The appellant contended that the Adjudicating Authority was not properly constituted at the time. This appeal aims to contest the Single Judge’s decision upholding the Adjudicating Authority’s order.  

   

Factual Background 

 

The case arose when the State Bank of India filed a complaint in August 2020 alleging the diversion of funds by the accused for purposes other than those the funds were availed for. An FIR was subsequently registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in February 2022 for various offenses. The appellant was not initially named as an accused in this FIR. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered an ECIR against the appellant and others, followed by a Provisional Attachment Order in September 2022. The ED filed a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority in October 2022 for the confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Order.  

   

The appellant also mentioned that a chargesheet related to the predicate offense had been filed by the CBI. The appellant then filed an application before the Adjudicating Authority, which is the subject of this appeal, arguing that the Adjudicating Authority lacked a proper quorum as required under the PMLA and that they had not been supplied with a copy of ‘Reasons to Believe’ by the ED, which led to the Provisional Attachment Order.  

   

Legal Issues 

 

  1. Whether the Adjudicating Authority had the required quorum under the PMLA. 
  2. Whether the appellant should have approached the Appellate Tribunal instead of filing a writ petition. 
  3. Whether the application for deferment of proceedings was maintainable. 
  4. Whether the Provisional Attachment Order was justified under the PMLA. 

   

Contentions 

 

  • Appellant’s Argument: The appellant argued that the Adjudicating Authority lacked the required quorum as specified under the PMLA. They also contended that their application should not have been rejected without a proper hearing, and a single-member bench was not in accordance with the PMLA.  
  • Respondent’s Argument: The ED argued that the application was not maintainable, as the Appellate Tribunal provided an alternative remedy. They also defended the validity of the Provisional Attachment Order and the composition of the Adjudicating Authority.  

   

Observation and Analysis 

 

The court reviewed the Provisional Attachment Order and the complaint, finding that the Order was based on a detailed analysis of various documents and materials. It concluded that the Adjudicating Authority had sufficient grounds to believe that the appellant possessed proceeds of crime.  

   

The court also clarified that the PMLA allows for the formation of single-member benches, citing precedent from an earlier case (J Sekar vs. Union of India & Ors). The application filed by the appellant requesting a two-member bench was deemed not maintainable.  

   

Decision of the Court 

 

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the Single Judge, and found that the writ petition filed by the appellant was not maintainable. It held that the appellant should have pursued the statutory remedies provided by the PMLA, including the option to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. 

 

 

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Written by – Ananya Chaudhary 

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Delhi High Court Clarifies MSME Act’s Applicability: Timing of Registration Matters 

Case Title: JKS Infrastructure Private Limited v. MSME Facilitation Council and Others 

Date of Decision: 18th September 2023 

Case Number: W.P.(C) 16567/2022 

Coram: Justice Prathiba M. Singh 

 

Introduction 

 

This case involves a petition filed by JKS Infrastructure Private Limited (the petitioner) seeking an order to set aside a reference made by the MSME Facilitation Council (Respondent No.1) under section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act), and subsequent proceedings initiated based on the said reference. The dispute arose between the petitioner and Lamba Techno Flooring Solutions (Respondent No.3), leading to a reference to arbitration. 

 

Facts 

 

  • The petitioner, JKS Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., filed a petition seeking the setting aside of the reference UDYAM-DL-10-0032365/M/00003 dated 10th September 2022, made by Respondent No.1 (MSME Facilitation Council) under section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act).  
  • The dispute arose between the petitioner and Respondent No.3 (Lamba Techno Flooring Solutions), which led to a reference to arbitration by Respondent No.1.  
  • The petitioner argued that the MSME Act did not apply as the purchase order and invoice between the petitioner and Respondent No.3 were dated before Respondent No.3’s registration as an MSME on 8th February 2021. 

   

Legal Issue 

 

Whether the MSME Act is applicable when the registration as an MSME occurred after the completion of the works or services? 

   

Contentions 

 

The petitioner contends that the MSME Act does not apply because the purchase order and invoice were dated before Respondent No.3’s registration as an MSME. This argument is based on the timing of registration relative to the contract.  

 

Legal Principles 

 

  • Registration under the MSME Act must occur before entering into a contract for the benefits of the Act to apply retroactively.  
  • The registration’s timing determines the Act’s applicability to goods and services supplied, with the Act applying only prospectively to post-registration supplies. 

   

Observation and Analysis 

 

The Court considered recent judgments in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Prakash, and M/s. Grand Mumtaz Hotel v. Deputy Commissioner North East Government of NCT of Delhi to resolve the legal issue. These judgments emphasized that registration under the MSME Act must occur before the contract and supply of goods or services for the Act’s benefits to apply. Registration after the fact does not grant retrospective benefits under the MSME Act.  

   

Decision of the Court 

 

In light of the legal precedent established in the aforementioned judgments, the Court ruled that if registration under the MSME Act occurs after the completion of works or the execution of the contract, the Act would not be applicable. Therefore, the impugned references were quashed. Respondents were advised to pursue remedies in accordance with the law.  

 

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Written by – Ananya Chaudhary 

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