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NIACL Triumphs: Supreme Court Validates Insurance Claim Rejection in Tata Steel Case

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Case Title – New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. 2024 INSC 356

Case Number – SLP (C) No. 10001 of 2009, C.A. No. 5242-5243 of 2009

Dated on – 30th April, 2024

Quorum – Justice K. V. Viswanathan

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. 2024 INSC 356, the insured had an insurance policy with the New India Assurance Company Limited (NIACL) covering their complete machinery of the mill, paying a premium of Rupees 62,09,655/-. On the 12th of December,1998, the 20 Hi Cold Rolling Mill was destroyed by a fire causing them a claimed loss of Rupees 35.08 Crores. NIACL was informed instantly, and surveyors were appointed. On dated 29th January,1999, a claim of Rupees 35.08 Crores was filed, based on the replacement quotations. On dated 24th March, 1999, NIACL transferred Rupees 4,92,80,905/. Rupees 29.60 crores were spent by the insured on a new 6 Hi Cold Rolling Mill to restart the operations. The insured agreed to accept an amount of Rupees 20.9 crores as a final settlement to avoid any detains. The NIACL further did not release the remaining balance resulting in the institution of a consumer complaint Case No. 233 of 2000 on the dated 30th May, 2000. NIACL appointed surveyors instantly post the fire and made interim payments on the basis of their reports. The final Joint Surveyors’ Report assessed the losses at Rupees 19.55 Crores and Rupees 13.51 crores for replacement and depreciation respectively on dated 11th December,2001. NIACL claimed that the insured informed them about the new 6 Hi Cold Mill on dated 27th March, 2002 which was in contrast to the claim for the reestablishment of the 20 Hi Cold Rolling Mill. The Claim was duly settled by the NIACL at Rupees 7.88 Crores, citing that the replacement mill was of lesser capacity.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

  1. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the subsistence of the reestablishment value clause in the insurance policy, which stated that the method of the indemnity should be the cost of replacing or reestablishing the damaged property with a property of the same type, but not superior or more comprehensive than the insured property when new and that this clause compels the insured to reestablish the damaged property within 12 months or within an extended period, or else, the clause stands futile.
  2. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the insured failed to take requisite steps for the reestablishment despite abundant opportunities provided by the NIACL and that the delay on the part of the insured in providing necessary information and taking action for the purpose of reestablishment. They contended that the delay on the part of the insured in providing requisite information and taking actions related to reestablishment. Further, the damaged property’s repair was delayed.
  3. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) faultily neglected their affidavit vindicating the calculation of depreciation at 60% and that there were no standard guidelines for depreciation calculation and that their conduct, including seeking a revised calculation from the surveyors, was apt as per the situation.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that existence of the reestablishment value clause in the policy document issued by the NIACL, asserting it was never received by them and that the Clause 9 of the policy conditions, which pertains to reestablishment, should be read in combination with any such clause.
  2. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the clause 9 of the policy applies when reestablished or repair is not possible, as assessed by the surveyor and cited the judgment in the Oswal Plastic Industries.
  3. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the depreciation should be calculated either on the sum insured or on the cost of a new locally sourced 20 Hi Cold Rolling Machine and that the NIACL failed to provide competent reasons for directing apart from the recommendation of the surveyors for 32% depreciation and that the doctrine of contra proferentem should be applied in their favour. 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 64 UM (2) of the Insurance Act, 1938 prescribes that the surveyors and loss assessors must follow the code of conduct for their duties, responsibilities, and other professional requirements as specified by the regulations made under the Act.
  2. Regulation 9(3) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (Protection of Policyholders’ Interest) Regulations, 2002 prescribes that if an insurer receives an incomplete survey report, they must ask the surveyor to provide an additional report on specific issues. The insurer must also notify the insured about the delay that may occur in the claim assessment if the insured doesn’t provide all the required information or doesn’t cooperate with the surveyor.

ISSUES 

  1. The main issue of the case revolved around whether the claim of Tata Steel for the loss incurred due to the circumstance of the fire incident covered under the insurance policy with NIACL?
  2. Whether the NIACL rightfully rejected the claim on the basis of the exclusion and conditions of the policy?

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. 2024 INSC 356, scrutinized the terms and conditions of the insurance policy between the Appellant and the Respondent to determine the coverage for the loss incurred. The court inspected the specified provisions, exclusions, and conditions of the insurance policy to ascertain if the Respondents’ claim came under the ambit of coverage. The court took into consideration any evidence or documentations provided by both the parties concerning the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The court discovered that the claim of the Tata Steel comes within the ambit of policy exclusion or conditions, upholding the rejection of the claim of NIACL. The judgment of the court provided a conclusive resolution to the dispute between the parties regarding the insurance coverage for the loss from the fire incident.

The court thus in this case, allowed the appeal of the NIACL and set aside the order of the NCDRC. The court observed that the claim was rightly settled by the NIACL letter dated 3rd January,2003 which determined the loss amount payable at Rupees 7.88 crores after applying 60% depreciation. The court dismissed the appeal instituted by the Insured-Respondent.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

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Dowry harassment case revived by Supreme Court, challenging the jurisdiction ruling of the High Court

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Case Title – Priyanka Jaiswal Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. 2024 INSC 357

Case Number – Criminal Appeal No. 2344 of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (CRL) No. 10668 of 2022

Dated on – 30th April,2024

Quorum – Justice Aravind Kumar

FACTS OF THE CASE 

In the case of Priyanka Jaiswal Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. 2024 INSC 357, the Appellant and the Respondent No.8 were espoused twice on the date 5th of October,2018 in Kolkata and on date 18th of January, 2019 in Jamshedpur. The accusations in this present case are inclusive of abuse by the in-laws concerning the dowry demands, abuse, and physical assault. The Appellant in the present case, lodged a complaint on the 4th of March,2021 which resulted in an institution of an FIR No. 68 of 2021 against Respondent 3 to 8. The Respondents did not reply to the investigation notices resulting in the issuance of Non-Bailable warrants. The Respondents 3 and 4, on date 17th of June, 2021, were arrested with others filing the applications for bail. The Appellant in this case, challenged the order dated 16th of June, 2022 of the Jharkhand High Court in Cr.M. P No. 1291 of 2021, which quashed the proceedings against the Respondent No. 3 to 8 for the offenses under Sections 323, 498A, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with the Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act), and the Non-Bailable warrants were issued against them.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

  1. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the it was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings on the basis of non-compliance with the Section 41A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
  2. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the complaint perspicuously reveals the offenses and that the High Court should not have intervened with the process of investigation
  3. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the High Court faultily considered the territorial jurisdiction on the basic of the residency, ignoring the facts related to the jurisdiction.
  4. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the application of the High Court of principles from the case of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh was erroneous.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the High Court justifiably quashed the proceedings.
  2. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case cited the reason for quashing the proceedings as non-compliance with Section 41A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
  3. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case cited the reason for quashing the proceedings as the lack of jurisdiction as per the allegations.
  4. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case cited the reason for quashing the proceedings as the generic and omnibus nature of allegations against them.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt
  2. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the Punishment for husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty
  3. Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the Punishment for Intentional insult with intend to provoke breach of peace
  4. Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the Punishment for Criminal Intimidation
  5. Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 prescribes the Penalty for giving or taking dowry
  6. Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 prescribes the Penalty for demanding dowry
  7. Section 41A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 states the Notice of appearance before police officer

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Priyanka Jaiswal Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. 2024 INSC 357, stated that the court cannot conduct a mini trial or entertain evidence at the stage of quashing the proceedings. The court stated that the complaints contain the specified accusations against the Respondent 3,4, and 8 and thus, quashing was erred. The court regarding the territorial jurisdiction, stated that the residency of the Appellant at Jamshedpur was sufficient for the purpose of jurisdiction. The court in this case ruled that the accusations in the complaint must disclose a prima facie case against the accused and that the lack of specific details in the complaint doesn’t justify the quashing proceedings. The court in this case, set aside the quashing the proceedings against the Respondent No. 3,4, and 8 and upheld the Respondents 3,4, and 8 due to the lack in specific accusations. The court achieved for record-keeping purpose, any pending applications (if any).

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Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

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Supreme court upholds CESTAT view that the process of labeling/ re labeling, packing / re-packing amounts to “manufacturing”.

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Case title: Commissioner of central excise Belapur V. Jindal Drugs Ltd

Case no: Civil appeal No. 1121 of 2016 and 788-790 of 2022

Dated on: 30th April, 2024

Quorum: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Facts of the case: 
This is an Appeal against the Order dated 16.04.2015 passed by Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) against Appeal No.E/86389/13-Mum.The Respondent is engaged in the business of exporting cocoa butter and cocoa powder. Its factory at Jammu manufactures cocoa butter and cocoa powder. Respondent has another unit located at Taloja. The Cocoa butter manufactured at Jammu are received by the Respondent’s unit at Taloja. In the Taloja unit, respondent affixed two labels on two sides of the packages of the goods received from its Jammu factory and had claimed rebate of the duty paid on the exported goods. Further, respondent availed cenvat credit of the duty paid on those two goods at the time of clearance from Jammu. Respondent also imported cocoa butter and cocoa powder from China and Malaysia which was received at Taloja.  The factory of the respondent at Taloja was visited by the officials of the appellant and it was found that the respondent was not only putting labels on the good bought from the Jammu unit but also was putting labels on the imported goods. As the labels were already fixed on the boxes containing the two goods additional labels affixed did not amount to manufacture as the additional labels affixed would not enhance the marketability of the goods which were already marketable. The appellant then issued a show cause notice to the respondents on 09.10.2012 to show cause as to why activity of labelling undertaken by the respondent on the product received from the Jammu unit and also on the imported goods are not to be held as activity of manufacturing in the terms of Note 3 chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act. It was alleged that the respondent had wrongly availed cenvat credit amounting to Rs. 23,02,53,752/. from the period of June, 2008 to July 2012. It was also alleged that the rebate amounting to Rs. 13,22,30,368 from the period of June, 2008 to July, 2011 was erroneously sanctioned. Thereafter, hearing the respondent, appellant passed an order on 25.02.2013 that the cenvat credit availed was irregular and the rebate sanctioned was erroneous thereby, the respondent was made liable to refund the credit availed for Rs. 23,02,53,752/- and a rebate of Rs. 13,22,30,368/- along with interest and penalty of 23,02, 53,752/- However, the penalty could be reduced to 25%, if the assessee paid the duty within 30 days of order.   The Respondent preferred appeal before CESTAT. After hearing the matter CESTAT passed an order dated 16.04.2015 by stating that activity undertaken by respondent is covered by Note 3 to chapter 18 which amounts to manufacture and that there was no suppression or misrepresentation of the material fact by the respondent. That being the position the cenvat credit and the refund availed by the respondent was right and hence no penalty could be imposed. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has now preferred appeal. 
Contentions of the appellant: 
The activity undertaken at the Taloja unit i.e; putting labels on both the sides of the cartons that were labelled at Jammu is not a manufacturing activity. Note 3 to chapter 18 Central Excise Tariff Act cannot be read in the manner that the activity of the labelling amounted to manufacture. The Technical Member of CESTAT had given a good reason to why such an activity cannot be considered as a manufacturing activity. 
Contentions of the respondent: 
In Note 3 chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, Parliament has consciously replaced the word ‘and’ by the word ‘or’, vide amendment dated 01.03.2008, thereby making it clear that the activity of labelling or re-labelling amounted to “manufacture”. 
Legal provisions: 
Section 11A (1) of the central excise act- deals with recovery of duties not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded. 
Rule 14 of Cenvat credit rules 2004- credit has been taken wrongly or erroneously refunded. 
Rule 3 of cenvat credit rules- A manufacturer or producer of final products shall be allowed to take credit. 
Note 3 Chapter 18 Central Excise Tariff Act 
Issues: 
Whether the activity of labelling amounts to manufacture? 
Courts analysis and judgement: 
Supreme court examined the definition of “manufacture” under Section 2(f)(ii) under Central excise Act “manufacture” includes any process,- (i) incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product; 
(ii) which is specified in relation to any goods in the Section or Chapter notes of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act (5 of 1986) as amounting to manufacture; or 
(iii) which, in relation to the goods specified in the Third Schedule, involves packing or repacking of such goods in a unit container or labelling or re-labelling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to render the product marketable to the consumer, and the word “manufacturer” shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account;  Therefore, the word ‘manufacture’ includes any process which is incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product; any process specified in Section or chapter notes of the first schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act or any process in relations to goods specified in 3rd schedule which involves packing or re-packing, labelling or re-labelling, declaration or alteration of retail sales price or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to render the product marketable. Further, post-amendment of 01.03.2008 to Note 3 to chapter 18 of the Central Excise and Tariff Act, “manufacture” contemplates any of the three processes. The three process are- 
i) labelling or re-labelling of containers; or 
ii) repacking from bulk packs to retail packs; or 
iii) the adoption of any other treatment to render the product marketable to the consumer.  If any one of the above three processes is satisfied then the same would amount to “manufacture” under Section 2 (f) (ii) of the Central Excise Act. There is no dispute as to the activity carried out by the respondent at the Taloja unit. Whether the goods are brought from Jammu or are imported, those re-labelled on both the sides of the pack containing the goods at the Taloja unit and thereafter, introduced in the market or sent for exports, in terms of Note 3 to the chapter 18 this process of re-labelling amounts to “manufacture”. The view taken by the CESTAT is correct and no case for interference is made out. Accordingly, the civil appeal 788-790 of 2022 stands dismissed.

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Supreme Court Directs Bombay High Court to Scrutinize Legality of Advocates’ Filed ‘Minutes of Order’

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Case Title: Ajay Ishwar Ghute and Ors V. Meher K. Patel and Ors

Case no: Civil appeal No. 4786 of 2024

Dated on: 30th April, 2024

Quorum: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Facts of the case:

An Arbitration Petition was filed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before single judge of Bombay High court wherein consent terms were filed in the arbitration petition preferred by the first respondent. In terms of the consent terms the learned single judge recorded that the process of handing over the possession of the suit property by the respondents to the first respondents as commenced. The disputes were related to lands of Parsi Dairy Farm. The seventh respondent filed an interim application after two years of filing the consent terms by stating that High court had directed the Police to give police protection to the parties for completing the process of handing over possession. A compound wall was to be constructed in terms of the consent terms, which according, to the seventh respondent could not be done as local persons obstructed the work. The learned single judge of the Bombay High court disposed the interim application by directing Police/Tahasildar/ Collector/ Gram Panchayat office and all other Government authorities to offer assistance to construct a wall to safeguard the suit property. The persons who had obstructed the construction of the wall were not part to the arbitration proceedings/ interim application. An application was filed to Deputy Superintendent of Land Records by first respondent and five others for measuring the land who vide later dated 20.11.2021 informed the first respondent that several persons have objected, in writing, in carrying out the survey. Hence, holding an enquiry was necessary. First and second respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution for non-compliance with the orders of the Arbitration Petition regarding survey and construction of compound wall. The persons who raised objections were not impleaded in the Writ Petition. The Division Bench on 09.03.2022 ordered the Superintendent of Police to be present. The Superintendent of Police filed an affidavit stating that local tribals have gathered an impression that they were attempted to be illegally dispossessed and they insisted that the lands be demarcated before constructing the compound wall. The District Superintendent of Land Records vide an affidavit stated that there are certain persons to whom the petitioners and others have sold small portions of land and if a compound wall is constructed the third parties are likely to get landlocked. The Division bench without noticing the contentions of the above Government officers, instead of directing impleadment of the affected parties passed an order in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ dated 16.03.2022, for issuing a direction to survey authorities to carry out demarcation of the boundary and to direct the police to provide protection for constructing the compound wall.

Contentions of the appellant:

Of the thirty review petitioners Nos. 7-18 were shown as interveners in the “Minutes of order” though they had not engaged any advocate. The said interveners never met the advocate who is shown to have signed ‘Minutes of order’ on their behalf. The appellants had rights in respect of several properties which were likely to be adversely affected by the construction of the compound wall. The principles of Natural justice were not followed before permitting the construction of the compound wall. The impugned order based on ‘Minutes of order’ is completely illegal and vitiated by the non-joinder of the necessary parties.

Contentions of the respondent:

The compound wall had been built in such a manner that no person was landlocked or in any manner inconvenienced. The owners of the adjacent lands continue to enjoy unhindered and unfettered access to their respective land.

Legal provisions

Article 226- Writ Jurisdiction of High Court.

Issue: 

Whether the High court was justified in passing a order while exercising Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India permitting the first and second respondent to construct a compound wall under police protection in terms of “Minutes of Order”?

Court’s Analysis and Judgement:

The court summarised conclusions regarding the concept of Minutes of order as follows:
a) The practice of filing ‘Minutes of order’ prevails in Bombay High court the object of which is to assist the court.
b) An order passed in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ is not a consent order. It is an order in invitum.
c) The Courts to apply its mind as to whether parties likely to be affected by an order in terms ‘Minutes of order’ have been impleaded to the proceedings and whether such order is lawful? If the court finds that all parties are not impleaded the court to defer passing of the order till all the necessary parties are impleaded.
d) If the court is of the view that an order made in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ will not be lawful court should decline to pass order in terms of ‘Minutes of order’.

It was the duty of the Court to call 1st and 2nd respondent to implead persons who were likely to be affected by the construction of the compound wall. The Division Bench of the High court failed to make an enquiry as to whether the third parties will be affected by the construction of the compound wall. Hence, order dated 16.03.2022 in terms of ‘Minutes of order’ is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The writ Petition to be remanded to the High court. After remand, High court must decide who are the necessary parties to the petition in case of failure of 1st and 2nd respondents to implead the necessary parties the High court is within its power to dismiss the Writ Petition and pass an order of restoration of status quo ante by directing demolition of the compound wall.

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Delhi High Court Upholds Claim of Retired Personnel; validates Eviction Notice based on seniority.

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Case Name: Satpal Singh Sarna & Ors v. Satya Prakash Bansal 

Case No.: RC.REV. 626/2019 

Dated: April 29, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Girish Kathpalia 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

In their eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the petitioners assert that they are the owners of the ground floor shops No. 3 and 4, which are part of a larger premises. They filed this petition against their tenant, the respondent, on the grounds that the subject premises were previously owned by their mother, Smt. Kulwant Kaur, who bequeathed them to them after her death, and that the petitioners became the owners of the subject premises upon the probate of that Will. Rented to the petitioners until December 2015, the respondent acknowledged them as landlords. The subject premises have been closed and unoccupied for the past five years because the respondent moved his business to another location around five years ago. 

The petitioner No. 1 resides in and operates his business out of the remaining larger premises along with his wife and two married sons. The petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 with their spouses and kids live in Canada and continue to travel to India, but they struggle to find enough room to stay at the larger premises mentioned above. The petitioners are the owners of the aforementioned larger premises, which consist of five stores, two of which are used as godowns by the sons of petitioner No. 1 who operate under the names Sunny Shoe Point and Sunny Punjabi Juti. 

That of the three rooms on the ground floor of the Girish Kathpalia digitally signed by Girish Kathpalia, the aforementioned larger premises are divided into two rooms occupied by one son of petitioner No. 1, one room serving as a guestroom, and two rooms and a store on the first floor occupied by the other son of petitioner No. 1. Because the larger premises are in a dilapidated state and petitioners No. 2 and 3 intend to return to India in order to marry and settle their children here, they have a legitimate need for the subject premises and do not currently have any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation available to them. As a result, they want to reconstruct the larger premises in accordance with their needs. 

Once permission to contest the proceedings was granted, the respondent/tenant filed a written statement acknowledging a legal relationship of tenancy with the petitioners. However, the statement further pleaded that the requirement set up by the petitioners is not legitimate because the mother of the petitioners had previously filed an eviction petition under Section 14 of the Act, which was dismissed.  

While it is unknown when and for how long the petitioners and their families, who live in Canada, want to visit India, it is possible that they have already been there. Following the property’s eviction, the petitioners want to relet the subject space at a higher rent. Petitioner No. 1 has been engaging in a range of activities with the intention of intimidating the respondent in an attempt to have the subject premises removed. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 

The petitioners’ attorney argued that there is no legal basis for the contested order. Invoking the intervention of this court, learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the impugned decree exhibits perversity on its face.  

Invoking the intervention of this court, learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the impugned decree exhibits perversity on its face. Expert legal representation for the petitioners contended that the petitioners’ genuine want to return home at this advanced age is a prerequisite for the petition to be successful. Knowledgeable counsel for the petitioners relied on the ruling of a coordinate bench of this court in a historic case to bolster his claims. 

It was argued that insufficient information had been presented to demonstrate that Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were ending their business ventures, jobs, or commercial activities in Canada or that they intended to sell their Canadian assets in order to relocate permanently to India. The experienced Rent Controller determined that there was no need to review the other provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act after concluding that the petitioners had not demonstrated that they are a bona fide requirement of the subject premises. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

The respondent’s experienced counsel contended that this court cannot reappreciate evidence and that its authority to intervene in proceedings under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act is quite restricted. The reply contended that the petitioners had neglected to provide the Aadhar cards of the petitioners’ children on file, which would have verified their adult age. A knowledgeable attorney representing the respondent further contended that the petitioners’ requirements aren’t legitimate because they’ve been attempting to kick the respondent out in a number of ways.  

The respondent’s learned counsel contended that this court cannot reappreciate evidence and that its authority to meddle in proceedings under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act is quite limited. The respondent contended that the petitioners had neglected to provide documentation of the Aadhar cards of the petitioners’ children, which would have demonstrated their adult age.  

The respondent argued that the petitioners had failed to produce proof of the petitioners’ children’s Aadhar cards, which would have proved their adult age. The respondent’s learned counsel further contended that the requirements set forth by the petitioners are not legitimate because they have been attempting to evict the respondent through a variety of tactics.  

LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: Tenant eviction is covered under this clause. It gives landlords the right to file for eviction if they legitimately need the space for themselves or any members of their family. This clause was triggered by the petitioners’ contention that they required the subject premises for their own purposes. 
  • Proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act: A review request against the Rent Controller’s ruling is permitted by this clause. Through this revision petition, the petitioners contested the way their eviction petition was dismissed. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court noted that on the directions of his client GIRISH KATHPALIA, learned counsel for the respondent addressed a particular question during the closing arguments based on the competing pleadings. He strongly asserted in a digitally signed document that was present in the courtroom that the respondent is still using the subject premises for his business. However, after the petitioners’ skilled counsel asked and the court granted their request to name a Local Commissioner to find out the facts, the respondent and his attorney made a U-turn and acknowledged that the respondent had not been using the subject premises for a number of years.  

The court, after determining the appropriate level of leverage to offer a tenant is contingent upon this factor. It was typical for the tenant to keep the leased property locked because they were unable or unwilling to utilise it, hoping to intimidate the landlord into accepting an offer of money in exchange for leaving. It was necessary to stop these activities since they seriously undermine the goals of the rent control laws. 

The court noted that there is no question about the fact that petitioner No. 1 and his family live in India, while the other petitioners and their families live abroad. Furthermore, there is no substantial disagreement, as demonstrated by the pleadings and documentation, about the fact that the petitioners are at least sixty years old and their children are mature adults. The petitioners’ want to go back home and live out the remainder of their lives in their country of origin cannot be viewed suspiciously in these circumstances. 

The court ruled that it is common for Indians who live overseas to experience a deep yearning to pass away in their birthplace. It is impossible to reduce such a powerful emotional need to a mere whim or common want. In a case heard by the entire bench of this court, it was acknowledged that a landlord’s desire to live out his final years in his own home was a natural aspiration. This is especially true when the tenant withholds information that would contraindicate their desire. 

In summary, the court found no reason to doubt the veracity of the petitioners’ stated desire to return home and settle down here after their children are married here in their birth country due to the complete lack of specific pleadings from the respondent, the complete lack of affirmative evidence, and the lack of a productive cross-examination. The petitioners’ plan to re-construct the larger premises is justified by the fact that, given the size of their families and the growing families of their grown children, the space available to them in the said premises would undoubtedly be insufficient. As a result, their requirement of the subject premises is certainly bonafide. 

 

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora. 

 

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