The explanation of section 21 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 states that because the contract has become incapable of specific performance, it does not preclude the Court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this Section. This judgment was delivered by single bench comprising hon’ble Justice Rajiv Shakdher at Delhi High Court in the matter of Shri Vijay Israni v. Shri Salim Lalvani [CS (OS) – 1995 OF 2008].

The ATS concerns offer of half unified offer in a developed property situated at A-1/149, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110029 [hereafter alluded to as “suit property”] by Mr. Lalvani for Mr. Israni. The absolute thought which Mr. Israni was needed to pay Mr. Lalvani under the ATS was Rs. 4 crores. The ATS records that out of the all-out thought of Rs. 4 crores, Rs. 5,00,000 was paid by Mr. Israni to Mr. Lalvani at the hour of its execution. Besides, regarding Clause 2.1 of the ATS, inside 60 days of its execution, two concurrent advances hosted to be taken by the gatherings. Consequently, while Mr. Lalvani was needed to execute a General Power of Attorney [GPA] and uncommon intensity of lawyer [SPA] for Mr. Israni, the last for example Mr. Israni was needed to transmit Rs. 3,18,91,000/ – as “clear assets” to the predetermined ledger of Mr. Lalvani.

The matter was taken up for hearing on 30.07.2020 on account of an application [i.e., I.A. No. 6053/2020] moved on behalf of Mr. Israni by Mr. Pragyan Sharma, Advocate. Although there was an affidavit of Mr. Israni dated 20.07.2020 on record, on that date, Mr. Pragyan Sharma sought time to file an affidavit in terms of order dated 09.07.2020 by 31.07.2020. The matter was directed to be listed on 04.08.2020. In the interregnum, Mr. Israni filed an affidavit dated 31.07.2020. On 04.08.2020, initially, there was no appearance on behalf of Mr. Israni.

The Hon’ble HC while deciding upon this case stated that in the facts of the instant case, as noticed above, Mr. Israni, at no stage, sought amendment of the plaint; he had only claimed the relief of specific performance. That right was available to Mr. Israni, which, for whatever reason, he chose not to exercise. Mr. Israni abandoned his relief for specific performance once he was unable to deposit Rs. 14,50,00,000/- with the Registry of this Court. Clearly, if the amendment for compensation/damages was sought, the parameters would have to be stricter. However, at this stage, it is only in the realm of speculation as to how one would have approached the matter, if such a plea was raised Therefore, in my opinion, the submission advanced on behalf of Mr. Israni that he should be paid compensation/damages in the facts of the instant case is misconceived and is, consequently, rejected. In any event, any relief for compensation/damages would require evidence for quantification, if nothing else. There is, concededly, no such evidence on the record as Mr. Israni prosecuted the case on one single plank which was to claim the relief for specific performance. Given the foregoing, I find no merit in the case. The suit is, accordingly, dismissed. Costs will follow the result in the suit.

[Please click here to view the judgment]

This Judgment was delivered by the single bench comprising Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Mohammad Rafiq & Hon’ble Justice Biswanath Rath of Odisha High Court in the matter of Pravakar Behera v. P.C.Chhinchani, [W.P.(Civil) No.2293 of 2020].

This is a writ petition filed by the petitioners, a private firm; seeking interference of this Court in the tender notice dated 06.01.2020 at Annexure-4 further also praying for issuing writ of mandamus to the opposite party to allow the petitioners to execute the work under Annexure-2 series and Annexure-3 series.

Short background involving the case is that opposite party floated tender notice No.2912 dated 08.08.2018 inviting percentage rate bids on online mode for execution of certain works as specified in the table therein. It is contended that in the tender notice dated 08.08.2018, bids from eligible contractors were invited for execution of 22 numbers of works involving Jeypore Municipality, reference of which is made through Annexure-1. Further plea goes to disclose that the petitioner no.1 participated in the tender and its bid found to be competitive and responsive, petitioner no.1 was awarded with the work on deposit of initial security in respect of all works specified in the table. An agreement for execution of work in question was signed involving 22 numbers of works. The petitioner no.1, as required, also deposited the E.M.D. as well as initial security amount against each work before execution of the work. It is here alleged that the opposite party has taken back the work order in respect of Item Nos.1, 3, 16 and 19, on the ground that the estimated cost in respect of these three works was since more than fifteen lakhs for which approval of the Collector, Koraput was necessary. Withdrawing the work order, as it appears, the petitioner no.1 was advised to wait till the approval of the higher authority is obtained. It is stated that out of 22 numbers of works, petitioners claimed to have completed all other works except work under Item Nos.1, 3, 16 and 19. It is claimed that while the petitioner no.1 was continuing in his efforts, he came to notice that the opposite party has already cancelled the tender in respect of above items but without any notice.

Petitioner alleged that it has also come to notice that opposite party in the meanwhile even invited fresh tender in respect of work including some other works involving tender call notice entering into a tender call notice dated 06.01.2020. Challenging the fresh tender call notice vide Annexure-4, Sri P.Behera, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there is no reason attributed to the petitioner in cancellation of the earlier tender notice in respect of rest of the works. Learned counsel for the petitioners thus claimed that such cancellation is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is in the above premises, Sri Behera, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the opposite party is going to fresh tender without having any valid reason depriving the petitioners from completing the work involved therein becomes bad. It is also alleged that the fresh tender notice has been issued in haste and 4 there is no intimation of estimated cost in the list of work and as such tender notice, impugned herein, otherwise also becomes contrary to codal provision of the Government. It is also urged that canceling the previous tender without providing opportunity to the petitioner becomes bad.

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the hon’ble HC observed that, “In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed for having no merit with vacation of interim order dated 22.01.2020. In the circumstances there is no order as to cost. As restrictions are still continuing due to the pandemic Covid-19, learned counsel may utilize the soft copy of this judgment available in the High Court’s Official website or print out thereof at par with certified copies in the manner prescribed, vide Court’s Notice No.4587 dated 25.03.2020.”

 

Click here to read more

Section 52A (2) of NDPS Act states that only the officer in-charge of a police station or the officer who is empowered under Section 53 of NDPS Act can dispose of drugs under Section 52 A of NDPS Act. This judgment was delivered by single judge bench comprising Justice Suresh Kumar Kait at Delhi High Court in the matter of Rohit v. Central Bureau of Narcotics [CRL. M.C. 1799 of 2020]. as per para 4 of the Notification No. G.S.R. 38(E) dated 16.01.2015, in suppression of the earlier Notification G.S.R. 339(E) dated 10.05.2007 inter-alia provides that officer in charge of the police station shall within 30 days from the date of the receipt of chemical analysis report of drugs, psychotropic substances or controlled substances apply to any Magistrate under Section 52(A)(2) in terms of Annexure 2 to the said notification.

The petitioner in the present petition alleged that particular information was received mutually by Sh.D.S. Singh Superintendent (Prev.) and Sh. Praveen Dhull, Inspector, Preventive Cell, Central Bureau of Narcotics on 14.01.2020 at 10:00 hrs. that M/s Moksh Meditech is going to convey unlabeled Buprenorphine Injections and diverse sort of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substance who used to sell these medications. The informer focused on that tremendous quantity of illicit drugs containing NDPS and unlabeled Buprenorphine can be recuperated on hunt of primes. The said data was recorded in CBN-1 what’s more, insinuated to Asstt. Narcotics Commissioner, Central Bureau of Narcotics, Gwalior. In like manner, Sh. Praveen Dhull, Inspector was coordinated by the said D.S. Singh, Superintendent (Prev.) to establish a preventive gathering and make an important move right away.

On reaching at Sanjay Gandhi Transport Nagar, Sh. Praveen called two public people who were going through and presented himself and other colleagues had notified them about the mystery data received with respect to unlawful purchase and sale of NDPS medicines by a shop specifically M/s Moksh Meditech and mentioned them to be available as autonomous observer during the hunt and other lawful procedures. The two of them gave oral assent and from that point, the Preventive Team alongside the free observers came to at M/s Moksh Meditech, Cellar. The owner of the equivalent specifically Rohit (applicant in this) was discovered present. Praveen, Inspector educated the candidate about the data got by the office and educated that the hunt is to be made appropriately. Moreover, educated the candidate that he has the privilege under area 50 of NDPS, that he might be looked before the Competent Gazette Official or Magistrate closest accessible. Prior to the pursuit procedures, the above colleagues offered their own search to the candidate within the sight of autonomous observers

The Hon’ble High Court while deciding upon this matter stated that as per the prosecution case, Insp. Praveen Dhull prepared a list of recovered articles, documents, Panchnama, etc. but not by Insp. Manoj Narawal, thus, the said Manoj Narawal is neither officer incharge of the police station nor empowered under section 53A of NDPS Act who can dispose of the drugs or nor move an application before the Magistrate for disposal of drugs as defined under sub-section 2 of section 52A of NDPS Act. Moreover, the said application was moved contrary to the notification dated 10.05.2007 and 16.01.2015 of Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), Government of India. In view of above facts, provisions of Act and notification, I am of the considered opinion that orders passed by learned Magistrate and learned ASJ/Special Judge, NDPS, New Delhi are bad in law, thus, deserves to be set aside.  Accordingly, directed no sooner the seizure of any Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic and controlled Substances and Conveyances is affected, the same shall be forwarded to the officer in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer empowered under Section 53 of the Act. The officer concerned shall then approach the Magistrate with an application under Section 52A(ii) of the Act, which shall be allowed by the Magistrate as soon as may be required under Sub- Section 3 of Section 52A. The petition is accordingly, allowed and disposed of. Pending application also stands disposed of. Accordingly, order dated 09.07.2020 passed by learned Magistrate and order dated 02.09.2020 passed by learned ASJ are hereby set aside.

 

 

Click here to read more

The Supreme Court of India while adjudicating upon a criminal appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court in which the Appellant along with his relatives was sentenced for life imprisonment for conviction under the case of dowry death. The Supreme Court overturned the judgment on the basis of lack of evidence and further stated that the wife did not die an unnatural death. This ratio was load down in the case of Sandeep Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Uttrakhand & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1512-1513 of 2017.

The brief facts of the case are that the Appellant was married to the deceased wife. As per the complaint made by the deceased’s father the husband and his relatives use to torture her for dowry. A month prior to the incident the deceased and her husband had come to the father of the deceased seeking for Rs. 10 lakhs as dowry. The deceased’s father alleged that he received a call from his daughter on the day of the incident that the husband and her relatives are forcing her to drink poison as she is not paying the dowry demanded. On that very day the wife died, and the deceased’s father filed a complaint under Section 304 B of IPC for dowry death. The trial court acquitted the accused due to lack of evidence and materials placed on record. An appeal was made to the High Court and the High Court convicted the Appellant and his relatives on the basis of a different conclusion and sentenced all of them to life imprisonment. Hence the present appeal is made to the Supreme Court of India for setting aside the judgment of the High Court.

The three judge-bench of the Supreme Court carefully analyzed the evidence and material on record in the case. After due consideration the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and acquitted all the accused in the case. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the testimony of the father and brother of the deceased was contradicting and not reliable. Secondly, a demand for of a loan of Rs. 10 lakhs cannot be seen as a demand for dowry. Thirdly, the court analyzed the medical records and stated that there were no marks of injury to prove struggle before death or no poisonous substance was present in the body.  The reason for her death as per the reports were due to the underlying medical conditions of the deceased which she was suffering from a long time and was carrying out a treatment for them as well. Lastly the death of the deceased was not an unnatural death which is one of the most important evidence for conviction under dowry death. Further, the prosecution failed to place any material evidence on record to prove the case of dowry death. Hence the court stated that, “We find it certainly not a circumstance so as to draw an inference that the deceased died an unnatural death or that the appellants administered poison to her. We would think that the High Court has clearly erred in interfering with the acquittal of the appellants.”

[Please click here to view the judgment]

“Both Indian Soft-shelled Turtle and Indian Flap Shell Turtle are two different species or part of single species or a subspecies of the latter are matters of expert evidence and ought to have been decided only under trial”, this remarkable stand was forwarded by the Honorable SC in the miscellaneous appeal case of Titty Alias George Kurian V. The Deputy Range Forest Officer, [R.P(Cri.) No. 593 Of 2018)] in [C.A. No. 758 Of 2018], chaired by Hon’ble Justice Mr. Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble Justice Ms. Indu Malhotra.

This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 16.11.2017 of the Kerala HC by which the HC has allowed Criminal M.C. No.2720 of 2017 filed by the respondent by quashing proceedings in C.C. No.706 of 2016. The Deputy Range Forest Officer aggrieved by judgment of the High Court has come up in this appeal.

The facts of the case briefly are: On 25.07.2016 from the respondent, Titty alias George Kurian a Turtle was seized by Rani Forest Flying Squared by a Range Staff at Karumbanakulam. The offence under Section 2, 9, 39A, 49A and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was registered. A charge-sheet was submitted by the Forest Officer. After seizure of the Turtle, the same was sent for identification to Veterinary Surgeon who by its letter dated 26.07.2016 identified the Turtle on inspection as “Indian Flap Shell”, the scientific name is “Lissemys Punctata”. The Court on 27.07.2016 directed the Turtle to be freed.

The respondent/accused filed an application before the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings. It was submitted before the High Court that Indian Flap Shell Turtle which was seized was not found included in Schedule I of Part II of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, hence, such possession of the Turtle of that species will not invite the offences alleged against the accused. The High Court being satisfied that Turtle seized was not that species of Turtle which is included in Part II of Schedule I of the Act, 1972, allowed the application and quashed the criminal proceedings. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court this appeal has been filed by the Deputy Range Forest Officer.

Learned counsel for the appellant contends that whether Indian Soft-shelled Turtle and Indian Flap Shell Turtle are two different species or part of single species or a subspecies of the latter are matters of expert evidence and ought to have been decided only under trial and the High Court committed error in allowing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the Hon’ble SC in this present appeal overruled the decision made by the HC, with the direction that, “A perusal of the letter given by the Veterinary Surgeon as extracted above indicates that Veterinary Surgeon has identified the Turtle as ‘Indian Flap Shell (Lissemy’s Punctata)’ whereas the Turtle which is included in Part II of Schedule I of the Act, 1972 is “Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata).” Lissemys punctata is a species of which Lissemys punctata is infraspecies. Although Lissemys punctata is included in Part II of Schedule I of the Act, however, the Turtle which has been seized is not that which is included in Part II of Schedule I. In the facts of the present case, on the face of it, the Turtle seized is not included in Schedule I Part II and the Turtle having already been freed on the second day of its seizure, the High Court did not commit any error in quashing the criminal proceedings registered for Wild Life offences.”

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case disposed the appeal stating that, “We do not find good ground to interfere with the order of the High Court by which the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. On the facts of the present case, the appeal is dismissed.”

Click here to add more