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6 Jul

Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed against the judgement passed by the single judge bench upholding the candidature of respondents

Uncategorized #chessferderation, #election, #HighCourt, #highcourtdelhi, #primelegal, #societies, #writ, #writpetition, Blog, Prime Legal

Title: MR KISHOR BANDEKAR AND ORS vs MR MAHESH CANDOLKAR AND ORS

Reserved on: 03rd July, 2023

Pronounced on: 06th July, 2023

+ LPA 504/2023 & CAV 312/2023, CM APPLs. 32400-32403/2023, 32711/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

Introduction

Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed against the judgement dated 02nd June, 2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 15097/2021, upholding the order dated 14th December, 2021 passed by Appellate Authority of All-India Chess Federation, New Delhi [“AICF”].

Facts of the Case

The Goa Chess Association [“GCA”] is a state-level sports organisation that is affiliated with both the AICF and the Sports Authority of Goa. It was established in accordance with the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The GCA’s Memorandum of Association (hence, “MoA”) and Rules and Regulations, all of which have been endorsed by the association’s General Body, serve as the framework for its governance.

A crucial adjustment to the GCA’s constitution was made by the General Body at its meeting on January 8th, 2017, raising the number of elected members of the Executive Committee from seven to twelve.

The GCA announced the elections for the Executive Committee on July 22, 2021. The list of accepted nomination forms was made public on August 5, 2021, and on August 10, 2021, the Presiding Officer (the “PO”) announced the names of the candidates elected to the North and South Goa Taluka Associations. The nomination forms of Respondents Nos. 1 through 4 were also ruled to be invalid, and a number of candidates from the talukas of Barder, Tiswadi, Ponda, and Salcete were found to have won their elections without opposition.

Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contested the aforementioned PO disqualification of candidature before the AICF Ethics Commission in line with the AICF Code of Ethics. The Commission reversed PO’s decision through an order that was signed on October 19, 2021, and instructed that the voting procedure be completed within two weeks of the day that the order was received. The Appellants filed an appeal against this ruling with the AICF Appellate Authority, but it was denied on December 14 of that year, and the Ethics Commission’s judgement was upheld.

2.5. Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, the appellants filed W.P.(C) 15097/2021 after being dissatisfied with the Appellate Authority’s ruling.

However, on June 2, 2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal and upheld Appellate Authority’s decision.

Analysis & Decision of the court

The Delhi high court held that The General Body meeting on January 8, 2017, when it was decided to expand the number of elected members of the GCA’s Executive Committee, is where the dispute’s origins may be found. This choice was made in order to permit additional committee members who might aid in the growth of chess in Goa and broaden the association’s operations. The MoA and GCA Rules and Regulations modifications were authorised by the resolution that came out of this meeting. Twelve elected members and one nominated member from each associated Taluka Chess Association will make up the Executive Committee of the GCA, according to the updated bye-laws and MoA.

The challenged ruling exhibits a careful consideration of the provisions of the MoA and Rules and Regulations of GCA. The prerequisites for a candidate, the election process, the tenure of the Committee members, and the mechanism for filling any vacancies on the Executive Committee are all outlined in Rule 42(i)(a) (extracted above). Additionally, it describes the election process, including the criteria for nominations, the review of nominations, and the roles of the President, Secretary, and designated Presiding Officer. Contrary to what Mr. Nayyar has emphasised, this clause does not support his allegation. The aim to expand the number of delegates is mentioned in the minutes of the meeting, but it is not stated expressly that these representatives should be equally divided across all talukas. That would imply that it is possible for a taluka to have more than one representative on the Executive Committee.

This viewpoint is reinforced by the modified Clause 13 of the Memorandum of Agreement, which stipulates that one delegate from each associated taluka should be a member of the Executive Committee, however it leaves open the possibility of electing an unlimited number of office holders from each taluka. The number of office bearers who can be chosen from a particular taluka is not limited under Rule 42(i)(a) of the GCA’s Rules and Regulations. The language employed in Rule 42(ii)(a), which requires that candidates for the Executive Committee elections be delegates with voting rights of and sponsored by Taluka Associations, supports the learned Single Judge’s view. According to this regulation, eligibility is dependent on being a delegate and instead of the number of representatives per taluka, voting rights.

Rule 42(i)(a), which is instrumental in the formation of Executive Committee comprising of both elected and nominated representatives, does not impose any limitations as canvassed by the Appellants. There is no requirement to guarantee that each taluka is represented on the Executive Committee under Rule 42(i)(a). This interpretation conforms to the erudite Single Judge’s opinion, which we also agree with.

We see no justification for interfering with the challenged finding relating to the PO’s judgement since we do not think the Appellants’ objection to the interpretation of such regulations has any validity. Therefore, the learned Single Judge’s opinion is still unchallengeable with regard to this matter as well. In conclusion, the erudite Single Judge’s interpretation based on the explicit wording employed in the GCA’s Rules and Regulations as well as the General Body resolution, appears to be accurate. Instead than restricting the number of office bearers per taluka, it appears that the stated requirements’ main goal is to increase representation and guarantee that each taluka has at least one delegate on the Executive Committee.

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Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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13 Jun

BOMBAY HIGH COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 379 OF THE INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT: EXAMINING THE MAINTAINABILITY OF APPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESSION CERTIFICATES

Prime Legal

Uncategorized #BOMBAY HIGH COURT, #hindusucessionact, #primelegal

INTRODUCTION:

The High Court of Bombay-Nagpur Bench passed a judgement on 12 June 2023. In the case of PRAKASHCHANDRA DEOKARANJI BHOOT AND OTHERS Vs MANOHARLAL DEOKARANJI BHOOT AND ANOTHER IN WRIT PETITION NO. 8387 OF 2018 which was passed by a single bench comprising of HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE VALMIKI SA MENEZES the judgment in question focuses on the interpretation of Section 379 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The case revolves around the maintainability of an application for a Succession Certificate when the requisite fee, as per Section 379(1) of the Act, has not been paid at the time of application. This blog aims to analyse the judgment, explore the arguments presented by both sides, and shed light on the relevant laws governing the issuance of Succession Certificates in India.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Manoharlal Deokaranji Bhoot, filed an application seeking a Succession Certificate for the estate of his deceased mother. However, the respondents opposed the application, arguing that it was not maintainable due to non-payment of court fees under Section 379(1) of the Act. The trial court dismissed this objection, stating that the payment of court fees did not affect the maintainability of the application or the court’s jurisdiction.

RELEVANT LAWS:

Indian Succession Act, 1925: The primary legislation governing matters related to succession and inheritance in India.
Section 372: Outlines the procedure for filing an application for a Succession Certificate, including the necessary particulars to be provided.
Section 379: Addresses the mode of collecting court fees on certificates and requires a deposit equal to the fee payable under the Court Fees Act.

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 379(1):

Section 379(1) of the Indian Succession Act states that every application for a Succession Certificate should be accompanied by a deposit equal to the fee payable under the Court Fees Act, 1870, or its regional counterparts. However, the section does not specify the consequences of non-deposit of the required sum at the time of application.

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED:

The petitioner’s counsel contended that the provision of Section 379(1) necessitated the deposit of court fees along with the application. They emphasized that the use of the phrase “accompanied by” indicated that the application should not be entertained without the requisite fees.

On the other hand, the respondents’ counsel argued that Section 379(1) did not mandate the immediate payment of court fees. They contended that the deposit could be made at the time of determining the share of each party when the court issued the final Succession Certificate. They relied on previous judgments to support their interpretation.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT:

The court examined the provisions of Section 372 and Section 379 of the Indian Succession Act. Section 372 outlines the procedure for filing an application for a Succession Certificate, while Section 379 addresses the mode of collecting court fees on certificates.

The court observed that Section 372 did not explicitly require the presentation of court fees along with the application. It further noted that Section 379(1) called for a deposit of a sum equal to the fee payable under the Court Fees Act, which would be utilized for purchasing stamps when issuing the Succession Certificate. The court concluded that the sum to be deposited was not actual court fees under the Court Fees Act but an amount that could be refunded or expended at the time of final orders.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that neither Section 372 nor Section 379 deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the application if the sum referred to in Section 379(1) had not been deposited. However, the court clarified that the Succession Certificate would not be issued to a successor unless the requisite court fees were paid on the allotted share.

CONCLUSION:

The recent judgment provides important insights into the interpretation of Section 379(1) of the Indian Succession Act. It clarifies that the deposit of court fees is not a mandatory requirement for the maintainability of an application for a Succession Certificate. However, it emphasizes the importance of paying the requisite fees before the issuance of the final Succession Certificate.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY VETHIKA D PORWAL, BMS COLLEGE OF LAW

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6 Jun

There is no absolute bar to take cognizance on an anonymous complaint: Gujarat High Court upholds the inquiry initiated against the petitioner

Prime Legal

Blog, Uncategorized #complaint, #Gujarathighcourt

Dipakkumar Dineshbhai Luhar vs State Of Gujarat on 12 April, 2023

Bench: Mauna M. Bhatt

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2164 of 2023

The present petition is filed challenging the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the charge-sheet which culminated into a Departmental Case

Facts

In the instant case, the petitioner pursuant to the advertisement issued by the State applied for the post of Class-II (Accounts Officer and after selection was appointed in the year 2011. Thereafter, he was promoted and transferred to various places and lastly posted at Gandhinagar as an accounts Officer in the office of Commissioner Rural Development. However, pursuant to an anonymous complaint regarding sexual harassment, a preliminary inquiry came to be initiated against him and upon allegations being held proved, a show cause notice was issued by respondent No.2 calling for response of the petitioner. The petitioner responded to the said show cause notice. Thereafter, a charge-sheet was issued by respondent No.1, aggrieved by which the petitioner filed the present petition.

The petitioner addressed a letter requesting to be provided with a copy of the anonymous complaint as well as certain other documents through which the departmental inquiry was initiated against him. However, it was expressly denied. Raising this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the chargesheet was bad in law. Moreover, no action can be initiated based on an anonymous complaint of which rule the department has gone against. Moreover, for an inquiry to sustain under the Prevention of sexual harassment at workplace(POSH) act, the complaint is to be made in writing. However, in the present case, there was nothing that was written down.

The pleader for the state on the other hand held that in the case of complaint of sexual harassment, the disciplinary authority is free to cause an inquiry in to the matter. In this case, in the preliminary inquiry held, the allegations prima facie was held to be true and therefore, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. Moreover, there is nothing specifically mentioned in the POSH Act that prohibits initiation of departmental proceedings

Judgement

The Gujarat High Court held that despite of a general practice where it is not necessary to take due cognizance and action on an anonymous complaint, there is no absolute bar. In the present case, facts on record suggests that the complaint/representation was made not by any anonymous person but by the employees of Pension Payment Office, Vadodara, where the petitioner was working and during preliminary inquiry, the statement of all the female employees were recorded. The statement of female employees was provided to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet. These facts show that the chargesheet is initiated in accordance with the law and hence, the Court dismissed the petition.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY AMIT ARAVIND

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2 Jun

Muslims may adopt a kid who has been given up, but they must follow the JJ (Care and Protection of Children) Act’s guidelines: Orissa High Court.

Prime Legal

Uncategorized

The Orissa high court’s division bench of S. Talapatra* and Savitri Ratho, JJ has adjudicated while exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, the objections relating to territorial jurisdiction cannot have serious impact in Nesar Ahmed Khan v. State of Orissa (2001 CriLJ 3279)

Facts of the Case

In the current case, the petitioner’s sister, as well as her daughter and son-in-law (Opposite Parties), have been imprisoning and holding against her will the petitioner’s underage daughter, who is around 12 years old. Despite many requests, the father of the youngster was unable to see his daughter. He had reported the incident to the relevant police station as well as to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC), but the authorities made no follow-up moves. The petitioner had gone to the police station on September 12, 2015, to request the release of his little daughter from unlawful detention. The Police didn’t do anything, though. The Police were instructed to open a case and begin an inquiry after the petitioner later filed a complaint with the Rourkela Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate’s Court. On March 25, 2016, the petitioner also wrote a letter of appeal to the Sundargarh Child Welfare Committee’s chairperson. The Investigating Officer further said that the child was imprisoned against his will in Phulwari Sharif in Patna. On August 22, 2016, a search warrant was granted, however the door was locked when the investigating officer went to the location.

Judgment

According to the Court, the parties have agreed that there is no practice in Mohammedan Law that is comparable to adoption as it is recognized by Roman and Hindu law. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (the “JJ ACT”), upon which the Opposing Parties had relied, was declared by the Court to be a secular provision. According to the JJ Act, the major goal of adoption, the Court further stated, is the rehabilitation of orphaned, abandoned, or relinquished children. The court further stated that a particular time limit had been set down in the JJ Act for the parents of the children who had been turned over to the authorities to rethink handing back custody. The Court reviewed Article 226(2) of the Indian Constitution and stated that any High Court with jurisdiction over the territories where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises may exercise the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders, or writs to any Government, authority, or person, even if the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. farther, the Court stated that if the cause of action is completely or partially based on the use of such power, this extends the Court’s authority even farther than its geographical jurisdiction. The Court noted that the care of the minor child was subject to being characterized as illegal detention in the absence of adoption. The Court ruled that even a familial link, as had been contended, was insufficient to deny the parents custody of their child, and that the detention of the kid was being attempted to be justified under the guise of an adoption that neither existed in reality nor was permitted by law. The opposing parties are one of the crucial considerations that the court needs to take into account, and the court was aware that emotional bonds had formed as a result of the little daughter’s prolonged stay. The court also mentioned how well-cared for the kid was by the opposing parties.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY HARSHEEN KAUR LUTHRA, RGNUL, PUNJAB

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1 Jun

Seeking Justice: A Retired Professor’s Struggle for Pension Arrears

Prime Legal

Uncategorized

Ishwarappa Mahalingappa Kolhar vs Director Of Technical Education

29 May, 2023

Bench: S.Vishwajith Shettypresided Bysvsj

Introduction:

In a recent case that came before the Indian courts, a retired professor, who had dedicated his life to teaching, sought justice for the delayed settlement of his pension arrears. The professor approached the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, invoking the powers of the judiciary to secure his rightful entitlements. After a long legal battle, the court issued a directive to the concerned authorities to consider the professor’s representation expeditiously. This blog delves into the professor’s struggle, the court’s ruling, and the significance of justice in pension matters.

The Professor’s Plight:

The petitioner, a retired professor, had served as an Assistant Lecturer in a renowned college since 1967. However, despite a government order issued in 1983 regarding the pay fixation of teaching staff, the petitioner’s case was not addressed. Frustrated by the lack of action, the professor filed a writ petition in 2003 seeking the implementation of the 1983 resolution and the designation of his post as a lecturer. Fortunately, in 2010, the court ruled in his favor, acknowledging his entitlement to all benefits, including monetary compensation according to the AICTE Scale.

The Delayed Pension Arrears:

Following the court’s judgment, the concerned college authorities submitted a report on the petitioner’s pay fixation, which was subsequently approved by the relevant government authority in 2012. However, the arrears owed to the petitioner, who had retired in 2000, were not disbursed until June 2013. The petitioner’s counsel argued that such a significant delay warranted the application of interest on the outstanding amount. To support their claim, a representation was made in 2012, invoking applicable circulars, but remained unconsidered.

Court’s Observations and Decision:

During the proceedings, the respondents did not dispute the petitioner’s claim that his representation for interest on delayed pension arrears had remained unaddressed. After considering the facts and circumstances, the court refrained from granting immediate relief in the form of direct payment of arrears. However, it emphasized the need for the competent authorities to expedite the consideration of the petitioner’s representation.

The court recognized the petitioner’s long wait for settlement of his dues, extending over ten years, and deemed it necessary to issue a directive for the expeditious consideration of the representation. The court directed the second respondent, the competent authority, to take up the matter within three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the court’s order.

The Pursuit of Justice:

The court’s ruling is a significant step toward ensuring justice for retired employees who face delays in receiving their entitled pension arrears. The case highlights the importance of timely disbursement of pension benefits, as these funds are essential for retired individuals to sustain themselves and maintain their quality of life.

While the court recognized the petitioner’s plight and provided a directive for speedy resolution, the struggle for pension justice continues for many retired individuals across the country. It underscores the need for efficient administrative mechanisms to handle pension matters promptly and to address grievances in a timely manner.

Conclusion:

The retired professor’s fight for justice in securing his pension arrears serves as a reminder of the challenges faced by many retirees in obtaining their entitled benefits. The court’s decision to expedite the consideration of the petitioner’s representation signifies a small victory in the pursuit of justice. However, it is imperative for the concerned authorities to address such issues promptly, ensuring the timely and rightful disbursement of pension arrears. Only then can retired individuals enjoy the peace of mind and financial stability they deserve after a lifetime of service.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY SHREEYA S SHEKAR

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