Tag Archives: #BOMBAY HIGH COURT

INTRODUCTION

The High Court of Bombay passed a judgement on 26 May 2023. In the case of RAJU DHONDIRAM AKRUPE Vs STATE OF MAHA. THR. PRIN. SECRETARY (DRUGS) MEDICAL EDUCATION AND DRUGS DEPT. AND ORS IN WRIT PETITION NO. 6239 OF 2023 which was passed by a division bench comprising of HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE ABHAY AHUJA and HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M. M. SATHAYE, the court deliberated on a petition seeking to quash an interim order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal (MAT). The petitioner, a government employee, had requested age relaxation to participate in the selection process for a higher post through nomination and appear in an upcoming examination. This blog will examine the key arguments presented, the court’s analysis, and the ultimate judgment rendered in this case.

FACTS

The petitioner, employed as a Food Safety Officer, was 39 years old and aimed to appear for the Combined Civil Services Preliminary Examination 2023 conducted by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission (MPSC). Citing the Bombay Civil Services, Classification, and Recruitment Rules of 1939 (the “1939 Rules”), along with a government circular from 2003 and a previous court decision, the petitioner sought age relaxation as a government servant. The petitioner argued that the 1939 Rules, despite being formulated prior to India’s independence and the Constitution, were still valid and applicable.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS

The petitioner’s counsel argued that the 1939 Rules entitled government servants to upper age relaxation. Although the petitioner had crossed the general category’s age limit of 38 years, being 39 years old, the counsel contended that the 1939 Rules still held legal authority. They referred to Rule 7 of the 1939 Rules, which outlined the qualifications for candidates in terms of age and education for government service appointments. Specifically, Note 3B under Rule 7 allowed for an exception to the upper age limit for government servants. The counsel maintained that the government circular issued in 2003, limiting age relaxation for government servants, contravened the 1939 Rules, which had statutory force.

PETITIONER’S ORIGINAL APPLICATION

In the original application filed before the MAT, the petitioner sought complete age relaxation for selection through nomination based on the 1939 Rules, the 2003 government circular, and a prior court decision. Additionally, the petitioner requested a declaration that the exclusion of an upper age limit in the advertisement for in-service candidates was illegal and unconstitutional. They further sought a direction to the state government to adopt and amend the Recruitment Rules and a direction to the MPSC to incorporate the amendment as a qualification in the selection process for the advertised post.

MAT INTERIM ORDER AND SUBSEQUENT COURT ANALYSIS

The MAT rejected the petitioner’s interim application, stating that the 1939 Rules did not mention selection by nomination as it was introduced after independence. The MAT also noted that the Rules of 1986, which governed the upper age limit for recruitment by nomination, did not provide age relaxation for government servants. Based on the Recruitment Rules of 2013 and 2022 for the post of Assistant Commissioner (Food)-cum-Designated Officer (Group A), the MAT determined that the 1939 Rules were inapplicable. The MAT concluded that no case was made out by the petitioner and rejected the interim relief application.

In the subsequent court analysis, the court concurred with the MAT’s interpretation. The court observed that the 1939 Rules did not address selection by nomination. They referred to the Recruitment Rules of 1986 and subsequent Rules, which did not provide age relaxation for government servants. The court noted that the Recruitment Rules of 2022 were applicable, and as they did not permit age relaxation beyond 38 years, the petitioner’s argument for relaxation was untenable. The court emphasized that public employment law was primarily governed by statutory rules, and unless specific rules permitted age relaxation, it could not be granted.

CASE LAW

In its analysis, the court cited the precedent set by the case of Anil Motilal Nimbhure vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (Writ Petition No.6179 of 2007, decided on 7th January 2008) where the court had held that the 1939 Rules were not applicable to selection by nomination. The court emphasized that this precedent was binding, and the petitioner’s reliance on the 1939 Rules was misplaced. As a result, the court concluded that the petitioner’s case lacked merit, and the interim relief was rightly rejected by the MAT.

JUDGMENT

Considering the arguments presented and the relevant legal provisions, the court held that the petitioner was not entitled to age relaxation for selection through nomination. The court affirmed the decision of the MAT, stating that the 1939 Rules did not apply to the present case and that the Recruitment Rules of 2022 governed the selection process. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition seeking to quash the MAT’s interim order.

CONCLUSION

This judgment underscores the significance of statutory rules in public employment cases and reiterates that age relaxation can only be granted if explicitly provided for by the applicable rules. The court’s analysis demonstrates the importance of legal precedent and the binding nature of earlier court decisions. This judgment serves as a reminder that thorough understanding and interpretation of the relevant laws and rules are vital for petitioners seeking relief in public employment matters.

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INTRODUCTION

The High Court of Bombay: Nagpur Bench passed a judgement on 19 April 2023. In the case of DIVYA MUKESH CHAWDA Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. SECRETARY, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPT. MUMBAI AND OTHERS IN WRIT PETITION NO.6971/2022 which was passed by a division bench comprising of HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE R. B. DEO and HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE VRUSHALI V. JOSHI the Court reviewed a case where a petitioner challenged the decision of the Scrutiny Committee to invalidate her claim of belonging to the Mochi Scheduled Caste. The petitioner’s claim was based on various documents and a genealogical tree provided to establish her caste identity. The Court carefully examined the evidence and ultimately ruled in favour of the petitioner, emphasizing the committee’s errors in disregarding the presented documents. This blog post will delve into the details of the case, highlighting the key arguments and the Court’s reasoning.

BACKGROUND

The petitioner, a student at Kapadia Gujarati Junior College in Amravati, sought a caste validity certificate to verify her claim as a member of the Mochi Scheduled Caste. After submitting the necessary documents, including validation certificates of her family members, the Vigilance Cell conducted an inquiry and confirmed the authenticity of the provided documents. However, the Scrutiny Committee issued a notice to the petitioner, demanding additional pre-constitution documents and questioning her relationship with one of the validation certificate holders, Shailesh Vallabh Chawada.

THE SCRUTINY COMMITTEE’S DECISION

In its decision, the Scrutiny Committee contended that the petitioner failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish her caste identity as Mochi. They reasoned that the petitioner had not submitted any pre-constitution documents, and the committee referred to a judgment by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, which stated that the Mochi caste did not fall under the Scheduled Caste category.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioner, through her counsel, argued that the Scrutiny Committee erred in discarding the validity certificates of her family members. The counsel emphasized that the High Court’s judgment was irrelevant to the case. It was further asserted that the petitioner had submitted four validity certificates of her cousins, including one of her real cousin brothers, Shailesh Chawada, along with a genealogical tree proving their relationship.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND DECISION

Upon careful examination of the case, the Court noted that the documents submitted by the petitioner, which referred to her caste as Mochi, were not questioned for their authenticity. However, the committee rejected her claim based on the petitioner’s father’s statement that their family originally hailed from Gujarat. According to the committee, the Maharashtra law stipulated that only Mochis from specific districts were declared as Scheduled Caste.

The Court acknowledged that the burden of proving the claim lies with the petitioner, as per the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, 2000. Nevertheless, the Court found fault with the committee’s approach. The Vigilance Cell’s inquiry had not questioned the petitioner’s relationship with Shailesh, and the Court believed the petitioner should have been given notice to provide additional documentary evidence to establish this relationship.

The Court found merit in the petitioner’s case since her family had settled in Maharashtra well before independence. Notably, a pre-constitution entry in a school admission register referred to the petitioner’s grandfather, Velji Shamji Chawada, as Mochi. The Court held that the committee erred by applying the amended presidential order relevant to Gujarat, rather than considering the pre-constitution evidence from Maharashtra.

In light of these findings, the Court set aside the Scrutiny Committee’s order and granted the petitioner’s prayer for quashing the order and directing the committee to issue her a validity certificate for her caste, Mochi, within one month.

CONCLUSION

This judgment highlights the importance of a fair and meticulous examination of evidence when determining caste validity claims. The Court’s decision recognized the significance of pre-constitution documents and concluded that the Scrutiny Committee had erred in disregarding them. By setting aside the committee’s order, the Court upheld the petitioner’s right to establish her caste identity and receive a validity certificate. This ruling serves as a reminder of the need for careful consideration and adherence to the law in caste validity proceedings.

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INTRODUCTION

The High Court of Bombay: Nagpur Bench passed a judgement on 10 March 2023. In the case of ARUN THUTE LOKVIKAS PRATISTHAN HINGANGHAT THR. PRESIDENT SMT. USHAKIRAN A. THUTE AND OTHERS Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THR. SECRETARY TO MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, MUMBAI AND OTHERS IN WRIT PETITION NO.1648/2022 which was passed by a division bench comprising of HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE R. B. DEO and HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE VRUSHALI V. JOSHI the court addressed the issue of the arbitrary rejection of an appointment by the Deputy Director of Education. The case revolved around the appointment of a peon in a school managed by an institution. The rejection was based on the grounds that the appointment was made during a period when there was a ban on recruitment to Class-C and Class-D posts. The court analysed the circumstances and the applicable laws to arrive at a decision.

FACTS

The petitioners, comprising the institution managing the school and the selected candidate for the peon position, sought permission to fill the vacant post. The Deputy Director of Education granted permission to fill the post, and the institution proceeded with the recruitment process. A suitable candidate was selected, and the appointment order was issued. However, later on, the approval for the appointment was rejected by the Deputy Director, citing the ban on recruitment during that period.

THE JUDGMENT

The court examined the grounds of rejection and considered the arguments put forth by both parties. The petitioners contended that the appointment was made after following due procedure, obtaining the necessary permission, and fulfilling all requirements. They highlighted that the appointment was for a clear and permanent vacancy and that the selected candidate belonged to the Other Backward Category.

The Deputy Director, on the other hand, argued that the institution should have stopped the recruitment process even after receiving permission, as the responsibility lay with them. They also mentioned that the previous Deputy Director granted permission without verifying the availability of surplus employees.

The court noted that the rejection of the appointment approval was solely based on the fact that it was made during the period of the recruitment ban. The Deputy Director referred to a government resolution that imposed the ban and subsequent extensions. However, the court found that the recruitment process had already commenced before the imposition of the ban, as evidenced by the permission granted prior to the ban.

The court drew parallels to a similar case decided by a Coordinate Bench and a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the precedent case, the court held that the ban on recruitment would not apply if the process was already initiated by the management. The Apex Court ruled that the ban should not negate the approval already given for filling grant-in-aid posts.

CONCLUSION

After considering the submissions and the applicable legal precedents, the court found the rejection of the appointment approval to be arbitrary. It emphasized that the petitioner had been appointed in a clear and permanent vacancy with permission granted before the ban was imposed. The court noted that the authorities could have cancelled or revoked the permission if necessary. Consequently, the court quashed the impugned order and directed the Deputy Director to grant approval for the appointment, along with the release of the petitioner’s salary from the date of joining.

This judgment highlights the importance of adhering to due process and ensuring that decisions are not arbitrary. It serves as a reminder that the imposition of bans on recruitment should not disregard the rights and legitimate expectations of individuals and institutions. The judgment provides clarity on the applicability of bans and the protection of approvals granted before their imposition.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY VETHIKA D PORWAL, BMS COLLEGE OF LAW

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