The mere non-mentioning of the probation period in the appointment letter of teachers cannot be a valid ground to deny them the benefits which they are otherwise entitled to. The aforesaid rule has been applied by the Chhattisgarh High Court while adjudicating the case of Smt. Indira Choubey v. State of Chhattisgarh [WPS No. 982 of 2013] which was decided upon by a single judge bench comprising Justice Sanjay K. Agarwal on 22nd July 2021.
The facts of the case are as follows. The petitioner sin the instant case are aggrieved by order by which regular pay scale granted to them with effect from the date of their initial appointment has been withdrawn. It was submitted by the counsel for petitioners that the omission of the probation period is only a clerical mistake and the petitioners could not be made to suffer for that. On the contrary, the counsel for respondent contended that the grant of regular pay scale to the petitioners has rightly been withdrawn by the Municipal Corporation.
The court perused the facts and arguments presented. It was of the opinion that “Municipal Corporation omitted to consider Circular dated 21/06/2007 in which it has clearly been held that teachers appointed between 1982-83 to 1994-95 are entitled for arrears of regular pay-scale from the date of their appointment. This act has neither been considered in the show cause notice nor it has been mentioned in the impugned order. Furthermore, the impugned order simply states that the period of probation has not been mentioned in the appointment order of the petitioners, but no such finding has been recorded by the Municipal Corporation that probation period of two years has not been completed by the petitioners. The petitioners have been working for about 20-25 probation years and merely non-mentioning of period in their appointment cannot deprive them of the benefits which they are otherwise entitled to. Thus, in light of the aforesaid fact that Circular dated 04/05/2011 has not been considered by the Municipal Corporation and since the finding recorded by the Municipal Corporation that probation period has mentioned in the appointment orders not of been the petitioners requires fresh consideration, in that view of the matter, the impugned order (Annexure P/1) is hereby quashed. Matter is remitted to the Municipal Corporation to consider the case of the petitioners afresh in accordance with law after noticing and hearing the petitioners and decide it by passing a reasoned and speaking order within 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Petitioners are at liberty to make additional submission in support of within three weeks from today.”