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21 Dec

When the parties have settled their dispute privately without any ADR Mechanism, is the plaintiff bound to get the refund of court fees? – Delhi HC

Prime Legal

Blog #courtfee #refund #settlementwithoutarbitration #cpc #courtfeesact

Title: V GUARD INDUSTRIES LTD Versus MS MAHAVIR HOME APPLIANCES

+ CS(COMM) 98/2023, I.A. 3531/2023, I.A. 14582/2023, I.A. 16345/2023 and I.A. 25081/2023

Decided on: 14.12.2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR

Facts:

The parties in this case have amicably resolved their dispute and have filed an application jointly under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), requesting the court to record the terms of settlement.

Laws Involved:

Section 16 & 16A, 161 of Court Fees Act
Section 69A and 89 of CPC

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the court fees paid, based on the provisions of the Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure.

Courts Judgement and Analysis:

The court finds that the dispute between the parties has been settled and therefore, there is no controversy remaining for consideration on merits. The parties shall be bound by the terms of settlement.

Section 161 of the Court Fees Act entitles the plaintiff to a refund of the entire court fee deposited when the dispute is settled under Section 16. Section 16 provides for a refund of the complete court fees in cases settled through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or judicial settlement.

However, Section 16A of the Court Fees Act only allows for a refund of 50% of the court fees paid if the suit is at a pre-evidence stage.

The court notes that the case may fall under either Section 16 or Section 16A, depending on the facts and whether the dispute was settled through mediation.

Section 89 of the CPC provides for a refund of the entire court fee paid when the dispute is settled under this section. The purpose of Section 89 is to facilitate private settlements and reduce the burden on the judicial system.

Section 69A of the 1955 Act also encourages settlements by providing for a refund of court fees. The court emphasizes that a narrow interpretation of Section 89 and Section 69A would lead to unjust outcomes, where parties referred to mediation centers by the court receive a full refund, while parties who privately settle their disputes are deprived of the same benefit.

The court concludes that a purposive interpretation of the provisions is necessary to avoid injustice and uphold the purpose of the provisions.

Conclusion:

The court refers the question of the extent of court fees to be refunded to the Division Bench for adjudication. The case is renotified for further proceedings on 31 January 2024, pending the decision of the Division Bench.

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Written by- Aditi

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21 Dec

If the accused is continuously in custody, even if a production warrant is issued for a future date, the custody is considered to be in continuity, and it is not deemed illegal during the interim period- Delhi HC

Prime Legal

Blog #habeauscorpus #writpetition #illegaldetention #delhihighcourt

Title: Nitin Garg versus UOI

+ W.P.(CRL) 3641/2023, CRL. M.A.33843/2023

Decided on: December 19, 2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT,

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR

Facts:

The petitioners have filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate direction to the respondents. They claim that their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution of India have been violated by the respondents. The petitioners argue that their continued illegal detention is in violation of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (Cr.P.C) and other provisions of Cr.P.C.

Laws Involved:

Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (Cr.P.C)- Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.

Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (Cr.P.C)- Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.

Contentions:

The petitioners argue that their detention is patently illegal as there is no judicial order remanding them to judicial custody as required by Section 167 of Cr.P.C. They seek a direction from the court to produce them and release them from illegal detention.
The petitioners further argue that the ED did not file any application seeking an extension of judicial custody.
They also contend that the learned ASJ-04 did not take cognizance of the prosecution complaint and failed to remand the petitioners to judicial custody under Section 309 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the petitioners’ custody since 07.12.2023 is not backed by a judicial order and is patently illegal.
The respondents argue that the petitioners’ custody is lawful as they are in judicial custody and not in the custody of the ED.
They also argue that the requirement of passing fresh remand orders for remanding an accused does not apply to the Court of Sessions.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners’ fundamental rights have been violated by the respondents?
Whether the petitioners’ continued illegal detention is in violation of Section 167 of Cr.P.C?
Whether the petitioners’ custody is lawful or illegal?
Whether the remand orders issued by the learned ASJ-04 are valid?

Courts Judgement:

The court notes that a writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy for illegal confinement. They observed that , an order of remand by a competent court is essentially a judicial function and cannot be challenged by way of writ of habeas corpus unless and until the remand order lacks jurisdiction or is absolutely illegal resulting in unlawful “custody”. It is true that an order of remand can be challenged in a Habeas Corpus petition if such an order is passed in an absolutely mechanical or casual manner. The court observed that if an accused is not produced in court on a scheduled hearing date and a production warrant is subsequently issued, there is a break in the continuity of the accused’s custody. During this break period, the custody may be considered illegal. However, if the accused is continuously in custody, even if a production warrant is issued for a future date, the custody is considered to be in continuity, and it is not deemed illegal during the interim period.

Conclusion:
The court dismisses the writ petitions and any pending applications.

Written by- Aditi

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20 Dec

The Madras High Court determined that Kerala SRTC was not entitled to rectification of the trademark register, leading to the dismissal of the petitions.

Prime Legal

Case Title: Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) v Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation

Case No: (T)O P(TM)/176, 177 & 178/2023 (ORA/166,167& 168/2015/TM/CHN)

Decided on: 12^th December, 2023

CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY

Facts of the Case

In order to correct the Register of Trademarks, the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) filed a judicial case. The word mark “KSRTC,” which had been registered in Classes 16 and 37, was the main source of dispute. KSRTC was first established in 1937 as the Travancore governmental Transport Department and changed its name to Kerala State Road Transport Corporation in 1965 as a result of a governmental policy decision. KSRTC emphasized that it has been using the acronym “KSRTC” as a trademark for a long time and that it has registered the trademark in Classes 37 and 39 as of March 27, 2015. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (Karnataka SRTC) obtained registration for the KSRTC mark in classes 12, 16, and 37, claiming usage dating back to 1973.

This led to a dispute, which KSRTC found. KSRTC filed a lawsuit in retaliation, claiming superior rights as the trademark’s original user. One claim made by KSRTC was that Karnataka SRTC’s acquiescence plea was untenable. KSRTC argued that registration of the mark should be used as the starting point for calculating the five-year statute of limitations during which a party may be considered to have consented to the use of a trademark, rather than the date of actual use. Additionally, Karnataka SRTC stressed that the mark’s use is restricted geographically. KSRTC contended that the use of the mark by Karnataka SRTC should be limited to goods and services inside the state of Karnataka, citing Section 12 of the Trademarks Act.

Legal Provisions

The case is governed by the legal provisions outlined in Section 57, 34, 33, 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Issues

Has the petitioner acquiesced in the use of the marks by the first respondent, considering the statutory period of 5 years for acquiescence under Section 33 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and if so, does such acquiescence affect the petitioner’s challenge to the use of the marks?

Courts analysis and decision

Section 33 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 served as the foundation for the court’s ruling. The court observed that Karnataka SRTC was permitted to use the “KSRTC” mark, and Kerala SRTC had consented to this usage under Section 33. The court emphasized again that Karnataka SRTC had no right to object to Kerala SRTC’s use of the previous mark, citing Sub Section (2) of Section 33. As a result, the court ordered that the two public sector enterprises carry on with their own operations and live in harmony. Kerala SRTC argued that the five-year statute of limitations under Section 33 should begin on the day of registration. The court disagreed, stating that this interpretation went against the clear meaning of the clause.

Rather, the court examined the case’s facts, noting that Kerala SRTC had not disputed knowledge of the mark’s use, and Karnataka SRTC had claimed to have been using it since 1974. Taking these factors into account, the court invoked Section 33 and came to the conclusion that neither Kerala SRTC nor Karnataka SRTC could annul the registration of Karnataka or object to the use of an earlier mark. The Karnataka SRTC was acknowledged by the court as having a right to receive the advantages of Section 12 of the Act. This clause gives the Registrar the authority to allow several owners of similar goods or services to register identical or similar trademarks.

Written by- Rupika Goundla

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20 Dec

The Madras High Court accepted that anyone breaking the terms of the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules 2016 should be contained under the category of “Goondas” under the Act.

Prime Legal

blog, Blog

Case Title: State v RS Rajesh

Case No: Crl.R.C(MD)No.957 of 2023

Decided on: 15^th November, 2023

CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.K. RAMAKRISHNAN

Facts of the Case

On May 27, 2023, the respondents committed the heinous act of carrying biomedical trash from Kerala to Kuruvankottai village via the Alangulam-Tirunelveli route, in flagrant violation of environmental and public health laws. This action was in clear violation of both Rule 4 of the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 and Rule 8 of the Plastic Waste Management Rules, 2016. The local Health Inspector, who functioned as the de facto complainant, questioned the respondents about this flagrant disobedience to regulations. The respondents not only failed to offer a plausible explanation, but they also engaged in criminal intimidation, impeding the Health Inspector’s ability to carry out his official duties.

The result was the filing of a thorough legal case against the respondents, which included accusations under several statutes, such as Section 294(b) for obscenity, Section 353 for assault or use of unlawful force, Section 506(ii) for criminal intimidation, Section 269 for carelessness that resulted in the spread of infection, and Section 270 for a malicious act.

Furthermore, allegations were made in accordance with Rule 8 of the Plastic Waste Management Rules, 2016 and Rule 4 of the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules, 2016. The State stressed that it is expressly forbidden to transport biomedical waste more than 75 km away from the hospital. Subsequently contempt petition had been filed. A division bench had ordered the government to impose a total restriction on the transfer of biomedical waste from Kerala to Tamil Nadu in response to the contempt suit. The respondents were accused of purposefully breaking court orders and extant regulations by deliberately disposing of large amounts of biomedical waste in defiance of these clear legal mandates. The State made a strong case that the trial judge erred in law when she decided to give the respondents interim custody.

Legal Provisions

The charges pertain to the breach of legal provisions outlined in Section 294(b) (Obscenity) and Section 353 (Assault or criminal force) and Section 506(ii) (Criminal intimidation) and Section 269 (Negligence by spreading infection) and Section 270 (Malignant act), Rule 4 of the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 and Rule 8 of the Plastic Waste Management Rules, 2016

Issues

Can individuals found in violation of the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules, specifically those engaged in the unauthorized dumping of medical waste, be categorized within the definition of ‘Goonda’ as per Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982?

Courts analysis and decision

The court took a strong stance on the issue in its observations, stating that the respondents had willfully violated regulations that forbade the transportation of biomedical waste more than 75 kilometres, endangering both the environment and the general population. The court condemned the discharge of vehicles implicated in such malpractices and stressed the need to deal sternly with such actions in light of such infractions. The court expressed dissatisfaction of the trial judge’s decision to release the vehicles and argued that the respondents had broken both an injunction order issued by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Court and the Bio-medical Waste Rules, 2016.

The court praised the government’s proactive efforts and asked the state to take the necessary actions to propose the necessary revisions to the Act. The court considered it appropriate to set aside the assailed decree of interim custody. In addition, the court suggested that the state move quickly to modify the Detention Act in order to bring it into compliance with the requirement to stop illicit acts pertaining to the unapproved disposal of biomedical waste.

Written by- Rupika Goundla

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20 Dec

Appellant cannot claim lack of evidence in a murder trial when there are multiple witnesses proving otherwise : Bombay HC

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Uncategorized #bonbayhc, #IPC, #law, #murder, #SEction302

TITLE : Santosh Gunaji Dudhmal v State of Maharashtra

CORAM : Hon’ble Justice Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi and Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Waghwase

DATE : 19^th December, 2023

CITATION : Criminal Appeal No 152 of 2019

FACTS

An appeal was filed against the Additional Sessions Judge for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 in default of set rigorous imprisonment of one month. The accused was alleged of murder on the instance because of a dispute that arose between the deceased and him. It was contended by the appellant that there is no convincing evidence and motive was not sufficient.

LAWS INVOLVED

Section 302 of IPC states that :

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine.

ISSUES

Whether the Additional Sessions judge passed an order for conviction of murder through lack of evidence?

JUDGEMENT

The autopsy surgeon was considered to be the best witness and evidence. The doctor noted that the injuries occurred are not sufficient in ordinary course of nature to occur. It was also observed that the informant had contradicting statements as a witness. Further it was noted that the wife of the deceased herself was not cooperating with the narrative of the prosecution. However, the court held that reason for her hostility to be that of the shock of losing her husband. One of the independent witnesses were also in the vicinity of the location when the murder occurred.

In lieu all of the statements passed by the witnesses, the court dismissed the appeal claiming that there was sufficient evidence to prove the appellant has actually committed the act of murder.

Written by- Sanjana Ravichandran

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